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Abstract 
New industries are recognized as new impetus to national wealth. At the same 
time, they are increasingly becoming geographically concentrated in some well defined 
areas. But current studies on the emergence of industrial clusters tend to analyze 
favorable driving factors. This dissertation takes the example of a Chinese endogenous 
industrial cluster, the traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) cluster at Tonghua, a small 
peripheral city in Northeastern China, to contribute to the theoretical understanding of 
the emergence of industrial cluster as a co-evolutionary process of organizations, 
institutions and firms, or, to put it more broadly, as economic evolution embedded in 
complex socio-economic contexts. 
The recent advance in evolutionary and co-evolutionary economics which 
considers the economy and economic landscape as dynamic process instead of 
equilibrium can be regarded as a part of broader and more intellectual turn of quest for 
history in social sciences. Although the principle of “history matters” is widely 
acknowledged, it tends to be reduced to a quite simple concept of “path dependence”. 
However, path dependence cannot offer space for new path creation, except from an 
external shock. Accordingly, the role of human conscious action or Schumpeterian 
innovation should be added to path analysis through the concept of path creation. 
Furthermore，and more importantly, history should be understood as context, and 
historical context can be explored through the understanding of multi-paths and 
interaction among them over time. So path inter-dependence (co-evolution between 
paths) would be useful to better understand the complexity of real history. Since the 
industrial cluster is composed of interconnected firms and is also subject to changes in 
institution and technology, I will focus on the multi-way causal relationship between 
firm, institution and technology. The theorizing is not entirely new, but most of the 
theoretical and empirical discussions are at the national or industrial level, not regional 
or local one. A competitive cluster can be regarded as a co-evolutionary hotspot in 
which multiple populations actively interact and are interconnected. Co-evolution itself 
is a dynamic and evolutionary process. So I will adopt a dynamic and evolutionary view 
to examine co-evolutionary degree or co-evolutionary effects in the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical cluster through time.  
After a brief introduction which deals with the national institutional changes that 
are highly associated with new venture creation, entrepreneurship, and innovation, with 
registrations on drug and healthcare system, and with changes in market demand of 
China’s pharmaceutical industry and geographical distribution, I will collect evidences  
  X
from three aspects based upon field survey and second hand data, i.e., the history of the 
enterprises, the origin of entrepreneurship, and the knowledge of evolution, linking their 
respective generative relationships through the genealogical method. In this volume, the 
evolution of the Tonghua pharmaceutical firm organization, the formation of local 
entrepreneurship, historical accumulation of knowledge, and particular knowledge of 
transfer among generations of firms will be discussed, then I will probe into co-adaption 
and co-evolution between local formal and informal institutions and organizations in 
Tonghua’s TCM industry. In addition, I will try to understand the co-evolutionary 
process at different geographical levels (namely, national and local). 
In summary, my main findings include the following several points. Firstly, in 
the course of the emergence of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry, local social 
networks and the traditional alliance between enterprises and government have played 
important roles. Secondly, the most important factor that influences the evolution of 
endogenous industrial clusters such as the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry in 
transitional countries is not the change in technology, but the change in fundamental 
national institutions. Thirdly, the success of the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry can be 
ascribed to the creation of multiple paths largely based on initial conditions, which 
implies that economic policy should have historical consciousness, namely, new 
economic innovation should make full use of both historical legacies and existing 
assets. Finally, it is co-adaption and co-selection of firm organization, institution, and 
technology that have jointly made Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry become highly 
competitive, which means that whether one region can grasp new opportunities partially 
depends on its capabilities to coordinate a varity of development agents.  
 
Key words: industrial cluster, institution and technology, China, transitional society   
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Background 
1.1.1 Industrial Clusters and China’s Economic Growth  
Industry Cluster in a World Perspective 
Over the last two decades, no concept has been more intensely scrutinized than the 
industrial cluster by academics and policy makers across the world. Since the 1980s, 
industrial clusters have been conceived as drivers of innovation and carriers of 
economic, even social development. The recent popularity of the industrial cluster 
approach in international academic community and amongst policy makers partly 
results from the clear recognizing of the importance of  small and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs) in economic growth in the global context. At the same time, it is 
connected to a long theoretical debate of “whether or not geography matters” (e.g. 
Krugman, 1991a; Feldman, 1994; Martin and Sunley, 1996; Morgan, 2001). Although 
globalization and telecommunications revolution have made communication across 
regions easier and more economical, knowledge is generated and transmitted more 
efficiently via local proximity, and information sharing is more convenient, economic 
activity based on new knowledge has a high propensity to cluster within a geographic 
region. Hence, the research issue of geographical concentration of industries has again 
received mounting attention from a variety of fields, when the new knowledge-based 
society is considered.  
Although it has been already recognized by theoretical and empirical studies that 
industrial clustering becomes potentially mortal (see, for example, Schamp, 2005; 
Grabher, 1993), it is evident that industrial clustering is a regional development strategy 
which can potentially promote innovation and economic competitiveness (Martin and 
Sunley, 2003). This has been wildly proved by a great number of successful stories of 
industrial clusters in the developed world, such as the Third Italy (e.g. Piore and Sabel, 
1984, Garofoli, 1992; Goodman and Bamford, 1989; Pyke, Becattini and Sengenberger, 
1990; Pyke and Sengenberger, 1992), Silicon Valley (Saxenian, 1994, Cohen and Fields 
1999) and Hollywood (Scott, 1998) in the USA, and Fukuoka (Kuchiki and Tsuji, 2005) 
in Japan, and even in developing countries, including software industry in Bangalore 
(Parthasarathy, 2004), the Jepara furniture cluster in Indonesia (Loebis and Schmitz, 
2005), new-tech industries in Beijing (Wang and Wang, 1998), agro- industry and  
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salmon aquaculture industry clusters in Chile (Perez-Aleman, 2005). International 
organizations, such as the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 
(UNIDO, 2001), OECD (2001, 2007) and the World Bank (2000), national 
governments, such as in US, the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands, 
New Zealand, former Eastern European socialist countries such as Czech Republic, 
oriental countries, including Japan, Korea, PRC, and even African countries like Kenya 
and Ghana
1, and regional development agencies like, to name but a few, the Northwest 
Regional Development Agency in the UK, Bio-Gen-Tec-NRW in the BioRegio 
Rheinland in Germany and Western Development Office in China, as well as 
uncountable local governments, were all involved in industrial cluster projects.   
The Geographical Myth of China’s Blooming Economy  
An impressive Chinese phenomenon of an above 8% annual growth rate after the 
economic reform and opening-up (for an international comparison of world economic 
growth rates from 1960 to 2005, see Table 1.1) has recently received much attention. 
Some scholars owe recent steady and constant economic growth after 1978 mainly to 
the low-cost advantage, and abundant labour resources. But this explanation is not 
sufficient to illuminate the Chinese economic success. Firstly, low labour costs 
themselves are not necessarily transformed to real competitive advantage of low 
product prices. In fact there are many countries which possess lower labour cost and 
can’t offer lower prices than China for the same product in the global market. Secondly, 
high technology-based production occupies an important position in the Chinese 
economy, which reflects that technology is also an important driving force in China, at 
least in some knowledge-intensive industries like information and biotechnology 
sectors. Thirdly, there are a lot of other factors that contribute to economic growth in 
China, including the presence of a multiplicity of companies (Arvanitis, et al., 2003), 
particularly the resurgence of privately managed enterprises and entrepreneurship, new 
emerging high technology industries, and a shift towards a foreign capital-oriented 
economy which is export-driven and relies heavily on foreign direct investment (FDI)
2. 
However, I do not, by any means, deny the existing arguments which attribute China's 
                                                        
1 For an overview of clusters with high competitiveness, most of which in developed countries, see OECD (2007); 
For a review of industrial clusters in developing countries, see (Nadvi and Schmitz, 1994) clusters in Africa, see 
Oyelaran-Oyeyinka and Lal (2006). 
2 China's foreign direct investment in actual use reached 63.021 billion US dollars in 2006 and was ranked the fourth 
largest country in the World (but the first one in the developing countries), after  the United States (177.3 billion US 
dollars), the United Kingdom (169.8 billion US dollars) and France (88.4 billion US dollars).  In 1994, China's direct 
foreign capital in actual use shared as high as 13.45 percent of the global transnational investment. After 2000, that 
percentage started to decline, but, in general, kept the increase of above 5percent per year.  
  3
economic achievements mainly to the labour cost advantage, but I would highlight that 
economic growth has a territorial texture (Rullani, 2002). Namely, the growth in human 
material wealth is not geographically even, there is a very evident trend that economic 
development is localized and organized in territorial clusters.  
Table 1.1 International comparison of world economic growth rate from 1960 to 2005 
Unit: % 
  1960-1970    1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2005 
China   2.9  3.7  8.8  9.3  8.3 
India   1.1  2.3  3.6  4.2  5.3 
South Korea   6.0  8.4  7.7  4.7  3.9 
Brazil   2.6  6.5  0.7  1.3  1.0 
USSR/Russia   4.0  4.7  1.3  -4.7  6.6 
Low-income economies 
(excluding China & India)  
2.0 1.8 2.2 1.2 4.2 
Middle-income economies   3.5  2.1  1.2  2.2  3.9 
Low- & middle-income 
economies  
   1.3  1.8  3.7 
East Asia and Pacific       5.9  5.7  6.9 
Europe and Central Asia       1.2  -1.7  5.2 
Latin America & Caribbean       -0.3  1.7  0.9 
Middle East & North Africa       -1.1  0.7  2.2 
South Asia       3.4  3.7  4.8 
Sub Saharan Africa       -1.3  -0.1  2.0 
High-income economies       2.7  2.2  1.5 
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report and World Development Indicators, various years.  
Note: Figures are average annual real growth rate of per capita GDP (%). 
In the process of national wealth growth, industrial clustering plays a significant 
role in regional development and contributes to the national competitiveness in both 
developed and developing countries, without exception of China. In today’s China, a 
variety of products, from information and communication products, home appliances, to 
clothing and family day-to-day supplies, are manufactured assumedly in places with 
such clusters, proliferating not only in the coastal provinces, but also in inland 
provinces. It is reported that there are more than 160 specialized industry towns
3 in 
Guangdong province (the richest province with the highest total GDP among all 
                                                        
3 ‘Specialized Industrial Town’ is a nickname of an industrial cluster used by local scholars and policymakers in 
Guangdong province, China. Each of these towns is specialized in making a particular industrial product. Most of the 
towns are so successful that they earn a reputation as a leading manufacturer in their own pillar industries. “One 
Industry in One Town” has become a unique economic feature in Guangdong province.  
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provinces, its nominal GDP increased to US$265 billion in 2005, about the same size as 
Denmark) creating approximately one third of the total industrial output value of 
Guangdong (Wang, 2004).
 In some industrial towns specialized on IT and electronics in 
the Pearl River Delta Region, one can purchase 90% of the computer components, 80% 
of the mobile components, and nearly 100% of the color TV components procurement 
in one day within the scope of 100 km (Liu, 2003). According to the survey by Zhejiang 
Provincial Economic and Trade Commission in 2003, about RMB 1 trillion Yuan, a 
half of the province's total industrial output value, was produced in 149 industrial 
clusters in Zhejiang province, which have crossed the marketing income level of 1 
billion RMB Yuan (Dong, 2005). In Jiangsu province, there were about 110 industrial 
clusters in 2002, which created sales income of RMB 532 billion Yuan, equivalent to 
nearly 40% of the province's total sales of industrial enterprises above designated size 
(the enterprises with an annual income over 5 million Yuan
4, Gu and Wang, 2003). 
These evidences strongly support the argument that industrial clusters in China have 
become a comfortable home to SMEs and important manufacturing base and export 
base, and a powerful “engine” for the rapid development of industrial areas, and an 
effective instrument for building regional economic capacity to compete in the global 
increasingly cut-throat markets, despite of the current lack of a unified statistical 
standards for measuring the economic contribution of industrial clusters to the national 
economy of China. At the same time, just like in other countries, the industrial cluster is 
considered as a potentially successful way of organizing industrial activities in China 
and has been zealously adopted by all levels of Chinese governments (Wang, 2007). 
The Importance of Endogenous Economic Growth 
There is a variety of formation types of industrial clusters in China. Taking the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical sectors as examples, there are mainly two: one is the 
exogenous industrial cluster which is government-led and mainly comes in existence in 
the form of recently developed high technology development areas such as Zhangjiang 
Bio-Pharmaceutical based in Shanghai, similar to Bangalore's software cluster in India. 
The other is endogenous. The Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster is a good representative 
for this type, in which local entrepreneurship is the first and main initiator of its 
emergence and growth. The former is linked to exogenous investments, especially 
foreign direct investment (FDI), while the latter is mostly related to endogenous factors 
                                                        
4 Industrial enterprises above designated size contain all state-owned enterprises and non-state-owned enterprises 
with an annual income over RMB 5 million Yuan.  
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and indigenous innovativeness. Different from the Western World, China has a special 
form of industrial clustering, i.e. some clusters origin from large state firms established 
during the planning period. The development of (Chemical) pharmaceutical industry in 
Shijiazhuang can be classified into this category.  
Associated to the typology of industrial clusters, there is a long-lasting debate on 
the importance of FDI in developing countries. In the 1990s, it was wildly accepted that 
vast introduction of FDI helped to stimulate industrial development, especially through 
industrial export zones, creating job opportunities, as well as consequently enhancing 
social wealth. For transitional economies, FDI might play a catalytic role in supporting 
the process of economic transition to a market-oriented system, and act as a conduit for 
revitalizing the private sector. This view is not wrong but very narrow (Huang, 2002). 
More evidence has emerged that such FDI-driven clusters are not “sticky places in 
slippery space”, in the term of Markusen (1996). This argument could be proven by the 
recent large-scale withdrawal of FDI from China. Since the new Labour Contract Law 
in China took effect in the first months of 2008, providing protection to employees from 
layoffs, as well as ensuring that they will be well compensated in the event of being 
made redundant by their employers, a lot of foreign firms, specially the labour-intensive 
Taiwan and Hong Kong funded enterprises, have stampeded from China to Vietnam, 
other Southeast Asian countries as well. The current financial crisis that broke out in 
September is or will be exacerbating this situation. This clearly manifests that FDI tends 
to seek profits throughout the world, and is more subject to any changes in the host 
countries, and that FDI has a high-level mobility across the international markets. 
However, indigenous enterprises are profoundly rooted in local socioeconomic 
contexts. Moreover, the fact that the vast FDI in the former Soviet Union did not bring 
such a successful economy as China, at least until today, clearly shows that it is very 
essential for the safety of a national economy to mobilize indigenously all kinds of 
resources, in particular through cultivating local entrepreneurship and innovation 
culture. This is why public attention transfers to the endogenous model of economic 
development. 
1.1.2 The Theoretical Puzzle Relevant to Cluster Emergence 
The large number of recently coined theoretical concepts explaining the 
competitive advantages from geographical clustering arises around the family of 
territorial innovation models (Moulaert and Sekia, 2003). The common focus of these  
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territorial innovation models is the origin and development of innovation and the 
significance of industrial organization and inter-firm linkages for regional 
competitiveness and regional innovation processes, so the core argument of these 
explanations is that the spatial co-localization or ‘clustering’ of firms and other 
organizations in related industrial sectors has a potential for economic and innovation 
benefits (Hassink, 2007). 
Now, the research thread, both in theoretical discussion and empirical research, 
has already been transferred from the empirical assessment of the relevance and 
importance of industrial clustering to the understanding of trajectories that lead to 
success or failure. For example, Humphrey (1995) calls for a shift “from models to 
trajectories”. During the research shift, we can clearly find that there are two research 
camps which make an attempt to address the issues of which factors determine the rise 
and fall of the industrial clusters, and how they drive the geographical clustering of 
industries: social constructionism versus technological determinism (Kenney and von 
Burg, 1999). There is an additional theoretical line, institutional determinism especially 
for the emergence of industrial clusters in China’s transitional context. It is necessary to 
note that though both social constructionism and institutional determinism emphasize 
the role of institution in industrial clustering, institution in the latter refers to the 
regulation on enterprise ownership, which is very meaningful in understanding the 
economic evolution of transitional nations from a centrally planned economy to a free 
market.  
(1) Social Constructionism 
On the base of empirical investigations, some key factors were recognized, such 
as the local accumulated human capital (Camagni, 1995), labour mobility (Angel, 1990; 
Saxenian, 1994), close proximity to research universities (Storper and Walker 1989; 
Storper and Salais, 1997)
  , supplier networks (Saxenian, 1994), local competition 
(Porter 1990), location economies and agglomeration economies（Doeringer and 
Terkla, 1995), face-to-face interaction (Doeringer and Terkla, 1995; Rosenfeld, 1997), 
and social capital (Cohen and Fields, 1999), abundance of venture capital (Teubal and 
Avnimelech, 2004), and entrepreneurship (Bouwman and Hulsink, 2002). At the same 
time, particular emphasis was placed on the local synergy between firms and the 
resulting collective efficiency (Schmitz, 1999). However, this research has been 
repeatedly accused, for instance, of “less rigorous case study evidence” by Markusen 
(1999). More seriously, it adopts an isolated world view, without taking the complex  
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and co-evolutionary nature of various social factors during the process of emergence 
and development of spatial clustering into consideration (Liu, 2006). In other words, it 
is social interaction and the creation of social capital (or “social network”, in Chinese, 
guanxi) that co-constitute an emerging cluster. Further, the embryogenesis of industrial 
clustering is, both in the developing and developed countries, also a synchronous 
process of the presence of supportive institutions, containing the launch of local 
research universities, the availability of venture capital, the cultivation of a culture of 
risk taking, and creation of strong local informational and business development 
networks (Feldman, 2001, p: 861). This argument is in accord with the recently 
developed theory of co-evolution of industry, technology, and institutions (see Nelson, 
1995; Murmann, 2003). 
(2) Technological Determinism 
On the contrary, there is another philosophical line, that of technological 
determinism. The fundamental building block of this theorizing is the cutting-edge 
technology which is vital for the fates of regional industries, high-tech industries in 
particular, so this research line attached more importance to the birth of cutting-edge 
technology and knowledge diffusion in local community. At the same time, the theory 
of technological/industrial lifecycle (adapted from the concept of product cycle, see 
Vernon, 1966; Abernathy and Utterback, 1975) is often used in this research stream (for 
example, Klepper, 1996; Dalum et.al. 2005; Storper, 1988; Walker, 1985; for an 
overview on this point, see Audretsch and Feldman, 1996). As Klepper (1996) pointed 
out, among the most heavily studied aspects of the life cycle is the evolution of the 
number of firms. At this point, the “evolutionary” model (or its family of models) states 
that new startups, especially spinoffs (employees leaving incumbent firms to start their 
own firms in the same industry), play a crucial role in the application of new technology 
and technology proliferation among firm generations (see, for example, Klepper, 2002; 
Zhang, 2003), since new spinoffs are the embodiment of innovation, especially for 
radical new technologies that are not easily absorbed into existing firms (Audretsch, 
1995). The value-added of technological determinism is that the importance of 
technology is acknowledged, but it is silent on the social factors of production and 
diffusion of new technology. In fact, economic development results not only from 
technological advances but also from the simultaneous socio-cultural and institutional 
factors. Similarly, technology is not an exclusive factor which contributes to the 
formation and growth of an industrial cluster. A variety of techno-economic changes in  
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the context of transitional countries tend to be accompanied by other non-technological 
factors, such as the increased importance of scale economies, easier access to capital, 
increasingly fierce competition market competititon and the market-oriented 
institutional framework. Moreover, in extremely turbulent environment in the 
transitional countries, institution, which “wake up” and activate the actually existing but 
not working technology, is more important than technology itself, as Wang and Wang 
(1998) discovered in the case of new-technology industry in Beijing.  
(3) Institutional Determinism 
Moreover, in the literature on the emergence and performance of China’s 
industrial clusters, the institutional determinism has been too much prevailed, which 
follows the framework of the new institutional economics inseminated by Coase (1937) 
and recently advanced by North (1990). The institutional determinism assumes that 
since the privatization of collective and state-run enterprises was earlier carried out in 
some southern coastal regions, such as Guangdong and Zhejiang, industrial clusters 
have developed and are developing better there. This viewpoint seems to be justified 
when we try to understand why the southern coastal region as a whole is  more 
energetic than other parts in China. It is estimated that 149 industrial clusters in 
Zhejiang province produced half of this province’s total industrial output value in 2003 
(Dong, 2005). However, the static and ahistorical analyses neglected an undeniable fact 
that property rights have not been clear-cut even at the very beginning in today’s 
relatively advanced economic regions in China, namely, the reform of property rights in 
these regions was not finished overnight like “the shock therapy” adopted by the former 
Soviet Union. As regards my case area, Tonghua, a peripheral city in the Old Industrial 
Base of Northeast China, the ownership reform there was relatively later implemented 
than in South China in general. Hence, the theory of property rights is too narrow and 
simplistic, and failes to explain why Chinese industrial clusters formed and still remain 
highly competitive even when property rights have been fuzzy for a long time. My 
argument is that the institutional reform of property rights in China took place in the 
process of co-adaptation between property rights institutions and other national policies. 
That means that there is interaction between institution and technology. We can not 
well understand the achievements of the Chinese recent economic reform without the 
perspective of co-evolution between firm organization, institution and technology.  
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1.1.3 Review on Evolutionary Economic Geography and Coevolutionary Study 
(1) Evolutionary Approach and Linear Historical Determinism 
Recent years have seen the emergence of a new wave of interest in the 
“evolutionary” concept in the field of economics, and economic geography as well. The 
distinct evidences are the increasing number of books and articles which delineated by 
so-called “evolutionary”, “Schumpeterian”’ or “new/post Schumpeterian” approaches, 
and the establishment of new professional societies and journals labeled 
“evolutionary”
5. Some leading neoclassical economists have turned away from 
mechanics to biological metaphors (Anderson, 1995; Arrow, 1995; Hahn, 1991). 
Meanwhile, in the realm of economic geography, apart from the traditional purely 
economic analysis, economic geographers have drawn freely on different sources, from 
social, cultural to political sciences, for theoretical and conceptual insights, which 
resulted in the emergence of some significant ‘turns’, such as the ‘cultural turn’ (Amin 
and Thrift, 2000; Barnes, 1999, 2001)
6, ‘institutional turn’(Martin, 1994, 2000 and 
Hayter, 2004) or ‘relational turn’ (see Amin, 1998; Dicken et, al. 2001; Ettlinger, 
2001,2003; Bathelt and Glückler, 2003; Boggs and Rantisi, 2003)
7, and the recent 
‘evolutionary turn’ (Storper and Walker, 1989；Cooke and Morgan, 1998; Martin, 
1999; Scott, 2004; Rigby and Essletzbichler, 1997; Boschma and Lambooy, 1999; 
Essletzbichler and Rigby, 2005; Boschma and Frenken, 2006a; Cooke, Roper and 
Wylie, 2003). Such conjunction between economic geography and evolutionary 
economic analysis offers powerful and insightful theoretical and conceptual 
underpinnings in emergences and development of clusters and the like.  
In the hot wave of evolutionary studies, economists and economic geographers 
are increasingly aware of the importance of “history” in understanding the ways in 
which industry (clusters) arise(s). For example, Arthur (1986, 1990), Nelson (1994) and 
Zysman (1994), among others, all suggest that understanding industrial development 
requires tracing the nature, origin and dynamics of historically rooted institutions. 
Unfortunately, the concept of “history matters” with richer and more extensive 
                                                        
5 The European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy and the International Joseph Schumpeter Association 
were already founded in the late 1980s. Moreover, the Journal of Evolutionary Economics commenced publication in 
1991.Other international recognized journals which paid special attentions to the evolutionary concept are Journal of 
Economic Behaviour and Organization, Journal of Economic Issues, Journal of Structural Change and Dynamics, 
Cambridge Journal of Economics, Economic Journal, Journal of Economic Geography, and Industry and Corporate 
Change. 
6 For an in-depth review on the cultural turn in economic geography, see Barnett (1998). 
7 For a review literature on the relational turn in economic geography, see Yeung (2005).  
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meanings was reduced to some oversimplified concepts, such as “initial condition” 
(Feldman and Schreuder, 1996), and “path dependence” (Britton, 2007; Essletzbichler 
and Winther, 1999; Belussi, 1999)
 . These concepts seem to follow a linear historical 
determinism, while the influence of history on the rise of spatial clustering of industries 
is far more complicated than it had been envisioned. Although these concepts might be 
a bit helpful for understanding industrial evolution in the USA and the mature and 
advanced market economies of Europe where industrial history is continuous, they are 
totally inadequate to address the same issues in transitional countries, in which 
momentous institutional changes made the preceding development paths disconnected: 
i.e. history was discontinuous. In other words, the powerful influence of initial 
conditions could probably be reflected well in the uninterrupted history, but the 
dynamics of the development trajectory of discontinuous history is more complicated. 
More seriously, the concepts dominated by the philosophy of linear historical 
determinism risk losing the rich contents of real history, since the trajectories of entities 
is locked in by their own history on the one hand, and the path dependence may 
bifurcate due to sudden external shocks or deliberate human actions, on the other hand. 
Meanwhile, the trajectory of a single entity is subject to its own history, as well as the 
changing history of the environment, in which it operates and exists. This means that 
we need an alternative theoretical concept for understanding the complexity of 
evolutionary history of industrial clusters. The integrated conceptual framework of path 
dependence, path creation, and coevolution (which we might call the non- linear 
historical determinism) appears to be a good choice, since it accommodates the need for 
the study on change (through the concept of path creation) and non-change (stasis, 
through the concept of path dependence), and the interconnectedness of the changes of 
entities (through the concept of path interdependence or coevolution between paths) in 
understanding the dynamics of industrial spatial evolution. 
There is no place for path creation owing to endogenous factors in the traditional 
path dependence study developed by Paul David and Brian Arthur. Arthur (1994a) 
extended the concept of path dependence to geography, and explained the location of 
new industries as a path dependent process. Despite of being insightful, one of his 
seminal works also receives challenges from geographers (for an extensive review, 
Boschma, 2007). I want to especially stress that Arthur, like other economists (for 
example, Krugman), abstracts from space, treating it as being flat and neutral before a 
new industry starts; namely, his models are silent on how geography may feedback on  
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this process (also see Boschma, 2007, p: 42). Martin (1999) and Martin and Sunley 
(2006) tried to fill this gap and state that path dependence should not only produce 
space (industries creating space) but places impact on path dependence (place 
dependence, for this concept, also see Berndt, 1998, 2001). Their arguments are akin to 
the concept of Windows of Locational Opportunity, which was coined by the so called 
Californian School of Economic Geography in the late 1980s (Scott and Storper, 1987; 
Storper and Walker, 1989, p: 75), and extended and refined by Boschma and his 
colleagues (e.g. Boschma, 1997; Boschma and Van der Knaap, 1999; Boschma and 
Lambooy, 1999; for a review on WLO, see Boschma, 2007). The key viewpoint of 
windows of locational opportunity is that new industries have the capacity of 
“generating their own conditions of growth in place by making factors of production 
come to them or causing factors supplies to come into being where they did not exist 
before” (Storper and Walker 1989, p: 71). There is another question related to this 
aspect, namely, whether it is realistic to assume that (local) new industries start from 
scratch. If not, where are their roots? In their own history? Or in related industries or 
other location-specific assets? Boschma (2007) states that why Coventry/Birmingham 
became a center of the British automobile industry was because it was well endowed 
with related industries like coach and cycle making in the late nineteenth century before 
the automobile sector started to expand. This means that the formation of local new 
industries benefits a lot from the existence of technically related industries. Are there 
other ways in which “new” industries don’t start from scratch? How to make use of old 
and existing resources in creating new industrial paths? 
(2) Co-evolutionary Study and Untouched Questions 
Co-evolution is a concept from biology, refers to the mutual evolutionary 
influence between two species, namely each population in a co-evolutionary 
relationship exerts selective pressure on the others, thereby affects one another’s 
evolution. The selective pressure on each other forces co-evolving parties to co-evolve 
and co-adapt to each other. Classic economics was coevolutionary, namely, the coupled 
cause-effect processes of technology and institutions, despite the term of “coevolution” 
was never used, for example, Adam Smith, Karl Marx, and Max Weber, Joseph 
Schumpeter, all explored the determinants of economic growth and the the intertwined 
influence of technology and institution (for a detailed explanation, see Nelson, 2002). 
However, economics has forgetten this good tradition for a long time. After this long 
forgetting, coevolution finally comes back again to economics and other social sciences.   
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Recently, some evolutionary economic scholars, such as Nelson (1994), Coriat and 
Dosi (1997), and Murmann (2003), have highlighted the necessity of developing co-
evolutionary models for better understanding the dynamics of economic change. 
Coevolutionary models can help us to understand the interaction between technological 
change, institutions, and industry structure (Lewin et al., 1999; Nelson 1995; Ziman 
2000). Recent work on co-evolution has called for analysis of both directions of 
causality (Pelikan, 2003) and rigid definitions of co-evolution (Murmann, 2003). Most 
literatures on the industrial evolution and industrial leadership concentrates on the 
national level, and has helped us to understand how these factors drive the rate, path 
and character of technical change – and thereby, economic growth, is shaped over time 
by the co-evolution of industries, technologies, and supporting institutions (Nelson, 
1994; Tucker, 2003). Good examples of empirical research on the co-evolution of new 
emerging industries and institutions are, besides Murmann’s book noted above that 
discusses the rise of the synthetic dye industry in the second half of the nineteenth 
century in Germany (Murmann 2003), the latest Consoli’s publication with the purpose 
of elaborating an evolutionary perspective on the process of structural change which has 
characterized retail financial services in the United Kingdom (UK) from the 1840s to 
the 1990s (Consoli, 2005). But there are a few coevolutionary studies, both theoretical 
and empirical, on the meso-level of geography, i.e. subnational (regional) or so called 
industrial cluster level. According to my literature survey, there are merely two papers. 
One is a paper of Lee and Saxenian (2008), which tries to grasp the multi-faceted nature 
of coevolution of technological, organizational and territorial change, using the 
Taiwanese information technology industry as an example. Another is a working paper 
by Sotarauta and Srinivas (2005), in which they compared various cases of regions in 
Finland, India, and the USA to show heterogeneity in development, specifically 
technologically innovative development, and attempted to provide us with a co-
evolutionary framework for a more comprehensive view of regional development 
processes. Therefore, many questions have been left. For example, can coevolutionary 
study at the national level be applied to the subnational levels? If yes, how to link local 
coevolution mechanism to macro-coevolutionary mechanism?   
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1.2 Research Questions  
I try to contribute to our understanding of a basic research question: why do new 
industries develop in some regions, and not in others? So, the main task of this thesis is 
to contribute to our understanding of the process and dynamics of the formation and 
growth of industrial clusters, with a motivation to theoretically contribute to 
evolutionary economic geography, in particular to the small subfield of ‘coevolution’. 
In order to fulfill the objective, the thesis will build upon a consistent system, from the 
methodological or philosophical foundation of the concepts I will use, to the conceptual 
framework itself and policy suggestion, all of them in a coevolutionary perspective for 
understanding and promoting industrial clusters. In addition, it will be proved that the 
emergence of successful industrial clusters results from the coupled interconnection of 
institutions, technology and firms at the national industry level. This dissertation will 
reinforce this viewpoint by empirically studying the Traditional Chinese Medicine 
(TCM) cluster in Tonghua, a small peripheral city in the Northeast of China, and will 
figure out when and in which situations the coevolutionary processes occur. Before 
starting to study the coevolutionary process on technology, institution, and firms, I will 
discuss the following two questions, which are relevant to the main topic of this 
dissertation.  
1.2.1 Uncover ‘How History Matters’  
A “historical turn” has recently begun to emerge in the social sciences as a whole 
(McDonald, 1996; Pierson, 2004). An evidence of this growing interest is that concepts 
and terminologies such as “path dependence”, “process”, “sequence”, “dynamics”, and 
“mechanism”, are increasingly often employed in literature. Some recently developed 
historizing theories, for example, regulation theory, institutional economics, and last but 
not least, evolutionary economics, try to contribute to understanding the relationship of 
current changes and what happened in the past, and view current changes as transition 
from one historical stage to another and attribute some explanatory power to historical 
events (Schamp, 1996). Evolutionary economic geography is a historical school in 
economic geography in the sense that it contributes to a basic evolutionary or historical 
issue, “the processes by which the economic landscape – the spatial
 organization of 
economic production, distribution and consumption – is 
  transformed over 
time.”(Boschma and Martin, 2007, p: 539).  
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The formation and development of evolutionary economic geography benefits 
from a marriage between economic geography and evolutionary economics, and offers 
alternatively better theoretical and conceptual underpinnings for understanding the 
economic landscape or geographical development (Boschma and Lambooy 1999; 
Boschma and Frenken, 2006a). Its research issues cover almost all fields of traditional 
economic geography, in particular, spatial evolution of industries and regional 
differences (e.g. Boschma and Weterings, 2005; Weterings, 2005), the decline of old 
industrial areas (e.g. Schamp, 2005; Hassink, 2007); the formation of local industries 
(e.g.Boschma and Wenting, 2007; Klepper, 2002) and spatial dimension of innovation 
(e.g. Cooke et al., 1998). At the same time, some important concepts of evolutionary 
economics have begun to be reflected when they are applied to economic geography. 
For example, Martin and Sunley (2006) construct the concepts of “place dependence” 
through reflection on the concept of “path dependence”, and Schamp (2009) develops 
the connotation of economic geography of the “coevolution” concept. Yet, this body of 
writing often contributes little to the foundation of theoretical questions, for example, 
what kind of history do we evolutionary scholars need for better understanding 
‘evolution’ in economy and economic geography.  
(1) What Kind of History Does Evolutionary Economic Geography Need 
Although a series of concrete techniques of gathering and processing data, such as 
demographical techniques, social network, and spatial econometric techniques, were 
applied in the field of evolutionary economic geography (see Frenken, 2007), all of 
these methods, which I will call the “research methods”, don’t say any word about the 
researchers’ ontological or epistemological views, namely, for what these concrete 
research methods are used. The first task of this dissertation is to make sound 
methodological construction by bringing history into evolutionary economics, namely 
elevating history to the methodological foundation of evolutionary economic 
geography, by which we can identify the evolutionary study from a-evolutionary or a-
historical ones. The term “methodology” here refers to the rational and philosophical 
assumptions underlying the logics of theoretical exploration and the usage of research 
methods. All concrete research methods to be used should be based on it to understand 
the real history through the lens of evolutionary concepts. This section serve as the 
philosophical foundation for the later discussion on path interdependence or 
coevolution between paths.    
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(2) Path Dependence Enough for Understanding History? 
The second task of this thesis, related to the first one, is to figure out how to 
understand history. In the history-oriented research, all historical effects tend to be 
reduced to a too oversimplified term, ‘path dependence’, which runs the risk of losing 
the rich contents of history. As Martin and Sunley (2009) state, it is the interrelated 
process of path creation and path dependence that shapes geographies of
  economic 
development and transformation. But there are few theoretical and empirical studies on 
this aspect. Accordingly, I will build up a new framework to understand the complexity 
of history, and then develop the concrete historical method for the empirical study. As to 
the empirical study, I will take an industrial cluster of traditional Chinese medicine 
(TCM) as an example.  
For the theoretical framework to be employed in this Ph.D. thesis, I will explore 
how to understand evolution in economic geography by placing history in historical 
time and historical contexts. Accordingly, the concepts of path creation and path 
dependence should be used together in the historical study. More importantly, the 
concept of path interdependence, which stresses the importance of the circumstances 
under which processes and events are likely to occur, opens a new window on the 
temporal aspects of the world and is also important to regional industrial policy. 
1.2.2 The Coevolutionary Process at Industrial Cluster Level 
The term “coevolution” is firstly used in biology and refers to successive changes 
among (two or more) ecologically interdependent but unique species so that their 
evolutionary trajectories interlace over time, adapting to each other. This results in an 
ecosystem of partially interdependent species that adapt together (Eisenhardt and 
Galunic, 2000). Norgaard (1984, 1994) first introduced coevolution in a socio-economic 
context to reflect long-term feedbacks that occur between five main subsystems: 
knowledge, values, organization, technology and environment.  
According to the rigid definition of coevolution, “two evolving populations co-
evolve if and only if they both have a significant causal impact on each other’s ability to 
persist” (Murmann 2003, p: 210), we can find that there are two different 
coevolutionary approaches to industrial evolution in existing coevolutionary literature. 
First, some literature contributes to understanding the co-evolution of industry (or 
firms) and external environments, for example, industry and technology, industry 
structure, and institution (Nelson, 1994, 1995; Fatas-Villafranca et al., 2008). Murmann  
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(2003) empirically studies the interaction of industry, institution, and technology, using 
the case of the synthetic dye industry in the second half of the nineteenth century in 
Germany. I would like to call this type of coevolutionary approach to industrial 
evolution as ‘the coevolutionary model of industry-environment’. Second, other 
literature has studied the coevolution of two or more industries, which we might call 
‘the coevolutionary model of industry- industry’. For example, Malerba, Nelson, 
Orsenigo and Winter (2007, 2008a,b) study the co-evolution of the computer and 
component industries from their inceptions to the 1980s. Recently evolutionary 
economic geographers (for example, Boschma, 2007) are also concerned about the 
‘industry-industry’ coevolutionary mechanism in industrial cluster analysis. 
In fact, these two coevolutionary models are interrelated, in the sense that it is 
impossible to well understand ‘industry- industry’ coevolutionary mechanisms without 
probing into the ‘industry-environment’ coevolutionary dynamics. As we know, an 
industry consists of a group of companies that operate in the same segment of the 
economy or share a similar business type. Considering that institutions and technology 
are always the main study topics both in economics and geography, and, in addition, 
they are the most important factors that have influence on industry or firms, I choose 
firms, institution, and technology as populations of my model. The coevolution of 
firms, institution, and technology is not an entirely new issue, even in evolutionary 
literature. Before the path-breaking book of Nelson and Winter (1982), some scholars 
(e.g. Penrose, 1959; Chandler, 1962) had emphasized that firm organizations should 
match the underlying technology and have the capacity for adapting to changing 
environments. Evolutionary theorists also consider the abilities of firms to adapt to and 
change the external environments (for example, of institution). Recently, prominent 
evolutionary scholars both in economists (e.g. Nelson,
  2002; Pelikan,
  2003) and in 
economic geography (e.g. Schamp, 2000, 2002, 2005; Boschma and Frenken, 2009) 
have begun to attach great importance to institutions (Nelson, 2002; Pelikan
 2003). 
Nelson (2002)
   and other evolutionary scholars as well, recently called for a 
coevolutionary study of institution and technology during the process of industrial 
evolution. But almost all existing literatures on industrial evolution in coevolutionary 
perspective do not focus on the local industrial level, but on the national level; for 
example, the Mumann’s study object is German synthetic dyestuffs industry.  
I want to carefully examine the coevolutionary process of institution, technology 
and firm in an industrial cluster. Hence, it is necessary to answer the following  
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questions: firstly, why and how a coevolutionary model can be applied to the sub-
national level? Secondly, how to link different geographical scales of coevolution? The 
existing coevolutionary studies see coevolution as given, either implicitly or explicitly; 
while my argument is that coevolution itself is not given or fixed, but a changing 
process, in which the coevolutionary degree and effect change over time. Hence, we 
should adopt a dynamic view to study coevolution itself. In order to theoretically and 
empirically investigate the coevolutionary process in industrial clusters, I will develop 
two standards or criteria, the degree of the interaction (weak or strong) and the effects 
of the coevolution (positive or negative), to examine the coevolutionary process of 
firms, institution, and technology. 
Theoretically, coevolution has intertwined geographical scales. Just as Lewin and 
Volberda (1999, p: 526) pointed out that multilevel coevolutionary thinking requires 
scholars to consider the interactions between multiple levels of coevolution. As I have 
said, my coevolution is in industry cluster, a meso-level, but its evolution is necessarily 
related to the higher geographic scales of institutions and technology (for example, 
global and national). This issue is of importance in the era of globalization of economy 
and technology in the sense that multiple geographic scales of institutions and 
technology interplay to an unprecedented degree. But Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
industry has been mainly specialized in TCM, which is different from chemical drugs in 
technology, and the global technology and market had little direct influence on 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry particularly before 1990s. I concentrate not on the 
global dimension of institutions and pharmaceutical technology, but on their national 
dimension. In addition, considering that the pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua are 
not so strong that they play an important role in national policy-making, I will 
concentrate in this dissertation on the top-down way of multi-scalar coevolution, by 
which national institutions and technologies affect the evolution of Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical industry.  
1.3 Why Coevolution of Firms, Institution and Technology 
In this section, I will answer the questions of what is the evolutionary unit and why 
I choose these three populations of firms, institution, and technology as my 
coevolutionary units. There is no general consensus on what the possible units of 
analysis of evolutionary economics are or how the units relate to each other. For 
example, in the work of Nelson and Witter (1982), the unit of selection is routine, while  
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following Veblen (1899), Hodgson (1993) treats “habits” and “institutions” as the units 
of selection (Corning, 1995). In general, the typical and often discussed units in biology 
are genes, individual organisms and species; correspondingly, the units of analysis in 
the social sciences at large are individuals, groups, and societies. In economics, firms, 
markets, institutions and technologies usually are chosen as the units of analysis but it is 
still unclear how they are causally related. Perhaps the multi-level selection theory and 
group selection (Sober and Wilson, 1998; Vromen, 2001) help to establish explanatory 
links between the different layers in the ontology of evolutionary economics 
(Essletzbichler and Rigby, 2007). My main task here is not to theoretically discuss this 
dilemma, but to explain why I use these entities in studying coevolution in regional 
industries. 
1.3.1 Why Firm 
(1) The Working Definitions of Firm and Industrial Cluster 
A firm may be defined as an entity for organizing production or services. In my 
empirical study, I define the legally registered investment entities, state-owned, 
collective, or private, as firms. Considering the special nature of the transition to a 
market economy, entities which were not legally registered but nevertheless operated 
for profit for themselves like separate firms, for example the contracted workshop 
during the transitional period, are also included. This kind of entities falsely tends to 
appear as affiliate subunits of a legally separate firm (state-owned enterprises).  
The definition of industrial cluster is fuzzy both in the industrial cluster literature 
and in practice (Martin and Sunley, 2003). Porter (1998, p: 199) defines an industrial 
cluster as “a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and 
associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and 
complementarities”. However, other researchers emphasize the interconnectedness of 
firms within a cluster, for example, Rosenfeld’s (1996, p: 13) definition is “a 
geographically bounded concentration of similar, related, or complementary businesses 
with active channels for business transactions, communications, and dialogue, that 
share specialized infrastructure, labor markets, and services and that are faced with 
common opportunities and threats”. The interconnectedness of clustered firms and the 
sequent result of innovation are the essence of an industrial cluster. My argument is that 
the firms in the same industry are the kernel component of an industrial cluster, though 
it is impossible for an industrial cluster to exist and grow without related, supporting  
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and complementary firms and other institutions like education, and government 
agencies. Therefore, pharmaceutical manufacturing firms will be the core units to be 
studied in the empirical research part of this dissertation.  
(2) The Reasons for Selecting the Firm as Basic Unit of Evolution 
The units of selection that found an evolutionary account (of economic landscape) 
could be firms, workers, routines, or even regions themselves (see also Essletzbichler 
and Rigby, 2007), which represents that firms are the most appropriate unit of selection 
within the (regional industrial) economy, and that other units of selection besides firms 
are equally useful for an evolutionary account. Why I choose firms as basic unit of 
analysis is based on the following three reasons. Firstly, my study objective is evolution 
in industrial cluster; meanwhile industrial clusters consist of firms in the same and 
related industries, located in relatively close proximity. Secondly, the firm (or in the 
words of Essletzbichler and Rigby, business establishment or plant)
8 is the often chosen 
unit of selection in economics and economic geography as well (Essletzbichler and 
Rigby, 2007, p: 23). The dynamics of evolution in a region as well as the evolution of 
regions which are research focuses of evolutionary economic geographies originate 
from variety creation and retention/transmission at the micro-level of firms. Finally and 
most importantly, selecting the firm is consistent with my research method. Through the 
usage of research method of business history, I will track the development trajectory of 
individual business organizations, based on the histories and stories of business 
themselves and entrepreneurs. The individual firms-based research method, together 
with others, enables us to find out detailed historical information on the micro-level of 
firms and makes possible a long-range observation of change at the meso-level of firm 
agglomeration.  
1.3.2 Why Institution and Technology 
(1) The Definitions of Institution and Technology 
It is a widely accepted definition that institutions are the rules of the game devised 
by human beings in order to create order, constrain political, economic and social 
interaction and reduce uncertainty in exchange. Institutions include formal or informal 
                                                        
8 Strictly speaking, there are some fine differences between the kinds of selection unit. For instance, both business 
establishments and plants can be not legally independent economic entities, which the films such as state-owned, 
collective-owned and privatized enterprises are independent economic unit. In addition, either establishment or plant 
operates in a single location, mainly engaged in a single productive activity, but a firm is an economic unit under 
single management consisting of one or more than one establishment, inside or/and across regions. The selection unit 
of Essletzbichler and Rigby (2007), the business establishment and plant, places more emphasis on technological 
change than my evolutionary unit of firms.  
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institutions. The formal institution is officially codified in written documents (as 
constitutions or laws, regulations), and easy to be changed, while the informal 
institution is not formally codified in official documents and is difficult to be changed 
in a short time (for example, norms, routines, and operating). The creation of formal 
institutions related to regional and industrial development is sanctioned by the state or 
regional agencies, and the enforcement or effectiveness of informal institutions are 
based mainly on auto-licensing (i.e. self-enactment and subsequent self-assertion) and 
the extent of public acceptance of uncoded practices or habits.  
Sometimes, organizations like firms and markets are viewed as institutions, but it 
is meaningful to distinguish between general social rules (the institutional environment) 
and particular organizational forms (sometimes called institutional arrangements). 
However, I will adopt a narrow definition of institution in the sense that the institution I 
employ refers to coded policies and rules, and informal forms like social capital, but 
excludes organization. In addition, I want to bring a multi-level perspective to 
institutional study, namely I will make a difference between local institution and higher 
level institutions. In the case of Tonghua, the city and counties are local levels, while 
the province and the state are higher levels. Since Saxenian (1994) argues that regional 
institutions determine the ability of a region-industry to adapt to changes in markets and 
technology, I will focus on local dimensions of institutions.  
This leads to another question, what kinds of institutions and organizations would 
be included in my empirical study. I will take the local institutions, including the 
industrial policies and local social capital, social connections (guanxi) as endogenous 
variables and the national institutions as the external variables. Since the institutions 
vary widely across China and the importance of institutions varies across industries, I 
will limit the scope of the national institutions to those which are highly relevant to 
China’s pharmaceutical industry or enterprises. It is very important to keep in mind that 
external conditions can be transformed into internal variables, namely, as the growth of 
local enterprises, local entrepreneurs have the ability to influence on the nation-level 
policymaking institutions. I will explain this in the last chapter. Firm is viewed as an 
organizational form in my dissertation, since the work definition of firms here is a 
legally independent economic unit which can operate across regions to produce goods 
or provide services. I view a firm with multiple plants as one entity. So just as I have 
already mentioned, I limit the scope of pharmaceutical firms (or enterprises) to the 
manufacturing organization, excluding the commercial organization in the field of the 
pharmaceutical sector (e.g. wholesale drug stations or companies), in my empirical 
study on Tonghua city.   
  21
Generally speaking, there are mainly two types of technology for firms: (1) 
technologies of production (technological innovation), which focus on improving a 
product or service and innovation on new production, producing process and quality; 
(2) technologies of operational management (organizational innovation), which focus 
on improving internal business, for example, new business process innovation or 
redistribution of management powers. Because firm organizational innovation that 
happed in the past 60 years in China is subject to changes of macro national institutions 
in the context of China’s transitional period, I will take in account changes in macro 
national institutions (see Chapter 3) in China in studying organizational innovation (see 
Chapter 6). In the Chapter 8, I will focus on technological innovation. According to the 
innovative degree and the way of innovation, we can differentiate radical innovation 
and incremental innovation. The former — associated with high uncertainties — 
explores a new (technological or organizational) change and is highly uncertain, while 
the latter is to exploit an existing technology or organization, with low levels of 
uncertainties. In studying both technological innovation and organizational innovation, I 
will examine whether their respective change dynamics originates from radical 
innovation or incremental innovation. 
(2) The Reasons of Focusing on Institution and Technology 
Before going to explain why I focus on institution and technology, I have to say 
that there are other factors, for example market, which also coevolve with firms or 
industries. But these factors could be created through collaboration between firm, 
institution and technology. Therefore, I will focus on institution and technology, besides 
firms, based on the following reasons. Firstly, both institution and technology are very 
important for economic development. Secondly, both institution and technology are at 
the center of evolutionary economics and evolutionary economic geography. Since this 
first reason has been explained in the literature on economic growth, institutional 
economics and technological economics, I will turn to the second point.  
The dialogue between institutional economics and contemporary evolutionary 
economics has recently emerged (for an overview on this point, see Brette, 2006 and 
Liu, 2006). In Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary approach to economy, they first 
emphasized the role of technology in economic evolution
9 but subsequently, some 
prominent economic ‘evolutionists’ (including Nelson himself) have increasingly been 
aware that it is necessary to bring economic institutions to evolutionary theory (Nelson,
  
2002; Pelikan,
 2003). In the realm of institutional economics, the evolutionary approach 
                                                        
9 Different from Nelson and Winter, Freeman paid more attention to instutitions at the very beginning of his studying 
the catch-up efforts of East Asian (for example, Freeman, 1987, 1988).  
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has received a welcome. For example Geoffrey M. Hodgson, a commonly recognized 
prominent scholar of old institutional economics has some highly cited publications on 
evolutionary economics; at the same time, another elite scholar of new institutional 
economics, Douglass C. North also is expressly concerned with the historical-
evolutionary character of institutions (for example, North 1990). Though North never 
explicitly used the principle of evolutionary economics, his outstanding research on 
institutional change is very helpful for a potentially fruitful conversation between 
institutional economics and evolutionary thinking.  
The co-evolution of institution and technology has recentlybecome one of the hot 
topics in the realm of (evolutionary) economics, as I discussed above. Economic 
geographers, on the one hand, take advantage of the evolutionary approach to better 
understand the dynamics of regional development (for example, Boschma and 
Lambooy, 1999; Boschma and Frenken, 2003; Boschma and Frenken, 2006a), and on 
the other hand, make use of the core ideas and concepts such as the concepts of “lock-
ins”, “embeddness” and “social network” from institutional economics or so-called 
institutional sociology to reveal a complexity of temporalities and spatialities in the 
development path of enterprises, industries and regions (for example, Schamp, 2000, 
2002, 2005; Boschma and Frenken, 2009). They argue that the territorial difference in 
economic performance is highly associated with the differences in institutions in the 
forms of humanly devised formal law, informal social norms and socially connected 
networks among regional development agencies (Whitley, 1992; Saxenian, 1994; 
Gertler, 1995; Martin, 2000; Grabher, 1993).  
1.3.3Why Pharmaceutical Industry  
The pharmaceutical industry is both an old and a new industry. It went through 
eras of traditional medicine to chemical and recently biological technology. Before the 
discovery of manufactured medicinal compounds (new chemical entities) in the Second 
Half of the Nineteenth Century, people over the world made use of raw plants and 
minerals to protect from diseases (the epoch of natural pharmaceuticals). The nascent 
chemical industry was formed in the late nineteenth century in the Upper Rhine Valley 
near Basel, Switzerland when dyestuffs were found to have antiseptic properties. The 
German chemist Felix Hoffman (1868–1946), the often regarded leader of this phase of 
the industry, discovered aspirin in 1897 through adding a cluster of two extra carbon 
and five extra hydrogen atoms to a substance extracted from willow bark. A lot of 
today’s international pharmaceutical giants, such as Hoffman-La Roche, Novartis
10, 
                                                        
10  Novartis was later formed in the 1990s by the merger of Sandoz and Ciba Geigy  
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started out as Rhine-based family dyestuff and chemical companies. Nowadays, the 
pharmaceutical industry has been attracting fruitful achievements from biotechnology 
and information technology, which makes it no longer a single manufacturing industry 
but populated by a large number of entrepreneurial research-oriented firms, and is 
characterised by continually changing technologies and intense competition.  
In the case of China, the pharmaceutical industry and its precursor, Traditional 
Chinese Medicine (TCM) industry, has a long and rich history. If we define 
pharmaceuticals as compounds manufactured for use as medicinal drugs (remedies), it 
can be dated back to 2735 BC and the Chinese Dynasty of Shen Nung. Since that, TCM 
had been an exclusive solution to keep healthy and cure diseases for a long time till the 
latter half of the 19th century when Western (chemical) medicine was introduced into 
China. Nowadays, the old way to treat various diseases is still of great importance in the 
double systems of Chinese and Western medicine. Traditional Chinese Medicine 
(TCM) is a comprehensive system of medical thought, pathophysiological concepts, 
and a range of therapeutic practices. Traditional medical practices of TCM includes 
herbal medicine, acupuncture and moxibustion, Tui Na (the ancient Chinese massage), 
and Qi Gong (the practice of energy movement in the body through physical 
movement). Herbal medicine is the primary therapeutic modality of internal medicine in 
TCM. The concept of TCM I will use refers merely to herbal medicine, excluding the 
other three forms of TCM. TCM industry denotes the industry of manufacturing herbal 
medicine, i.e. the commercial sector for TCM drugs is not included in my study. 
Currently, China’s TCM industry has changed its traditional handmade mode to modern 
machine production mode. In recent years, especially since the 1980s (the Dengist 
period), TCM enterprises have invested into research on new TCM durgs based on 
formal research and development.  
Today, China has become a large nation of pharmaceuticals manufacturing and 
consumption, hosting a number of foreign pharmaceutical enterprises. After 30 years of 
market-oriented economic reform, China’s pharmaceutical industry started to manifest 
an internationally observed trend that this sector is geographically concentrated, for 
example, in San Francisco, USA, BioTech Munich, Germany, and Cambridge-SE, 
England. In China, the pharmaceutical industry has been going ceaselessly ahead, and 
some areas in China, such as Beijing (biotechnological pharmaceuticals), Shanghai, and 
Hangzhou in Zhejiang (Chemical pharmaceuticals), Tonghua in Jilin (Traditional 
Chinese Medicine, TCM) made great achievements in the industries. But it is still at its  
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early stage of development, and there are many competing hypotheses about its future 
development. We have a limited understanding of the process of cluster formation. 
Keeping in mind the industrial difference inside pharmaceutical industry, I limit the 
pharmaceutical industry to be study here to its sub-sector of TCM. I believe that my 
founding would be helpful to contribute to understanding temporal–spatial peculiarity 
of industrial evolution. 
Moreover, the pharmaceutical industry is a highly regulated industry. As a result, 
the legal, regulatory factors restrict its dynamism. At the same time, biotechnology 
seems to offer developing countries a new opportunity to enhance economic 
performance and enter knowledge and information society. Various forms of biomedical 
and (bio) pharmaceutical industrial parks have been emerging in various countries, 
without the exception of China. In the case, it is feasible to research the role of 
institutions and government in the emergence of biotech industries in a region. 
In short, the pharmaceutical industry, and its subsector of TCM, is characterised by 
continuous change, in terms of technology, firm organization and geographical 
distribution. At the same time, it is subject to the national and local regulations. These 
facts together offer us a good case industry, by which we can better understand the 
interactive impacts of technology, institution and firm on each other.  
1.4 Structure of the Dissertation 
This dissertation is organized as follows. the Chapter 2 construct the theoretical 
framework of the coevolutionary process approach to industrial cluster, which starts with 
basic questions of what is history and what kind of history evolutionary economic 
geography needs. This framework provides a “philosophical foundation” for 
coevolution, based on which history is understood as context. Path inter-dependence (co-
evolution between paths) is a useful concept used to understand the complexity of 
history. Furthermore, I will explain why we need to shift to study coevolution and why 
we need a focus on the geographical mosaic of coevolution, and why we should take the 
industrial cluster as meso-level in studying coevolutionary processes of firm, institution 
and technology. In doing so, I will develop two terms to examine coevolutionary degree 
and effects.   
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Figure 1.1 The theoretical base for a coevolutionary approach 
In Chapter 3, I introduce the macro-environment, in order to help readers to 
understand changing China’s pharmaceutical industry, by focusing on national institutions 
that have had a great impact on new venture creation, entrepreneurship, and innovation, 
and registrations on drug and healthcare system. At the same time, present the growth of 
market demand for China’s pharmaceutical industry is presented in this chapter. Finally, 
the history and geographical patterns of China’s pharmaceutical industry is also 
introduced. 
In the next four chapters, after a short overview of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
industrial cluster, I employ the methodology of business history and field survey to 
collect evidence of three threads, and their respective evolutionary histories, i.e., firstly, 
the history of the enterprises, secondly, the origin of entrepreneurship, and, thirdly, the 
evolution of knowledge. The last chapter examines coadaption and coevolution between 
local formal and informal institutions and organizations, and organizations in the 
Tonghua TCM industry.  
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Chapter 2 The Theoretical Base for Coevolution in Industrial 
Clusters 
2.1 Making a Place for History in (Evolutionary) Economic Geography 
2.1.1 The “Historical Turn” in Social Science 
A “historical turn” has recently begun to emerge in the social sciences as a whole 
(McDonald, 1996; Pierson, 2004), which is more or less related to the revival of 
Darwinism
11 in social science, new advances in computer science, complexity science, 
and thermodynamics. The “historical turn” in social sciences indicates to a certain 
extent indicates a rise of interest in evolutionary dynamics across natural science. A 
clear evidence for this is an increasing tendency of employing concepts and 
terminologies such as “path dependence”, “process”, “sequence”, “dynamics”, 
“mechanism”, and so on in recent literatures. This turn addresses big, substantive 
questions of how the system (e.g. economy, institution or culture) evolves, and takes 
time seriously, traces transformations and processes of varying scale and temporality, as 
well as specifies temporal and spatial sequences. It likewise makes an effort not only to 
bridge the gap between macro contexts (e.g. social environments, institutions) and 
micro individuals (e.g. firms), but also hypothesizes a time-consuming process between 
macro and micro levels rather than examining just one institution or process at a time. 
These three features – substantive agendas, temporal arguments, and attention to 
contexts, and configurations – add up to a recognizable historical-context approach 
which would make a significant contribution to our understandings of the relationship 
between the past and the present. 
Indeed, the importance of history and taking time or process seriously is not 
newly perceived by social scientists. A historical analysis approach has long been used 
in the social sciences. As Mahoney and Rueschemeyer (2003, p: 3) pointed out: “Those 
whom we now regard as the founders of modern social science, from Adam Smith to 
Alexis de Tocqueville to Karl Marx, all pursued historical analysis as a central mode of 
investigation”. Even when social sciences entered an epoch of separate disciplines in 
the early twentieth century, historical investigation still maintained a leading position in 
economics. For example, Joseph Schumpeter, who is widely acknowledged today as 
                                                        
11 Since Darwinism was mistakenly regarded as the natural theoretical base for notorious racialism, it has been 
rejected for a long time after World War II.   
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one of the forerunner of evolutionary economics, adopted a more historical and 
empirical approach in nearly all his works (McCraw, 2006), and made a plea that 
“economic historians and economic theorists can make an interesting and socially 
valuable journey together, if they will. It would be an investigation into the sadly 
neglected area of economic change.” (Schumpeter, 1947, p: 149). Unfortunately, other 
approaches to social sciences partially eclipsed historical research after neoclassical 
theory gained absolute dominance in economics around the mid-twentieth century 
(Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003).  
After a long period of neglect, the recent two decades have witnessed a dramatic 
reemergence of the historical and dynamic tradition. Though there are problems and 
dangers, not least concerning the scope and limits of methodological triangulation, this 
revived wave of history-oriented research has been making constant efforts to bring 
itself back to the center of today’s social sciences, which is helpful as a whole for our 
understanding in the complicated world. 
Today, the perspective of historical turn is slowly penetrating into a lot of 
disciplines in social sciences, including anthropology (Thomas, 1989), sociology (e.g. 
Somers, 1996; McDonald, 1996; Abbott, 2001; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003; 
Saldana, 2003; Pierson, 2004), policy sciences (e.g. Howlett and Rayner, 2006), politics 
(e.g. Pierson et al., 2002; Robert and Tilly, 2006; Pierson, 2000), literary theory (e.g. 
Myers, 1998, 1999), economics (e.g. Hodgson, 2001), business study (Lamoreaux et al., 
2008) and organizational analysis (Clark and Rowlinson, 2004). 
This significant transformation of the intellectual agenda in social sciences is 
apparent, which is evidenced by, for example, the appearance of the “new historicism” 
in literary criticism and literary theory (e.g. Greenblatt, 1982; Cox and Larry, 1993), a 
revived interest in “history in philosophy”(e.g. Hare, 1988; Lavine and Tejera, 1989), a 
historically oriented “new institutionalism” economics (prominent scholars here would 
include Robert Fogel and Douglas North), and political science (e.g. Dryzek et al., 
1988; Pierson, 2004; Thelen, 1999; Tilly, 2006), the coming back of “evolutionism” to 
economics (e.g. Nelson and Winter, 1982; Witt, 1993a; Metcalfe, 1998), “ethnohistory” 
in anthropology (e.g. Thomas, 1989; Rubertone, 2000; Nicholas, 1996); “historical 
sociology” in sociology (e.g. Abbott, 1995; Smith, 1991), and even a more self-
consciously reflexive and historicist methodological discussion in history itself (see 
McDonald, 1996).  
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Although there are variations inside history-oriented research in social sciences, 
even in some basic and fundamental issues, four characteristics existed as a whole. (1) 
Comparative research method is often used in historical study. Scholars in historical 
studies usually start by asking about various historically situated outcomes of broad 
interest – perhaps posing a puzzle about why something important happened or not, or 
asking why certain structures or patterns were shaped in some times and places but not 
others (Pierson and Skocpol, 2002). Douglass C. North, for example, explored a long-
run institutional change – the role of economic institutions and political structure in 
producing modern economic growth – by asking why some nations succeeded even 
within Western Europe (The Netherlands and England) while others failed (Spain and 
Portugal); (2) Their main research question in general is to answer “how economic, 
political, social systems evolve through time”. That is, historical scholars devote 
themselves to a better and more “true” understanding of social, economic and political 
change and transformation, although they sometimes employ various concepts and 
theories with diverse theoretical directions and frameworks. Again, for instance, North 
contributed to the understanding of institutional change in economic growth (for the 
contribution of Douglass C. North to economic theory, see Myhrman and 
Weingast,1994)
12; whereas evolutionary-economists such as Richard R. Nelson and 
Sidney G. Winter also explored economic change, firstly focusing on technological 
change, recently also beginning to touch institutional evolution; (3) The principle of 
“history matters”, or some variations of it including “sequence matters”, or “the past 
influences the future”, has been basically recognized by scholars in the historical 
traditional line, although different viewpoints of history or alternative models of 
historical sequencing coexist (Howlett and Rayner 2006)
13. Those who have argued that 
“history matters” have challenged this general conception of the historical temporality 
of social processes, and insisted that change or its outcomes in the economic, legal and 
social system is much more contingent rather than deterministic. The sources of 
contingency are not only individual actions in a given environment, but also more 
structural factors like historical timing or the “ordering” of relevant events (Howlett 
and Rayner, 2006; Pierson, 2000); (4) Scholars under the umbrella of historical analysis 
do not merely look at what happened in the past, and their processes, but immerse 
                                                        
12 But North limits himself in the undertaking of modifying neo-classical theory, Nelson and Winter go further and 
rejected the framework and core hypothesises of Neoclassical economics. 
13 Howlett and Rayner (2006) evaluate four general models of historical change processes which have emerged in 
various fields in the social sciences – namely stochastic, historical narrative, path dependency and process 
sequencing.  
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themselves more into exploring particularly temporal relationships among variables. 
This means that they not only made historically-grounded investigations, but also 
readily developed a sharper and broader explanation of the origins, variety, and 
dynamics of systems of economy, technology, and regulation. To do so, in the case of 
studies in path dependence, identification of crucial events (like initial conditions, 
critical juncture and their corresponding results) is of much importance (Pierson, 2000; 
Mahoney, 2000). In other words, the timing and sequencing of significant events and 
the genesis of variety indicate a great deal for scholars who devote themselves to 
historical or evolutionary study. 
2.1.2 Bringing History to Economic Geography 
In one sense, the recent emerging evolutionary thinking in economic geography and 
economics (David, 2001) can be seen as or a part of a broader, more catholic intellectual 
turn of a quest of history in social sciences. Accordingly, I find it useful to devote a few 
lines to historical thinking in economic geography.  
(1) Historical Thinking in the Economic Geography  
There is a long and distinguished history of historical thinking in the field of 
economic geography
14 and some economic branches such as development economics. 
For instance, in German geography, there is also a historical school, 
‘Kulturlandschaftsgenese’ up to the present which is a kind of path dependence 
investigation of cultural landscapes (Schamp, 1996). Martin and Sunley (2006, 2009) 
and MacKinnon (2008) have identified the history of history thinking in this theorizing 
line, but they reduced the historical turn in economic geography and regional 
development sciences to “path dependence thinking”
15, which narrows down the 
meaning of the concept of history. Here I will outline the main theoretical approaches 
that have ever involved into this wave of the “historical turn”, based on previous 
                                                        
14 Because of the fuzzy boundary of economic geography and the strong influence of some economics (for example 
development economics in 1950s, and New Economic Geography pioneered by Krugman and Fujita) on economic 
geography, the term of economic geography I use here includes “economic geography”, development economics to 
some degree, regional science and other subjects that study spatial and geographical issues of economic activities. As 
to New Economic Geography, I totally agree with Martin that New Economic Geography’s models (the work of 
Krugman as representative) are better characterised as economics than as geography (Martin, 1999), actually 
Krugman himself never claims that he is a geographer, but considering that New Economic Geography also deal with 
geographical issues, for instance, economic agglomeration in geographical space, and the core-periphery structure of 
the global economy (see Fujita and Krugman 2004), and deepened our outstanding, New Economic Geography could 
be included. 
15 Evidently, the problem of the replacement of “history matters” by path dependence study is associated with a 
fundamental question of “what is history” and “can historical study be reduced to the path study”. Briefly speaking, 
my argument is that path dependence study is merely a small piece of the grand field of history-oriented research. I 
will go back to this problem later.   
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studies, including Martin and Sunley (2006, 2009), MacKinnon (2008), and Schamp 
(1996). 
In the 1950s and 1960s, Myrdal, Hirschman, Kaldor and others, who were 
influenced by Thorstein Veblen, explained uneven spatial development with the concept 
of cumulative causation (O’Hara, 2002; MacKinnon, 2008). The research on industry 
life cycles (see Chapman, 1992) which is a concept derived from the product cycle 
model (Vernon, 1966), could be probably included in this wave as well. Marxist 
economic geography in the 1980s, which views uneven regional development as a 
historical process, is also a remarkable school in the wave of ‘historical turn’. Massey 
(1984) argued that the new spatial divisions of labour, partly resulted from economic 
imperatives, are determined by broad changes in social and political struggle and 
transformation; and that the legacies of its past exert an influence on the present and 
future development (see, Martin and Sunley, 2009). Inspired by Marx’ concept of 
“surplus capital”, Harvey used (is still using) a similar terminology of ‘spatial fix’ based 
on his approach of “historical-geographical materialism” to explain the instability and 
geo-political dynamics of capitalism (Harvey, 1982, 1985, 2006). But this research was 
too concerned with changing forms of uneven development over time rather than 
directly focusing on evolutionary processes (Boschma and Martin, 2007; MacKinnon, 
2008). 
The contemporary economic geographers have also been swept up in this wave of 
‘historical thinking’. A number of leading theorists in the subject have argued that 
“history dependence” is one of the fundamental features of the economic landscape. For 
example, Storper and Walker stated that “Localized technological change in an industry 
can be understood, like all industrial development, as an evolutionary path in which each 
step moves one way from a past that cannot be recovered and that limits future 
directions” (1989, p. 113). Richard Walker (2001) himself further explained that: 
“One of the most exciting ideas in contemporary economic geography is that industrial 
history is literally embodied in the present. That is, choices made in the past – 
technologies embodied in machinery and product design, firm assets gained as patents 
or specific competencies, or labour skills acquired through learning – influence 
subsequent choices of method, designs, and practices.… It does not mean a rigid 
sequence determined by technology and the past, but a road map in which an 
established direction leads more easily one way than another – and wholesale reversals 
are difficult. This logic applies to industrial locations as well…” (p: 126).
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Allen Scott (2006) has a similar argument that any attempt to understand the 
economic landscape  
“must formulate the problem by reference to a dynamic of cumulative causation whose 
logic is definable not in terms of some primum mobile or first cause, but in terms of its 
own historical momentum. This… points… to the importance of an ontology of regional 
growth and development that is rooted in the idea of path dependent economic 
evolution and cumulative causation.” (p: 85). 
There are two distinct terms of “economic geography” to treat history in 
understanding the significance of history in economic landscape. One is the ‘new 
economics geography’ (NEG), associated particularly with the economist Paul 
Krugman (for example, Krugman, 1991a; 1991b). The other is “Evolutionary Economic 
Geography”, which is fundamentally different in basic standpoints from the former. 
Advocators of NEG recognise that ‘history matters’ in regional convergence and 
divergence processes and their models incorporate notions of path dependence, 
increasing returns as well (for a more detailed review, see Martin and Sunley, 2006). 
For example, Krugman emphasizes the importance of history in explaining observed 
patterns of industry location and growth in the sense of initial location patterns which 
then become locked in by path-dependence generated by processes of cumulative 
causation:  “The long shadow cast by history and accident over the location of 
production is apparent at all scales, from the smallest to the largest … this clear 
dependence on history is the most convincing evidence available that we live in an 
economy closer to Kaldor's vision of a dynamic world driven by cumulative processes 
than to the standard constant-returns model” (Krugman, 1991a, p: 9-10). However, 
history (as his concept of geography) is an abstract notion in Krugman’s formal models 
of urban agglomerations or regional production systems. Namely, in the model of NEG, 
history is oversimplified to “small historical accidents”, there is little attention paid to 
history in the sense of change and development, as Martin and Sunley (1996) have 
pointed out: “He claims that the same broad locational forces which explain the growth 
of nineteenth-century concentrations also underlie the continued tendency to 
agglomeration. Indeed, this is one reason why he is reluctant to emphasize 
technological spillovers as a key determinant of contemporary clusters.” (Martin and 
Sunley, 1996, p: 269). Furthermore, new geographical economics still retains some 
conceptual apparatus of mainstream (orthodox) economics, requiring explanations 
based on methodological individualism, full information, utility-maximizing individuals  
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and profit maximizing firms
 16(Scott, 2006; p:60; also see Martin 1999). Accordingly, 
Krugman’s approach can be considered as a recent extension of neoclassical thought to 
explain trade, specialization and agglomeration, relaxing the frequently used 
assumptions of perfect competition and constant returns to scale (Boschma and 
Frenken, 2006a), questions such as the changing balance between the spatial 
concentration and dispersal of industries over time are the main issue of attention rather 
than evolution per se.  
Evolutionary economic geography claims even more emphatically that its basic 
concern is with
  “the processes by which the economic landscape – the spatial
 
organization of economic production, distribution and consumption – is transformed 
over (real, I add) time..…is both with the ways in which the forces making for economic 
change, adaptation and novelty shape and reshape the geographies of production, 
distribution and consumption, and with how the spatial structures and features so 
produced themselves feed back to influence the forces driving economic evolution” 
(Boschma and Martin, 2007, p: 3), so it can be seen as part of the broader “historical 
turn” in social sciences. This new school of economic geography theory which derived 
from evolutionary economics and complexity science (Boschma and Martin, 2007; 
Martin and Sunley 2007), makes efforts to better understand uneven development and 
adaptive transformation of the economic landscape over time. This new approach 
blends Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary theory of the firm, Generalised Darwinism 
based on the evolutionary principles of variety, selection and retention (Essletzbichler 
and Rigby, 2007), concepts such as path dependence (Martin and Sunley, 2006) and 
coevolution (Schamp, 2009), and self-organization in complexity theory (see, Martin 
and Sunley, 2007). Evolutionary economic geography, based on more realistic 
assumptions concerning the agent (bounded rationality, imperfect information) tries to 
understand the historical far-from-equilibrium process or dynamics of changing 
economic landscape. Although the institutional economic geography and relational 
economic geography also admit the importance of history in the formation and 
evolution of institutions and social networks, they are silent on the dynamic process of 
                                                        
16 Marchionni distinguished between realism and realisticness and argued that despite of the above mentioned 
“unrealistic assumptions” of geographical economics, their representations of the core of real-world phenomena 
might nonetheless be approximately true (Marchionni, 2004, p. 1742).What is I have to say is that the attitude of 
economic geographers to new economic geography should be more tolerant, not acridly captious and endless attack, 
because new economic geography is the only friendly field in economics to geography which attempts to incorporate 
the role of space into conventional economics. A friendly and tolerant dialogue atmosphere in which distinct 
theoretical, methodological and epistemological genres can be accommodated is conducive to deepen our 
understanding of the geography in economy, which is a joint mission of economists in new economic geography and 
geographers.  
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economic landscape, at least not evidently. Hence, evolutionary economic geography 
could be the only one ‘evolutionary school’ in economic geography, which really 
contributes to understand a historical and non-equilibrium process of changing 
economic landscape. Here, I must stress that what is new  in evolutionary economic 
geography is not its research contents, but a special perspective; i.e. the evolutionary 
perspective opens up a new way
 of thinking about what is arguably the central concern 
of economic
 geographers – firm location, uneven geographical distribution of economic 
activities
17 (Boschma and Martin, 2007, p: 2). At the same time, just as Boschma and 
Martin (2007) and Boschma and Frenken (2006a) said, evolutionary economic 
geography is still under construction, we have a lot to do until it becomes an established 
field. This section of my dissertation tries to construct the historical methodology for 
evolutionary economic geography, by elevating history to the methodological 
foundation of evolutionary economic geography, on which concrete research methods 
should be based. Before discussing on what kind of history evolutionary economic 
geography needs, I would like to illuminate how important it is to introduce history into 
economic geography, both theoretically and methodologically; and how to avoid the 
risk of over-emphasis to empirical and historical evidences. 
(2) Significance of Bringing History into Economic Geography 
The significance of bringing history into economic geography lies in at least three 
aspects. Firstly, history is one of the main intellectual sources, for both theorists and policy 
makers. As Schumpeter advised us 50 years ago, “Nobody can hope to understand the 
economic phenomena of any epoch, including the present, who has not an adequate 
command of historical facts and an adequate amount of historical sense or of what may be 
described as historical experience.” (Schumpeter, 1954, p: 12). At the same time, history 
can allow us to see how economic change occurs through the changing relationship 
between economic and non-economic variables; the inspiration from history could be 
helpful when we are confronted with the uncertain future. 
Secondly, notwithstanding economic geography today is optimistically viewed as a 
rising star of the social sciences (see, Ashby, Monk and Monk, 2007), it looks still like a 
clumsy dwarf standing by the giant of economics. That is related to the fact, at least to 
                                                        
17 Boschma and Frenken (2006) argued that the key issues addressed in evolutionary economic geography are the 
spatial evolution of firm dynamics, the spatial evolution of clusters, the spatial evolution of industries, the spatial 
evolution of networks and the evolution of urban/regional systems. However, I would like to add the evolution of 
institutions at these three levels of aggregation to the key issues of evolutionary approach to economic geography. 
My added issue has begun to be the recent research focus of evolutionary economic geographers, for instance 
Boschma and Frenken (2009) and Schamp (2005).  
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some degree, that economic geographers have not devoted much to historicity or 
temporality of economic geography for a long time (maybe Marxist economic 
geography in the 1980s is one exception). Regional or geographical speciality, rather 
than general and abstract economic theoretical questions, has been at the heart of 
economic geography. Temporality is also an important dimension of any entity, equally 
important to spatiality. More attention to history would be helpful to elevate economic 
geography to the status of a real star of the social sciences.  
  Last but not least, bringing history into evolutionary economic geography is 
meaningful for methodology. Methodology here refers to the rationales and the 
philosophical assumptions that underlie a particular study and data collection, rather than 
specific scientific methods. I agree that diversified theoretical approaches and analysis 
tools can co-exist in evolutionary approach, but they should be built on a fundamentally 
unified methodology. Methodologically, the historical research method is the foremost 
important approach of the evolutionary economic geography. Murmann’s book (2003) 
“knowledge and competitive advantage: the coevolution of firms, technology, and national 
institutions”, gave an outstanding example
18. In short, the quest for change and 
transformation of economy should be based on the utilization of historical evidence, and 
focus on a dynamic process. Accordingly, bringing history into economic geography could 
make a valuable contribution to the construction of “historical” methodology and 
evolutionary economic geography. 
(3) A Historical Lesson for “Being Historical” in Economic Geography 
The major theoretical sources of evolutionary economic geography seem to be 
more and more obvious. For example, two advocators of evolutionary economic 
geography, Ron Boschma and Ron Martin, believe that both Darwinian evolutionary 
theory (variety, selection, retention and the like) and complexity theory (emergence, 
self-organization, dissipation, criticality, ‘far-from-equilibrium’, co-evolution) would be 
main intellectual sources for constructing this new school of evolutionary economic 
geography (see Boschma and Martin, 2007; Martin and Sunley 2007). There is however 
a debate within evolutionary economics itself about its theoretical sources and 
precursors
19. And so the discussion continues. No evolutionary scholars, however, can 
                                                        
18 Comparative historical research method might be a more appropriate term for Murmann’s study. My argument here 
is historical research method is more important than a comparative one, methodologically, for that study of process. 
19 For this debate, see Hodgson (1993), Witt (2003), Metcalfe (1998), among others. The commonly acknowledged 
forerunner of evolutionary economics might include C. Darwin, K. Marx, E Engel, H. Spencer, A. Marshall and Carl 
Menger, and T. Veblen, J. Schumpeter, and E Hayek, and Schumpeter. It is worth noting, nobody of the pre-
Nelson/Winter (1982) economist prepared a comprehensive theory for explaining the evolution of Economy.  
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deny that the German Historical School of Economics has had a heavy influence on 
evolutionary economics, through Schumpeter (Reinert, 2000; Reinert and Daastøl, 
1997; for a detailed explanation, also see Michaelides and Milios, 2008), and even 
today this old school is still nourishing evolutionary scholars.  
In fact we can find that their writings on evolutionary economics and German 
historical school of economics have several common characteristics, including minimal 
explicit reliance on mathematics, rejection of universal laws and principles and more 
emphasis on spatio-temporal specificity of economic theory, abjuration of atomism and 
reductionism, and predilection for holism and organicism. My motivation here is not to 
make a detailed explanation of the historical influence of the German historical school 
on evolutionary economics (see, Hodgson, 1993, 2001; also Shionoya, 2001; Howey, 
1982, for this topic)
20, but to stress that the German historical school of economics not 
only offers theoretical inspirations, but also would give methodological illuminations 
for evolutionary study, in both economics and geography. Now I will turn to another 
issue, the methodological illuminations from the German historical school and her 
followers.  
I believe that there are at least two points as follows: (1) The German historical 
school rejected the universal validity of economic theorems and insisted on the 
historical (and, we might add, geographical, because German Historical School places 
emphasis on nation- specific policy) specificity of economic theorems; evolutionary 
thinking also views economy as contexts-specific (including culture-spatio-temporal-
specific). Evolutionary scholars should equally have a sense of history as German 
historical economists. (2) The German historical school heavily critiqued the deductive 
approach of the classical economists, especially the writings of David Ricardo, and 
employed abundant historical material to make careful empirical and historical analysis. 
They denied what Schumpeter later called “the Ricardian vice” (Schumpeter 1954, p: 
569). The Ricardian vice is prevalent in economics, named after David Ricardo, one of 
the first economists to bring mathematical rigor to the discipline, and refers to the 
                                                        
20 The German historical school has ever had so wide influence in history. For example, it had in part contributed to 
the emerging American institutional economists in the early part of the twentieth century (Hodgson, 2001, p.xüi), but 
also it exercised an influence on today’s economics, particularly so-called heterodox economics such as evolutionary 
economics. Heterodox economics normally refer to a category of unorthodox economic traditions or schools. 
Orthodox economics is “mainstream economics” or the Walrasian tradition which has largely developed from the 
neoclassical economics in the late 19th century, benchmark by Alfred Marshall. Today, Heterodox economics include 
Post-Keynesian economics, (old) Institutional and Evolutionary, Behavioral, Ecological, Feminist, Social, Socio, 
Marxist, Radical Marxian and Austrian economics. For more information, see the Heterodox Economics Web, 
http://www.orgs.bucknell.edu/afee/hetecon.htm.  
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tendency for economists to introducing utterly bold assumptions into an already 
oversimplified representation of the complex economy and resulting in theories that are 
mathematically beautiful but largely useless for practical applications. By the way, we 
should note here that mathematical method as a tool is good for understanding the 
economic laws; and what is actually against is the abuse of mathematics, namely, 
abstract model-building and mathematical formulas with unrealistic assumptions and 
too much dependence on mathematics. But we can't go to another extreme – what we 
might call “the vice of historians” – over-attention to empirical and historical 
evidences, and blindly rejecting generalizing economic laws. In this sense, evolutionary 
scholars should have enough historical knowledge and depend more on historical 
evidences, meanwhile should shake off a vice of indulging ourselves with countless 
historical data. 
2.1.3 “Being Historical” and Evolutionary Economic Geography 
(1) Evolutionary Study Needs History 
Evolutionary economics as heterodox economics has borrowed some biological 
metaphors from natural sciences and employed population thinking and systematic 
thinking to study economic processes of economy instead of its final results. 
Evolutionary scholars, both in economics and economic geography, state that novelty 
(innovation) is the fundamental driving force of economic changes. Thus, evolutionary 
economists participate in research on issues in the range of innovation-related fields 
including, but not limited to industrial evolution, national innovation system, etc. 
Economic geography, as a field of study on the uneven distribution of economic 
activities in space, surely has made an attempt to apply evolutionary economics into 
economic geography to probe into the changes in economic landscape. 
Evolutionary economics focuses on the processes rather than consequences (Witt 
1993b; Shiozawa, 2004). Witt (2002, p: 10)
21 summarizes the main characteristics of 
evolutionary economics, which, in my opinion, can be partly applied to evolutionary 
economic geography, as follows: (1) historical: it concentrates on historical processes 
and transitions from one state to another over time which are irrevocable and path-
dependent (Witt, 2002, p: 10); (2) dynamic: an evolutionary explanation needs to 
                                                        
21 Aside from the previous two characteristics I have already quoted here, an additional one in Witt (2002) work is 
self-transformation explaining—in that it includes hypotheses relating to the source and driving force of the self-
transformation of the system. But my argument for this point is that the system thinking canot be viewed as a 
common feature that all branches in evolutionary economics share, because part of evolutionary economist employ 
biological analogy. For the detailed explanation, see Chapter 2.2.1.  
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identify units of transmission, sources of variation, mechanisms and processes of 
transformation, and sources of isolation (Durhan, 1991, p: 22); (3) another 
characteristic should be added specifically for economic geography, namely, 
geographical. In contrast to evolutionary economics which to a large extent ignores the 
dimension of “geography” of the evolution of systems (with the exception of a few 
innovation system scholars, for example, Lundvall, 1988), evolutionary economic 
geography “takes history and geography seriously by recognizing the importance of 
place-specific elements and processes to explain broader spatial patterns of technology 
evolution” (Essletzbichler and Winther, 1999, p: 180). In sum, “being historical” and 
“being geographical” are two necessary conditions, while “being dynamic” is the 
sufficient condition of evolutionary economic geography. Thus, “being historical” is 
quite indispensable to evolutionary study. 
(2) A Crisis in the Methodological Construction of Economic Geography 
Over the last couples of years, economic geographers and economists have started 
to make joint efforts to deal with geographical issues. During the dialogues between 
two camps, geographers learned much more from economists than economists from 
them. The international community of economic geographers has recently made a large 
number of theoretical achievements and empirical work that can’t be neglected even by 
economists. Unfortunately，the methodological issue of economic geography was 
hitherto taken less into consideration (but with a few exceptions. e.g. Clark, 1998; 
Yeung, 1997, 2003; Markusen, 1995; Schoenberger, 2001, and Tickell et al., 2007).  
Just as Trevor Barnes and his colleagues said in their new book “Politics and 
Practice in Economic Geography”, in the last two decades “economic geography has 
passed through a series of far-reaching cultural, institutional and relational ‘turns’ ” 
(evolutionary could be added to here). However, its objects, subjects, means of study 
and research practices have been repeatedly overhauled, but, questions of method – the 
how and why of research – have been only fitfully (re)considered (Tickell et. al, 2007, 
p: 2). The lack of methodological consideration will definitely be a big danger to the 
advance of economic geography.  
Methodology in scientific research plays an equally important role as 
philosophical and epistemological foundation, and the construction of basic concepts. 
Any subject or school neglects its methodological construction, especially at its very 
beginning; thus, it will be involved into a disadvantageous situation in the competition  
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of scientific concepts. If we take a look at different fates of economic geography and 
economics, we can understand the importance. Economics has already become 
imperialistic today while economic geography had descended to a clumsy dwarf 
standing by the economic giant. Economists concern more about methodology than 
geographers, from the very start. Classic economists, from Smith to Marshall to 
Schumpeter, perceived the importance of methodology. Schumpeter’s history of 
economic analysis (1954) is one of the best illuminations of attempted efforts to offer 
systemic research methods for economics. In addition, methodological debate in 
economics has never stopped. It is the constant methodological fights that accelerated 
the advance of economics, at least partially. However, economic geographers seem to 
forget this momentous mission. This may be partly explained why economic geography 
is at the crossroads, and why it is embarrassing when economics and sociology break 
into its territory. 
Accordingly, back to the recently developed but potentially promising school in 
economic geography, what evolutionary economic geographers should urgently do at 
the start is not only to construct a theoretical framework (associated mainly with the 
work of Ron Boschma and his colleagues (for example, Koen Frenken), 
Eike.W.Schamp and Jurgen Essletzbichler, Ron Martin), conceptual reconstruction 
(benchmarked by Ron Martin and Eike.W.Schamp) and empirical work (in the case of 
spinoff, e.g. Steven Klepper), but also to make methodological reflection. I believe that 
historical methodology would be useful for evolutionary economic geography, and this 
mission of constructing of historical methodology is very pressing. Now I turn to the 
discussion on what kind of methodology evolutionary economic geography needs.  
(3) Research Methods in Evolutionary Economic Geography 
Evolutionary economic geography, rooted in economic geography and partially in 
economics and social economics, deals with issues regarding spatial evolution over time 
at micro, meso and macro levels, and calls for analytical innovations to better grasp the 
specificities of spatial changing processes at different levels over time. Due to the 
complexity of its study objectives, evolutionary economic geography relies on a 
combination of many research methods (Boschma and Frenken, 2006a, 2006b). The 
literature pools a wide set of very different contributions, including in-depth case 
studies (Garnsey and Heffernan, 2007), social network analysis (Glückler, 2007; 
Boschma and ter Wal, 2007; Giuliani, 2007, 2008), spatial econometrics (Essletzbichler, 
2007; Rigby and Essletzbichler, 1997), data envelopment analysis (Jacob and Los,  
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2007), complexity theory (Sorenson et al., 2007), gravity modeling (Maggioni and 
Uberti, 2007), and etc.  
Evolutionary economic geographers seem to open all research methods, including 
mathematical modeling and case study. However, such massive hybridization of 
multifarious methods has left evolutionary economic geography rather analytically 
adrift. The direct application of research methods without any reflective consideration is 
not unproblematic, thus geographers should apply concepts to geography with caution. 
In fact, the reconstruction of research methods is as important as the theoretical 
remaking of evolutionary concepts like Martin and Sunley (2006) and Schamp (2009) 
did. Since no methodology is a panacea, this principle of “no one fits all” can likewise 
be applied to methodology. Methodology in evolutionary economic geography should 
be diversified. The reason for the decline of the German Historical School in the 
Methodenstreit with Carl Menger and the Austrian School at the end of the 19th 
Century is that the German Historical School fell in absolutism that historical research 
method had absolute advantage over others. We should keep this lesson in mind and 
need other methodologies to complement the first and most important methodology of 
evolutionary approach. 
(4) Methodological “Being Historical” for Evolutionary Economic Geography 
Studying historical or evolutionary processes requires historical data, but the 
essential difference between historical studies and ahistorical studies is not whether 
historical data is used, but how to use historical data. Merely listing time series data 
does not lead to an evolutionary study. Ahistorical studies in which longitudinal data are 
also employed have rarely studied with an explicit concern for the mechanisms 
involved. The evolutionary approach cares more about an explication of the underlying 
mechanisms at work. This debate involves the following questions, what is “history”, 
how to treat history, and how to study history.  
To address these questions, we need to distinguish between historical 
methodology and historical method at first, which are partly related to each other but in 
fact are quite distinct concepts. The distinction would be useful for understanding what 
kinds of study under the label of evolutionary or historical is evolutionary economics or 
a really historical study in social sciences more generally. The historical method refers 
to the concrete techniques, by which the historians gather data (primary sources and 
other evidence) in quest of history. However, historical methodology is more than a  
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simple set of methods; it refers to the rationale and the philosophical assumptions that 
underlie a particular study. The historical methodology is associated with two questions 
of what does history mean and how history is incorporated in economic model, since 
the historical evidence is never conclusive. Historical fact does not prove theory, while 
true-explanation is always hypothetical and fact is observed in the light of theory. 
Despite of the “under-determination of theory by evidence”, science gets results in 
conformity with ground rules of method. 
Defining the History 
Collier and Mazzuca (2004, p: 473-374) summarize that time has four notions, 
taking history in political analysis as instance: firstly, history as period refers to the fact 
that phenomena are located within some socially defined interval of time; secondly, 
history as conjuncture  indicates a temporal coincidence of a potentially limitless 
number of forces, actors, structures, and events, including the accidental and the 
contingent; thirdly, timing,  namely, the fact that phenomena may occur in different 
sequences and with different temporal spreads; and the fourth temporal idea involves 
changing over time, including the unfolding of a series of different but interconnected 
events, the longitudinal trajectory of single factors, and the speed of a process or 
change. 
Being in Historical Time 
More importantly, the term ‘historical’ in historical analysis denotes historicity 
inherent in economic phenomena, which is common with the German Historical 
School. The distinction is not the one between history and theory, but rather the one 
between ahistorical study and historical study (see, Dopfer, 2001, p: 162). Foster 
summarized the difference between historical-evolutionary study and ahistorical one in 
saying that time irreversibility, absence of equilibrium, structural instability and 
fundamental uncertainty are features of historical processes, as stressed by many 
evolutionary economists, but they are not to be found in ahistorical biological analogies 
(Foster, 1997, p: 448-449, also Hodgson, 2002, p: 262 ). I want to say that the most 
basic distinction is the different viewpoint of time (or how to treat history).  
Although some ahistorical studies have a series of historical events and temporal 
periods that can be measured by physical time-distance, ahistorical analysis can 
determine a time path, for instance “a continuous accumulation of capital, or a 
particular pattern of fluctuations” (Robinson, 1962, p: 23), this kind of study cares less 
about the temporal and causal ordering of phenomena unfolded over history, namely  
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longitudinal trajectory that tracks changes of a single factor over time. This could be 
related to the temporal viewpoint of ahistorical studies. In ahistorical studies, all points 
in time are treated the same (temporal homogeneity), and disconnected from all other 
points (non-history dependent), which is defined by Robinson as “the logical time” 
(Robinson, 1962, 1979). In her contributions to time-in-economic- theory, Joan 
Robinson (1962, 1979) made a distinction between logical and historical time, 
addressing the problem of interpreting the historical process of accumulation as a 
movement from one equilibrium position to another, a sequence of equilibrium 
positions, or a progression along an equilibrium path (Harris, 2005, p: 93). In reference 
to the process of economic modeling, she claimed that, “in a model depicting 
equilibrium positions there is no causation. It consists of a closed circle of simultaneous 
equations. The value of each element is entailed by the values of the rest.” (Robinson, 
1962, p: 26). 
At any moment in logical time, “the past is determined just as much as the future” 
(Robinson, 1962, p: 26). In other words, “tomorrow” is always like the “past” and 
known for certainty (temporal homogeneity or time reversibility) in logical time. 
Therefore, decisions taken today in anticipation of future events are always confirmed 
by future events (historical determinism). As Robinson (1980, p: 219) pointed out, 
however, ‘today’ is influenced, but not completely bound, by the past. Any action or 
decision taken today is either the result of blind habit and convention or is directed 
towards its future consequences, which cannot yet be fully known (history-dependent 
but not fully determined by history). The viewpoint mirrors her idea of “historical 
time”
22: “In a historical model, causal relations have to be specified. Today is a break 
in time between an unknown future and an irrevocable past. What happens next will 
result from the interactions of the behaviour of human beings within the economy. 
Movement can only be forward.” (Robinson, 1962, p: 26) 
In historical time, the , ‘arrow of time’ points only one way (irreversibility), which 
means that there is strictly one-way traffic, time moves forward, and events occur in a 
uni-directional sequence in which ‘today is a break in time between an unknown future 
and an irrevocable past’ (Robinson, 1962, p: 26). At any instant, the past is irrevocable 
                                                        
22 The historical time in economic theory has a long and reputable history. For instance, an interest in the implications 
of historical time can be found in Austrian, and Institutional economics, Keynes and the Post-Keynesian school 
(Setterfield, 1995). Perhaps, it is true that no model can be truly faithful to being historical in a strict sense, partially 
because all models involve some level of abstraction, while history is so complicated that it is not impossible to be 
abstracted and decomposed, so all are unrealistic by definition. Nevertheless, some models may be less unrealistic 
than others by virtue of the types of abstractions they make, and also less ahistorical.  
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and the future in some sense open (Curry and Barnes, 1988, p: 146). Furthermore, “any 
event occurring in the present exists in the context of a given and immutable series of 
prior events corresponding to the periods which make up the past.” (Setterfield, 1995, 
p: 3) and also is contextualized by current conditions.  
History as Context 
Historical study, just as Dopfer (2001, p: 161) addressed evolutionary analysis, is 
not truly ‘history friendly’ when it refers to context, which could be understood as what 
“surrounds” a single phenomenon. Therefore, context is distinct from the single 
phenomenon itself, which can be seen as either a single event and a process or a causal 
relation.  
Table 2.1:  Logical versus historical time 
  Logical Time  Historical Time 
Directionality of Time  Reversibility  Irreversibility,  One-Way, 
Move Forwards 
Nature of Time  Homogeneity  Heterogeneity 
Time Intensity of Action  Instantaneous  Discreteness, Lags, Inertia 
Expectations Correct  Foresight  Future  Unknowable 
Change Disembodied  Embodied,  Path-Dependent 
Equilibrium Or Dynamic  Equilibrium  Dynamic 
        Source: modified from Harris (2005, p: 98) 
The reasons of taking context into account in understanding the historical 
phenomenon of primary interest might be premised on the idea that economic events 
are dependent on initial and boundary conditions, which are, in turn, influenced and 
shaped by those events (Dopfer, 2001, p: 163). Economic phenomena or processes 
should be understood as the thing occurring in many discrete space and discrete time 
contexts (spatio-temporal heterogeneity), not in homogeneous space or homogeneous 
time (Potts, 2001). Even a contingent event is not determined by chance but has an 
inherent dynamic that must be recognized as endogenous in its historical nature. 
Here we should note that taking history as context denotes that a place- specific 
particularity of phenomena should be put more emphasis on. A place here is not only a 
point on the globe having a distinct material endowment, but also, or more important, a 
place with different embedded cultures, and institutions (e.g. politic- economic regime). 
To sum up, evolutionary economic geography, evolutionary economics as well,  
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not only requires time, the temporal period of historical phenomena, but also needs 
historical time and contexts of historical phenomena. The historical study can be 
regarded as a true evolutionary or historical study only if it emphasizes historical time 
and in the quest for the causation of historical events.  
2.1.4 Understanding Historical Evolution: Path Dependence and Path Creation 
(1) “History Matters” Can’t be Reduced to “Path Dependence”  
Despite of the increasing use of the concept of “history matters” or its derivative 
terminology and notions such as “path dependence”, or “path creation” by economists 
and geographers, some basic principles are still not clear yet. For example, the most 
often used terminology of “history matters” as if it is already self-evident and wholly 
unproblematic. As a consequence, this, what I want to call “the first principle of the 
historical turn in social sciences”, and related concepts, needs more time to make an 
extensive and detailed discussion. I will critically reflect in brief and draw on the 
established concepts to construct a novel model in order to account for change and non-
change in history.  
It seems that “history matters” has become a widely-used concept across a wide 
range of history-oriented research literatures, mostly through the notion of “path 
dependence”. However, history in economic processes or more general systems does 
not always matter (David, 2001), at least not in the same ways. Furthermore, the degree 
of the “importance”, as David (2001) has already addressed, should be attached to the 
particular category of path dependent dynamical processes, in the sense of what 
proportion of the changes occurring in the economy and how much ‘importance’ must 
be addressed by empirical inquiries. That appears to call for a careful examination of 
the degree of “historicity”, i.e. of the strength of the influence of the past in economic 
dynamics. David (2001) coined several terminologies of “weak history”, “moderate to 
mild history”, and “strong history” (see also Castaldi and Dosi, 2004). Actually, this 
unresolved question is associated with a fuzzy concept of history, namely of “what does 
history mean”. Very surprisingly, there has been little extensive or detailed discussion 
on this very fundamental issue of “history should be viewed in a highly abstract term, or 
as concrete historical events, or both”, at least not explicitly. Because history consists of 
small events over time, I would like to argue that history here refers to particular events 
that occurred in the historical past and their historical consequences, not to an abstract 
and whole history. Further, history is important because some important historical  
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events, not all events over time, are meaningful. Namely, some events are history 
dependent while others might be history independent or very week history dependent 
(during some period). More interesting for geographers, these seemingly similar 
historical events are very important for a specific region, while it means nothing for 
others. For example, there are numerous military stations of research and technology all 
over the world, but merely a few regions with a long root of military technology have 
become hi-tech company clusters, the most famous one among which is Silicon Valley 
in San Francisco Bay Area (see, Saxanian, 1994). It means that the degree of 
“historicity” is place-specific.  
In sum, historical research contributed so much to understanding the relationship 
between the present and the past, which partly owed to a number of theoretical and 
empirical studies on path dependence. But we should watch out for a dangerous trend 
that most authors use path-dependence to define simply “history matters”. Here it is 
very urgent to indicate that the first principle of social sciences, history matters, is much 
richer than this concept of “path dependence” in meaning. Therefore, we should have 
an alternative to understand how history matters.  
(2) Main Arguments of Path Dependence Theory  
Path dependence, a terminology widely used in understanding history in social 
sciences, has produced a variety of usages, even some misinformation, as Paul David 
(2001) himself complained. To avoid potential confusion here, I will confine path 
dependence theory to some classic discussions which will be shown later.  
Research on the concept of path dependence has been stimulated by Paul David’s 
long-term interest in seeking to understand technological trajectory, and also by Brian 
Arthur’s studies on non-linear economic processes. Today, besides the literature on 
economics and technology, there is another prominent way of thinking about path 
dependence, namely, the work of new institutional economists (advanced by Douglas 
North and Mark Setterfield), which focuses on institutional path dependence through 
time. Other branches of social sciences, including anthropology, history, political 
science, sociology, economics and management studies, also often employ the notion of 
path dependence (for an excellent review, see Martin and Sunley 2006). Some famous 
examples of path dependence in the field of industrial standards include the dominance 
of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard (David, 1985), the VHS video player (Cusumano 
et al., 1992) and the gauge of railway tracks (Puffert, 1991).   
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In his seminal work, Paul David (1985) illustrated through the now-famous case 
of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard that some new sub-superior technologies, for 
idiosyncratic and unpredictable reasons, can achieve an initial advantage over 
alternative, even more effective technologies, even if in the long run the alternatives 
would have been more efficient. This domination of sub-superior technologies is 
probably linked to several interrelated sources of feedback and reinforcement, namely, 
what David called QWERTY- nomics or Arthur’s various forms of increasing returns in 
generating path dependence in the economy (1994a, b). David (1985, p: 334) argues 
that there are three features of the evolving production system which were crucially 
important in causing QWERTY to become “locked in” as the dominant keyboard 
arrangement: technological interrelatedness (the reinforcing effects of complementarity 
and compatibility between different components of a technology and its uses), 
economies of scale (the benefits associated with the use of a technology), the quasi-
irreversibility of investments (the inertia of sunk costs arising from the difficulties of 
switching technology-specific capital and human skills to alternative uses). At the same 
time, somewhat different from but related with David, Arthur identifies four types of 
increasing returns: large fixed, initial, and set-up costs (which give the advantage of 
falling unit costs to increased output); dynamic learning effects (learning by doing, 
learning by interacting and learning by using all tends to entail positive feedbacks); co-
ordination effects (which confer advantages to ‘going along’ with other economic 
agents taking similar actions); and self-reinforcing expectations (where the increased 
prevalence of a product, process or practice enhances beliefs of further prevalence) ( 
also see Martin and Sunley 2006, p: 399).  
In the mode of path dependence, both Paul David and Brian Arthur, together with 
other proponents
23, highlight the importance of small, historically contingent 
‘accidents’ or ‘chance events’ which can have long-run effects on the future path of 
economic technologies, organizations and system. For instance, Arthur claimed, “Under 
constant and diminishing returns, the evolution of the market reflects only a priori 
endowments, preferences and transformation possibilities; small events cannot sway 
the outcome. . . . Under increasing returns, by contrast, many outcomes are possible. 
Insignificant circumstances become magnified by positive feedback to ‘tip’ the system 
into the actual outcome . . . The small events in history become important” (Arthur, 
                                                        
23 But they have difference, in a strict sense. For example, as Thelen (1999) pointed out that David emphasizes 
chance elements and essentially random factors in determining among an apparently very wide range of possible 
outcomes, but Arthur (1989) is overall more circumspect and nuanced.   
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1989, p: 127). As a consequence, “ ‘historical accidents’ can neither be ignored nor 
reality quarantined for the purpose of economic analysis; the dynamic process itself 
takes on an essentially historical character” (David, 1985, p: 332). This idea is akin to 
the concept of “first mover advantage”, in some sense.  
A clear logic is involved in strictly defined path dependent processes: once 
entered upon at a “critical juncture”, a path generates self-reinforcing or positive 
feedback processes (“increasing return effects”) that will stabilize and entrench it, 
turning it into a deterministic frame. That is, path dependent processes can be highly 
influenced by relatively modest perturbations at early stages, and once being plunged 
into a particular path (lock-in), however, systems are likely to find it very difficult to 
reverse course. This difficulty is connected to some of the above mentioned version of 
increasing returns. These increasing-returns economies often give rise to a third element 
in this literature, models of multiple equilibria. In the David type model of multiple 
equilibria dependence model, systems of technology and economy depend on their own 
historical developments which may be balanced on different equilibria (multiple 
equilibria, associated mainly with the work of Paul David). The concept of multiple 
equilibria constitutes a main difference from the traditional theory of the neo-classicists 
who take just one equilibrium into consideration, which is obligatorily met through 
market-mechanisms.  
(3) Challenges of Path Dependence 
Path dependence provides a unique and fertile analytical framework which can not 
only explain and assess the ever-changing adaptation process by characterizing 
economic action in a dynamic perspective but also appreciate the role of historic time. 
So, it should be considered as one of the most fruitful concepts within the field of 
evolutionary economics. But the concept is based on problematic simplifications 
(Sydow et al., 2005; Meyer and Schubert, 2007), so it confronted (and still is receiving) 
much challenges and criticisms.  
The first criticism concerns the philosophy of small or random events. The concept 
of “path-dependent” gives rise to the debate on the influence of chance versus necessity 
(see e.g. Kwasnicki, 1994). But path-dependence seems to go to an extreme. The so 
called small events may actually be so small and not so random and innocent after all 
(see, Bassanini and Dosi 2001; Sydow et al., 2005), but embedded in a more much 
broader socio-economic structure.  
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In addressing the emergence of Silicon Valley in Northern California, it is often 
believed that an accidental event – William Shockley (coinventor of the transistor) left 
from Bell Labs to found his own laboratory (Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory) in 
Mountain View (a city in Santa Clara County, in the U.S. state of California) in 1956
24 
and brought silicon to Silicon Valley – is very important to the success of the industry 
of silicon transistor in the 1970s and even the sequential domination of Silicon Valley 
over the world in the filed of information industry. However, this historical event is not 
random, not only for William Shockley himself (highly dependent on his personal 
experience, Shockley completed his secondary education in Los Angeles and earned a 
bachelor's degree in physics at the University of California at Los Angeles), and also 
deeply rooted in regional contexts (for example, the state of California had established 
high qualified research institutes in physics). From this aspect, we should turn to 
broader socio-economic surroundings in order to understand the necessity behind 
accidents.  
Moreover, path dependence scholars mostly view the emergence of novelty and 
new pathways to be serendipitous. It might be true that in some cases, for example, the 
discovery of penicillin might be a chance event, whereas, as a general rule reliance on 
random chance is not a good enough explanation for the creation of new pathways. 
Indeed, this problem is related to the second one. Namely, the path dependence concept 
leaves less space for the transformation of the path itself. Classical path dependence 
scholars also acknowledge the possibility of change, but hold it to be essentially rare 
and occurred in radical ruptures, namely, once a path is locked-in, and remains largely 
unchanged, path transformation is presumed to be highly unlikely except through rare 
radical ruptures or reorientations, which are often associated with violent external 
shocks (Djelic and Quack, 2007). This means that path breakthrough is wholly 
exogenous in this model of path dependence, and tends to grant little sense of agency to 
actors once a particular trajectory has been set in train (Grabher, 1993; Hassink, 2005). 
Consequently, there is still an unresolved critical issue in path study of why and how 
new pathways get started. More recent literature tries to fill this gap, so they move 
away from the simplistic and historically deterministic path dependence theory to 
alternatives. For example, Hudson (2005) used the notion of “path contingency”, which 
                                                        
24 Merely a point can tell us the powerful influence of Shockley Semiconductor Laboratory: Fairchild Semiconductor 
and Intel Corporation are both its spinoff. The former is a leading global provider of semiconductor technology and 
has had over 50 offspring companies in 1980s, while the latter is the world's largest semiconductor company and the 
inventor of the x86 series of microprocessors, the processors found in most personal computers. Hence, William 
Shockley is called the father of the transistor, and the father of the Silicon Valley.  
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better captures the economic development of North East England over the 19th and 
20th centuries in terms of how it was influenced by particular circumstances and events 
(rather than being driven by a clear historical logic).  
Last but not least, path dependence, the highly condensed concept of history 
importance, can’t so well reflect the richness of history, partly like what Sewell said 
“what has happened at an earlier point in time will affect the possible outcomes of a 
sequence of events occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell, 1996, p: 262). The 
keyword to be underlined here is “possible”, but not “necessary”. In much of path 
dependence literature, the historical study on the historically complicated causal 
relationship was simply reduced too much to a study on relatively deterministic chains 
of temporally ordered and causally ordered events, namely small events at critical 
junctures, and what Mahoney defined self-reinforcing sequences and reactive sequences 
(Mahoney, 2000)
25. Due to this kind of highly reduced focus, path dependence theory 
simply traces a specific set of historical events, mostly by ex post facto artificially 
imagined causal relation (which I want to call ‘a single path study’), which in turn 
results in the losing of something meaningful, in particular, the neglecting of the impact 
from the contemporary settings on historical events (similar to the concept of path 
interdependence of Martin and Sunly, 2006).  
Consequently, the recognition of properties of complexity in historical evolution 
of (technological economic and other) systems can aid to understanding the shift from a 
simple evolutionary perspective of change along a given trajectory (single path 
dependence) to evolution understood as an interactive change of one trajectory 
dependent on others (path interdependence, or co-evolution of paths). The more 
recently developed co-evolutionary theory would be useful for understanding the 
complexity in evolution of the real world. I will go back to this point later on. To 
understand how, how much, and in what way multi-paths become interdependent, in 
case of the formation of an industrial cluster, will be a main mission of my dissertation.  
In short, path dependence is a strong tool of “historical economics”, but its 
premises of rational choice and its basically deterministic structure evoke objections 
and raise intriguing questions. More seriously, path dependence arguments tend to focus 
                                                        
25 Mahoney (2000) developed two types of path dependent sequences: ‘self-reinforcing sequence’, and ‘reactive 
sequences’. The former is characterized by the formation and long-term reproduction of a given institutional pattern, 
which often demonstrate what economists call ‘increasing returns’. The latter are chains of temporally ordered and 
causally connected events. This kind of sequence is reactive in the sense that each occurrence within the sequence is 
a reaction to an earlier event. Thus, each step in the chain is dependent on prior steps, similar to the sunk cost 
approach.  
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on mechanisms that anchor and stabilize trajectories while pay less attention to the 
sources and mechanisms of change. It focuses mostly on past directions enclosing or 
restraining directions for coming changes (Mahoney, 2000), which I call “backwards-
looking” thinking. Since we live in a time of rapid, unpredictable, and novel change, I 
am fully convinced that it is very necessary to move to “forwards-looking” thinking, 
namely, to some issues, such as how to create a new path, on what degree a “new” path 
is dependent on an “old” one (the degree of path dependence) or another one (path 
interdependence), would be very important. Subsequently, I suggest that the notion of 
the path dependence concept requires modifications.  
(4) Path Creation and Path Inter-Dependence: Complementary to Path Dependence 
Some concepts emerged with the criticism on path dependence, and the most 
brilliant one among them are path contingency and path creation. The very concept of 
path-dependence provides much less insight into regional adaptation and adjustment 
than the concept of path-contingency developed by Ray Hudson (2005). The concept of 
path contingency “captures the character of the growth process, and in particular the 
transition from growth to decline, more adequately than does that of path dependency” 
(Hudson 2005, p: 583). This concept better expresses the possibilities of moving 
between as well as along developmental paths (Hudson, 2003; Hardy, 2002), but did not 
provide much knowledge about how to create a new path. Perhaps the notion of path 
creation developed by Raghu Garud and Peter Karnøe (2001) can fill this gap. 
The concept of path creation by Raghu Garud and Peter Karnøe (2001, 2003) is 
also based on the same fundamental assumptions to path dependence, for instance 
cumulative causation, increasing returns and history as an endogenous variable in path 
transformation, but makes a significant shift from “describing our past worlds” (the way 
of path dependence concept) to “shaping our current states” (the way of path creation 
notion) to create new futures. The creation of a new path perhaps benefits from 
conscious strategic choices, deliberate and mindful action, as what Garud and Karnøe 
(2001, 2003) term “mindful deviation” model, particularly of entrepreneurs. In this 
model of path creation, entrepreneurs are imagined as the powerful actors who can 
intentionally exercise strategic actions. In the process of deviating mindfully to create 
new paths, on the one hand, entrepreneurs dismember themselves from the existing 
cognitive structure, through overcoming their long-formed habits and cherished beliefs; 
on the other hand, they reframe their thoughts and actions around what will benefit the 
new path, and what will advance it forward (Pham, 2006, 2007).   
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Garud and Karnøe (2001, p: 2) criticized that proponents of a path dependence 
perspective often celebrate historical accidents to explain the emergence of novelty and 
relegate human agency to “choosing to go with a flow of events” that actors have little 
power to influence in real time. It means that the genesis of novelty becomes a black 
box and there is no role to human agency in path dependence theory. The concept of 
path creation by Raghu Garud and Peter Karnøe (2001, 2003) offers solutions for some 
of the problematic simplifications of path dependence, by placing the entrepreneur in 
the newly refined model. In the new model of path creation study, the genesis of 
novelty in path evolution is placed at the center. Hence, experimentation and 
exploration are necessary wherein any action is a probe into the world even as it is 
being created. Because experimentation is time-consuming, entrepreneurs must 
maintain control over the path, sometimes must be patient to wait for right time for new 
ideas to be refined even as new institutional and market preference structures co-evolve 
(Van de Ven and Garud, 1993). In this sense, path creation is a co-evolutionary process. 
So entrepreneurship requires an ability to mobilize time as a resource and control the 
speed of path change.  
The recently developed theory of path creation, i.e. the assumption that human 
agents have control over historical outcomes in real time, has a much longer genealogy, 
at least tracks back to the work of Marx, Veblen, and Schumpeter. But the popularity of 
path dependence in social science made us forget about these economists and their 
works in which human agency (e,g. entrepreneurs) has been placed at the center, for 
example, Schumpeter’s Creative Destruction. It is important to stress that a 
Schumpeterian entrepreneur is not an inventor, but an innovator (of new products, 
processes, organization mode and so) (McCraw, 2007). Accordingly, we can say that 
Schumpeterian entrepreneurs play a role as the creators of new path. Without these new 
path creators, capitalism would lose propulsion. The emergence of the theory of path 
creation reminds us once again of the significance of human agency in economic 
processes (Pham 2006, 2007). 
But we should note that despite of epistemological and ontological differences 
between path dependency and path creation (see Garud and Karnøe, 2001), both 
notions could be complementary, but not mutually exclusive to each other (Meyer and 
Schubert, 2007) in understanding path processes. The path dependence concept of 
Arthur and David places too much weight to history, and emphasizes the relevance of 
emergent and non-intended consequences of actions and the stochastic properties of the  
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resulting processes, but it inadequately characterizes the fragility of any path as it is 
produced and reproduced through micro-level practices where social rules and artifacts 
are enacted (consistent with the routine of Nelson and Winter). In contrast, the path 
creation notion by Garud and Karnøe stresses the deliberate influence of path 
developments through powerful (collective) actors (Meyer and Schubert, 2007). That is, 
what is new in the path creation model to the study of path is just adding the concept of 
actors with deliberate actions and their role, by which we can understand path processes 
better; in particular, path bifurcation, namely, how a new path in some sense is created. 
Path creation focuses on path breakthrough at critical junctures, however says very little 
about the following development trajectory of a path after it has been created. That is 
why we need a combination of both in understanding a path process.  
Value-Added of Path Creation in Path Study  
According to the principle of “history as context”, evolutionary or historical 
studies should place a system in real time, i.e., construct temporally joint “moving” 
pictures of events and surroundings rather than “snapshots”, and place more attention to 
interacting relations of entities and their surroundings over time. Technically, historical 
contexts can be explored through understanding overlapping multi-paths and interaction 
among them over time. So it is safe to say that the shift from a simple evolutionary 
perspective of changes along a given trajectory (single path evolution) to the co-
evolutionary thinking, in which evolution is understood as interactive changes between 
trajectories (path interdependence, or co-evolution of paths) can vastly enrich our 
understanding of complex social dynamics. 
As mentioned previously, the more recently developed co-evolutionary theory 
(e.g., Nelson, 1994
26; Witt, 1997; Helfat, 1994; Lewin and Volberda, 1999; Rodrigues 
and Child, 2003; Volberda and Lewin, 2003) is consistent with the Martin and Sunley’s 
concept of “path interdependence” (2006, 2009). According to Murmann’s definition 
(2003), co-evolution refers to “two evolving populations co-evolve if and only if they 
both have a significant causal impact on each other’s ability to persist” (Murmann 
2003, p: 210). The keywords to be underlined here are multidirectional causalities 
between micro- and macro-co-evolution, as well as between and across other system 
elements. Co-evolution can be understood as intertwined multidirectional causalities 
between multiple paths, or interactions between the evolving single theme and its 
                                                        
26 Although Nelson did not make explicit use of the notion of path dependence, their term of “natural trajectories” 
with regard to technological change has similar connotations.  
  52
surroundings (naturally, surroundings can be describes in terms of other paths). 
The concepts of path inter-dependence or co-evolution (among multiple paths) 
extend the path study which focused on an evolving single theme to multi-specific 
interactions between two or more populations, in which, the fitness of an evolving 
population depends not only on itself, but also on the state of other coevolving entities. 
It is becoming increasingly obvious that single-theme explanations for change and/or 
non-change of a single population, such as the concepts of path dependence and path 
creation (which I term “a single path study”), have reached their limit, and evolutionary 
scholars should adjust research strategies and take into account all interacting 
populations of organizations and environments where organizations survive, compete, 
and change.  
Co-evolution, together with the concepts that derived from it such as mutual 
adaptation (co-adaptation), becomes a powerful tool for inherently interacting 
populations. Different from a single-path study in which a certain population is often 
seen as an isolated entity and the environment as a parametrically fixed one, co-
evolutionary study emphasizes more on the interaction between genetically distinct 
populations and between the population and their environments. The concept reflects 
well the viewpoint that the world is complex, in which human cultural and social 
behaviors are not predictable, and human behavior is dynamically linked to its 
environment on a range of temporal and spatial scales (Winder et al., 2005, p: 355).  
There are at least two ways to understand path interdependence for economic 
geographers (Schamp, 2009; Martin and Sunley, 2009). Firstly, path interdependence 
involves interactions between industrial paths, as what Schamp terms “the co-evolution 
of two firm populations” (Schamp, 2009). As we know, economies are typically 
ensembles of overlapping sets of inter-related sectors (Metcalfe et al., 2006; also see 
Martin and Sunley, 2009). Secondly, path interdependence in a regional context would 
be interactions between different socio-economic “arenas”，including what Schamp 
(2009) calls “the co-evolution of populations of firms and institutional arrangements”, 
interactions between the broader local economic, technological and socio-institutional 
systems, and interactions between multi-geographical scales as well. Economic 
geographers have been interested in the phenomenon of co-localized firm (e.g. today’s 
industrial cluster), but at present, there are few empirical investigations on these kinds 
of path interdependence so that we have little knowledge about how far they can  
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effectively change the course of an industrial path, possibly by spinning off and the 
rising of market niches, and subsequently co-adaption between market, technology, 
industry, and institution. Therefore, studying path-interdependence should be put on the 
research agenda of evolutionary economic geographers as soon as possible, both 
theoretically and empirically (see Martin and Sunley, 2006 and 2009). 
2.2 Paradigm Shift from Evolutionary Approach to Coevolution 
Thinking  
2.2.1 Two Types of Evolutionary Economics  
Although evolutionary thinking has recently attracted increasing attention in 
economics (Dopfer and Potts, 2004,
 p: 195)
 and economic geography (Boschma and 
Martin, 2007), a single coherent body of concepts
 and methods can’t be observed in this 
emerging field, and appears to be a ‘massive
 hybridization in theory’ of evolutionary 
theory, complex systems theory, self-organization theory and agent-based 
computational theory (Dopfer and Potts, 2004,
 p: 195)
27. The hybridized theory at least 
incorporates Austrian, Behavioural, Original and New Institutional, Post-Keynesian and 
Schumpeterian economics and French regulation theory. At the same time, it is 
methodologically characterized by a great variety in tools and methods, many of which 
were not originated within economics or social sciences, but from thermodynamics, 
biology, systems theory, complexity theory, cognitive science, computer science and 
neuroscience. The advance in evolutionary economics is also associated with the 
important recent development in mathematical economics, the evolutionary game 
theory, and the work developed by the Santa Fe Institute in the United States, which 
entails applications of chaos theory and several other types of computer simulation. 
This situation is associated more or less with three facts: (1) the subject domain is non-
mechanistic, non-deterministic and unpredictable, complexity and open economic 
processes, which need a high-dimensional, non-linear dynamic perspective (e.g. Foster, 
2003; Lawson, 2003); (2) the sources of evolutionary theory in natural science, which 
enlighten evolutionary economists are numerous, and not unified; (3) evolutionary 
thinking itself, both in natural and social sciences, is evolutionary. Moreover, when 
applied
 and used in a context of human society, additional issues arise
 that reinforce this 
predicament, because a huge gap of evolutionary mechanisms exists in natural and 
                                                        
27 Hodgson (1999) pointed out the existence of ‘at least’ six main groups using this term.  
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human realms. 
(1) Biological Metaphor and Population Thinking  
Basically, there are two ways to understand the economic process inside 
evolutionary economics. One group consists of some evolutionary scholars who openly 
acknowledge and employ the biological metaphor, historically including Marshall, 
Veblen，and Nelson and Winter
28, Hodgson and Knudsen. There are some differences 
inside this line, however, for example, the original Nelson/Winter’s book (1982) draws 
on Lamarckian rather than Darwinian
  evolutionary ideas, while Hodgson and his 
colleagues (Hodgson and Knudsen, 2006a, 2006b) claim that an adequate explanation 
of the evolution of such a system must involve the three Darwinian principles of 
variation, inheritance and selection, and hence requires a generalized Darwinism. As a 
whole, they all appeal to biology as a source of inspiration and metaphor for a non-
mechanistic economics.  
Evolutionary economists who borrow biological metaphor to economics follow 
Darwin’s ‘population thinking’, reject typological thinking supported by neo-classical 
economists like Marshall. Darwin’s “population thinking” demarcates Darwin’s theory 
from the essentialist mechanics of Newton. The idea is implicit in works such as 
Penrose (1959) and Nelson and Winter (1982), and explicit in Metcalfe (1994, 1998). 
Population thinking maintains not only the change at the micro level which determines 
the aggregate results at the macro level, but also the macroeconomic policy and 
environment which influenced individuality, creativity and distinctness of individuals in 
the population (Mantzavinos, 2004). Adoption of population thinking means that the 
economy consists of heterogenous firms with different characteristics or traits that are 
distributed with a certain frequency. There is no one ‘typical’ individual agent, but 
unique and heterogeneous agents in the organic world of economy.  
(2)Anti- biological Metaphor and Complex System Thinking 
However, the other group argues that economists (e.g. John Foster, Ulrich Witt, 
and Matthias Ruth) should abandon biological analogy and favor an economic self-
organization approach (see Foster and Metcalfe, 2001 for an overview). For example, 
John Foster and Matthias Ruth directly reject the use of “biological analogies” in 
economics (Foster, 1997, p: 444; Ruth, 1996). Witt partially acknowledges evolutionary 
                                                        
28 Although the processes of selection, mutation and inheritance are invoked not as biological metaphors but as real 
economic processes, the authors nevertheless explicitly acknowledge that there is an analogy between bio-genetic 
process and firm dynamics.  
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biology
29 (see Hodgson, 2002, p: 263), but this group as a whole prefers to employ the 
theory of self-organization as the foundation for evolutionary economics. For example, 
Witt (1997, p: 489) says: “The theory of self-organization . . . provides an abstract, 
general description of evolutionary processes.” Foster seems to go further and argues 
that self-organization is an alternative to “biological analogy” (see Witt, 1997, p: 444; 
Foster, 1997).  
Different from population thinking, the self-organization approach is also used by 
some evolutionary economists who reject biological metaphors. The self-organization 
approach developed firstly in physical sciences, focused on the non-linear, ‘far-from 
equilibrium’ properties and structural transformation in natural realms. Entering the 
1990s, it and its varieties such as the “science
 of complexity” or “complexity theory” 
have diffused into economics (Anderson et al., 1988; Arthur,
 1999; Arthur et al., 1997; 
Metcalfe and Foster, 2004), and economic geography (Frenken
 and Nuvolari, 2004; 
Frenken, 2000)
 30. Actually, the thinking has a long history in economics, and has been 
presented in various guises by eminent economists such as Herbert Simon, Friedrich 
von Hayek, Gunnar Myrdal and Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, to name but a few. For 
instance, Georgescu-Roegen (1971) argued that the entropy law was the ultimate 
foundation of dynamic economic analysis. It is associated with the Santa Fe Institute as 
well which is dedicated to the study of complex systems. Recently evolutionary 
economists have employed a (complex) system approach (see Foster, 1997; Witt, 1997). 
A new notion of “complex adaptive systems” was coined, with a purpose bridging a 
system theory with the ideas of generalized Darwinism. According to Levin (2003), 
such systems have three properties: (1) diversity
 and individuality of components, (2) 
localized interactions
 among these components, (3) an autonomous process that uses
 
outcomes of those interactions to select a subset of those components
 for replication or 
enhancement.  
The opponents of biological metaphor or Darwinism in economics are afraid that 
the similar situation to Newton's mechanics controlling neo-classical economics would 
take place in evolutionary economics. However, Hodgson and Knudsen (2006a, b) 
insist that the Darwinian evolutionary philosophy is universal, namely, Darwinian 
principles of evolution can explain a wide range of complex material phenomena, from 
                                                        
29 Witt opens the door to evolutionary biology, notwithstanding only to admit biological mechanisms of variation, 
inheritance and selection among human individuals.  
30 For a brief review on this point, see Martin and Sunley (2007).  
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cosmic to social objects, despite of the distinction between a natural and economic 
domain. In addition, some supporters of biological metaphor (for example, Hodgson) 
fear that evolutionary economics would be deluged with the mathematical 
formalization and modeling
31 potentially caused by the self-organization theory.  
We should keep in mind that each approach has its own advantages and 
disadvantages, thus, there might be a third way to adopt, a combined approach of 
biological metaphor and self-organization/complex theory. Actually, the evolution of all 
open, complex systems needs to be understood in terms of the logic that Darwin used to 
explain biological evolution, as Foster’s microscopic selection mechanisms (1997, p: 
44). Witt himself (1996, p: 714) also argues that “Darwinism may even become a 
fruitful part of evolutionary economic theories, not through metaphorical use, but 
through direct application” (also see Witt, 1999, p: 30), which is in terms of 
understanding the biological evolution of human preferences (Witt, 1999, p: 27). Since 
“complexity is one of those ideas whose definition is an integral part of the problems 
that it raises” (Nicolis and Prigogine, 1989, p: 36), the complex theory would be useful 
to understand complexity at different levels of a structure in a single system. In 
economics, the idea of self-organization has a long tradition, associated with Austrian 
economics that was quite independently of natural science (see Witt, 1993c). Austrian 
economists have conceived processes of “spontaneous order” in the formation of 
economic structures, based on human creativity and diffused into economic 
organization and complexity through the transmission and storage of knowledge. Thus, 
the revitalization of older traditions in economics and political economy provides some 
useful insights for an ongoing nonlinear structural change of economic systems (Foster, 
1997), equally to biological metaphor in economics.  
2.2.2 Micro-Theory for Evolutionary Economics 
(1) Bounded Rationality  
In a neoclassical view, various types of economic agents (such as all consumers, 
or all firms) are assumed to be perfectly rational, regardless of specific circumstances. 
That is, economic agents have the same level of full rationality, of ability to recognize 
and implement both the best product mix and the best practice techniques (rational 
                                                        
31 Accurately speaking, what do evolutionary economists want to oppose is not the application of mathematical tools 
in economics, but the excessive concentration on formalization through mathematical simulations.In fact, some 
evolutionary scholars including Nelson and Winter themselves employ mathematical simulation in studying 
economic evolution.  
  
  57
agent). This is at crux of many recent critiques of neoclassical theory from heterodox 
economics. Evolutionary economics stands on the opposite side of mainstream 
economics and also criticizes neoclassical economics for taking for granted that 
economic phenomena are based on rational choices of profit-maximizing firms and 
utility-maximizing agents, presuming that economic agent is perfectly or absolutely 
rational and thus economic processes are totally deterministic. Hence, evolutionary 
economists argue that most decisions of firms and consumers are strongly restricted by 
their cognitive limits (bounded rationality), and that human decisions are made in a 
habitual manner. To be more specific, decision-making processes are programmed 
(Simon, 1979), and also generally bound by rules, norms and institutions. The most 
important part of the decision-making process is to find a problem, and then solve it, 
which is driven by the ability of the subjects to formulate and to solve it. Accordingly, 
the core of the decision-making process is therefore the activity of searching a solution 
to a problem. We should especially note here that bounded rationality (Simon, 1979) 
implies that the decision-making process is highly path-dependent and locked in the 
existing organizational routines, on the one hand; on the other hand, agents can create 
novelty by learning or searching, imitating and mutating of the fitter routines of other 
agents.  
In the evolutionary model, firms are presented as “repositories of productive 
knowledge” (Nelson and Winter 1982, p: 175), in which knowledge is stored, 
memorized, and applied in their operational routines. This kind of approach primarily 
maintains that organizational routines which developed from past experiences enable 
agents to cope with future complexity and uncertainty under the condition of bounded 
rationality, and that difference in organizational routines is the basis of a firm’s 
distinctiveness. Hence, the evolutionary approach adopts a historical perspective in 
which behaviour of agents or changes in the spatial structure is conditioned, but not 
determined by structures on the micro (routines of organizations) and macro-level 
(institutional and geographical structures).  
A path-dependent (or local) search is much more likely than an undirected and 
global search process, because in this early process agents already refer to the structures 
or structural properties of a social system (like the organization) and more or less 
consciously select one or another of many alternatives (Sydow et al., 2005). Different to 
the neoclassical economics in which all agents are assumed to be exactly identical 
(representative agent), evolutionary economics recognizes differences among agents  
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(heterogeneous agent). Economic agents are heterogeneous in knowledge, resources 
and organizational routines and never perfectly informed, and consequently tend to 
operate in a familiar way in order to reduce uncertainty and risk. It is increasingly 
recognized that heterogeneity in the organizational routines and in the productive 
technologies of firms is crucial for technological changes (e.g. Nelson and Winter 1982, 
Cantner and Hanusch 2001). In the case of my study, there are two interwined levels of 
heterogeneity. One is the heterogeneity of sectors (a population of firms), and another is 
that of firms. More specifically in my empirical study, I will take into account the 
differences not only between traditional Chinese medicine (TCM) sectors and other 
pharmaceutical sectors (mainly through comparison with the chemical pharmaceutical 
sector), but also among firms inside the TCM sector. Because new characteristics that 
frequently emerge at the industry level (a population of firms) are based on the 
continuously generated variations at the firm level, my evolutionary study of the 
Tonghua TCM sector will explore how the population changes, based on how much 
novelty at the firm level is generated. 
(2) Dynamic Capabilities 
Bounded rationality and unprogrammed decisions imply that learning, mostly 
based on interaction among (local) agents, becomes important. The issue is necessarily 
related to the dynamic capability theory of the firm. The dynamic capabilities’ literature 
tries to integrate the resource-based theory of the firm with dynamic and evolutionary 
views, and builds upon a theoretical framework founded on the work of Schumpeter 
(1934), Penrose (1959), Cyert and March (1963), Nelson and Winter (1982), Teece 
(1988). The resource-based view of the firm portrays firms as a collection of tangible 
and intangible assets, resources or competencies, which are tied to the firm and are 
difficult to be imitated by others. It argues that the firm’s competitiveness is determined 
by how resources are employed and in what manner the experiential knowledge of its 
personnel is developed and applied (Penrose, 1959). This approach has been criticized 
for ignoring factors surrounding resources, instead assuming that they simply “exist”. 
Considerations such as how resources are developed, how resources are integrated 
within the firm and how they are released have not been taken into this theorizing. 
Drawing on Nelson and Winter, the approach of dynamic capabilities attempts to link 
firm resources to its capabilities to its ever-changing environment, by adopting a 
process approach, with an aim of explaining how firms achieve and sustain competitive 
advantages despite an ever-changing environment. Consequently, Teece et al. (1997, p. 
516) define dynamic capabilities as “the ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure  
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internal and external competencies to address rapidly-changing environments”. The 
resource-based approach to the firm emphasizes the resource choice (the selecting of 
appropriate resources), while the dynamic capability perspective stresses resource 
development and renewal (Teece and Pisano, 1994; Teece et al., 1997; Eisenhardt and 
Martin, 2000).  
Teece (1988) describes a firm's competencies as a set of differentiated 
technological skills, complementary assets and organizational routines that provide the 
basis for a firm’s competitive capacities in one or more businesses. According to 
Chandler (1990), a firm gains competitive advantages through the making of three 
interrelated investments: (1) investment in production to achieve the cost advantages of 
scale and scope; (2) investment in product-specific marketing, distribution, and 
purchasing networks; (3) investment in the managerial talent and management structure 
to plan, coordinate, and monitor the firm’s often dispersed operations. The theory of 
dynamic capabilities of firm argues that all strategic investments are constrained by 
internal routines or standard operating procedures. These routines, already standardized 
solutions to specific problems, are deeply embedded in historical processes of the firm, 
hence they are not ready to be replicated or imitated by other rivals. In the dynamic 
capabilities view, the difference in routines is the most important heterogeneity, which 
makes firm performance different. As discussed in Nelson and Winter, standard 
operating procedure or organization routine is highly path-dependent in nature. But 
coping with a changing environment needs changes in routines, otherwise a successful 
firm finally fails, which means learning in the firm is an inherently organizational 
process. The existing routines determine how firms locate, identify, and make use of 
information and new resources. But learning, and searching new solutions and constant 
learning adds knowledge and information to current routines, and then changes its 
trajectory. The new routines allow the firm to respond to and exploit changing market 
environments. 
2.2.3 Key Evolutionary Concepts  
The evolutionary framework for the interpretation of economic dynamics, as 
some excellent evolutionary economists stated (e.g.Hodgson, 1995; Metcalfe, 1988; 
Nelson and Winter, 1982), must be built on core principles such as heredity, variation, 
competition and selection. In this dissertation, I will concentrate on the evolution of 
industrial cluster, a geographical level of sub-nation, but similarly, I hope, the 
arguments to be formed here can be equally used to understand the change of spatial 
pattern of economic activities at the national level in the following ways.  
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The economy at any moment in time comprises a population of firms. Firms are 
heterogeneous, each of which is identified by a unique combination of technological, 
organizational, and informational characteristics, as well as the legacy of past choices. 
This means routines of firms are different. As I previously discussed, a new firm 
inherits a subset of routines of its parents, at the same time it has to learn how to search 
new incremental or radical routines in order to survive and adapt itself to new 
environments (e.g. in terms of market and technology). Essentially, this process is a 
process of learning by doing, learning through interacting, trials and errors, and 
learning how to learn. Imitation of a successful firm’s routines is also a method, even a 
more economical one. However, only those firms with fitter routines can survive. 
Although market competition increases variety through continuous trial and search in 
existing firms and new entrants, it also destroys variety through processes of selecting 
the better, imitation and firm exit (Metcalfe, 1998; Foster and Metcalfe, 2001; Rigby 
and Essletzbichler, 2002). In the market, the differential allocation of profit across firms 
tends to be based on the quality of original routines and later variation of routines. The 
competitive process of market selection consequentially decides on which firms and 
which routines can survive. In other words, on the one hand, firms in market 
competition adopt positively selected variations to seek competitive advantages 
(Metcalfe, 1994); on the other hand, the selection environment limits diversity by 
eliminating less efficient variations in firm behaviors, and wiping out unprofitable firm 
from the active population (Essletzbichler and Winther 1999; Metcalfe 1994). It is 
notable that considerable selections finally alter the environment within which future 
decisions are made. Since there is a certain level of inertia in firm characteristics, for 
example, institutional inertia, these behavioral routines may preserve some continuity 
over time in organizational form, i.e. the behavioral routines of firms tend to be 
relatively stabilized in the short run.  
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Figure 2.1: The evolutionary mechanism 
The evolutionary arguments noted above have considerably enriched our 
understanding in the micro-level of economic changes — the firm level. Similarly, they 
help us to increase the apprehension in the changing patterns of geographical 
distribution of industries. As in economy more generally, the technological change and 
economic change at the regional level are shaped by the processes of heredity, 
variation, selection and retention. A given industry in a region that consists of a 
population of competing firms may be characterized by its variety in terms of 
technological, organizational, and informational features. At the beginning of the cycle 
of an industrial district, higher profits and huge potential markets allure more new firms 
into this area. With the standardization of products, competition among firms and 
especially cost competition becomes fiercer. Only those profitable firms can survive in 
a region, while those poorly-performed firms are doomed to leave this region or 
industry, which consequently affects the spatial distribution of the industry (Boschma 
and Frenken 2006b). 
2.2.4 The Paradigm Shifts to Coevolution  
(1) Defining Coevolution 
Evolution is a mode of explanation based on the selective retention of renewable 
variation, and accounts for phenomena of structural fit and change in a variety of 
domains. A co-evolutionary explanation, however, entails two or more evolving 
systems whose interaction affects their evolution. Socio-environmental co-evolution 
involves human systems (material practices and non-material ideas and values) and 
non-human systems (living and physical). The challenge then is how to develop case-
specific and empirical applications that define and elaborate the variants which co-
evolve and specify the processes of mutual selection. Applications could benefit from 
retention 
Variation 
 
Firms operate 
based on routines 
Search new solutions 
(Incremental or radical)
New 
Environments
Profits fall 
Environments changes 
Pressure On firm 
with traditional 
routines 
New routines 
established
selection 
Heredity 
Market 
acceptability 
  62
existing classifications and causal propositions in the natural and social sciences. Co-
evolution is part of a larger analytical toolkit for looking at complex socio-
environmental problems. Although distinct, there are strong synergies, 
complementarities and potentials for combined uses of co-evolutionary, co-dynamic 
and complexity-based explanations. 
The concept of co-evolution, like other notions in evolutionary study, has risen in 
the biological sciences and has also spread across a number of disciplines, including 
linguistics, computer modeling, and psychoanalysis, economics among others. 
Darwin’s original insight that reciprocal interactions of species can give rise to complex 
co-evolutionary responses was neglected for a long time, by biologist and zoologists. 
Darwin virtually recognized that ecological interactions among species are the most 
important processes that drive the adaptive evolution and diversification of species: “I 
can understand how a flower and a bee might slowly become, either simultaneously or 
one after the other, modified and adapted in the most perfect manner each other, by 
continuous preservation of individuals presenting mutual and slightly favourable 
deviations of structure” (Darwin, 1871)
32. In the 1960s a handful of biologists began to 
be aware of the importance of co-evolution (Porter, 2006). The term of co-evolution 
made its premier appearance in Ehrlich and Raven’s (1964) paper describing reciprocal 
evolutionary relationships between butterflies and food plants. Since the 1980s co-
evolution has been identified as a major research framework in the biological sciences 
(Futuyama and Slatkin, 1983; Thompson, 1982, 1994, 2005). 
In the 1990s, scholars in the fields of economics and management, especially 
organization study, borrowed the concept from biology, sometimes together with the 
recent achievements from complexity science, emergence, computational organization 
theory, and population ecology. Recently, some evolutionary economists, such as 
Nelson (1994), Coriat and Dosi (1997) and Murmann (2003) have clearly called for a 
need to construct the co-evolutionary model for better understanding the driving force 
of economic changes. They believe that studying the co-evolution of economic changes 
will help further to reveal the complex reality of the economy. In these studies, co-
evolution is still a new entrant, but the work applying the co-evolution construction has 
been garnering an increasing attention in recent years. The evidences prove that co-
evolution can provide a powerful alternative not only because it grounds on formal 
                                                        
32 Darwin, C.(1871), The Origin of Species, available at the website  http://www.literature.org/authors/darwin-
charles/the-origin-of-species/index.html  
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theorizing with more realistic assumptions (like bounded rationality and disequilibrium, 
which is the same in evolutionary studies), but also it abandons a worldview in which 
the population to be examined (for example, firms) is described as an isolated entity, 
free from the changing surroundings. 
According to Murmann (2003), co-evolution means: “two evolving populations 
co-evolve if and only if they both have a significant causal impact on each other’s 
ability to persist” (Murmann 203, p: 210). Applying a co-evolutionary approach is not 
simple (Kallis, 2007). As a result, most publications with co-evolution in the title are, as 
Volberda and Lewin (2003, p: 2128) noted, not in reality empirical studies on co-
evolution. On the basis of the disordered status in this field, Volberda and Lewin (2003, 
p: 2128) presented certain requirements that empirical co-evolutionary research must 
satisfy. Choosing the appropriate populations and the existence of bidirectional or 
causal mechanisms between the populations are necessary conditions for an applied co-
evolutionary study.  
The co-evolutionary approach has been gaining adherents, but it is far from being 
well accepted or understood. Volberda and Lewin (2003, p: 527) analyzed the essential 
properties of co-evolution: (1) multilevelness/embeddedness, co-evolution takes place 
at multiple levels within firms as well as among firms; (2) multidirectional causalities at 
least include direct co-evolution, in which one population evolves in response to 
another population, and diffused co-evolution, in which one or more populations evolve 
in response to several other populations in a broader ecological system (Baum and 
Singh, 1994); (3) nonlinearity. Changes in one variable can produce quite 
counterintuitive changes in another variable; (4) positive feedback. Organizations and 
organizational environments have a recursive bidirectional cause-and-effect 
relationship; (5) path and history dependence. Adaptation in a co-evolutionary process 
is path/history-dependent. On the basis of these properties of co-evolution, they 
identified several requirements that distinguish co-evolutionary research from the non-
co-evolutionary research: (1) studying organization adaptations over a long period of 
time; (2) examining organizational adaptation within a historical context of the firm and 
its environment; (3) considering multidirectional causalities between micro- and macro-
co-evolution, as well as between and across other system elements; (4) incorporating 
mutual, simultaneous, lagged, and nested effects .  
Because my research focuses on the applied level of evolutionary economics,  
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spatial evolution of industries, I will discuss the co-evolution in an industrial cluster to 
illuminate how to make a co-evolutionary study in the strict sense. The articulation of a 
sound co-evolutionary explanation for the spatial evolution of industries involves three 
very significant steps. The first step is to choose the appropriate populations. In other 
words, one needs boundaries of populations before starting to explore their co-
evolutionary mechanisms and processes. Because “population” as a concept is 
extremely flexible, an entity may be a common member of various populations, there is 
the difficulty in selecting population. The usual way is to choose a given population 
like a special industry at first, and then find out the important influencing factors as co-
evolving populations. The second step is to examine whether bidirectional or causal 
mechanisms exist in the chosen populations. Only when those populations have a 
significant “causal impact on each other’s ability to persist” through time, the third step 
can be done. The third step is to link the evolutionary trajectory of populations by 
causally affecting the variation, selection, and retention processes in their respective 
arena (Sotarauta and Srinivas, 2005). In this dissertation, I will follow these steps and 
explore the co-evolutionary mechanisms and process in the geographical scale of 
industry cluster, by focusing on the interactive causal chains of TCM firms, institutions 
(concerning the Tonghua industry cluster) and TCM technology.  
(2) Co-evolution Research Status 
For more than a decade, the concept of “co-evolution” aroused the curiosity of 
scholars from various fields. Several organization researchers, following the tradition of 
the model of variation, selection, and retention of changes (Campbell, 1969), have 
highlighted the phenomenon that organizations co-evolve with their environments 
(March, 1994; Koza and Lewin, 1998; Lewin, et al., 1999). Rosenkopf and Tushman 
(1994), for example, point out the fact that technology and industry coevolve 
(Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1994). Recently, evolutionary economics scholars, including 
Nelson (1994), Coriat and Dosi (1997), and Murmann (2003), have emphasized that it 
is very necessary to develop co-evolutionary models to better understand the dynamics 
of economic changes. Johann Peter Murmann’s book about the co-evolution of firms, 
technology, and national institutions (2003) was awarded the 2004 Schumpeter Prize by 
the International Joseph Alois Schumpeter Society to recognize his contribution to 
Schumpeterism and evolutionary economics. In his book, he purposed articulating a co-
evolutionary model that links industrial, technological, and institutional dynamics. 
Although Murmann presented a very strict definition of co-evolution, “two evolving  
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populations co-evolve if and only if they both have a significant causal impact on each 
other’s ability to persist” (Murmann 2003, p: 210), he simultaneously claims that “co-
evolution” can also be used in the broader sense in which multiple things are jointly 
evolving. 
Research on co-evolution of institutions at the national level and industry is 
conspicuous in the diverse literatures on the co-evolutionary approach. Freeman et al. 
(1982) made an early discussion on the interactive relationship between public 
institution and technology changes. Many excellent studies have helped us to 
understand how these factors drive the rate, path and characteristics of technical change 
– and thereby, economic growth is shaped over time by the co-evolution of industries, 
technologies, and supporting institutions (Nelson, 1994; Tucker, 2003). Sotarauta and 
Srinivas (2005) have recently made various case studies on regions in Finland, India, 
and the USA to show heterogeneity in development, specifically technologically 
innovative development, and attempt to provide us with a co-evolutionary framework 
for a more comprehensive view of regional development processes. There are good 
examples of experiential research on the co-evolution of new emerging industries and 
institutions, besides the above mentioned works, McKelvey’s (1996) work on the rise 
of biotechnology industry and Murmann’s study on the synthetic dye industry between 
1856 and 1914 (Murmann, 2003). Consoli (2005) purposed elaborating an evolutionary 
perspective on the process of a structural change that has characterized retail financial 
services in the United Kingdom (UK) from the 1840s to the 1990s. The recent “co-
evolutionary turn” in evolutionary study is meaningful. Here I will explain the 
significance of the paradigmatic shift from an evolutionary approach to co-evolution 
thinking.  
2.2.5 Significance of the Paradigmatic Shift 
From the above discussion, we can see that the co-evolutionary study is different 
from the evolutionary research: evolutionary study devotes itself to looking for single-
theme (or single population) explanations for the adaptation– selection phenomenon, 
while co-evolutionary study wants to extend standard evolutionary search to multi-
specific interactions between two or more populations, in which the fitness of evolving 
solutions depends on the state of other coevolving individuals. As Volberda and Lewin 
(2003, p: 2114) pointed out, it is becoming increasingly obvious that single-theme 
explanations for the adaptation– selection phenomenon have reached their limit,  
  66
evolutionary scholars (including in the field of organization theory, economic and 
geography) should adjust research strategies and take into account all interacting 
populations of organizations and environments in which organizations survive, 
compete, and change. 
Co-evolution, together with these concepts that derived from it such as mutual 
adaptation (co-adaption), becomes a powerful tool for understanding inherently 
interacting populations. There are differences between evolutionary and co-evolutionary 
perspectives. In the evolutionary approach, a certain species is often seen as an isolated 
entity, while the environment in which species survive is considered as parametrically 
fixed. However, the co-evolutionary perspective emphasizes more the interaction 
among genetically distinct populations or between species and environments. The key 
ideas of the co-evolutionary approach are that the world is complex, human cultural and 
social behaviours are not predictable and human behaviour is dynamically linked to its 
environment on a range of temporal and spatial scales (Winder et al., 2005, p: 355). 
This raises another question, how a population evolves in a changing environment. 
There are two different approaches to this issue. One is to see the changes of the 
environment as exogenous (to the model), another is that they are endogenous. The 
latter is the co-evolutionary approach, because co-evolution means “changes in one 
population can propagate by changing the selection pressures experiences by others” 
(Winder et al., 2005, p: 351), and “selection pressures are not exogenous and fixed, but 
reciprocally coupled and dynamic” (Winder et al., 2005, p: 355). It means that co-
evolution is at first about evolution, and then more about “co” (reciprocally coupled 
links). Each of these populations is an evolutionary system in its own right, but we can’t 
ignore the fact that they are coupled, at the same time, that co-evolutionary selection 
pressures are not exogenous and fixed, but reciprocally coupled and dynamic. Each of 
the reciprocally linked evolutionary sub-systems has the potential to change the 
selection regime experienced by the others (Winder et al., 2005, p: 355). 
It is here worth to note that the co-evolutionary approach is not a result of 
decanting the old wine of complex system theory into increasingly fashionable co-
evolutionary skins (Winder et.al, 2005), the complex systems with their view on socio-
natural interaction focus on framing dynamics in terms of flips between multiple stable 
states or attractors (Berkes et al., 2003), but co-evolution is the evolution of two or 
more populations through the action of reciprocal selective pressures and adaptation 
between them. The central problem of co-evolution is to understand how interactions  
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among populations are shaped by reciprocal natural selection and how they persist 
across space and time even as they undergo constant and often rapid co-evolutionary 
changes. In the co-evolutionary model, technology market conditions and other external 
environments are not parametrically fixed, but endogenous. One of the biggest 
differences between evolutionary and co-evolutionary study is that co-evolution studies 
have a two-way or multi-way causal relationship, while evolution focuses on a one-way 
causal relationship, for example, the adaptation of organizations to the environment, 
which does not touch any influence of organizations on the environment change. In 
recent years, many scholars are becoming aware that it will be difficult to fully 
understand organizational conduct and performance, if their studies only focus on a 
single adaptation or selection, they don’t consider the inherently causal link between the 
changing environment and changes in organizational behavior. So it is safe to say that 
the co-evolutionary approach is the ground block for the evolutionary study, which is 
not only the extension of the evolutionary study, but also provides a powerful analytical 
tool for better understanding evolutionary processes of economic and social systems.  
2.3 Why Co-evolution between Institution, Technology and Firms 
As I have already pointed out before, together with some evolutionary scholars 
(for example, Volberda and Lewin, 2003), the contemporary evolutionary approach is 
moving to co-evolutionary research from its traditional perspective which focuses more 
on the adaptation – selection process of a single population. My analysis will 
concentrate on the co-evolving interactions of three populations, i.e. institutions, 
technologies and firms. The reasons behind why these three populations are chosen are 
(1) these populations are often examined in co-evolutionary study (for example, in the 
work of Murmann, 2003); (2) TCM industry is highly subject to the changes of related 
institutions and technologies (see for a more detailed explanation, Chapter 1.3.2). 
Considering that the conceptually blurred boundaries between institution and 
organization, I will firstly make a distinction between institution and organization, 
which might be a base of my co-evolutionary study.  
2.3.1 Distinction between Institution and Organization  
Today nobody can deny the importance of the role of institutions in economy. But 
many unresolved issues remain as to the real content of the concept of institution and 
the scope of the specific institutions that must be taken into consideration. It is  
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important to distinguish general social rules (sometimes called the institutional 
environment) and particular organizational forms (sometimes called institutional 
arrangements), although organizations can also be thought as sets of rules. I follow a 
traditional institutionalist approach, defining institutions as the “rules of the game” that 
govern human behavior and interactions (North, 1990). Institutions include formal 
institutions, such as the legal system, written documents or rules that are determined 
and executed through formal position, such as authority or ownership, and informal 
institutions such as socially accepted implicit customs and rules, social norms, routines. 
Organizations are deliberately and intentionally created by people pursuing a set of 
collective purposes, with established roles, methods of coordination, procedures, 
culture and space (Jonsson, 2007). Organizations can include political bodies (political 
parties, government, Congress), social or religious groups (churches, clubs, 
associations), economic bodies (firms, cooperatives, financial corporations), and 
educational and scientific bodies (schools, colleges, training centers, research institutes) 
(North, 1990). 
2.3.2 The Long Division of Technology and Institution in Theory 
Since Adam Smith, economists have been explored the determinants of economic 
growth, and the roles of technology and institution have always been their main 
concern. Smith analyzed the impact of the division of labor on technology, as well as 
national institutional structures on the national wealth. Marx explored more directly the 
relationship between technology and institution by using the terms of productive forces 
and productive relations. However, there has been a big difference in this topic for a 
long time. We can clearly see three threads around this issue: one is technological 
determinism advocated by economics in the camps of classical, neo-classical and neo-
classical growth theory, another is institutional determinism supported by neo-
institutional economists. Recently some scholars want to go the middle course of co-
determinism of institution and technology (coevolution between institution and 
technology).  
These economists, from Marx, Schumpeter, even his followers, Neo-
Schumpeterian and the New Growth Theorists, argue that technology determines 
economic growth: The classical theory of economic growth hypothesizes that 
technology is given, and the neo-classical theory of economic growth presumes that 
technology is in progress but exogenous. In the model of new growth theory, however,  
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technology is fully endogenous, which reflects a theoretical development trajectory of 
gradually regarding technology as an endogenous factor of economic growth. By 
contrast with technological determinism, institutionalists, including old institutional 
economists (for instance, Thorstein B. Veblen, Wesley C. Mitchell, John K. Galbraith) 
and new institutional economists (Ronald Coase, Douglass North and Oliver 
Williamson) stress that institution, not technology, plays a determining role in economic 
growth. Although old institutional economics wanted to uncover the “black box” of 
institution which neo-classical economics seldom addressed, this school as a whole was 
shadowed by technological determinism. But new institutional economics regards 
institution as an endogenous variable, and argues that institutional innovation and 
change are a decisive power for economic development. In this sense, new institutional 
economics as a whole is similar to “institutional determinism” which is characterized 
by North’s doctrine of institutional change and economic growth. 
Here I do not want to defy the roles of technology or institution, to criticize 
technological determinism and institutional determinism for their ignoring the research 
results from each other: for example, Neo-Schumpeterian theories which focus too 
much on technology, and never take institution into consideration. Similarly, new 
institutional economics concentrates itself on institutions and rarely refers to 
technology. Obviously, focusing on technology or institution might be helpful to form a 
systemic and coherent theory. However, this may bring about a bias, i.e. excessive 
preference for its own theories, and then ignore some equally useful research 
achievements from another side. However, in real economic life, economy is jointly 
driven by technology and institutions; which are deeply influenced by each other. That 
is why co-evolutionary theory between institution and technology has been recently 
developed.  
2.3.3 Ongoing Convergence or Divergence: Technology and Institution in Theory 
Contemporary economics, institutional economics and evolutionary economics 
initially focus on institution and technology
33, respectively. Hence, it is necessary to 
examine their relatively complex relationship. (Original) institutional economists claim 
that the evolutionary approach is synonymous to (original) institutional economics in 
the work of evolutionary institutional economists (for example, Hodgson, 1999, p: 18; 
                                                        
33 Strictly speaking, evolutionary economics here refers to the work of Nelson and Witter (1982), except the 
contributions of other evolutionary economists who place the role of institution in economy at the very start, for 
example, the early works of Christopher Freeman.   
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Groenewegen and Vromen, 1999, p: 105). However, there is an opposite argument that 
evolutionary economics and institutional economics have different immediate sources 
and distinct focal orientations (Nelson, 2002). There are possibly some reasons for this 
troubling phenomenon.  
Firstly, scholars in both fields claim that they all draw their inspiration from the 
work of well-known economists such as Marshall, Veblen, even Commons and so on. 
That means that both institutional economics and evolutionary economics have 
common early pioneers. At the same time, as Nelson (2002)
 stated, both camps share 
common core assumptions and perceptions as stated above, such as bounded rationality, 
uncertainty, and some common research interests: for example, the determinants of 
economic performance, and how economic performance differs across nations and over 
time. In addition, institutional economics is divided into an original “old “branch, in 
which evolutionary ideas play a paradigmatic role, and a more recent “new” branch, 
which lacks a perspective on time, in particular “historical” time.  
Secondly, both camps have common research issues, for example, they both deal 
with the evolution of institutions. In addition, the marriage of the two research 
traditions is helpful for studying some applied questions such as innovation systems 
and industrial development, so that the two camps should work together (Nelson, 
2002). But this does not mean that there is a theoretical convergence between them. 
Actually, the two research traditions remain largely autonomous and specific, even if 
there are some interactions (Brousseau, 1999). This is mainly determined by their 
respective theoretical orientations. 
Finally, both schools have respectively different theoretical orientation. The 
orientation of institutional economics is to discover the set of factors that mold and 
define human interaction, both within organizations, and between them. In contrast, the 
Nelson and Winter’s evolutionary economic theorizing focused centrally on the 
processes of technological advances (Nelson 2002, p: 19) at the very start, with an aim 
to understand the cause, processes and consequences of economic changes in general 
(Brousseau, 1999, p: 4). But recent explicit evidences show that the two strands work 
together again. On the one hand, nowadays the best known scholars in the realm of 
institutional economics have gradually adopted an evolutionary perspective regarding 
how institutions are formed and changed , for example, Hodgson (1988, 1993), 
Langlois (1989) and North (1990). On the other hand, recently institution had been  
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placed at the center of evolutionary theory (see Nelson, 2002; Nelson and Sampat, 
2001; Pelikan, 2003). 
As regards the realm of economic geography, on the one hand, economic 
geographers have recently been paid a large amount of attention to both institutional 
and evolutionary approaches to better understand the dynamics of regional 
development (for example, Boschma and Frenken, 2003; Boschma and Frenken, 2006a; 
Boschma and Lambooy, 1999). On the other hand, they made full use of the core ideas 
and concepts from institutional thinking such as “lock-ins”, “embeddness” and “social 
network” (e.g. Schamp, 2000, 2002, 2005; Grabher, 1993; Boschma and Frenken, 
2009). Institutional economic geography argues that the differences among territories 
are primarily related to the differences in institutions which is more related to North’s 
definition of institution (North, 1990) as humanly devised formal law and informal 
social norms (Whitley, 1992; Saxenian, 1994; Gertler, 1995; Martin, 2000; Storper, 
1997). The evolutionary approach, as Schamp indicated (Schamp 2005, p: 617), can be 
applied to different institutional levels in different ways, that is, the region, the sector, 
and the firm, depending on which dimensions of space and time are considered.  
2.3.4 The Co-evolution of Firms, Technology and Institutions 
As pointed out above, though it is not safe to say that institutional economics and 
evolutionary economics will converge, they surely have some common research 
interests. The kind of marriage would be useful to understand the complexity in the real 
economic world. Nelson and Winter’s (1982) pathbreaking research originally 
concentrated on evolutionary theories of technological changes, but evolutionary 
economists also tried to bring institutions into evolutionary theorizing (Nelson, 2002; 
Nelson and Sampat 2001; Pelikan, 2003), and emphasized on co-evolution and the 
interaction between technology and supporting institutions (e.g. Nelson,1995).  
Some literatures made attempts to link technology, industry and institutions 
together to study their co-evolutionary relationships (e.g Nelson, 1994; 1995; Fatas-
Villafranca et al., 2008). Murmann (2003) executed a distinguished dye case 
(Murmann, 2003). By comparing the development of the synthetic dye industry in 
Great Britain, Germany, and the United States through the lenses of evolutionary 
theory, Murmann identified differences in educational institutions and patent laws as 
the key reasons for German leadership in the industry. Different from previous analyses 
that focused on technical developments, educational systems, and other influences, and  
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have neglected the role of the individual firm and overlooked the institutional context, 
Murmann has set out “to integrate the existing theories that emphasize either 
environmental or firm-level factors into a comprehensive framework” (Murmann, 2003, 
p: 198).  
Murmann highlights the mutual relations between individual companies and 
institutions and successful firms engaged in the construction of organic chemistry 
knowledge institutions, such as impressive universities, and advanced polytechnic and 
business schools. These knowledge institutions not only provide highly qualified 
employees for this sector, but also cooperated closely with the research and 
development departments of individual companies. At the same time, the two social 
communities (the firm giants and knowledge institutions) jointly deeply influenced the 
German patent law. The soundly interlinked scientific networks provided the German 
system with a number of advantages. This
  has led Murmann to the following 
hypothesis: “the relative strength
 of a national industry which has a significant input of 
science
 or engineering knowledge is causally related to the strength
 of the relevant 
science or engineering discipline in the nation
 and vice versa. Over longer periods, a 
nation cannot remain
 weak in one domain and strong in the other. Both domains will
 
either become both strong or both weak.” (Murmann, 2007, p: 33) 
The analysis identifies three causal processes as being responsible for the co-
evolution of national industries and national academic disciplines: the exchange of 
personnel between industrial firms and academic organizations, the formation of 
commercial ties between the two social arenas, and lobbying by each on the other’s 
behalf. In both social arenas, the exchange of personnel affects the variation, selection, 
and retention processes, whereas the formation of commercial ties influences only the 
variation and selection processes, and lobbying impacts only the selection processes.  
As Murmann demonstrated, co-evolutionary theory takes into consideration the 
impact of institutions on the historical development of firms and stresses the causal 
links between industrial, technological, and institutional dynamics. Hence, a complex 
co-evolutionary process linking firms, technology, and national institutions resulted in 
industrial success. But like other previous analyses of co-evolution, this study has been 
conducted at the national and industrial levels, but not regional level. Accordingly, this 
gives rise to some questions, for example, can the co-evolutionary theory at the 
national/ industrial level pioneered by Murmann be applied to a sub-national and  
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regional level? How to link evolutionary mechanism of regional to national levels? My 
dissertation tries to fill this gap and do a co-evolutionary study at the industrial level 
and regional level.  
2.4 The Geographic Mosaic of Coevolution and Co-Evolutionary 
Degree and Effect 
Co-evolution is one of the major processes organizing the intertwined populations 
(for example, technology and institution). But co-evolution is an ongoing process so 
that a geographic perspective is needed. The biggest current challenge for economics 
and regional development science is to understand how co-evolution operates across 
broad geographic landscapes, how some regions gained high economic performance 
while others did not. At the same time, it is necessary to see co-evolution itself as a self-
reinforcing process in which the interactive effects and degrees of intertwined 
populations varied over time.  
2.4.1 The Theory of the Geographic Mosaic of Coevolution in Biology 
Recently John N. Thompson, an outstanding scholar in evolutionary biology, 
provides a framework for asking how co-evolution continually reshapes interactions 
across different spatial and temporal scales (Thompson, 1994, 2005). This framework 
of “the geographic mosaic of co-evolution” analyzes how the biology of species 
provides the raw material for long-term co-evolution, evaluates how local co-adaptation 
forms the basic module of co-evolutionary change, and explores how the co-
evolutionary process reshapes locally coevolving interactions across the earth's 
constantly changing landscapes, and then tries to answer how geographically structured 
co-evolution differs in various locations. I believe that this intellectual satisfying work 
would be also important for understanding these co-evolutionary processes in human-
altered systems, namely how co-evolution continually reshapes interactions across 
different spatial and temporal scales. 
2.4.2 The Geographic Mosaic of Coevolution in Economy 
In fact, we can find similar phenomena of geographic mosaics in economic life. 
Economic growth is not geographically even. Britain gained the hegemony in textile 
industry in the late half of the 18
th century, continental Europe
  (Germany and 
Switzerland) in the 19th century dominated over machine tools, chemicals,
  and  
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pharmaceuticals etc, but during most of the 20th century America held the supremacy 
in semiconductors, petrochemicals, computers, and biotechnology. Later the Asian 
Newly-Industrializing countries (NICs, Japan, Korea) got partial leaderships in 
electronics, machine tools during the second half of the last century (Nelson and 
Wright, 1992; Nelson and Pack, 1999; Schamp, 2000; also see Fatas-Villafranca et al, 
2008).  
There is a well-known fact at some point in the development process of multiple 
industries that a handful of regions and a small number of firms from the same nation 
(or from a small group of nations) have reached an unquestionably competitive position 
on a worldwide level. Today’s world economic climate is dominated by the first-class 
industrial clusters, which have become powerful instruments for building economic 
capacity for regions to compete in the global market. The typical examples cover the 
computer technology clusters in Silicon Valley, the financial clusters in New York and 
London, the movie production cluster in Hollywood, the automotive clusters in 
Southern Germany and Detroit, the aerospace cluster in Toulouse, the fashion clusters 
in Northern Italy, software outsourcing in Bangalore, the diamond cluster in Antwerp 
and others (Porter, 1990). The geographic concentration of competitive industries 
constitutes the geographic mosaic of material wealth. Here I prefer to call these 
competitive industrial cluster hotspots of co-evolution among firms, technology and 
institution. Hot spots are regions in which interacting populations have reciprocal 
effects on each other’s fitnesses through the mechanisms of local co-adaptation and 
selection and are often embedded within broader surrounding regions in which the 
fitnesses of at most one of the two species depends on the interactions with the second 
species (Co-evolutionary cold spots). 
2.4.3 Call for a Study on Co-Evolutionary Degree and Effect 
There has been no disputation in the field of biology about the idea that species 
co-evolve as groups of genetically distinct populations. Initially, many biologists 
believed co-evolution occurred rarely but only under strong pair-wise interaction. From 
the late 1960s onwards, however, a growing number agreed with Darwin that evidence 
of co-evolution was far from rare (Winder et al., 2005; Thompson, 1994)
34. The idea 
that grass and grazers, predators and prey, mammals and their parasites have not 
emerged by co-evolution seems implausible, and even absurd. But we should note that 
                                                        
34 See Thompson 1994 for a history of co-evolutionary biology.  
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the concept of co-evolution is very fuzzy, because no entity is isolated, all processes 
interact with their environment and other species, and species and populations are a part 
of the environment that determines the selection pressure experienced by others. As 
Winder et al. （2005, p: 356) pointed out, perhaps bees and donkeys have a co-
evolutionary impact on each other, but the dynamic linkages between them are so weak 
and rates of co-evolution are so slow that they can be treated as isolated evolutionary 
systems at a first level of approximation.  
Moreover, the uncritical and direct application of the biological concept of co-
evolution to the study of human society is problematic. Even in biology, no population 
of one species co-evolves with one population of another species within a real 
biological world. Co-evolution in real species, however, involves multiple 
interconnected populations, and complex environments (Thompson, 2005, p: 9). From 
this point, we have to say that, if we can’t carefully examine the degree of interacting 
link between populations, co-evolution will otherwise make no sense. Another 
important statement is that we should differentiate positive co-evolution from negative 
one. Despite co-evolution, like evolution, is a value-neutral concept, the co-
evolutionary result can be added to value, for example, good and bad for human 
welfare. Furthermore, the plea for an examination of co-evolutionary effect and degree 
is also in connection with a few empirical studies on this aspect in social sciences. 
Hence I will adopt a dynamic viewpoint to study co-evolution itself, but my 
geographical level is the level of industrial cluster, a sub-national level.  
2.4.4 Co-Evolutionary Degree and Effect at a Regional Level 
In order to illustrate this argument more clearly, we can group different types of 
regions along two axes: the degree of relationship between co-evolving populations 
(coevolutionary strength: week or strong) and the effect of relationship between co- 
evolving populations (coevolutionary effect: positive or negative). We can identify four 
types of regions. First, there are some regions with a lower degree of co-evolution 
among firm, institution and technology as well as a lower level of positive effect, as 
referred to ‘cold spots’. A good example is Zhong'guancun before 1980. It was not until 
the early 1980s that the commercialization of scientific and technological knowledge 
began in China’s “Silicon Valley” and largest intellect-intensive region where the 
research and education establishments have been (and still are) densely concentrated 
(Wang and Wang, 1998).  
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Figure 2.2: Coevolutionary curve of degree and effect 
Secondly, there are only a few examples concerning regions with a lower degree 
of interaction in firm, institution and technology but dominated by a higher positive co-
evolutionary effect. One German example is the textile industry in Westmuensterland 
(from 1980s onwards) in which continuous new entrants, moreover the minor 
importance of this sector to local society in the terms both of economic and 
employment contribution, jointly weaken potential lock-ins, and these relatively weak 
functional, cognitive, and political lock-ins in turn lead to a successful renewal 
(Hassink, 2007).  
Thirdly, at the opposite end of the figure we find some regions in which 
technology, institution and firms are tightly coupled (“strong co-evolution”), and this 
higher interaction brings about a “positive co-evolutionary effect”. This type of region 
is what Pouder and St John (1996) define as “a hot spot”. Nearly all most successful 
regions in history can be classified in this group, for example, the information industry 
in Silicon Valley in California from the 1980s onwards and nowadays top 
biotechnological clusters over the globe, such as Cambridge Biotech cluster and 
German BioRhine, the Scientific City in France, the ceramics industry in Sassuolo, 
Italy, auto manufacturing in the Basque Region, and medical instruments in Tuttlingen, 
Germany. 
Fourthly, there are regions or industries with a high co-evolutionary degree but 
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without so much positive co-evolutionary effect. Nearly all heavy industry complexes 
in old industrial regions, for example, Wales in UK, the Ruhr Area in Germany, and 
Great Lakes Regions in America between 1970s and 1980s (Cooke, 1995) belong to 
this type. The deteriorating performance of a hot spot can also be referred to as the 
development of ‘core rigidities’ (Leonard-Barton, 1992) or negative ‘lock-in’ (Grabher, 
1993) 
It is necessary to note that the different types of industries or regions are movable. 
Generally and theoretically speaking, economic performance rises with strong 
interacting links between institution, firms and technology. However, extreme strong 
ties lead them to ignore changes outsides the local community, and further result in a 
dangerous situation of lower performance. Once on this trajectory, it is not easy to go 
out, without strong external shocks.  
2.5 Conclusion 
As I have illustrated above, an embryonic “historical turn” has recently emerged 
in social sciences. In some sense, the recent development in evolutionary economics 
and evolutionary economic geography that both regard economy and economic 
landscape as a dynamic process is a response to the historical turn in social sciences. 
Bringing history to economic geography is of vital importance to theoretical and 
methodological foundation. “History matters” is widely accepted by social scientists, 
but often is simply reduced to the concept of “path dependence”. Although path 
dependence is very important, with history and memory influencing today and the 
future system, particularly in co-determining structure of the system (Cilliers, 1998), 
too strong “history” in this theory makes it very vulnerable to the suspects of historical 
determinism. When locked into some trajectory, there is little possibility to transform 
the existing path, and hence history can be known only as an ex post factor (backwards-
looking thinking), and there is no place for human creativeness. Accordingly, path 
creation is also important, considering the huge uncertainty in technology market and 
even institution (Garud and Karnøe, 2001), it is necessary to add the role of human 
creativity and intentional actions to the traditional path study. In the redefined model of 
path creation, powerful and innovative actors make a new path possible. That is, the 
path breakthrough in the redefined model of path creation is endogenous innovation by 
traditional entrepreneurs in the Schumpeterian sense and institutional entrepreneurs, 
rather than the David type of path breakthrough, namely external shock. The path  
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creation’ forwards-looking thinking reflects the capability of human intention in the 
new model. Hence, the combination of path dependence and path creation could be 
useful to better understand stability and changes of complex systems. 
Evolutionary economics as heterodox economics does not focus on economic 
final results but its processes, and employs biological metaphor and population thinking 
or complexity system thinking. At the centre of evolutionary economics is novelty 
(innovation) as the fundamental force driving economic change. This is why 
evolutionary economists and innovation scholars frequenctly make constructive 
dialogues. Their research scopes and contents sometimes overlap with each other, i.e. 
evolutionary economists, for example, Richard Nelson himself, do research on 
innovation system and  at the same time, innovation system scholars such as Bengt-Åke 
Lundvall and Philip Cooke actively participate in constructing evolutionary economics. 
Economic geographers who are interested in dealing with the uneven distribution of 
economic activities over space, surely made an attempt to apply evolutionary 
economics into economic geography, and contributed to our understanding in the 
changes in economic landscape. Co-evolutionary economics not only considers the 
evolutionary process but also emphasizes the relationships and inter-dependence among 
the different systems (path interdependence), or multiple levels of a single system 
(multilevel interdependence). Therefore the notion of co-evolution will not surprisingly 
be helpful to understand the economic world more really. 
Institution and technology have been theoretically separated in the past. Recently 
some theorists want to combine them and make some empirical explorations. The most 
outstanding one is Murmann’s comparative work on the development of the synthetic 
dye industry in Great Britain, Germany, and the United States through the lenses of 
evolutionary theory. But most of theoretical and empirical discussions are at the 
national or industrial level, not regional or local level. An unresolved issue thereby still 
retains, can coevolution study on the national scale be straightly applied to sub- 
national scales? Moreover, we must adopt a dynamic view to study co-evolution itself. 
To do so, I tried to link co-evolutionary degree to co-evolutionary effect. As in biology, 
co-evolution in economic system also has a geographical dimension. Economic growth 
is not geographically even, and competitive industries only occur in a few regions in 
which firm, technology and institution interact in a favorable way, which I call co-
evolutionary hotspots.   
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As previously pointed out (in Chapter 1.2.2), the main aim of my dissertation is to 
deal with an old but still ongoing question: how do industrial clusters come into 
existence and how do clusters evolve, but from a coevolutionary perspective. So my 
research focuses on the intertwined processes of firm organizational change, 
technological and institutional innovation in a cluster. China has undergone significant 
changes in many socio-political and economic aspects, among which the most 
significant are the two transitions, firstly from capitalism to a centrally planned 
socialism, secondly to a market economy, and industries in China experienced 
significant changes in firm organization, technology and institution. A good example is 
the pharmaceutical industry which started from TCM industry, through chemical 
pharmaceutical technology, and today entered the times of biotechnology. At the same 
time, large, middle and small-sized pharmaceutical enterprises coexist in this sector, 
some of them come from overseas. As regards its geographical structure, some 
geographical concentration of pharmaceutical enterprises emerged in China (see 
Chapter 3.4.3 and Chapter 3.5), among which the most remarkable are Beijing 
(biotechnological pharmaceuticals), Shanghai (biotechnological pharmaceuticals), and 
Shijiazhuang (Chemical pharmaceuticals), Tonghua in Jilin (Traditional Chinese 
Medicine, TCM). Beijing and Shanghai are the two largest metropolises in which most 
of China's first-class research institutes and universities in the field of pharmaceutical 
and medical industries are located, so these two cities’ pharmaceutical sectors host a lot 
of R&D-oriented (foreign) pharmaceutical enterprises and small enterprises run by 
overseas Chinese students. The Shijiazhuang Chemical pharmaceutical industry is 
historically based on a large-sized state-run enterprise (today’s North China 
Pharmaceutical Group established in 1958), and has been specialized in Chemical 
pharmaceuticals. The economic achievement of this sector in Tonghua city, however, is 
based on neither a R&D-based knowledge advantage nor origin from a large state-run 
enterprise. In addition to the technological history, though the Tonghua pharmaceutical 
sector has a long tradition in the production of TCM drugs, it transformed to Chemical 
pharmaceuticals between 1960s and 1970s and then shifted again to TCM productions 
after the mid-1980s. The pharmaceutical firms also changed significantly in their form 
of ownership, for example, from family-run store, state or collective-owned (during the 
Maoist period), to contracted enterprises or workshops (in the Dengist China), and 
private firms today. During the time, the firm size also changed. Nowadays, some 
Tonghua pharmaceutical enterprises have emerged that have relatively large shares in  
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sales across China. So these characteristics of technological change (compared to 
Beijing, Shanghai and Shijiazhuang), variety in firm organization, together with local 
institutional change, enable us to better observe the interaction of technology, institution 
and firm in an industrial cluster.  
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Chapter 3 Changing Environments for China’s 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
3.1 Traditional Chinese Medicine and Chemical Medicine 
3.1.1 Pharmaceutical Technologies throughout History 
Fundamentally speaking, there have been three pharmaceutical technologies 
throughout history. Before the arrival of man-made drugs, the human race used natural 
plants and minerals to cure diseases. More specifically, in ancient times, people 
experimented with animals, plants and minerals in an attempt to fight against various 
diseases, with the result that only those cures deemed most, were handed down through 
the generations as drugs to treat various illnessness. This approach has played an 
important role in Western medicine from ancient to modern times.  
However, the old treatment gradually lost its importance as pharmaceutical 
synthetic chemistry progressed in Western countries during the 19
th century (Efferth et 
al., 2007), despite of still being used today. The creation of the first proprietary drug 
Aspirin acetylsalicylic acid that was synthesized by reacting acetic anhydride with 
salicylic acid from willow bark in 1897 ignited the new epoch of the chemical synthesis 
of drugs (see Chapter 1.3.3). During the late 19th century, encouraged by their success 
with synthetic dyes, German companies Bayer, Hoechst and Merck began the chemical 
synthesis of drugs, by first making analogues and derivatives of active substances found 
in medicinal plants. Following that, the pharmaceutical industry moved to a new way of 
science-based drug development.  
In the early 20th century, German speaking nations (Germany and Switzerland) 
occupied, with an absolute advantage, the majority of the chemical synthetic medicine 
market. The third approach to drug development was the use of the body’s own 
biological molecules to treat disease (biopharmaceutical technology). This approach 
had already been pioneered in the 1920s by companies such as Lilly, which developed 
injectable insulin for the treatment of diabetes, but is, in fact over the past thirty years, 
most closely associated with the rapid advance in biotechnology, and the rise of 
biotechnology companies. The leading pharmaceutical industry in today’s world market 
has shifted to the United States (for a more detailed description of technological change 
in the pharmaceutical industry, see Dominguez, 2006; Hulse, 2003).   
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3.1.2 Traditional Medicine  
Traditional medicine (TM) refers to various forms of indigenous medicines, which 
include plant, animal and mineral based medicines, spiritual therapies, manual 
techniques and practices, applied singularly or in combination, to treat, diagnose and 
prevent illnesses or to simply stay healthy. Of the major TM systems, namely traditional 
Chinese medicine, Indian ayurveda and Arabic unani medicine, and Greek (European) 
and Egyptian herbal and traditional medicine, perhaps the most sophisticated and most 
effective remains TCM (Kleinman, 1975; Goldbeck-Wood et.al, 1996; WHO, 2000). 
Unlike other forms of traditional medicine which have almost become extinct, 
traditional Chinese medicine continues as a distinct branch of modern medical practice, 
and has a far-reaching influence on medical systems not only in China, but also in 
Japan, Korea, Vietnam, and other East Asian regions. It continues to play an important 
role in the public health care system.  
3.1.3 Traditional Chinese Medicine: A Comparative Perspective 
As mentioned above, Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), one of the world’s 
oldest medical approaches with its unique philosophical framework, different to another 
Western medical system, is a special form of Oriental Medicine. This traditional 
approach to treating diseases includes a wide range of traditional medical practices such 
as acupuncture, moxibustion and Chinese pharmacology (see Chapter 1.3.3). I will now 
continue with a summation of the characteristics of TCM, compared to Western 
medicine. Western medicine refers to synthetically manufactured single compounds that 
target a certain disease.  
TCM and Western medicine take different approaches to health and disease. Each 
approach develops its own advantage in areas, such as chronic diseases and syndromes, 
gynecological and gastrointestinal problems for traditional Chinese medicine, while 
acute and catastrophic problems for Western medicine. This means that TCM helps the 
body to retain or maintain its balance in a step-by-step fashion. The philosophy behind 
how Chinese medicine should be applied is that a superior treatment consists of dealing 
with an illness before it appears.  
As pointed out by the Medical Classic of the Yellow Emperor (Huangdi Neijing), 
written between the third and first centuries B.C, which laid the theoretical foundations 
for TCM, “when one masters the mystery of the yin-yang principle, one can even enjoy 
a life as long as nature itself” (as translated by and cited in Cai, 1998, p: 56), TCM  
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considers a disorder of the human body as a disharmony in the external environment 
and in the internal body. This comes as a result from changing atmospheric and climatic 
conditions and an imbalance in a person’s psychomental state, i.e. disharmony between 
two opposite aspects inside the human body, the yin and the yang, which are closely 
interdependent and constantly interrelated. From this viewpoint, the goal of TCM is 
consistent with the definition of WHO’s 1948 that “health is a state of optimum 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease and 
infirmity”.  
Western medicine adopts a reductionist worldview and argues that the individual 
part of physical body functions separately during the course of treatment, while the 
Chinese medicine treatment is influenced by the more holistic worldview, and sees the 
human body as a sophisticated organic whole in which each part is interconnected. 
Accordingly, TCM explains visceral phenomena, physiology and pathology of the 
body, by the “five phases” principle, somewhat similar to the humorism theory, which 
consists of five elements: wood, fire, earth, metal and water (Cai, 1998). TCM applies 
four varying methods for diagnosis, namely, inspection, inquiry, auscultation and 
olfaction and palpation. However, a final and accurate diagnosis can only be made 
following an overall and comprehensive analysis. As for the concrete treatment 
measures, besides acupuncture and dietotherapy as examples, the leading force against 
disease is the use of an extensive pharmacopoeia of over 6,000 herbal and other natural 
products.  
Although both TCM and Western medicine are based on continuous 
experimentations and learning by trial and error (today’s jargon, learning by doing), the 
advancement in TCM did not rely on research and development (R&D) based 
knowledge before the 1980s, but, instead, on constant personal observation - even 
experimentations with people’s own babies, while any new chemical entities are 
developed in a formal way (formalized in-house R&D programmes). Modern Western 
medicine is scientific medicine based on the understanding of cellular structures and the 
organic chemistry of the human body. Compared to their Western counterparts, TCM 
doctors had a limited understanding of infection, which predated the discovery of 
bacteria, viruses (germ theory of disease) and an understanding of cellular structures 
and organic chemistry. Instead they mainly relied mainly on the observation and 
description of the nature of infections to figure out remedies. Based on theories 
formulated through three millennia of observation and practical experience, a system of  
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procedure was formed to guide a TCM practitioner in the course of treatment and 
diagnosis.  
3.1.4 Modern Technologies in Traditional Chinese Medicine 
In the last thirty decades TCM characteristically involved formalized and 
organized R&D and scientists from various fields, working together as individuals or 
more often in teams, using state-of-the-art technology (for example chemical and 
biological technology) in order to identify and harness the potential of therapeutic 
compounds of natural herbs, as well as to reduce undesirable side-effects. The 
involvement of science and technology into TCM is partly caused by adjustments in 
national regulations of TCM in China and partly by increasing competition among 
domestic firms, mainly focusing on the domestic market.  
The Chinese government began to strictly supervise the pharmaceutical industry 
in the 1980s, especially after the “Drug Administrative Law” in 1985, “Good 
Laboratory Practice” (GLP) in 1994 and “Regulations for Approval of New Drug 
Application” in 1994 (for this apect, see Chapter 3.2.4). According to these new 
regulations, it is necessary to submit information about the methods of production, 
quality indices, pharmacological and toxicological testing results as for the safety 
evaluation of TCM drugs to the pharmaceutical supervisory and administrative 
department of China, and only on its approval can clinical tests be carried out (for 
detailed information, see Chapter 3.2.4). Main purposes of clinical studies are: efficacy 
evaluation, safety evaluation and the establishment of a safe and effective dose range. 
Thus TCM is also involved in a great deal of in-house scientific experiments, using 
modern pharmacological knowledge and information, computing science, molecular 
biology and biochemistry as well.  
For example, Shanghai Innovative Research Center of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine, a top R&D centre for TCM, constructed a TCM database which contains 
information about more than 30,000 compounds of active ingredients of TCM herbs. 
This database has been widely used in screening lead compounds, studying mechanisms 
of TCM drugs, predicting toxicity of herbal combinations as well as creating new TCM 
formulas, since it provides information on these compounds in a range of molecular 
structure, biological activity, herbs containing these compounds, toxicity, TCM formula 
and their clinical application.   
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3.2 National Institutional Changes  
3.2.1 General Review on China’s Transition 
There were four significant ideological breakthroughs that governed China’s 
economic reform after the death of Mao Zedong in 1976. The first breakthrough was 
the first wave of “emancipation of mind” driven by the debate on the “judge of truth” in 
1978
35. This debate ended with the speech of Deng Xiaoping at the Central Work 
Conference before the third Plenum of the 11
th  Chinese Communist Party Central 
Congress (CCPCC), affirming that “practice is the sole criterion of truth”. Following 
this ideology, the Chinese leadership endorsed the economic reform and open-door 
policy at the third Plenum of the 11th CCPCC, which deviated from the development 
path in the Mao-era.  
The second was the endorsement of a socialist planned commodity economy at 
the 3rd Plenum of the 12
th CCPCC in 1984 by which the leadership accepted the 
elements of market in the economy that deviated from a pure planned economy in the 
past. These breakthroughs loosened the control of planning instruments, and then 
strengthened the role of market instruments, while appreciating, besides state-owned 
ones, other economic components.  
The third was that Deng Xiaoping’s 1992 Southern Journey re-affirmed the 
economic reform and open policies. Here, the 3
rd Plenum of the 14
th CCPCC in 1993 
endorsed the shift of economic system to a socialist market economy. Since then 
China's reform has accelerated the pace of economic reform, and fulfilled significant 
breakthroughs in both theory and policy. This shift, though still insisting on socialism, 
has highly appreciated the role of the market in the economy and further loosened the 
previous ideological constraints. In November 1993, the third Plenum of the 14
th CCP 
National Congress
36 highlighted that companies are to be classified into limited 
                                                        
35 This was initiated after Mao’s death by debating on which path the Chinese development should follow. The 
conservatives proposed to follow Mao’s path, taking “two whatevers” as principle. On the contrary, the reformists or 
pragmatists recognized the major problem of the past development and proposed to rethink about the past. “Two 
whatevers” are: whatever Chairman Mao’s policies are, we protect them; whatever Chairman Mao’s instructions are, 
we follow them loyally from start to finish. 
36 The Third Plenum of the Fourteenth CCP National Congress marked the shift of the economic reform from a 
“quantity growth reform” to “an overall advancement.”. At the same time, in order to establish the framework of a 
socialist market economy by the end of the 20th century, the 3rd Plenum highlighted the importance of reforming the 
state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in addition to macroeconomic reforms of taxes and finance. In the past, due to 
excessive emphasis on SOE deregulations rather than the restructuring of SOEs, the SOE reform was not effective. 
For some SOEs, not only did managerial and financial conditions not improve, the situation actually worsened. In 
view of this situation, the Third Plenum concluded that the direction of the SOE reform should not be deregulation; 
instead, it should be institutional innovation. After the Third Plenum, we started, on a trial basis, to establish the 
modern corporate system in some SOEs.  
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companies and joint-stock companies, and the former was only limited to a state 
investment company, and that a modern corporate system
37 should be established in 
State-Owned Industrial Enterprises (SOEs). 
The fourth and most recent was the 15
th CCPCC in 1997 which affirmed that 
private ownership is an important component of the economy, and decided to convert 
state-owned enterprises into entities with Western-type corporate governance. After 
that, the reform of state-owned enterprises, in particular the reconstitution of property 
rights, speeded up. 
3.2.2 Enterprise Reform and Ownership Transformation  
The transformation of the ownership system in communist China can be roughly 
divided into two major historical periods. The period between 1949 and 1979 was 
characterized by the attempt of the CCP to establish a new socialist planned economy, 
based on a complete public ownership, including collective and state sectors, wiping out 
virtually all private enterprises and any other forms of private ownership. The result of 
this transformation was the establishment of a Soviet-type command economy in China, 
although the Chinese economy might have differed from the Soviet economy to a 
certain degree. The reform period after 1978 was characterized by (a) the micro-
management institutional reforms without any changes in ownership during the early 
reform period, and (b) the effort to transform ownership structures, especially since 
1992, from a complete public ownership to the mixed ownership structure with 
predominant public ownership coexistent with other economic elements such as 
cooperative, individual (in Chinese, getihu)
38, private, foreign and joint-ventured ones. 
The post-Mao reform period can be divided into three main stages. 
The first stage, from 1979 to 1987, is featured by the decentralization of 
management or an expansion of managerial autonomy of SOEs. The most important 
among them
39 is the introduction of the factory director responsibility system (in 
                                                        
37 A typical “modern enterprise” is defined using sixteen Chinese characters: “clear property right, clarified rights and 
responsibilities, separation between the government and the firm, and scientific management. In new model of 
enterprise governance, the ownership of property of the SOE is revert to the state and the maintenance and increase 
of asset values should belong to the SOE. 
38 Individual enterprise is a Chinese form of self employed enterprise or private entity whose scale is smaller than 8 
employees. 
39 The central government issued regulations to expand autonomy in 1979, including (1) the Regulations on 
Expanded Enterprise Autonomy, (2) the Regulations on Profit Retention of SOEs, (3) the Regulations on the 
Collection of Fixed Assets Tax, (4) the Regulations on the Improvement of the Depreciation Ratio of Fixed Assets of 
State-Owned Industrial Enterprises (SOIEs) and the Using method, and (5) the Regulations on Lending of Working 
Capital.  
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Chinese, Changzhang fuze zhi)
40 in 1982. At the same time incentives including 
‘mandatory planning reduction’, ‘profit-retention mechanisms’, ‘profit tax reform’ and 
‘production responsibility systems’ make enterprises more autonomous. They were 
allowed to produce more than the plan quota and to sell the surplus to the market. The 
extra profit was partly kept by the firms. Managers were given monetary rewards 
explicitly based on their firm's performance. In general the firms (factory director as 
representative) were given more freedom regarding to make management decisions (on 
production, marketing, investment, and profit distribution) (Byrd, 1991; Groves, et al., 
1994). The new measures caused a dual pricing system. Dual pricing partitioned 
supplies of industrial products into plan (planned price) and market components (prices 
responded increasingly to the forces of supply and demand) (see, Jefferson and Rawski, 
1994). Later the micro-management reform (1984-1986) shifted the financial 
obligations of the state enterprises to the government and exposed enterprises to market 
influences. The reform of ‘Tax for Profit’ (Ligaishui) 
41 namely replaces ‘profit 
remittances’ by ‘profit tax’
 42, and divided public revenues and expenditures between 
the central and local governments. 
The second stage, from 1987 to 1992, centered on the separation of ownership and 
management by introducing a system of ‘contracted managerial responsibility’ under 
which the power to manage enterprises was delegated to managers and directors by 
contracts, which clarified the responsibilities and benefits between the state and the 
managers. Here it is necessary to note that such a reform was in essence based on 
market mechanisms, despite still in the “old” publically-owned ownership framework. 
Evidently the reform was to clarify the authority and responsibilities of enterprise 
managers. In 1988 some events with deep historic meanings took place: the 
Provisionary Regulations on Private Enterprises, the Provisionary Regulations on 
Corporate Tax on Private Enterprises, and the Regulations on Collecting Adjustment 
                                                        
40 In the new system, the factory director (or manager) as the representative of SOEs is responsible to the state, for 
not only the profit presented to the state but also production output, quality, cost and so on, and each unit within the 
enterprise such as a group, team, and worker is responsible for the fulfillment of work. Wages of staffs are directly 
related to their fulfillment, while in the old system, the SOE is responsible for the fulfillment of planned targets and 
for giving profit to the state, without any incentive to improve. 
41 In this reform, the government levied a corporate tax rate of 55% on the large and medium-sized SOEs while still 
adopting the profit payment system. The objective of this reform was to adjust the phenomena of the ‘bian da quai 
niu’ (whipping the fast cow) where the highly productive SOEs at the time of the introduction of the profit retention 
system had only a low retention ratio because of the low growth of profit and vice versa. 
42 In 1980, the new Regulations on Profit Retention enacted two profit retaining systems, i. e. SOEs in one system, 
could retain a certain ratio of profit in the previous year as a base, while SOEs in another system, could retain a high 
ratio of profit in the current year. That means the more productive SOEs are, the higher is the retention ratio during 
the period between 1980 and 1983.   
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Tax on Individual Revenues Invested in Private Enterprises were issued. Private 
economy came back in China once again and could be established legally in China. In 
terms of labor system contract systems were introduced in the same period.  
In the third stage, from 1992 to the present, China's economic reform moved into 
“building a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics” by transforming the 
ownership system into a mixed structure with a dominant public sector and various 
types of coexistent ownership (Qian,
 1999). Since 1992 the enterprise reform focus was 
to build a Western modern enterprise system with “clarified property rights, clearly 
defined responsibility and authority, separation of enterprises from the government, and 
scientific internal management”. After becoming China’s premier in March 1998, Zhu 
Rongji made it clear that the government would finish the reform of SOEs within three 
years. The Beijing government has made serious efforts to initiate the reform agenda, 
for example, the policy of “grasp the big, let go the small” (in Chinese, zhuada 
fangxiao)
43. This means that those companies most important to the national economy 
would be controlled by the central government, while other small and medium-sized 
SOEs could be directly turned into private firms through policy package measures 
including reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions, leases, and sales 
44. According to 
the State Statistics Bureau and the State Administration Bureau of Industry and 
Commerce, the Chinese economy today has become a mixture of eight sectors: state-
owned, collectively-owned, privately-owned, individually-owned, cooperative or joint-
ventured, shareholding, foreign-owned and others (including Hong Kong, Macao, 
Taiwan and other overseas Chinese- invested). 
3.2.3 Changing China’s Science and Technology Management System 
(1) Science and Technology Management System before the Reform 
When the Communist Party assumed political control over China in 1949, the 
R&D administrative system focused exclusively on military industry. After the Sino-
Soviet relationship fell apart, China became a “politically isolated island” and had to 
give priority to R&D and industries concerning the national security. This period before 
                                                        
43 This guiding principle of SOE restructuring means that the government wanted to keep control of the biggest and 
most important companies, but woluld let the smaller ones fend for themselves. The Beijing government decided to 
keep 500 to 1,000 large SOEs inside of a few critical sectors under state ownership, and attempted to corporatize or 
restructure the SOEs into giant conglomerates, shareholding companies or shareholding cooperatives based on the 
competition of the market and to transform all other mall and medium-scale SOEs that run losses through policy 
package measures including reorganizations, mergers and acquisitions, leases, and sales. 
44 During the pivotal reform stage, SOEs went through a huge wave of downsizing, and the new phenomena of 
unemployment and layoff. To cope with this big social issue, a brand new social security networks started to take its 
shape.  
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the 1978 reform was characterized by: firstly, primary activities were distributed 
among thousands of functionally specialized organizations, and organizational 
boundaries were essentially defined by the type of activity; secondly, the power of 
decision-making (both operational and policy-related) was distributed vertically and 
horizontally (tiao/kuai) among a large number of governmental secondary actors with 
mandates defined by type of activity (such as education), industry (such as 
pharmaceuticals, machinery, and electronics) and institution (such as pricing), or what 
Lieberthal (1992) described as “fragmented authoritarianism”; thirdly, the dominant 
performance criterion for primary actors was scale of output, without any explicit 
attention to efficiency or, in practice, quality of output (see Liu and White, 2001; 
Xue,1997).  
Hence under this rigid bureaucratic system manufacturing organizations acquired 
knowledge from governmental laboratories and then made production; at the same time 
government laboratories which were completely financed by center or local 
governments focused on R&D, regardless of the market potential of scientific 
achievement; universities contributed most of their resources to talent training. S&T 
activities at public research institutes (PRIs) and production at state owned enterprises 
(SOEs) were completely separated (Xue, 1997). Few S&T outputs at PRIs were 
efficiently transferred to industries, and since PRIs got research funds and other 
expenditures on the base of the number of employees in the institutes rather than the 
research performance, PRIs had no incentives to understand the needs of enterprises for 
technology (Motohashi, 2006). In the case of the pharmaceutical industry (the sub-
industry of TCM), there is no direct link of knowledge between pharmaceutical 
manufacturing organizations and research institutes.  
(2) Science and Technology Management System in Transition  
A famous and profoundly influential proposition, “science and technology is the 
first productive force”, by Deng Xiaoping at the very beginning of the economic 
reform, broke the long-standing neglect of intellectuals and began to mobilize scientific 
and technological personnel, who were tightly restricted during the Cultural Revolution. 
Some evidence showed that China began to reorient R&D activities from military to 
civilian products. For example, the Chinese government explicitly stated that 
“economic development must rely on science and technology, and science and 
technology must be oriented towards economic development” in 1982, and civilian 
technologies became the focus projects in the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) (for a  
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list of eight fields in this plan, see Sun, 2002, p: 481).  
Before the reform research projects and R&D funds were allocated by 
corresponding level governments. The funding system was the focus of the reform and 
government-funded research institutes had to obtain funds from other channels. So new 
market institutions such as the technology market were introduced and technology trade 
was no longer considered illegal. At the same time S&T personnel was encouraged to 
“jump into the sea” (go to the market and become entrepreneurs), and the old funding 
assignment approach was replaced by a bidding system in 1986.  
Table 3.1: Major national innovation programs in China 
Policies   Dominant features   Year  
Sparkle system   Promoting basic research in agriculture   1985 
863 program  (national high-technology 
research and development program) 
High-tech promotion  
Enhance international competitiveness and improve 
overall capability of R&D in high technology 
1986 
National  Natural  Scienc  e  Foundation  Promote and finance basic research and some 
applied research 
1986 
Torch  program    High-tech commercialization, high-tech zones 
establishment 
1988 
National S&T achievements spreading 
program  
Promoting product commercialization   1990 
National engineering technology research 
centre program  
Technology transfer and commercialization of 
research products 
1991 
Climbing program   Promoting basic research   1992 
Endorsement of UAEs by SSTCC   Promoting university and industry linkage   1992 
S&T progress law   Technology transfer, S&T system reform   1993 
Decision on accelerating S&T progress 
(CCCP)  
Promoting URI-industry linkage   1995 
Law for promoting commercialisation of 
S&T achievement  
Regulating the commercialisation of S&T 
achievement  
1996 
Super 863 program   Commercialization, break-through in key areas   1996 
Decision on developing high-tech and 
realising industrialisation (CCCP) 
Encouraging technology innovation and 
commercialization  
1999 
Guidelines for developing national 
university science parks  
Accelerating the development of university science 
parks  
2000 
Source: compiled by the authors from various MOST sources. 
Since 1985 China formulated a series of general programs for scientific and 
technological research and development, aiming to improve China's competitiveness 
through science and technology (see Table 3.1).  
For example, The Natural Science Fund Committee (NSFC) for basic research; 
The National Hi-tech R&D Program (or 863 Program) for the development of hi-tech 
technologies
45 including bio-technology; the Spark Program for rural economy through 
                                                        
45 The hi-tech field in this project includes biotechnology, space, information, laser, automation, energy, new 
materials and oceanology technology.  
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science and technology; The Torch Program in 1988 for the application of research 
results by establishing some high-tech industrial development zones.  
The reform during the period from 1978 to 1992 was merely limited to technology 
transfer, from knowledge production to application. The reform of science  and 
technology management system after Deng Xiaoping's tour of southern China was 
characterized by a shift from the previous emphasis on technology transfer to systemic 
approaches with the major aim to build up an enterprise-centered innovation system. 
During this reform period PRIs have gradually lost their dominant role as main research 
actor, while enterprises have taken their losing role instead, and industrial enterprises 
became the primary force for technological innovation (Lundin and Serger, 2007, also 
see Table 3.2).  
Table 3.2: Inputs of R&D in China in transition 
year 
Types 
Number of 
R&D 
institutes  
R&D personnel 
(in 1000 
persons/year) 
R&D expenditures (in 
100 million yuan) 
R&D 
expenditures (in 
%) 
1987 5,222  106.8  106.8  60.7  Public 
research 
institutes  2003 4,169  399.0  399.0  25.9 
1987 934  7.0  7.0    4.0  Universities 
R&D units  2003 3,200  162.3  162.3  10.5 
1987 5,021  62.1  62.1  35.3  Enterprise 
R&D units  2003 11,300  960.2  960.2  62.4 
1987 n/a  n/a  n/a  n/a  Others 
2003 3,300  18.1  18.1  1.2 
1987 11,177  175.9  175.9  100  Total 
2003 21,969  1539.6  1539.6  100 
Source: website of Missions of the Ministry of Science and Technology of P.R. china, 
http://www.most.gov.cn/eng/statistics/ 
Note: n/a means non-available. 
In 1995, the “Decision of the State Council Concerning the Deepening of the 
Reform of the Science and Technology Management System” specified that a closely 
integrated mechanism of scientific research, development, production and the market 
should encompass an enterprise-centered technology development system, a scientific 
research system with scientific research institutions and the institutions of higher 
education as its main body, and a socialized scientific and technological service system. 
However, it was clearly seen that those three systems were parallel and independent of 
each other, and not in an integrated policy framework. It is noteworthy that this differed 
from previous reforms. One of the reform targets during this period was the  
  92
organization of higher education and their affiliated scientific research institutions in 
particular. Various forms of linkage between universities, government-sponsored 
institutes and enterprises were encouraged to develop. University staff was legally 
allowed to take part-time or full-time jobs in enterprises or establish their own 
enterprises (see, Zhong and Yang, 2007). 
The National Congress of Technical Innovation in 1999 is a landmark which means 
China formally embarked to become an innovation-driven nation. “National Medium- and 
Long-Term Science and Technology Development Planning (2006-2020)” identifies 
innovation as the new national strategy, placing innovation capability as the strategic basis 
for S&T development and the core of industrial restructuring and growth mode of 
transformation. The main goal was to consolidate the ability for independent innovation and 
to make China an innovation-driven economy by 2020 (Xinhua News Agency, 2006). In 
addition, what is most prominent in this planning is that most of the innovation policies aim 
at enhancing the innovation in various enterprises, especially SMEs. 
More interestingly, the number of new drug applications of foreign-invested 
companies in China has been increasing. The number of American applicants has 
reached about 40% of the non-Chinese applications, followed by Japan, Germany, 
France, Britain, and Switzerland, see Table 3.3. 
Table 3.3: Foreign new drug applications in China 
 
country 
 
1997 
 
1998 
 
1999 
 
2000 
 
2001 
U.S  618  494  634  924  824 
japans  308  212  242  377  375 
Germany  219  151  212  270  264 
France  107  89  90  124  160 
Britain  80  108  92  148  159 
Switzerland  86  96  76  118  136 
Source: Dai and Wang (2003) 
 
3.2.4 Changing Registrations on Drug and Healthcare System 
(1) Changing National Regulatory System 
After 1949, the Ministry of Health had controlled China’s pharmaceutical 
regulatory system until 1979. The Ministry of Health and the State Pharmaceutical 
Administration of China were jointly responsible for the management of medicine after 
1979 (Deng and Kaitin, 2004). The Bureau of Drug Policy Administration (BDPA) is an 
year 
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agency of the Ministry of Public Health (MOPH), which filled a function similar to that 
of the Food and Drug Administration in the U.S., and enforced the Chinese 
pharmaceutical law. The State Pharmaceutical Administration of China (SPAC) was set 
up in 1978 as an MOPH daughter agency. It supervised all activities relative to 
pharmaceutical R&D, manufacturing, sale and distribution. Since 1993 the SPAC’s 
duties have been limited to reviewing and approving the administrative protection of 
pharmaceutical products. A new regulatory agency, the State Drug Administration 
(SDA), was established in 1998 by consolidating the SPAC, BDPA and the State 
Administration of Traditional Chinese Medicine (SATCM; similar to SPAC but only 
responsible for regulating traditional Chinese medicine), to conduct drug regulation and 
ensure the safety, effectiveness and reliability of medical products, directly under the 
State Council. It was transformed into the State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) 
in 2003. 
(2) The Regulation and Approval of New Drugs in China 
Although the Chinese Ministry of Health published drug regulation to manage 
new drugs as early as in 1963, and the Ministry of Health as well as the State 
Pharmaceutical Administration of China in 1979 joined the New Drug Management 
Regulation, pharmaceutical manufacturers did not need to conduct systematic scientific 
experiments on new drugs. It was very easy for pharmaceutical manufacturing 
companies to receive the approval from the provincial department of health to market in 
China (Deng and Kaitin, 2004). 
The Drug Administrative Law marked the beginning of a new era of drug 
regulation in China as the first law in China in 1985 (revised in 2001), because it 
established a legislative process for the regulation of drug manufacturing, distribution 
and new drug development. It was the first time that premarket testing and an approval 
for new drug products were required. In the same year a new regulation, “Provisions for 
New Drug Approval”, was also issued by the Ministry of Health to require providing 
adequate preclinical data to verify the new drug’s safety and to justify the 
commencement of clinical tests. “Drug” refers to a substance used for the prevention, 
treatment and diagnosis of human diseases, and with the object of regulating human 
physiological functions, with stipulated indications, usage and dosage, including TCM 
(Chinese medicinal materials and Chinese medicines sliced and prepared for decoction, 
prepared Chinese medicines), Western medicine (chemical raw material drugs and their 
components, antibiotics), biochemical drugs and so on. “New drugs” refered to those  
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drugs which have never before been produced in China. Thus these new regulations 
were applied to TCM new drugs. It is not until 1988 that China promulgated the first 
importation rule to require imported drugs to be registered.  
Table 3.4: Key regulatory and institutional events in the Chinese biomedical industry 
Year   Event  
1983  Drug distribution (centrally controlled supply system to market-oriented demand system 
1984   The first patent law in China.  
1984   The introduction of Good Supplier Practice (GSP), as recommendation.  
1985  Drug administration law 
1985  Enforced drug quality control  
1985  Enforced regulating drug market 
1987   Technology trade was permitted.  
1992   The first revision of the patent law, in which biomedical products (chemicals/drugs) became 
patentable. 
1994  Good Laboratory Practice(GLP) 
1994  Regulations for Approval of New Drug Application, toxicological experiments for the 
safety evaluation of TCM drugs 
1997   The introduction of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP), as recommendation.  
1998   State Drug Administration (SDA) was established.  
1999   Good Clinical Practice (GCP) was introduced.  
2000   The second revision of the patent law, in accordance to TRIPS.  
2001   China’ WTO accession, which implied specific conditions for biomedical industry. 
2001   Good Supply Practice (GSP) became compulsory for medical- and pharmaceutical products. 
2003   State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) was established.  
2004   GMP became compulsory for medical- and pharmaceutical products.  
Source: Liu and Lundin (2007), Deng and Kaitin (2004) and Dong at el (1999) 
To further protect the domestic pharmaceutical industry, China’s State Drug 
Administration (SDA) issued the Regulations on New Drug Protection and Related 
Technology Transfer in April 1999. The regulations provided a 6-12 year period of legal 
protection for five different categories of new drugs. During that period a large number 
of Chinese generic drugs, which might have been patented drugs outside China, were 
protected as new drugs by the Chinese legislation, and thus sales expanded vigorously 
in China. In the same year Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) was carried out. In the 
following years Good Clinical Practice (GCP) and Good Supply Practice (GSP) were 
introduced.  
China's Patent Law was first enacted in March 1984, and it excluded drugs from 
patent protection, among other things. In the first patent law chemical entities were not  
  95
patentable in order to protect domestic producers of generic drugs. This law, however, 
provided patent protection for the manufacturing methods of pharmaceuticals. China's 
Drug Administration Law, which was issued in September 1984, specified that 
pharmaceutical products that had never been manufactured in China, hence were new 
drugs. The law allowed Chinese pharmaceutical companies to replicate foreign drugs 
that had not been manufactured inside China even if they had been manufactured 
outside elsewhere or had been marketed inside China.  
Table 3.5: Intellectual property rights system for pharmaceuticals in China 
Protection System  Year in Force  Types of Patents and Protection Period 
Trademark Law  1985  Marketing brands of drugs (10) 
Patent Law  1983  Invention patent (20 years)  
Utility model (10 years) 
Design of patterns and packages (10 years) 
Administrative protection
(a)  1993  Applicable only by foreigners from some 
countries; 7.5 years 
Protection Regulation for 
traditional Chinese medicine
(b) 
1993  Administrative protection for TCM; Applicable 
for TCM produced in China according State 
Standard; (30, 20, 10 or 7 year). 
New Plant Variety Protection 
Regulation 
1997  Artificial or development plant varieties 
20 or 15 year 
Source: own elaboration based on collected data  
Notes: (a) Administrative protection must be meet conditions: (1) not applicable for patents that were in 
china before January 1, 1993; (2) received exclusive right in local nations between January 1, 1986, and 
December 31, 1992; (3) no sales have been made in china before the date of applying for administrative 
protection;  
(b) the samples should meet the request of State Standard 
Before the revised Chinese Patent Law in 1993, patent protection for intellectual 
property rights of new drugs mainly depended on administrative protection. Since 1993 
two parallel systems of Patent Law protection and Administrative protection coexist. 
The administrative protection of patents here refers to the protection of intellectual 
property rights on drugs according to the administrative regulations by state 
administrative organs. At present the intellectual property rights related to 
pharmaceuticals can be protected in the following five protection systems (see Table 
3.5).  
(3) Drug distribution network 
The Drug industry in China, similar to other sectors, also went through the 
centrally planned system to a market-based economic structure. In the planned economy 
manufacturing and distribution were separated, namely the manufacturing factories  
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produced the drugs and the business sectors (drug wholesale station and drug station) 
sold the drugs. Specifically, the state-run enterprise produced drugs were distributed 
directly to province-level state-run drug wholesale stations and then to prefectural and 
county drug wholesale stations, finally to hospitals and drugstores. The hospitals 
usually purchased drugs from corresponding level drug stores (see Figure 3.1, Dong et 
al, 1999).  
 
Figure 3.1: Old distribution network of pharmaceuticals in the planned economy 
Source: Dong et al 1999 
The centrally controlled and highly vertically organized supply system of drug 
distribution began to move to the market-oriented demand system in 1983. Figure 3.2 
shows the new pharmaceutical distribution network, which is more complex than before 
and similar to the Western pharmaceutical distribution system. In the new distribution 
system pharmaceutical manufacturers can sell their products not only to the drug 
wholesale stations or other drug trading companies, but also directly to hospitals and 
drug stores. Salesmen on behalf of the drug factories or drug companies directly contact 
hospitals to persuade them in order to prescribe their products.  
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Figure 3.2: New distribution network of pharmaceuticals in the market economy 
Source: Dong at el 1999 
(4) Changes in Health Care Institutions 
After 1959, Chinese rural areas carried out a Rural Cooperative Medical Care 
System together with the Rural Cooperation Movement. The Rural Cooperative 
Medical Care System witnessed an unprecedented development. In 1962 the coverage 
of the Rural Cooperative Medical Care System jumped up to 10%, and by 1976 it was 
over 90%. But since the Rural Household Contract Responsibility System was 
implemented in the late 1970s, the rural collective economy quickly collapsed and so 
did the Rural Cooperative Medical Care System. From its peak of 90% in 1978 the 
coverage descended sharply to only 5% of the country in 1989. The Chinese 
government once again considered rural medical insurance and wanted to rebuild the 
Rural Cooperative Medical Care System, mainly relying on the local governments’ 
administrative impetus. Since 2003 the central government began to financially invest 
in this project.  
In the planned economy urban residents in China shared the right to receive free 
medicinal care. Those who worked in state and collective enterprises, employees and 
their families received coverage by an employer-paid medical security system, while 
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employees serving the government would enjoy medical care, financed by government 
funding. After the economic reforms some new problems appeared. State-owned 
enterprises with poor profits could no longer afford a sufficient medical insurance fund 
for their staff, and the non-state-owned enterprises (the private and foreign enterprises) 
were not mandated to provide medical welfare. As a result, 44.8% of urban residents 
and 79.0% of rural residents had no medical security and had to pay out-of-pocket, 
according to data from the Third National Public Health Service Survey in 2003 (Liu 
and Yin, 2006). 
Today China’s total health expenditures are divided into three parts: government, 
social security and individuals’ finance. Since the 1980s government budget for health 
expenditures has been in a slow growth, individual health expenditures have increased 
relatively to total health expenditure. Figure3.3 shows that individuals are responsible 
for the increase in healthcare expenses. In the government budget expenditures dropped 
to 17%, in a sharp contrast, and the 53.6 percent of China's total health expenditures 
was taken by individuals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Payment Structure of Healthcare Expenditure in China（1978-2004） 
Source: the website of the Ministry of Health (MOH) of China (www.moh.gov.cn) 
(5) The Market Openness 
In 1998 the first foreign investor, the Japanese Otsuka Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., 
came to China and established a joint venture with Chinese manufacturers and 
distributors in Tianjin (China National Pharmaceutical Industry Corporation, China 
National Pharmaceutical Foreign Trade Corporation and Tianjin Pharmaceutical 
Holdings, Ltd.). Later on several multinationals established their business units in 
China. The WTO accession in 2001 brought market openness in a broader range of 
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fields, such as distribution and service (see Table 3.6). Most of the top global 
pharmaceutical players have affiliates and operations in China today. At the same time 
the strong presence of foreign firms also imposed competitive pressure on the Chinese 
pharmaceutical enterprises. 
In recent years, multinational companies in China expanded investment in the 
field of China’s medicine market. At the end of 2006 the number of foreign owned and 
joint pharmaceutical ventures in China was more than 1,500, accounting for 30% of the 
total. For market share sales of foreign-funded enterprises in China accounted for 
around 25% of the entire pharmaceutical market. In the major cities foreign drugs and 
drug imports have occupied 60% to 65% market share. The hospital market is the main 
terminal market of foreign-funded pharmaceutical enterprises in China. All of top 10 
hospital market leaders in 2006 are foreign-funded pharmaceutical enterprises. In 
addition, after the first foreign R&D center in China was founded by Novo Nordisk 
from Denmark in 2002, the world leaders in pharmaceutical companies have set up their 
own R&D centers in China, including Roche, Pfizer, Novartis, GlaxoSmithKline, and 
AstraZeneca. 
Table 3.6: WTO pharmaceutical market timeline 
  Distribution and Logistics  
2001  China-foreign joint venture distributors were allowed.  
2004  All restrictions on foreign involvement in pharmaceutical distribution were 
removed and foreign firms could start to distribute pharmaceutical products. 
2007  All restrictions on foreign ownership of chain store pharmacies will be lifted. 
Source: Ernst and Young, 2005 
3.3 Market Demand and Market Consumption 
3.3.1 Population Explosion and Ageing Population  
In the past 60 years China's population grew explosively (see Table 3.7); the 
population policy has also gone through birth encouragement during the era of Mao 
Zedong to the Birth control during the late 1970s. The implementation of the “one child 
policy” in the early 1980s coincided with the coming of the age of the “baby boom” 
generation, and the birth rate slipped back up to 23.33 in 1987 before subsiding steadily 
to reach 16.03 in 1998, pulling the natural growth rate (birth rate minus death rate) 
down from 16.61 to 9.53 over the same period. Hence, population ageing is 
unprecedented without parallels in Chinese history. The official total population figure  
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at the end of 2003 is 1,307.6 million, a quarter of the world’s population. Due to the 
coming of the ageing society and rapid economic development, the well-off people 
enhanced health awareness and increased demand for medicine, both in quality and 
quantity.  
Table 3.7: Population growth and population structure by age (1953-2000) 
Item  1953 1964 1982 1990 2000 
Total  population  (million)  594.35  694.58 1,008.18 1,133.58 1,265.83 
Population  by  age  group  % % % % % 
0-14  years    36.28 40.69 33.59 27.69 22.89 
15-64  years      59.31 55.75 61.50 66.74 70.15 
65 years and older   4.41  3.56 4.91 5.57 6.96 
Source: China health statistics yearbook, 2006 
3.3.2 Climbing Healthcare Expenses 
In addition to population growth, the ageing society and increased health 
consciousness, there is another economic reason for the huge increase in pharmaceutical 
consumption.  
The constantly rapid economic growth brought about ever-improving living 
standards, and accordingly more expenses on health care. Figure 3.4 illuminates the 
growth of China's total health expenditures from 1978 to 2004 and the proportion of the 
total health expenditure to GDP.   
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Figure 3.4: Total healthcare expenses in GDP (1978-2004) 
Source: China health statistics yearbook, 2006 
China’s total health expenditure rose to more than 755 billion Yuan in 2004, from 
just over 10 billon Yuan in 1978. That is an increase of 68 times in less than 30 years. 
The per capita total health expenditure increased by 50 times, from 11.5 Yuan in 1978 
to 583.9 Yuan. The proportion of the total health expenditure to GDP in 2004 reached 
5.55%, while the number in 1978 was 3.04 %. 
3.4 The Evolution of China’s Pharmaceutical Industry and 
Geographical Patterns 
3.4.1 Introduction of Western Medicine before the 1950s 
The development of medical products and medical care in China has traditionally 
been characterized as Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM), which has existed and been 
accepted for the last 4,000 years and still holds an important position in health care in 
China (Efferth, 2007). Tongrentang and Huqingyu, today’s two predominant producers 
of TCM, were founded in 1669 and 1874 respectively and engaged in both manufacture 
and retail sales, operating drug stores. However, the traditional TCM enterprises were 
mainly operated by families, and were responsible for disease diagnosis, drug 
production, and retail, mainly for local inhabitants. As a consequence, TCM stores were 
almost small-scaled and distributed evenly throughout China.  
It was not until the Opium War in 1840 that the so-called modern China’s 
pharmaceutical manufacturing enterprise in terms of mass production and scientific 
technology had come into existence in China. The formation of the “modern” 
pharmaceutical industry in China is historically related to the introduction of the 
Western medicine. The introduction of the Western medical system into China can be 
traced back to the 16
th century, by missionaries from Europe like Matteo Ricci. The 
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Western medical system, however, had no virtual impact on China’s medical care 
system before the 1840s, because Western medicinal knowledge in the form of Chinese 
translations was not widely disseminated and merely limited to a few intellectual elites. 
After the Opium War, this situation changed gradually and considerably. Western 
medicine and the Chinese medicine began to co-exist in China. Firstly, some doctors 
from the U.S. and Europe, like Dr. Thomas Richardson Colledge and Dr. Livingstone, 
who ever served for the East India Company, practiced just in several limited coastal 
cities, mainly port cities such as Guangzhou and Macao. Secondly, Western medicine 
swarmed into China with foreign traders in China. Thirdly, the bulk of foreign-invested 
hospitals and clinics (see Table 3.8) was erected in coastal areas (Liu and Lundin, 
2007). 
Table 3.8: Geographical distribution of foreign- sponsored hospitals and drugstores in China (1921) 
  No.of hospital  No.of drugstore  total 
Fujian 41    41 
Jiangsu 34  6  40 
Guangdong 39    39 
Hubei 27  8  35 
Hebei 24  7  31 
Jiangxi 12  19  31 
Northeast China
(a) 25  6  31 
Zhejiang 19  9  28 
Henan 16  11  27 
Shanxi 11  12  23 
Hunan 18    18 
Gansu 2  12  14 
Guizhou 3  6  9 
Anhui 8    8 
Guangxi 4    4 
Total 283  96  379 
Source:http://www.cintcm.com/lanmu/zhongyi_lishi/jindaijuan/xiyi/mulu/diyizhang2.htm  
Note: Northeast China includes three northeastern provinces (Heilongjiang, Jilin and Liaoning). 
Chinese people began to operate their own pharmaceutical industry after the 
“Westernization Movement” (1860s-1890s). In 1900 China's first pharmaceutical 
manufacturing company was founded in Shanghai by an English businessman named 
Star Talbot. From then on, the Chinese began their own pharmaceutical manufacturing 
industry. Generally speaking, most of China's pharmaceutical manufacturers gained  
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their experience from being traders to become producers, i.e. firstly specialized in 
commerce of Western medicine and then transformed to chemical drug producers. 
Apparently the business model is closely related to the fact that Shanghai and 
Guanzhou were highly populated cities with foreign importers of medicine. In the case 
of Shanghai the number of Chinese funded pharmaceutical manufacturers during the 
First World War was as high as 24 and increased immensely to 58 in 1936. Guangzhou 
had about 30 pharmaceutical enterprises in 1938. During the Japanese invasion of 
China, the pharmaceutical industry in occupied territories was controlled by Japanese 
drug businessmen, and thereby the Chinese local pharmaceutical industry was almost 
ruined. However, Shanghai seemed to be an exception, because most of Shanghai 
pharmaceutical enterprises were located in the concession areas and received protection 
before the outbreak of the war in the Pacific in December 1941.  
It is noteworthy that the pharmaceutical industry in other Chinese regions under 
the leadership of CCP during a time span from1937 to 1949, also developed to a given 
degree. There are two aspects of the significance for the succeeding regional 
development of the pharmaceutical industry. The first is that the early established 
pharmaceutical companies played a part of incubators. For example, the foundation of 
Shandong Xinhua Phara in 1943 opened a window for the Chemical medicinal industry. 
Historically the enterprise had a variety of relations with other local pharmaceutical 
enterprises. Some of the latter directly stemmed from it, others learned a lot from it in 
the planning system, and more recently, it gave birth to new local entrants in this sector. 
The second is a large number of professionals and experts as pharmaceutical engineers 
and drug researchers whom the CCP trained before 1949. They became the first 
generation of intellectuals who either worked in universities or served as managers for 
the new state owned pharmaceutical enterprises after the foundation of PRC. Notably 
the Eighth Route Army Health School established in 1937 in Yan’an was an important 
predecessor of today’s China Medical University in Shenyang and Shenyang 
Pharmaceutical University. Another, the later Bethune Medical University (currently 
affiliated to Jilin University), can be traced back to Bethune Medical School in 1939. 
The three universities offered a mass of talents for the development of the Chinese 
pharmaceutical industry, particularly in Northeast China.  
3.4.2 Highly Fragmented Geographical Layout before the Mid-1990s 
In the first five year planning period (1953-1958), a few large-sized 
pharmaceutical enterprises were erected as key industrial projects. The North China  
  104
Pharmaceutical Factory (currently North China Pharmaceutical Group Corp, NCPC) in 
Shijianzhuang (which is the capital of chemical pharmaceuticals) and Taiyuan 
Pharmaceutical Factory (that was merged by NCPC), two of 156 Soviet-Assisted 
Projects, were formed in 1958 and 1960 respectively. Through construction of large 
new state-owned firms, nationalization of established private enterprises, reconstruction 
and expanding existing workshops and factories into mass production producers, China 
established basically integrated chemical and pharmaceutical industries. This marked a 
new era in China’s pharmaceutical industry, totally breaking the decades-long situation 
in which most Western drugs could not be produced locally and thus China was forced 
to be highly dependent on imports. 
However, after the first five year planning period, almost all established largest 
state-owned pharmaceutical enterprises were situated in province-level cities. In a quite 
long period, i.e. approximately from the 1960s to 1978, a great lot of middle and small 
pharmaceutical enterprises was established by local governments in non-metropolitan 
areas, even peripheral small cities, under the misguiding principle of “Self-Sufficiency”. 
This irrational investment resulted in a highly dispersed geographical lay-out of the 
pharmaceutical industry at a very early stage of development. Driven by the 
unreasonable massive investment, mainly from government, China’s medicine market 
enjoyed a high rate of growth. An average annual increase of 10.2% was achieved. The 
national aggregate sale of medicinal products in 1978 was RMB 5.03 bn., compared 
with RBM 0.46bn. in 1953, despite of a slight setback between 1962 and 1965 owing to 
the policy of “a significant reduction of the growth rate of industrial production and 
adjustment of industrial structures” framed in 1962 (See Table 3.9).   
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Table 3.9: Gross sales of China’s medicinal goods before 1978 
Unit: RMB hundred million 
  Medicine  Medical Instruments  Chemical Reagents  Total 
1953 3.3  1.1  0.2  4.6 
1957 9.3  1.9  0.4  11.6 
1962 19.0  2.3  0.7  22.0 
1963 17.2  3.3  1.2  21.7 
1970 21.6  4.2  1.6  27.4 
1975 33.9  6.2  2.3  42.4 
1978 39.0  8.3  3.0  50.3 
Total growth (%)  1,081.90  654.5  1,400  1,043.20 
P.a. growth (%)  10.4  8.4  11.4  10.2 
Source: ICC of SDA, 2000: p: 152 
Note: Medical instruments for 1953-1978 include glass apparatus 
Since the implementation of the opening-up policy in 1978 the importance of the 
pharmaceutical industry in China’s national economy has risen steadily. The annual 
sales increased by 17% between 1978 and 1997 with an exceptional annual growth rate 
of 22% during 1990–1995, which was nearly two times larger than GDP growth each 
year (See Table 3.10). However, the rapid growth also brought about the second wave 
of excessive investment. Since the introduction of fiscal decentralization with the 
economic reform local governments had a strong incentive to expand financial revenue. 
Given that background, almost all county-level governments established at least one 
(normally one Western medicine and one additional TCM) pharmaceutical plant. 
Moreover, local protectionism, following the decentralization of economic decision-
making in the middle of the 1980s, undoubtedly consolidated this spreading situation of 
the pharmaceutical industry (Bai et al., 2004). Excess investments in this industry 
together with low research and development capability for introducing new drugs 
consequentially led to a series of severe issues, such as idle production equipment, 
small firm size and medical accidents caused by unqualified drugs.   
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Table 3.10: Gross Sales of China’s Medicinal Goods from 1978 to 1997  
Unit: RMB hundred million 
 Medicine  Medical 
Instruments 
Chemical 
Reagents 
Glass 
Apparatus  Total 
1978  39.0 8.3 3.0    50.3 
1980  42.0 6.9 3.1 0.8  53.5 
1985  61.3  10.3 4.2 1.2  120.6 
1990  177.2  24.7 9.0 2.8  365.0 
1995  464.0 42.6 12.4  4.2  803.6 
1997  607.8 42.4 10.5  3.5  998.9 
Total  growth  (%)  1,458.5 408.4 250.0 337.5  1,885.9 
P.a. growth (%)  +15.5  +8.9 +6.8 +8.1  +17.0 
Source: CC of SDA, 2000: p: 152. 
Note: There are six major kinds of medical commodities in China after 1985, including medicine, 
medical instruments, chemical reagents, glass apparatus, traditional Chinese medicines and Chinese 
medicine preparations. 
After the reform and the opening-door policies, another novel factor is worth to 
note, i.e. foreign-invested pharmaceutical enterprises came to China again and affected 
the development trajectory of China’s pharmaceutical industry, both on the national and 
regional level. After the first foreign pharmaceutical investor, Otsuka Pharmaceutical 
Group from Japan, which entered China in 1981 and established a joint venture with 
Chinese manufacturers in Tianjin, some multinational pharmaceutical giants, e.g. 
AstraZeneca and Novartis, followed the wave to establish local production units. 
During the early phase joint ventures were the only permitted entry mode for foreign-
invested pharmaceutical enterprises in China. Massive foreign investments filled the 
gap of capital shortage, providing a strong financial support for the take-off of China's 
pharmaceutical industry after 1990. During the 8
th Five-Year Planning period (1990-
1995) the total investment in fixed assets reached about RBM 45 billion and the actual 
utilization of foreign capital in this industry was about US dollars 1.2 billion. At the 
same time the demand gap for imported costly medicines was filled through the form of 
joint venture. By 1996 17 of the top worldwide pharmaceutical companies had 
established branches in China. 
3.4.3 Moving Towards Geographical Concentration after the Mid-1990s 
The period after 1995 was turbulent for China’s pharmaceutical industry which 
witnessed painful policy adjustments, like the compulsory Good Manufacture Practice 
(GMP) policy, the ownership reform of state owned enterprises (SOEs) and the 
encouragement of foreign investment entrance. In gross output value the growth rate of 
pharmaceutical industry in China still maintained on a higher level than that of China’s 
GNP during the corresponding time span. The total revenue of pharmaceutical products  
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reached RMB 96.2 billion in 2000 with an increase of 13% compared to the one of 
1995, in which the revenue of the state-owned and state-holding companies was RMB 
47.88 billion, 9.5% more than that of the previous year (See Table 3.11).  
Table 3.11: Profile of Chinese pharmaceutical industry from 1995 to 2004 
Source: China High-tech Industry Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2004 
The total profit reached RMB 7.58 billion with an annual increase rate of 19%. 
The profits of foreign companies as well as enterprises with investments from Hong 
Kong, Macao and Taiwan rose by 14.8%, and the profits of collectively-owned 
companies grew by 6.5% over the previous year. The gross output value of China's 
pharmaceutical industry increased from RMB 178.13 billion in 2000 to RMB 324.13 
billion in 2004, the industrial added value rose to RMB 117.3 billion, the profits 
summed up to RMB 30.33 billion, the sales revenue jumped to RMB 427.1 billion, and 
they all witnessed an average annual growth of about 20%. 
At the same time, through 10 years of increasingly ferocious market competition 
and government-led industry restructuring and substantive foreign investment (see 
Table 3.12), Chinese pharmaceutical industry was moving towards geographical 
concentration in total, and simultaneously a proliferating geographical division of labor 
of Chinese pharmaceutical industry can be clearly identified among province-level 
regions, and this in turn contributes to the geographical concentration of China's 
pharmaceutical enterprises (Zhang and Van Den Bulcke, 2008). As regards regional 
distribution, 60% of the industry’s total profit comes from the eastern coastal regions. 
According to Chinese Medicine Economic Statistics Report for 2004, the top 10 
province- level regions, consisting of 2 of the 4 municipalities directly under the control 
of the central government (i.e. Shanghai and Beijing), 4 coastal provinces (Jiangsu, 
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Enterprises 
Gross 
Output 
Value 
Added 
Value 
Sale 
Revenues  Profits 
Taxes 
And 
Profit 
Export 
1995  5,388 961.26 264.67 902.67 51.48  101.72  127.32 
1996 5,396  1,151.10  359.75  1,043.34  65.58  127.28  n.a 
1997 5,028  1,262.34  411.51  1,177.58  72.73  149.15  n.a 
1998  3,280  1,372.73  432.91  1,264.10  77.44 163.17 147.15 
1999  3,272  1,497.22  514.86  1,378.96 101.46 199.43 162.54 
2000  3,301  1,781.37  633.88  1,627.48 136.58 262.63 167.93 
2001  3,488  2,040.86  722.43  1,924.39 168.05 312.78 183.38 
2002  3,681  2,378.44  834.65  2,279.98 201.42 365.77  n.a 
2003  4,063 2,889.90 1,024.92 2,750.73  259.58  446.91  n.a 
2004  4,765 3,241.30 1,173.00 3,033.00  275.00  479.80  n.a  
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Zhejiang, Guangdong and Shandong) and Hubei, Jilin and Sichuan, Henan, accounted 
for approximately two thirds (66.76%) of the gross industry output value in 2003, 
employing 60 percent of national work force in the pharmaceutical industry.  
From the viewpoint of technological distinction it is also evident that specialized 
pharmaceutical production districts are emerging in China (See Table 3.13). Zhejiang 
and Hubei successfully developed in the fields of raw materials and intermediate 
products. The former is mainly promoted by private companies, which partly can be 
attributed to an active spin-off mechanism from SOEs. Jiangsu is specialized in 
chemical drugs with strong participation of foreign-invested enterprises (FIEs). 
Shanghai and Beijing, as key bases for medical research and development, play a 
significant role in R&D of new drugs, especially in the recently emerging field of 
biomedicine. In the Pearl River Delta, particularly in Guangdong province, private and 
other forms of non state-owned companies remain relatively more energetic, taking a 
leading position in TCM, bio-drugs and medical equipment. For example, Shenzhen 
became a new well developed city in the biopharmaceutical industry. Shandong and 
Liaoning provinces focus on mass production of chemical raw materials and genetic 
drugs, which can be partly owned to established large state pharmaceutical enterprises 
before the 1980s, and their branches. Western China and frontier provinces, including 
Sichuan, Yunnan, and Jilin, typically based on natural resources, have a long tradition 
of TCM production with a quite diversified and complementary value added chain. As a 
consequence the TCM industry in these regions was considerably promoted, since more 
importance was recently placed on the industry with a long history.  
3.5 The Emerging Pharmaceutical Industrial Clusters in China  
In recent years, allured by American and European brilliant (bio)pharmaceutical 
industries, China’s central government and local authorities have established numerous 
pharmaceutical/biological parks as a key spatial strategy to enhance regional/national 
competitiveness of (bio)pharmaceutical industry in the global context. There is now an 
increasing trend to establish (bio)pharmaceutical parks in China. Chen (2005) identified 
64 biopharmaceutical industrial parks until 2004, 23 of which were located in the hi-
tech zones and 41 in independent parks. Eighteen of these parks were initiated or 
approved by the central government, while 26 were authorized by provincial 
governments and the rest by county-level administration. Zhang and Van Den Bulcke 
(2008), by calculating a location quotient based on location and employment data from  
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the Directory of Chinese Companies (2006), identified 81 pharmaceutical industrial 
clusters in China, which host 62% of all China-based pharmaceutical firms and occupy 
72% of the total employment in the industry. Although these studies had caused a 
debate on the accurate number of pharmaceutical industrial parks, partly because of 
different working definitions of the (bio) pharmaceutical industry, the number is 
arguably constantly increasing. At the same time these studies commonly demonstrate 
that the geographical concentration level of the Chinese pharmaceutical industry has 
become much higher than ever before. 
When one takes a closer look at the location of the first class Chinese enterprises, 
the trend of geographical concentration of China’s pharmaceutical industry is evident. 
According to the 2004 data from the National Statistics Medicine Network 
(www.yytj.net.cn), we can find that 3 municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai and Tianjin) 
and two old pharmaceutical industry cities (Hanzhou and Shijiazhuang) host most of the 
top 100 pharmaceutical enterprises in China. In Beijing there are 10 of the top 100 
enterprises, most of which are multinational companies. Shanghai hosts 7 large 
pharmaceutical enterprises, 3 of which are aided by foreign capital. Hangzhou and 
Shijiang are also major habitats for first-class pharmaceutical enterprises. 
In the north of China almost all the important pharmaceutical enterprises have 
remained in Beijing. Beijing's biomedical industries are distributed in three distinct 
parks in the Beijing Economic Development Zone. The Zhongguancun Life Park 
commits itself to research and development in life sciences. Enterprises work as an 
incubator, pilot production, to some degree because of the existence of universities and 
public research institutes concerning the life sciences and pharmaceutics. The two other 
parks, i.e. the Daxing biomedicine industrial base and Yizhuang Medicine Valley, are 
more oriented towards mass production. As Figure 3.5 and Table 3.14 show Beijing is 
the second largest place of foreign pharmaceutical R&D Centers in China, following 
Shanghai.   
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Figure 3.5: Location of foreign pharmaceutical R&D Centers in China by 2004 
Source: Festel at el (2005: p. 116) and own research 
The pharmaceutical industry in Jilin province seems to be the most competitive 
amongst the northeastern provinces in China, especially Changchun’s biological 
industry and Tonghua’s TCM industry. Both of them are the national industrial bases of 
the pharmaceutical industry. 
In Hebei province, the city of Shijiazhuang manufactures annually 60,000 tons of 
chemical medicine, accounting for 12% of the national production. It ranks second 
(following Shanghai) by gross output value. It is impressive that there are a number of 
extra large-sized pharmaceutical enterprises with a strong competitive edge on national 
and even international markets, and some of them were ever state-owned, such as 
NCPC, CSPC, and Yiling Pharmaceutical Group. In addition, there is a great deal of 
small and medium-sized enterprises surrounding the large ones. It is estimated that there 
are currently 300 pharmaceutical manufacturers and 640 additional supportive and 
related enterprises in this city.  
The Yangtze River Delta has already been one of the most economically dynamic 
regions of both the biotechnological and pharmaceutical industries. Shanghai and its 
neighbor cites, like Nanjing,Wuxi, Suzhou, and Hangzhou, became emerging industrial 
Shanghai 
Beijing 
Tianjin 
Servier (Beijing) R&D Center (2001)
Novo Notdisk(China) R&D Center 
(2002) 
R&D Center  
by GSK (2004) 
East-Asia clinical Research Center (2003) 
R&D Center by (J&J2004)  
China R&D Center by Roche (2004) 
Shanghai Chem exploer Co Ltd by Eli Lilly
(2003)  
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bases for the (bio)pharmaceutical industry. By 2004 more than 140 biomedicine 
enterprises, 54 of which are foreign-owned, had existed in Zhangjiang, with the largest 
biomedicine industrial park in Shanghai. More interesting, most of the international 
R&D centers established by the top pharmaceutical giants worldwide have been located 
primarily in Shanghai. And the number of foreign pharmaceutical R&D centers in 
Shanghai is still increasing. 
In some of China's coastal areas the development of biomedical industries is 
mainly dependent on marine resources. Hankou in Hunan province began to make use 
of local biological resources to construct the so-called “Natural Drug Storehouse”. A 
medicine valley was claimed to be in its embryonic stage here. The development of the 
biomedical Valley in Qingdao City is similar to the story of Haikou city.  
In Central China some satellite towns surrounding the provincial capitals, such as 
Liuyang in Hunan and Gedian in Hubei, built biomedical industrial parks in the early 
1990s. The formation of industrial parks was basically from scratch and owed to local 
governments. In North-Western China (including Chongqing municipality, Sichuan 
province, and Yunan province and Tibet) the pharmaceutical industry is typically based 
on natural resources and is more oriented towards TCM manufacturing. In particular, 
Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan province, is the largest production base of the 
medicinal industry in North-Western China. Sichuan province is the first national-level 
TCM Industrial Base in China and was approved in 1998 by the Ministry of Science 
and Technology, Jilin province became the second TCM industrial base in 2002). 
Chongqi, Kunming and Guiyang respectively established their own pharmaceutical 
industry parks, based on unique resources of natural plants. Even in the northwest part 
of China, Ningxia province officially declared that it would make attempts to develop 
into a Western pharmaceutical valley, taking advantage of the opportunity of Great 
Western Development Strategy.   
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Figure 3.6: Emerging pharmaceutical industrial clusters in China 
Source: own elaboration  
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Table 3.12: Ownership structure of Chinese pharmaceutical industry in 2003 
 
Source: Chinese Medicine Statistical Yearbook (2003) 
  Note: the number in brackets represents the percentage 
Characteristics Total  FIEs  SOEs  Collective  firms  Private  firms 
Number of companies  4,634.00  794.00  (17.13)  678.00  (14.63)  364.00  (7.86)  2,798.00  (60.38) 
Number of Loss-making enterprises  1,015.00  180.00  (17.73)  249.00  (24.53)  59.00  (5.81)  527.00  (51.93) 
Number of employees  1,283,783.00  177,174.00  (13.80)  198,996.00  (15.50)  78,167.00  (6.09)  829,446.00  (64.61) 
Industrial output (100 million RMB)  31,037.76  7,155.76  (23.05)  2,758.61  ( 8.89)  2,132.40  (6.87)  18,990.99  (61.19) 
Output of New products (100 million 
RMB)  4,392.12  1,052.82  (23.97)  349.17  ( 7.95)  226.22  (5.15)  2,763.91  (62.93) 
Sales (100 million RMB)  29,286.17  6,692.94  (22.85)  2,631.70  ( 8.97)  2,028.73  (6.94)  17,932.80  (61.24) 
Export value (100 million RMB)  3,516.77  1,217.14  (34.62)  343.52  (97.68)  132.60  (3.77)  1,823.51  (51.85) 
Added value (100 million RMB)  10,428.69  2,404.33  (23.05)  926.89  ( 8.89)  716.49  (6.87)  6,380.98  (61.19) 
Assets (100 million RMB)  45,371.32  8,085.07  (17.82)  5,263.31  (11.60)  1,907.16  (4.20)  30,115.78  (66.38)  
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Table 3.13: Top 10 provinces in Chinese pharmaceutical industry 
 
Source: Chinese Medicine Statistical Yearbook (2004) 
TCM 
Chemical Raw 
Material Medicine 
Bio-Preparation 
Rank Province  Number of 
Enterprise  Province  Total Output 
Value 
Province Output  Value  Province Output  Value  Province  Output 
Value 
1  Jiangsu  428 Jiangsu  3,578,468 Guangdong  914,138 Hebei  1,326,659 Hubei  328,968 
2 Zhejiang  386  Zhejiang 2,878,634  Jilin  801,950 Zhejiang  1,183,530 Zhejiang  309,222 
3  Guangdong  339 Guangdong 2,670,385 Sichuan  512,007 Shandong  923,685 Shandong 252,223 
4  Shandong  281 Shandong  2,490,432 Jiangxi  468,173 Heilongjiang 606,290 Shanghai 244,713 
5  Shanghai  280 Shanghai  2,062,305 Shandong  466,383 Jiangsu  598,208 Guangdong  174,484 
6  Hubei  270 Hebei  1,874,399 Guizhou  463,944 Tianjin  319,819 Beijing  166,887 
7  Jilin  206 Beijing  1,430,688 Zhejiang  387,143 Hubei  314,547 Tianjin  139,540 
8  Beijing  204 Hubei  1,377,999 guanxi  350,187 Shanghai  303,226 Jilin  96,937 
9  Sichuan  202 Sichuan  1,181,766 Jiangsu  342,976 Liaoning  282,697 Jiangsu  92,626 
10 Henan  200  Jilin  1,177,845 Beijing  323,631 Guangdong  229,224 Sichuan  85,196 
Total of top 10 region  2,796    20,722,921    5,030,532    6,087,885    1,890,796 
National gross  4634   
31,037.76 
  8,102.7    7,125.499    2,463.05 
% of top 10 regions in 
national   60.3    66.76    62.08    85.43    76.76  
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Table 3.14:  Foreign pharmaceutical R&D centers in China by 2004 
 
Source: Festel at el (2005, p: 116) and own collection 
 
 
Year   MNC  Name of R&D Center  Location  Investment  Ownership 
2001  Sevier  Servier (Beijing) R&D Center  Beijing  n/a  Wholly foreign-owned 
2002  Novo 
Notdisk 
Novo Notdisk(China) R&D 
Center  Beijing n/a  Wholly  foreign-owned 
2003 Astra-zeneca  East-Asia clinical Research 
Center  Shanghai  Fitst year:US 4 million Wholly  foreign-owned 
2003  Eli Lilly  Shanghai Chem exploer Co Ltd.  Shanghai  All funds supplied by Eli Lilly,>100 
scientists 
Jont-invested with  Shanghai Chem exploer Co 
Ltd. 
2004  Roche  China R&D Center  Shanghai  Fitst year several millions,50 scientists  Wholly foreign-owned 
2004  GSK  n/a  Tianjin  16 scientists  Wholly foreign-owned 
2004 J&J  n/a  Shanghai n/a  Wholly  foreign-owned  
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Chapter 4 Empirical Research Method and Design 
I have pointed out in Chapter 2 that the evolutionary thinking and coevolutioanry 
approach to economy and economic geography are helpful to understand the changes of 
the economy or economic landscape. However, both evolutionary economics and the 
coevolutionary approach need a real history. In Chapter 2.1.3, I theoretically answered 
to a basic theoretical question, what kind of history we need to better understand 
evolution in economic geography. There is still an unresolved question, namely, how to 
bring the historical methodology into (co)evolutionary empirical studies. The main aims 
of this chapter are to make this question clear and to explain from where the data for my 
study is sourced.  
4.1 The Methodological Predicaments of Industrial Cluster 
The literature on industrial clusters and the like can be methodologically divided 
into two intertwined strands in general. One is, based on a case study approach of 
economically successful regions, aiming at identifying some mechanisms and 
circumstances that seem to be responsible for or at least influence the economic success 
of a region. The specific history in the case of the Third Italy (Dei Ottati, 1994; 
Rabellotti, 1997), accidental events like research funding from the Department of 
Defence in Route 128 (Rosegrant and Lampe, 1992), and the existence of universities in 
the case of North Jutland (Dalum, 1995), are regarded to be the crucial factors for the 
emergence of the industries in special areas. Many other different prerequisites have 
been identified, including the existence of research institutes and universities (for 
example, Porter, 1990; Florax and Folmer, 1992; Dalum, 1995; Garnsey, 1998), the 
availability of venture capital (Florida and Kenney, 1988; Garnsey, 1998), the 
entrepreneurial attitude in a region (Fumagalli and Mussati, 1993), the specificity of 
local markets (Porter, 1990) and the influence of policy makers (Markusen and Park, 
1993). But this research tradition has been criticized for the lack of a united framework 
and/or ignoring the importance of timing. Timing should be taken into consideration in 
the discussion about the evolution of industrial clusters (Brenner and Fornahl, 2003). 
Firstly, the importance of the above-mentioned mechanisms changes through time. 
Secondly, the market situation and technological development in industries play an 
essential role for the emergence of local clusters, and change over time in each industry. 
Finally, the emergence of local industrial clusters is a process, in which the impact and  
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effectiveness of policy measures vary during the development of the cluster, and the 
same policy measures have different influences at different times. Therefore, when the 
case study is conducted, more attention should be placed to timing, at the same time, a 
more general and broader theoretical consideration should be needed. 
The other strand is, based on more general theoretical approaches, to explore why 
economic activities, on a general and an industrial level, are geographically clustering, 
for example, Krugman (1991a), and Ellison and Glaeser (1997). These theoretical 
approaches try to rebuild geographic concentration in simulations (for example 
Camagni and Diappi, 1991; Jonard and Yildizoglu, 1998; Krugman 1991a; Ellison and 
Glaeser, 1994). However, these studies targeted a final spatial distribution similar to the 
one observed in reality, and failed to explain the dynamics of the distribution formation 
in detail. In other words, this theoretical approach neglects the key questions of how, 
where and when the localised industrial clusters evolve (with the few exceptions of 
Brenner, 2004). In addition, in some cases, for example, in the work of Krugman (e.g. 
1991c), both place and history are viewed as abstract entities (for this aspect, see 
Martin, 1999 and Chapter 2.1.1). Although Brenner (2004) has made some progress in 
this direction by trying to construct a theoretical model which can accurately describe 
the evolution of clusters in general terms, beyond the peculiarities of each cluster, he 
only points to the fact that local industrial clusters do not exist in all industries, while he 
does not explore the sector-specific characters of clustering. In addition, this research 
line tends to be on a general and an industrial level, ignoring the place-specific 
characters of clustering. There have recently been a few attempts to study the spatial 
evolution of particular industries (i.g. Boschma and Weterings, 2005a; Klepper, 2002b; 
Weterings, 2004), with the application of evolutionary economics. Observably, there is 
little literature on how to bridge the principles of an evolutionary approach with the 
‘evolutionary’ empirical investigations, which insists on situating an ‘evolutionary’ 
empirical analysis in the real history (see Chapter 2.1.3). Here I will develop another 
history-oriented research method for empirical research on the evolution of an industrial 
cluster, which is different from the history-friendly modelling method of Malerba et al. 
(1999, 2001). 
4.2 History-Oriented Empirical Research Methods 
As regards the “methodological variety and openness” in evolutionary economic 
geography, I entirely agree with Boschma and Frenken (2006a) that the methodological  
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openness may be considered a strength of evolutionary economic geography, but all 
concrete research methods should be based on more realistic assumptions (like bounded 
rationality and disequilibrium) and real history, otherwise the over-openness of research 
methods will doubtlessly bring about potential dangers (see, Boschma and Martin, 
2007). I elevate history to the methodological foundation of evolutionary economic 
geography in Chapter 2.1.3, on which concrete research methods should be based, and 
clearly state that to better understand evolution in economic geography should place 
history in historical time and historical contexts. For historical contexts, the concepts of 
path creation and path dependence should be used together in historical study. Here, I 
will focus on how to bring real history to a case study on cluster evolution in practice. 
Probably the history-friendly research method is a good choice.  
There are actually some history-oriented research methods that have already been 
employed in industrial evolution studies. These history-oriented models, which are 
based on a detailed rigorous illustration of a specific industry, add “richer, history-
based, phenomenological details to the formal representation” (Bottazzi et al., 2001, p: 
614). A more recently used approach are the ‘history friendly models’ which Malerba et 
al. developed, which try to use carefully simulation models in studying specified, 
empirical ‘histories’ of individual industries, for example, the models on the history of 
the computer industry with a special focus on the role of IBM (Malerba et al., 1999, 
2001) and the recent history of pharmaceuticals and biotechnology (Malerba and 
Orsenigo, 2002). The “History-friendly models” (HFM) are formal evolutionary 
economic models. They aim to capture – in stylised form – the mechanisms and factors 
affecting the evolution of various industries, technological and institutional change 
(Malerba et al., 2001). But HFM need further examination through historical evidences.  
Here I will offer another descriptive “history-friendly” research method, but not in 
formalised mathematical models, for studying the evolution of an industrial cluster. This 
qualitative history-oriented research method is characterized by a mixture of the 
methods of business history case studies and ethnographic methods. My approach is 
closer to what Nelson and Winter (1982) labeled “appreciative theorizing”, i.e. non 
formal explanations of observed phenomena based on specific causal links proposed by 
the researcher. The common points of HFM and my approach at least includes: (1) they 
both try to reproduce stylized facts in accordance with an evolutionary explanation; (2) 
their main purposes are to broadly explore the logic of evolutionary economic 
processes; (3) they both recognize the richness and importance of history, and give  
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more attention to time series and specific sequences of events (for the point of HFM, 
see Malerba et al., 2001). But my approach is different form HFM in the following 
aspects: (1) HFM are quantitative theories, while my approach is mainly based on 
qualitative analysis; (2) HFM are more deductive but my approach is more inductive; 
(3) HFM believe that formal models play a crucial role for the development of more 
general theories of industrial evolution, but I think that my mixed methods also can 
identify variables of industrial evolution and relationships and test causal mechanisms.  
Among the three research methods I will employ to study the evolution of an 
industrial cluster, business history is the base one for the other two in the sense that the 
materials and data used in the latter two methods are collected through the first method. 
The approach of business history was often used in early evolutionary work, for 
example, of both Joseph Alois Schumpeter and Alfred D. Chandler. Business history is 
an approach which moves beyond a “pure” empirical and historical approach to 
economics, and led Schumpeter to a uniquely powerful understanding of modern 
capitalism (McCraw, 2006, p: 261). Alfred D. Chandler employed the business history 
case study method to engage with a broader question, namely the importance of the 
large managerially directed enterprises (see Lamoreaux et.al, 2008). In a nutshell, 
business history case study could be seen as an interpretative history-friendly method, 
based on long-range empirical and historical data on (i) entrepreneurs (their behavior, 
decision-making rules, and interactions); (ii) individual companies, and (iii) the 
environment in which they operate, and other particular parameters that are likely to 
have been important in generating the observed history. The value-added of this method 
is that it offers detailed historical materials, but it is silent on the historical relationship 
between firms over time, i.e. the evolution between different firm generations. So we 
need other research methods to complement the business history approach, when we 
want to explore the evolution of co-located firms. 
The genealogical method and the approach of “generative relationships” obviously 
can fill this gap. The genealogical method is a well-established ethnographic research 
method and was developed in anthropology in the late nineteenth century, by which 
ethnographers can symbolize an evolutionary connection between kinship, descent, and 
marriage. This genealogical method can be applied to industrial (cluster) evolution, 
because it is helpful to understand the “kinships” (of firms, technologies), by testing the 
effect of inheritance on any individual trait and variation, based on the collected 
materials and data through business history method. For example, in practice, we can  
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record connections of kinship, descent and merger and reorganization of firms with 
diagrams and symbols, based on individual firm’s histories, which can be collected 
through interview surveys with firm founders and/or key consultants, and second-hand 
data (e.g. enterprise autobiography) as well.  
In light of the theories of complex systems and coevolution, however, an entity 
(for example firm organization) is not fixed, but constantly changing (a complex 
adaptive system itself); at the same time, it is also a member of a higher-order complex 
adaptive system comprising the focus entity itself and the others with which it interacts. 
This means that the changes in one entity are not just elements of its own evolution 
(path-dependent processes), but, rather, are influenced by heterogeneous and 
unpredictable contingent factors. For example, the final particular form of technological 
development we observe is not only the result of technical necessity, but is influenced 
by social, economic factors and, to some extent, political and institutional factors as 
well. Often, interactions between particular sets of entities take place in recurring 
patterns that persist over time, and these interactions may give rise to relationships 
between the participants (Lane et al., 1996, p: 59) that we can call “generative 
relationships” (GRs). The notion of GRs was put forward by Lane and Maxfield (1996) 
and was defined as “a relationship that can induce changes in the way the participants 
see their world and act in it and even give rise to new entities, like agents, artifacts, 
even institutions” (Lane and Maxfield, 1996, p: 215).  GRs has two important 
characteristics: (i) generative: interactions amongst the participants in a GR can give 
rise to something new, which one of the members of the relationship could not have 
produced alone; (ii) unpredictable: the loosely coupled reciprocal relations and their 
results  could not have been foreseen in advance. It was created by the interaction 
between the parties (for extended discussion of generative relationships, see Lane and 
Maxfield, 1996; Lane et al., 1996, p: 59; Russo and Hughes, 2002). This approach, as 
Russo and Hughes (2002) pointed out, is consistent with the definition of innovation 
suggested by Schumpeter (1934). 
The combined approach I will use is not new in the evolutionary study of an 
industrial cluster. A good example is that Patrucco (2005) explicitly employed the 
notion of “generative relationships” and the ethnographic approach, and implicitly used 
the approach of business history case study as well, in studying the emergence of 
technology systems in the Emilian plastics district, Italy. With this method, a detailed 
analysis on the individual paths of main entrepreneurs, both specific and idiosyncratic,  
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can be made. The historical and in-depth analysis of formation and transformation of 
firms is extremely important for grasping the historical relationships among firms at any 
point in time in the local pharmaceutical sector. It is notable that the mixed method only 
provides some rough lines implying the material succession between enterprises, 
therefore, it is indispensable to examine how the knowledge, especially the knowledge 
of industrial technology and business management, flows through personal movement 
in this local industry. In a nutshell, the mixed method enables longitudinal and 
evolutionary studies, in particular in the case of small studies, in which the number of 
firms is relatively small. If the amount of firms is sufficiently large, the work on data 
collection and depicting generative relationships of clustered firms is so much that it is 
impossible to be well finished.  
4.3 Data Sources for Empirical Exploration 
4.3.1 What Kind of Information Should Be Collected 
According to “historical time, as opposed to a time-line, is uneven and punctured 
by events” (Clark and Rowlinson, 2004, p: 342) and what kind of history evolutionary 
scholars need (see Chapter 2.1.4), it is essential to identify particular influential events. 
Since I explore the evolutionary trajectory of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry 
through three populations (namely, firm, technology and institution), I should identify 
those important historical events that had have a great influence on these three 
populations. The emergence and growth of an industrial cluster depend both on the 
growth in firm number and the increase in economic performance of individual firms 
(through various forms of innovation inside and between enterprises), thus all important 
historical events that impact the rise and fall of firm number and enterprise innovation 
should be included. More specifically, as regards firm organization, the momentous 
events such as firm creation and firm closure, the ownership change should be involved; 
as far as technological events are concerned, these events like the emergence of new 
technology, redevelopment of “old” technology, and influential research projects must 
be included; for institutional change, events including key regional and industrial 
planning and strategies should be contained as well. Furthermore, all innovative events 
(for example, the creation of new ventures, and adoption of new technology) are 
involved with entrepreneurs; hence some entrepreneurial events should also be 
included.    
  122
4.3.2 Data Sources and Survey Processes 
The main task of this Ph. D. thesis is to explore the regional industrial trajectory in 
the transitional context in China, taking Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry as an 
example. To accomplish this task, the empirical analysis should provide strong 
empirical content related to theory. To be sure, a historical or evolutionary approach to 
an industrial cluster involves serious methodological challenges. These include the 
construction of time series data that permit longitudinal analysis and provide 
information sufficiently fine-grained to reveal how the dynamic interplay of micro-level 
adaptation sequences and meso-level events is implicated in an industrial cluster. At the 
same time, the difficulties of acquiring reliable data at the firm and industry level in an 
industry cluster requires the generation of data sets for the long-term evolutionary 
study. Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry began in the second half of the 19th century; 
however there is at most over 20 years of data (from 1985 onwards) available to 
researchers. It is hence statistically questionable whether industry-level panel data 
analyses can be validated within the boundaries of statistical confidence. The issue is 
also acute at the firm-level. On the one hand, data on many of the variables influencing 
industrial clustering are not available in published enterprise-level data sets; on the 
other hand, data (for example, output value, and sales) are available merely in relatively 
large private enterprises. Thus, face-to-face interviews can best identify the relevant 
variables and their causal relationships between them. The empirical study to be 
presented in the next four chapters is largely based on the information about the 
founding events and organizational backgrounds of each individual pharmaceutical 
enterprise in the cluster until the end of 2005. Data collection was mainly based on 
reading secondary data, in-depth interviews with local actors and with local experts and 
Jilin provincial government agencies (see Appendix 1-3). The collection of the 
information, which has involved an extensive amount of work to trace the foundation 
and historic events of every firm having ever been a part of this regional industry, was 
conducted in the following ways. 
In order to better map the contexts and backgrounds of the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical industry, I conducted personal face-to-face interviews with Jilin 
provincial government agencies (the Development Research Centre of Jinlin Provincial 
Government, the Jilin Province Development and Reform Commission, the Jilin 
Province Development and Reform Commission, the Jilin Provincial Science & 
Technology Department, the Jilin Food and Drug Administration, the Jilin Academy of  
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Social Sciences) and local government agencies (the Tonghua City Administrative 
Office of Pharmaceutical Industry, the Tonghua City Science Technology Department, 
the Erdaojiang District the Organization Department, the CCP Tonghua City 
Committee, see Appendix 1) , complemented by second hand materials, including the 
materials provided by the interviewed government agencies, previous studies (Wang, 
2006; Hou, 2007; Wang, 2006; Xue, 2008; Li,2006; Gao,2005), local and provincial 
newspapers (Tonghua Daily, and Jilin Daily), public publications (Tonghua Statistical 
Yearbook and Tonghua industrial history, the History of Jilin Province Forty-Year 
Manufacturing Industry), and local industrial reports and public speeches. The semi-
structured interviews with the government agencies interviewees focussed on the 
following issues: (1) the change in national and provincial regulations on the 
pharmaceutical industry, in particular TCM industry; (2) the national, provincial and 
local development plans and strategies of pharmaceutical industry, in particular TCM 
industry and their influences on Tonghua; (3) the characteristics of the pharmaceutical 
innovation, the role of demand factors and markets; (4) local industry-support 
measures, and other China’s TCM regions (see Appendix 4). Secondary data is also one 
source of empirical evidences and played an important role in conducting the 
longitudinal analysis.  
The enterprise-level data was mainly collected through two channels. The first is 
semi-structured interviews with local companies, local policy makers, expert analysts 
and members of collective bodies directly involved in the implementation of local 
institutions and local structures of co-ordination for the developing activities of the 
cluster. Five in-depth face-to-face interviews with local officials and experts (four 
government officials and one local scholar specialized in the history of the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical industry) were the main source of information before my interviews 
with local firms. Each of these interviews lasted 2-3 hours (Appendix 1), by which I got 
the general information, including the list of firm names, firm addresses, and general 
managers or founders. With the support of two local government agencies, the Tonghua 
Pharmaceutical Industry Administrative Office and the Tonghua Science and 
Technology Bureau, I conducted thirty-five local company interviews. The number of 
my interviewed firms is about half the number of GMP (Good Manufacturing Practice) 
firms in Tonghua. The list of GMP firms was provided by the Tonghua City 
Administrative Office of Pharmaceutical Industry.  
The companies chosen for my survey are basically middle and small-sized  
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pharmaceutical enterprises. The reasons why middle and small-sized enterprises were 
chosen are that (1) it is easier to get access to them than to large enterprises, in other 
words, it is difficult to visit key figures of relatively large pharmaceutical enterprises; 
(2) second-hand enterprise-level data and materials of large enterprises are better   
available than that of middle and small-sized enterprises. I can use second-hand 
materials such as published data and enterprise websites to make up the deficiency of 
the first-hand data of large enterprises. At the same time, in order to make full use of 
each firm interview to obtain as much information as possible (both about the 
interviewed firm itself and others), I chose half of the number of GMP firms in the 
subregions. Considering that Changchun is the capital of Jilin province which hosts 
most of pharmaceutical and medical research institutes in this province, additionally, 
that Changchun is always the main technoligical source for Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
enterprises in history, I interviewed additional five firms in Changchun which have 
direct and important connections with Tonghua’s pharmaceutical cluster. Three of them 
were acquired by big pharmaceutical groups in Tonghua, and the other two are 
research- oriented enterprises which have long-lasting research cooperation with 
Tonghua pharmaceutical enterprises. All firm interviews were conducted in June and 
July, 2007 (Appendix 3). 
The semi-structured interviews with the company interviewees focus on the 
issues of (1) the organization of the productive activities of firms, including the 
changing ownership structure, spin-offs, and work experiences of the founders; (2) 
production and technology, including main strategies or projects, product and process 
innovations, sources of practical know-how, and knowledge about how to develop new 
drugs; (3) financial situation, for example, the financial sources at their starts, turnover, 
capital investments and other internal and external factors influencing firm 
development and the competitive environment in which the firms operate; (4) 
Information about other local firms. The enterprise-level relevant written 
documentation was collected both from the informants and other sources like company 
information from websites, annual reports and pamphlets, press articles and the 
internet.  
I interviewed people in various positions including: company founders and 
entrepreneurial team members, scientific researchers, and industrial partners. In order 
to get to know the history of the interviewed enterprises and their founders, I firstly 
tried to visit key figures (founders and top managers). But it is difficult to conduct  
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face-to-face interviews with the top managers of relatively large businesses (the chief 
executive officer). In these cases (6 firms), I interviewed middle-level managers or 
insider experts who were familiar with basic information of these interviewed 
enterprises. The lack of first-hand information of important historical events (for 
example, work experiences of the founders and the financial sources at their starts) can 
be complemented by  the second-hand materials, for example, autobiographies of 
enterprise and entrepreneur, or the internet. For most of the relatively small-sized 
enterprises, I interviewed company founders or general managers. In these cases (29 
firms), the interviews focused on letting the informant describe the information about 
the above four aspects, with a minimum of interruption by the interviewer. This type of 
narrative interviewing (Czarniawska, 1998, p: 29) was carried out in order to get closer 
to the actual events and the real history to avoid that personal views and theoretical 
perspectives influenced the data collection. All of the firm interviews were face-to-face 
and lasted around one hour. 
From the results of the field survey one cannot draw strong conclusions, in 
statistical terms, on the evolution of this cluster. In order to get more information of 
local firms that have ever appeared in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical sector, I had to turn to 
a second type of historical materials (enterprise autobiography and government 
documents and other collected materials). According to the list of Tonghua 
pharmaceutical enterprises that have existed especially in the early years of the cluster 
and which was provided by the Tonghua Pharmaceutical Industry Administrative 
Office, I searched their historical information. Besides interviews with enterprises, I 
rely on the existing historical records and other archives, including enterprise 
autobiography, local newspaper (Tonghua Daily) and government documents, to get as 
much information as possible about the foundation year, the closure year, and other 
aspects. But merely former state-owned enterprises had good writing stuffs, while the 
majority of small firms, especially the vanished ones, can’t provide enough information. 
So some information has to be found through other channels, for example, through the 
websites of the current firms. All information is double-checked using multiple different 
sources to make sure that the information is as accurate as possible. The information of 
the entrepreneurs was collected in the same way. 
Since some issues, such as interactions among actors, knowledge sharing, and 
institutional co-operation, are extremely complex, and some factors are hard to be 
coded, only open and face-to-face interviews and in-depth discussion with  
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entrepreneurs, local policy makers, even local scholars and experts in the technological 
and administrative fields may capture the very qualitative nature of such 
interdependences. Such set of descriptive and qualitative information gathered through 
interviews was complemented with the data collected in a survey of the firms in the 
cluster. 
Most interviews were taped and key contents of the interviews were transcribed 
in Chinese, as parts of the data analysis process were done after interviews. The 
collected data provided both narrative accounts of the process of the rise of the 
Tonghua pharmaceutical sector and factual descriptions of context, actors, and events 
from diversified sources. By combining the different sources of information and 
repetitively consulting informants (the two supporting government agencies —the 
Tonghua Pharmaceutical Industry Administrative Office and the Tonghua Science and 
Technology Bureau, and one local scholar), an in-depth description of the emergence 
of the pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua was made. Critical characteristics and 
events related to firm, institution and technology in Tonghua pharmaceutical sectors 
were identified through induction.  
4.4 Database Construction and Study Process 
Data collection and theoretical analysis was conducted in an interactive process as 
summarized in Table 4.1. By combining the different sources of collecting information, 
I have drawn on two databases. I have made a systematic effort to identify all the 
pharmaceutical firms that existed in Tonghua from the 1950s to 2005. The fundamental 
unit of the first database is a firm. The information such as its founding year, and 
founder, the closure year, present ownership, time of ownership transition, total staff, 
early and present main productions, main technological sources at the very beginning, 
and the current cooperators for new drug development, other significant events, was 
here included. The second database concentrates on entrepreneurs, including the name 
of firm, the name of entrepreneurs, native place, age, education experience and work 
experience, the founding year of their first new ventures. There is limited access to 
information on entrepreneurs of small enterprises, the number of entrepreneurs in the 
database is 62, while the number of enterprise is 104. In order to link the two databases, 
I chose the enterprise names as key words that existed in both databases. According to 
the two databases, I mapped the generative relationships of clustered firms (see 
Appendix 5). Furthermore, I made tables describing time, actors, and critical events. In  
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order to offer theoretical explanations for the processes and events observed, 
observations that fitted with theoretical concepts and research question were identified 
(Borch and Arthur, 1995). The theoretical concepts and theoretical findings were 
formed and then adjusted to match the historical empirical evidences in a coupled 
process. As the analysis proceeded, the logical frame and theoretical findings were 
developed through deduction, using collected data. In addition, I presented an early 
analysis result of this empirical exploration at a seminar especially held for this study 
with the support of the Soft Science Institute at Jilin Academy of Social Sciences, in 
which five local researchers, five senior Tonghua enterprise managers, two officials of 
the provincial Science and Technology Bureau who are familiar with the intervention 
policy of government at central level and provincial level, attended. These attendees not 
only gave valuable comments, but also corrected or provided some facts, in particular 
information about policies and other region’s pharmaceutical industry in Jilin.   
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Table 4.1: Summary of main steps in the data collection and analysis process 
Step in data collection and 
analysis process 
Data sources, collection, and analysis 
Mapping the national context 
and Tonghua case 
National level: attending policy, conversations, and documents, 
previous studies 
Tonghua: visits, conversations, and personal interviews, interviewed 
Jilin provincial  government agencies (7) and Tonghua government 
agencies (4) 
Case selection   Internet search and informal conversations, previous studies 
Identified general information  
Identified case informants through key informants  
Interviews  Interviewed central informants over a 2 month period (interviews) 
Interviewed local Firms (35) 
Interviewed non-localFirms (5) 
Interviewed university professors (specialized in medical technology, 
3 and familiar with the economic history of Jilin or Tonghua. 
Document collection   Obtained enterprise plans, government documents, presentations etc. 
from interviewees  
Autobiographies of enterprises  and entrepreneurs (3)  
Searched the Internet for web pages of enterprises and related 
government agencies, press articles, etc. 
Obtained 6 doctoral or master dissertation 
Data transcription   Transcribed the interviews in Chinese (most from tape), focus on 
revealing the process  
Databases construction  Database of enterprises (including 104 enterprises) 
Database of entrepreneurs (including 62 enterprises) 
Mapping generative 
relationships of clustered firms 
Mapping generative relationships of clustered firms according to the 
above two databases 
Mapping central events over 
time 
Wrote narratives about this process of firm change, technology and 
institutional transformation, and made tables describing time, actors, 
and critical events  
Presenting preliminary analysis 
result  
slightly adjusted factical evidences, in particular information about 
national and provincial regulations; 
Added information about other China’s TCM region  
Matching theoretical concepts   Working with theory and empirical data in an interactive process   
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Chapter 5 Overview of the Tonghua Pharmaceutical Industry 
5.1 Introductory Overview of Tonghua 
5.1.1 Location and History of Tonghua 
The region of Tonghua, a mountain area with an area of 15195 square kilometers 
and a population of 2.3 millions (See Table5.1), is located in the southeast of Jilin 
province, facing the Democratic Republic of Korea across the Yalu River (see Figure 
5.1). It covers five counties (Huinan, Liuhe and Tonghua, Meihekou and Ji’an, two 
country-level cities) and an urban area (Dongchang district and Erdaojiang district). 
“Tonghua city” I use in this dissertation often refers to a prefecture-level city if I do not 
deliberately note, do not confuse it with “the Tonghua county”, its sub-geographical 
unit. The capital of Tonghua city is located in Erdaojiang district. As a city with a long 
history of human culture, Tonghua is the birthplace of Goguryeo Kingdom which had 
predominated over southern Manchuria (present-day Northeast China), southern 
Russian Maritime province, and the northern and central parts of the Korean peninsula 
for about 700 years between 37 BCE and 668 CE.  
5.1.2 Tonghua as Natural Medicinal Materials Treasury 
Tonghua city is located at the foot of Changbai Mountain, with a forest coverage 
rate of 62.9%. Consequently, it is rich in natural resources of Chinese medicine herbs. 
It's proved that there are 1,800 species of medicinal plants in this area, accounting for 
about one third of the national total volume. Among these precious herbs, the output 
value of ginseng and deer antler occupies 80% and 60% of the nation, respectively, and 
above 60% of the world. Therefore, the region wins a reputation as one of the “Five 
Natural Medicinal Materials Treasuries” (in Chinese, Tianran Yaoku) in China.  
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Table 5.1：The profiles of Tonghua and Jilin in 2005 
 Tonghua Jilin    (%)
Population(person) 2,263,120 27,160,000  8.33
labor force(person)  889,200 10,994,000  8.09
Area (1000 km
2) 15.6078 187.4  8.33
GDP (RBM ten thousand)  2,336,343 36,202,700  6.45
     Primary Industry  412,943 6,256,100  6.60
     Secondary Industry  1,062,051 15,808,300  6.71
     Tertiary Industry  861,349 14,138,300  6.09
Source: Tonghua Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2005; Jilin Statistical Yearbook 2006 
5.1.3 Industrial Structure in Tonghua 
Historically, Tonghua was an agricultural area; even today the primary industry 
(including agriculture, mining industry, fisheries, aquaculture)  is still the largest 
employment sector (see Table 5.2). After the foundation of the P.R.C, the entire 
northeast region has been developed into an important industrial base; however 
Tonghua did not nurture one of the key industrialized areas in Jilin province, since it 
had been an important military base during the long period of the tense relation between 
China and Japan following the foundation of PRC. As recently as the 1980s, Tonghua 
has embarked on the evident and pressing process of industrialization and urbanization. 
Nowadays, the industrial system of manufacturing, composed of smelting, machine 
building, electronics, timber processing, paper making, liquor distillation, textiles, 
pharmaceutical, and light industries, has been formed in this rising industrial city. 
Table 5.2：Employment structure in Tonghua by Sectors（1991–2005) 
year  Primary Industry  Secondary Industry  Tertiary Industry  Total 
1995  584,369 (54.1%)  256,890 (23.8%)  238,217 (22.1%)  1,079,476 
2000  577,859 (67.4%)  120,218 (14.0%)  159,319 (18.6%)  857,396 
2005  453,057 (51.0%)  162,331 (18.2%)  273,812 (30.8%)  889,200 
Source: Tonghua Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2005 
Note: the numbers in brackets represent the percentage of the industries to the total.  
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Table 5.3：GDP structure in Tonghua by Sectors 
Unit: RMB 10 thousand Yuan  
Year  Primary Industry  Secondary Industry  Tertiary Industry  Total 
1995  179,034 (22.1%)  324,567 (40.0%)  307,983 (37.9%)  811,584 
2000  282,956 (24.1%)  445,204 (38.0%)  444,635 (37.9%)  1,172,795 
2005  412,943 (17.7%)  1,062,051 (45.4%)  861,349 (36.9%)  2,336,343 
Source: Tonghua Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2005 
Note: the numbers in brackets represent the percentage of the industries to the total. 
5.1.4 The Importance of the Pharmaceutical Industry in Tonghua 
The pharmaceutical industry has grown up as the pillar manufacturing industry in 
Tonghua and has played an increasingly key role in both employment and economic 
wellfare, especially since the mid-1990s. The pharmaceutical industry, food and 
metallurgy industry are seen as Tonghua’s three major pillar manufacturing industries, 
and their total output value reached up to RMB 19.31 billion Yuan in 2005, accounting 
for 82.6% of the whole output of above-scale industrial enterprises
46 in this area, with a 
profit of RMB 950 million Yuan which is equivalent to 86% of the total profit of above-
scale industrial enterprises. Output value and profits of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
industry held 36.6% and 44.6% respectively of Jilin province.  
Table 5.4：Economic contribution of three major pillars by output value in 2005 
  Output Value     
(billion Yuan) 
Of the total output values of above-
scale industrial enterprises (%) 
Pharmaceutical industry  0.708  36.7 
Food industry  0.185  30.3 
Metallurgy industry  1.038  44.4 
Total   1.931  82.6 
Source: Tonghua Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2005 
The pharmaceutical industry, following the metallurgy industry which employs 
over 17,000 people, is the second largest manufacturing sector for employment in 
Tonghua, with the number of the formal employees reaching 13,000 (Tonghua 
Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2005). However, according to the vice general director of 
the Tonghua City Science Technology Department: It is estimated that the 
pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua employ approximately 30,000 salesmen, most of 
who work outside Tonghua. If taking into account this number, the pharmaceutical 
                                                        
46 The above-scale industrial enterprises refer to all state-owned and state-holding enterprises and non-state-owned 
enterprises whose annual sales income is above RMB 5 million Yuan.  
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sector will be the first largest manufacturing sector hosting employment in Tonghua. 
(Interview, No.G79 in Appendix 1) 
5.2 The Pharmaceutical Industry in Tonghua 
5.2.1 Age Structure 
Table 5.5 illustrates the foundation periods of current pharmaceutical companies 
in Tonghua. There were three waves of firm creation in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
industry. The first wave was from the second half of the 1960s to 1985, during which 18 
firms were established, accounting for about 20% of the total pharmaceutical firms 
then. The second phase during the period of 1985 and 1995 is called the golden time of 
the creation of pharmaceutical firms in Tonghua. During that period, 29 pharmaceutical 
corporations were founded, equivalent to more than one third of the total number of the 
Tonghua pharmaceutical companies. The third peak period of the new startups was the 
period after 1999, with 25 new start-ups coming into existence since then in the 
increasingly competitive industry. The alteration of the number of pharmaceutical 
enterprises founded in different times reflects the dynamic characteristics of the local 
pharmaceutical sector which will be discussed in the following section. 
Table 5.5: The foundation of pharmaceutical companies in Tonghua  
Year of foundation  No. of firms  in % of the total 
Before 1985  18  21.4 
1986—1994 29  34.5 
1995—1998 12  14.3 
After 1999  25  29.6 
Total 84  100 
Source: The Tonghua City Administrative Office of Pharmaceutical Industry 
5.2.2 Ownership Structure  
The Tonghua pharmaceutical enterprises, similar to their counterparts in other 
regions in China, had been state-owned or collectively owned before the 1990s when 
the ownership reform happened, during which the ownership of these enterprises was 
successfully transformed into private entities through diversified ways, such as 
reorganization, merger, selling, leasing, and bankruptcy. By the end of 2005, all of the 
enterprises had ended up with the privatization process with the exception of one state-
owned joint-stock company (Tonghua Jinma).   
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Table 5.6：Employment structure of the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry in 2005 
 Pharmaceutical 
industry 
% of whole 
Pharmaceutical 
industry  
All 
manufacturing 
sectors 
 % of pharmaceutical 
industry to the whole 
manufacturing sectors  
State-owed   198  1.5    3,540  5.6 
Collective   165  1.2    6,445  2.6 
Private   12904  97.3  40,814  31.6 
Total   13267  100  50,799  26.1 
Source: Tonghua Statistical Yearbook, 2002-2005  
Note: the percentage is the the total employees engaged in the manufacturing sector 
Table.5.6 indicates that the proportion of private firms in the number of 
employees is relatively high. The smooth restructuring of ownership led to a significant 
increase in the proportion of private investment, and this in turn promoted effectively 
the rapid development of the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry. If we take into account 
the location of Tonghua city (Jilin province is a typical old industrial area where the 
proportion of state-owned economy in the national economy is still large), we can see 
that Tonghua is the first mover in the privatization process in Jilin province.  
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5.2.3 Geographical Structure  
 
Figure5.1: Geographical distribution of GMP firms           (cartography: Liang Jun) 
Source: The Tonghua City Administrative Office of Pharmaceutical Industry 
Note: The number of GMP firms at the end of 2006 
Concerning the location of the GMP firms, we can see that the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical industry geographically concentrates in the Tonghua county and 
Dongchang district. These two areas host approximately half of the pharmaceutical 
companies in Tonghua city (See Figure 5.1). The spatial distribution of the firms 
composing the pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua reveals that the agglomeration of 
the sector is much more well-defined in geographical terms, and the pharmaceutical 
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production is more and more concentrated in this area. 
5.2.4 Firm Scale Structure 
By the end of 2005, there were 84 pharmaceutical enterprises located in Tonghua, 
among which 71 were the Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) firms. Some enterprises 
have developed into large-sized group corporations, like Xiuzheng, Dongbao, Wantong, 
and Zhenguo, and so on, and six enterprises pushed their ways into the list of 500 top of 
the National Independent Accounting Pharmaceutical Enterprises (Yiyao Gongye Duli 
Hesuan Qiye)
47 in 2005. As Table 5.7 illuminates, many large enterprises have emerged 
in the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector by recent years, but the vast majority of these 
enterprises is still small and medium-sized by sales volume. 
Table 5.7： Firm scale structure by sales in 2004 
        Unit: RMB 100 million Yuan 
Firm size  Number  Percentage 
≥20 1  1.7 
4--20 1  1.7 
2--4 4  6.8 
1--2 7  11.9 
0.5--1 4  6.8 
0..25—0.5 13  22.1 
≤0.25   29  49.3 
Source: The Tonghua City Administrative Office of Pharmaceutical Industry 
5.2.5 Specialization in TCM industry 
Table 5.8 shows that Tonghua City bends itself to TCM industry relatively. 
Although the latest data are not available, it is very clear from all the indications that 
the division of labor between industries has been consolidated in recent years. By the 
end of 2003, a total of 809 varieties had been produced in Tonghua, of which 759 were 
Prepared Chinese Medicine (PCM), while only 50 were chemicals. PCM is the final 
dosage form of TCM and is safe and without any side effects, while another form of 
TCM is crude Chinese medicinal materials, for example, crude herbal and natural 
animal parts and minerals. From the viewpoint of the number of producers, the 
companies manufacturing chemical medicines are a minority just with the number of 
                                                        
47 Industrial enterprises with independent accounting system refers to enterprises engaging in industrial production 
activities and covers all state-owned enterprises (SOEs) with an independent accounting system and all non-SOEs 
with an independent accounting system and annual sales revenue in excess of 5 million RMB yuan.  
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six, five of them produced PCM also. Precisely speaking, only one pharmaceutical 
enterprise in Tonghua city is fully specialized in producing chemicals. According to 
statistics in 2003, Chinese medicine produced the output value of RMB 5.311 billion 
Yuan, with a profit of RMB 714.03 million Yuan, accounting for 95.9% of all output 
value of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry and 98.4% of the total profit respectively. 
5,000 tons of PCM, accounting for 40% of the output of Jilin province’s Proprietary 
Chinese Medicine, is produced per year by local Chinese medicine enterprises. 
Consequently, it is safe to say that the current Tonghua pharmaceutical industrial 
cluster is specialized mainly in PCM, even though Tonghua also made or still is making 
efforts to utilize modern biotechnology to find out or produce bio pharmaceuticals.  
Table 5.8: Production structure of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry in 2000 
Unit: RMB 10 thousand Yuan 
  Chemical Medicine  Prepared Chinese 
Medicine 
Output Value   8,098  274,470 
Tax   2,835  74,357 
Profit   1,996  51,365 
Sales Revenue  6,298  201,608 
Total Assets  68,456  700,548 
Net Fixed Assets  9,714  100,617 
Source: The Tonghua City Administrative Office of Pharmaceutical Industry 
5.2.6 Growth Driven by the Domestic Market 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry has been driven by the domestic market. 
There was only one business enterprise, Dongbao, engaged in exports of 
pharmaceuticals before 2003, with exports amounting to RMB 64.3 million Yuan, 
accounting for less than 2% of the total sales of the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry. 
And foreign capital accounts for only 1.7% of the capital in Tonghua City’s 
pharmaceutical industry. This reflects the fact that the pharmaceutical industry in 
Tonghua city has a high level of inward-oriented economy, driven by domestic capital. 
5.3 Tonghua’s Pharmaceutical Industry: Non Knowledge-Based 
A significant body of research and facts shows that the pharmaceutical, especially 
biopharmaceutical industry, whether in China or other countries in the world, is a 
knowledge-intensive industry and the pharmaceutical clusters tend to emerge in  
  137
metropolitan areas, or knowledge-intensive regions (see Table 5.9).  
Table 5.9: Selected (bio) pharmaceutical clusters developed or planned around the world 
Name Country  Location 
East River Science Park   USA  New York City  
Biotech   Germany  Munich 
Bangalore Bio  India  Bangalore 
Shanghai Biomedical Technology Industry 
Base  
China Shanghai 
Thailand Science Park   Thailand  Klong Luang,  
Dubiotech   United Arab 
Emirates  Dubai 
Source: own elaboration 
Among the outstanding pharmaceutical industrial clusters, Cambridge, the most 
important cluster in Europe, Heidelberg, one of the strongest in Germany, Aarhus in 
Denmark, Marseille in France, and Milano in Italy, are good examples. There are also 
strong empirical evidences for concentration of newly established firms around 
universities. 
Metropolitan areas can offer all-round industrial and financial facilities, easy 
access to scientific and technological infrastructures and experienced professionals, 
convenience of communication with policy makers, and systematic communication 
mechanisms. In other words, metropolitan areas provide profuse resources of 
knowledge and more positive institutional context which would affect the dynamics of 
localised technological and managerial knowledge.  
However, Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry is located neither in a metropolitan 
area nor in a knowledge-intensive region since local research resources in 
pharmaceutical production are not adequate. In other words, it is notable that this 
pharmaceutical sector does not benefit from the advantages stemming from a 
metropolis or knowledge area. 
In Jilin province, research-oriented universities, such as Jilin University and the 
Northeast Normal University, are all located in the capital city, Changchun (see Figure 
5.2; also see Appendix 6). There was no research-oriented pharmaceutical entitity, 
public or private, in Tonghua before 2000. Only entering into 21
st , some local large 
pharmaceutical firms began to establish science-based laboratories, some of which are 
the results of collaboration with public research units. Therefore, in the process of the 
Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster development, especially at the early stage, the localised 
knowledge, instead of science-based knowledge from universities and research  
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institutes, played an important role. In addition, today’s pharmaceutical enterprises in 
the Tonghua cluster origined from small-sized enterprises, while other pharmaceutical 
clusters, for example Shijiazhuang Chemical pharmaceutical cluster, are the result of 
spinoffs from large-sized state-own enterprises that were established in 1950s. It means 
that it is very necessary to find the peculiarity and the strength of local mechanisms that 
determine the emergence and evolution of this huge agglomeration observed. 
 
Jilin U nive rsity (1946)
Northeast Normal University (1946) 
Jilin Institute of Chemical Technology (1958) 
Jilin Institute of Chemical Technology (1958) 
Changchun Normal College(1958) Changchun 
College  of Medicine (1936)
Jilin Agricultural University(1948)
Jilin Medicine College(1952)
Tonghua Normal  Col lege(1958)
Yanbian University(1949) 
Jilin Normal U niversity(1958)
Figure 5.2: Location of universities in Jilin 
Source: own elaboration 
5.4 Conclusion 
There are 84 pharmaceutical manufacturing companies. Here it is necessary to note 
that these research institutes are not the scientific laboratories for developing new 
drugs, but mainly specialized in production process innovation. More interesting, as the 
sector grows, other supporting or related sectors developed as well. There were 35 
pharmaceutical whole sales companies, more than 200 Clinic pharmacies, and at least 
30 logistics companies, 76 packaging companies (see Figure 5.3).   
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Figure 5.3: The actors of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry 
Note: Numbers in brackets represent the number of entities. Actors on the left side of the 
dotted line are located outside Tonghua 
It is necessary to point out that the knowledge-intensive institutes such as research-
oriented medicinal companies are not located in Tonghua, but they contributed a lot to 
the development of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry. Because this group of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing companies forms the hard core of the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical sector, I will concentrate on them in this dissertation. 
From the above introduction, we can find that the Tonghua pharmaceutical 
industry has the following characteristics. Firstly, the industrial structure is dominated 
by small and medium-sized enterprises, though some national well-known business 
groups exist in this place. Secondly, it is specialized in the manufacturing of TCM 
drugs, and in fact a location of manufacturing assembly facilities for the domestic 
market. Thirdly, the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry is not based on localised R&D 
knowledge, which is significantly different from its foreign counterparts. 
This phenomenon leads to another question from where the sources of the 
competitiveness of this emerging cluster come. This issue might be explained by 
exposing to natural resources, but more attention should be paid to the reasons behind 
the phenomenon that the rich natural plants can be made full use in Tonghua, while it 
could not in other regions.  
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Figure 5:4 Provinces of Chinese herbal Medicine and natural medicinal materials 
Source: Cui (2007) 
Natural herbs are the main source of TCM, and grow in mountain areas. In China, 
they grow largely in Jilin, Henan, Hubei, Shanxi and Southwest China. Amongst them, 
there are actually five regions for natural medicinal materials in China, namely 
Xishuangbanna in Yunan province, Enshi in Southwest Hubei province, Changbai 
Mountain area in Jilin, Xixia in Henan province and Hainan, the largest island in 
southern China (see Figure 5.4). But only in two of them, namely, Tonghua and Hainan, 
the pharmaceutical industry occupies an important position in the local economy in 
terms of GDP and employment. In fact, there are merely two cities in the coverage of 
the Changbai Mountains, Tonghua and Dunhua, where the pharmaceutical economies 
are well developed. Although there are a few pharmaceutical firms in some other cities 
(e.g the neighboring city of Tonghua, Baishan City), they are not as good as those in 
Tonghua. 
These bizarre realities reflect the fact to some extent that the success of Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical industry is not merely built on the advantages of natural resources. 
Although the role of rich resources can’t be ignored, especially in the early stage, there 
are some other underlying reasons for the success. In reality, possessing abundant and 
cheap raw materials is no longer sufficient for the competitiveness of a city and a firm  
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in the knowledge-based economy, and it must be supplemented, or even substituted, by 
cautiously increasing product quality, rapid and continuous innovation, and command 
of (strategic) technologies (Vet, 1993, p: 98) and good adaption to changing 
environments. Hence, I will go to the empirical study and explore the formation process 
and the mechanism of this competitive pharmaceutical sector by the lens of coevolution 
of firm, technology and institution.   
  142
Chapter 6 The Genesis of Tonghua Pharmaceutical 
Enterprises 
The aim of this chapter is to explore the evolution of the population of enterprises 
in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical sector. Just as I pointed out in Chapter 1.3.1, I select the 
firm as the basic unit of evolution and make use of the research method of business 
history, together with two other methods (the genealogical method and the approach of 
generative relationships), to identify the mechanism of the inheritance, selection, 
variation of different generations of firms and technologies and institutions (see Chapter 
4.2). All empirical evidences were collected on the base of individual firms. In other 
words, this chapter is the groundwork for understanding the coevolutionary 
mechanisms of firms, technology and institution in the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector.  
The chapter is organized in the following way. In Chapter 6.1, I try to answer the 
questions of why we concentrate on the creation of firms in studying the emergence of 
firms, and what is the theoretical base of the empirical discussion of the evolution of 
enterprises and their technologies. Chapter 6.1 also presents the typology of new firm 
entrants in China’s transitional context. In Chapter 6.2, according to the change of the 
firm numbers, I divide the origin of Tonghua pharmaceutical enterprises into three 
different phases. Finally, in Chapter 6.3, I discuss the emergence of new firm 
organizations taking the changing national macro-institutions into consideration.   
6.1 The Formation of New Firms in China’s Industrial Clusters  
6.1.1 The Creation of New Venture as an Impetus of an Industrial Cluster 
As previously explained in Chapter 4.3, the development of the industrial cluster 
depends on the increase in both the amount of firms and the economic performance of 
individual firms (through innovation inside enterprises and collaboration between 
enterprises). The performances of individual firms are involved with technological 
improvement, which will be discussed more detailedly in Chapter 8. Here I will 
concentrate on the rise and fall of the firm numbers.  
The creation of new ventures is actually a longstanding research concern in the 
studies of economic development, since new firms play a significant role in the 
economic and social well-being. New startups not only play the role of innovators, who 
often break old systems and create new ones, but also provide a large number of job  
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opportunities. In particular, the creation of hi-tech new ventures has been viewed as a 
tool of creating and retaining cut-edge competitiveness of national economy for 
developed market economies, and a method of economic “catching up” for newly 
industrialized countries or a way of economic revitalization for transitional nations. 
New venture creation is at the core of the evolutionary thinking about economic growth, 
specifically in the formation of regional clusters of industrial innovation (Feldman, 
2001), since startup firms are the embodiment of innovation, especially for radical new 
technologies, which are not easily absorbed into existing firms (Audretsch, 1995). So 
the relationship between industrial clusters and start-ups has become the research focus 
in the literature on the emergence and growth of industrial clusters in recent years (for a 
detailed discussion, see Feldman, 2001). 
The evolutionary scholars, both from economics and economic geography, 
identify two main dynamics influencing the spatial evolution of industries, i.e. 
(entrepreneurial) spin-off and agglomeration economies (for a detailed discussion, see 
Boschma and Wenting, 2007, Klepper, 2002; Garnsey and Heffernan, 2005), 
considering that the founders of spin-off firms inherit the knowledge of the parent firms 
and transfer it to the new ventures; meanwhile clusters, where local incubators highly 
concentrate, become the entrepreneurial seedbeds for spin-offs. Moreover, 
agglomeration economies actually attract the new spin-offs to locate close to the parent 
firms. Hence, among the four types of new firm entrants which I will discuss later on, 
spin-off is seen as the most important mechanism for creating new ventures in the 
opinion of evolutionary scholars.  
In Klepper’s (2001) evolutionary framework, which accounts for spin-offs, he 
uses the funny metaphor of the entrepreneurial spin-offs as children and the past 
employers as parents. Because new spin-offs inherit and duplicate organizational 
routines and knowledge of their parent firms, Klepper claims that success leads to 
success, namely, those firms which stem from successful parent companies are more 
likely to be successful than others whose parents have not had so high performance 
(also see Boschma and Wenting, 2007). Furthermore, since employees who leave the 
parent firms and establish their own entities tend to locate near the parents, the spin-off 
process is basically expected to be a local phenomenon (Boschma and Wenting, 2007, 
p: 216). These assumptions are well justified by some top worldwide clusters, for 
example, the ICT sector in Silicon Valley, the US automobile industry in Detroit and 
wireless telecommunications around Aalborg. Hence, just as Dahl et al. (2005) argue,  
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evolutionary scholars believe that the main driving force behind the generation of new 
firms is the initial success of the first firm, which eventually leads to the formation of 
clusters later. 
6.1.2 The New Firm Creation in Historical Perspective 
The arguments above mentioned may be true in general, but as disccussed in 
Chapter 2, the creation of new ventures is not only the result of the entrepreneurial 
activities of individual entrepreneurs, but also restricted by broader socio-economic 
environments. In fact, even in the mature market economies (e.g., Western Europe, 
North America and Japan) in which the entrepreneurial environment in terms of 
availability of venture capital, clarity of property rights and supporting services are 
more friendly to entrepreneurship in general, the specific requirements for the 
development of new industries (e.g, specialized infrastructures and institutional 
environments, as well as new technologies and markets, etc.) can’t be met at the very 
beginning. In other words, market, technology and institution in favor of cultivating and 
nourishing new industries co-evolve with industries even in mature market economies, 
not to mention in transitional countries from former communist economies (including 
Eastern Europe, China and Vietnam ect.) in which general market economy-oriented 
legal and institutional settings have so far not been developed well hitherto. It means 
that the timing of spin-off should be taken into account in order to find out the impact of 
national public institutions related to private entrepreneurship on the origin and 
evolution of enterprises in transitional countries.  
In addition, most of the literature on this issue is empirically based on the Western 
countries, so there is limited knowledge about the process of producing private 
entrepreneurship and new ventures in transitional nations from a long-term historical 
perspective. Although spin-off has become an increasingly important mechanism of 
economic development as legal environments have been improved, for example, the 
legalization of private property and the issue and implementation of an intellectual 
property law, we should note that spin-off firms have not appeared until the past decade 
(namly, approximately since the mid-1980s) in China. From a historical perspective the 
role of the existence of a large number of state-owned and collective enterprises in a 
transitional economy should not be ignored. Moreover, as there are differences in new 
venture creation between mature market and transitional economies, we accordingly 
should develop an alternative typology of new firm entrants.  
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6.1.3 Situating the New Firm Creation in China’s Transitional Context 
As pointed out in Chapter 6.1.2, the creation of new firms and business strategies 
of enterprises are to some degree influenced by the institutions. Therefore, it is 
impossible to understand the history-specific particularities of new firm creation 
without grasping the historicity and uniquity of particular institutional structures of a 
specific transition economy. Different from some sociological research on China and on 
transforming socialist economies more generally spoken (mostly associated with the 
work of Victor Nee, 1989,1992 and Andrew Walder, 1995,1998,2003, for their 
contributions to understanding China's transition see Guthrie, 2000) which gave greater 
emphasis on nation-level institutions such as private property rights and the legal 
system in the organizational changes in China, I would like to state that local 
institutions have a great influence on the timing in the emergence of new organizational 
forms and local entrepreneurship. So I will concentrate on the influence of national 
institutions on the development of the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster and, at the same 
time, on the interaction between local institutions and local business over time.  
To understand the evolution of the particular case of the Tonghua pharmaceutical 
cluster in the light of the types of new startups and their own background, it is 
necessary to select a relevant typology to differentiate them. However, since China has 
undergone significant changes in its property rights system, a large number of firms, 
which were transformed from state-owned or collective firms, had been existing for a 
long time before the transformation, even if the entrepreneurs or owners changed 
(which I call “the divided histories of business and entrepreneurs”). But in order to fully 
understand the evolution of firm organization in China’ transitional period, we need 
some knowledge about enterprise ownership changes in China.  
(1) The Particularity of Firm Organization in the Context of Chinas Transition 
There are three basic forms of enterprises from the perspective of ownership: state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), collective enterprises and private enterprises. The latter form 
emerged only after the reform and opening-up policy in 1978. The first two are often 
called “publicly owned enterprises”. In fact, collective-owned enterprises are different 
from state-owned enterprises in some aspects, for example, they mainly covered the 
service and light industry, and their product price was determined by market (see Table 
6.1). But it is notable that Chinese collective enterprises are characterized by two main 
features: vaguely defined property rights and significant involvement of government  
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officials since most of them were established by (or supported by) local governments. 
In addition, some of them were initially private businesses before the foundation at the 
P.R.C and had been changed into state-owned enterprises, when they had grown up 
under the permission of central or local governments during the period of 1956 to 1978.  
As regards state-owned enterprises, there is a noteworthy point. Different from the 
former Eastern European socialist countries (for example, Hungary), in which state-
owned enterprises were controlled by the central government, the state-owned 
enterprises in China could be classified into two types of ‘central SOEs’ and ‘local 
SOEs’ (the term of Hu, 2005, p: 707), which were affiliated with national government 
and local governments respectively. There are four levels of sub-central government in 
China: provincial, city/prefectural, district/county, neighborhood committee/ township 
(Hubbard, 1995). The lower the government to which the enterprises were affiliated, the 
easier and earlier they were privatized in the following transitional period. “Local” in 
this dissertation refers to the scope of Tonghua city. Because the Communist Party of 
China interferes with economic life and the cadres could move between government 
agencies and the party organization, simply, “government” includes government itself 
and the party organization as well; government officials in this dissertation refer to 
officials both of government and of the Communist Party of China.  
In fact, the transition of post-Communist economies to a market system has given 
birth to a nontrivial diversity in organizational forms and a plurality of property rights 
(Nee, 1992, p: 1). The firms with hybrid ownership represent an intermediate state, 
bridging between the publicly-held enterprises and private ones. In fact, hybrid 
organizational forms could be observed as well in other transitional countries, for 
example, “work partnerships” in Hungarian enterprises. Workers in these enterprises 
worked for the company during the day and used company equipment during off-hours 
to do entrepreneurial work (Stark, 1989).  
Stark defines the recombinant property as a “form of organizational hedging or 
portfolio management, in which actors respond to uncertainty in the organizational 
environment by diversifying their assets, redefining and recombining resources” (Stark, 
1996, p: 997). The contracted firms could be included in hybrid organizational forms. 
Hybrid firms lacked a well-specified structure of property rights and therefore high 
autonomy. Enterprises during the transitional economy were confronted with rapidly 
changing environments, which were characterized, on one hand, by weak market 
structures, poorly specified property rights and institutional uncertainty, and on the  
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other hand, by the incremental replacement of the state’s redistributive mechanism by 
market forces. So the hybrid firms had to establish personal social networks (for 
Tonghua enterprises, with local state) to reduce risk and/or “use resources and/or 
governance structures from more than one existing organization” (Borys and Jemison, 
1989, p: 235). The emergence of this organization could be viewed as a flexible and 
temporal strategy to match the institutional chaos of efficiency and flexibility of 
individual firms.  
(2) Typology of New Firm Entrants in the Transitional Context 
Considering the particularities of transitional economies and my research concern, 
I will firstly distinguish local and non-local investment, according to whether investors 
have a local background or not. For the foreign-invested enterprises (that refer to the 
investment coming from outside of Tonghua, but not outside of China, in fact there are 
no investments from overseas in this local sector), three typologies of new entrants are 
often seen in: (1) greenfield vestment, i.e., setting up a new plant in the host country to 
produce goods locally; (2) acquisition of a local firm and its production capacity 
(M&A); (3) cooperation with a local firm by setting up a joint venture. The creation of 
new firms is relatively complicated. As for the enterprises established in the planned 
economy, we can classify them into state-owned enterprises and collective enterprises, 
according to the different ownerships. But as explained above, there is an additional 
organizational form of hybrid firms (e.g., joint ownership between state-owned and 
private firms) during the transitional period, for example, the contracted ventures (see 
Table 6.2). Almost all of the hybrid firms in the transitional period were transformed to 
private entities. In addition, we can find that there were some new startups in Tonghua, 
which can be divided into two different groups based on the experiences of their 
founders: new startups established by spin-off entrepreneurs who leave the job in 
incumbent firms in the same industry to found stand-alone companies or by diversifying 
entrants. Diversifying entrants refer to those preexisting firms entering a new industry 
through diversification strategies including cross-border acquisition, joint venture and 
constructing new establishments (Klepper, 2001; Helfat and Lieberman, 2002; Dahl et 
al., 2005). They tend to have no previous working experience in the same industry. The 
typology used in this dissertation is shown in Table 6.2.  
  148 
Table 6.1: Summary of enterprises from the perspective of ownership in China’s transition 
 
  State Owned Enterprises   Collective Enterprises  Hybrid Enterprises   Private Enterprises 
Ownership  State-Owned  (Government as  
Delegate) 
Collective (Local 
Government as  Delegate) 
Publicly Owned + Private   Private 
Top Manager   Assignment by  Corresponding-Level 
Government 
Local Government  
Assignment 
Contractors   Owners Determined 
Producer Prices  Pegged with Intramarginal Delivery 
Quotas 
Market Determined  Market Determined Market  Determined 
Taxation  Expropriation of Surpluses  Uniform Value-Added Tax  Uniform Value-Added Tax  Uniform Value-Added Tax 
Credit 
Eligibility 
State Bank  Nonbank Capital Market  Nonbank Capital Market  Nonbank Capital Market 
Wages  Government Determined  Collectively Determined  Market Determined  Market Determined 
Residual Profits  Accrue to Government  Dividends to Collective-
Retained Earnings For 
Reinvestment 
Dividends to Contractor-Retained 
Earnings 
Dividends to Owners-Retained 
Earnings  
Labour Force  Assignment by  Corresponding-Level 
Government 
Self-Employment  Market Determined  Market Determined 
Producer Prices  Pegged with Intramarginal Delivery 
Quotas 
Market Determined  Market Determined Market  Determined 
Source: own elaboration  
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Table 6.2: Typology of new firm entrants 
 
 
 
  Entrant type  Main features  Entry period  
Nonlocal-Invested 
Enterprises 
  the investment comes from outside of Tonghua, but in China  planned economy 
  Greenfield Investment  setting up a new plant in the host region to produce goods locally   
 Merger  &  Acquisition  acquisition of a local firm and its production capacity   
  Joint Venture  cooperation with a local firm by setting up a venture   
Local--Invested 
Enterprises 
  Established by local investors    
  State-Owned Enterprises   Investment form local government, production according to government 
plan 
planned economy 
  Collective Enterprises  Investment from the  Self-Employees but controlled by local 
government ,  market-oriented production 
planned economy 
 Contracted  Ventures  As 
Hybrid Firm 
Contract ill-performing SOEs or collective enterprises, market-oriented 
production  
transitional economy 
  Transformed Ventures  transformed from established firms, e.g, former state-owned, collective 
ones or contracted venture to private ones 
After the privatization  
  De Novo Entrant  Newly established firms   After the privatization 
  - Entrepreneurial Spin-Off  Founder(s) previously employed in the industry  After the privatization 
  - Diversifying Entrant  Founder(s) no prior experience or contacts in the industry  After the privatization  
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Figure 6.1: Firm number Tonghua pharmaceutical industry 
Source: own elaboration based on collected data 
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6.2 Firm Organization and Institutional Changes in Tonghua’s 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
The development process of the pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua can be 
divided into four stages as follows: 1958–1984, 1985–1991, 1992–1997 and from 1998 
onwards. Each of these stages is marked by a drastic rise in the amount of firms (see 
Figure 6.1), distinct entry strategies and national and local institutions. Considering the 
first years of China's reform and opening, it seemed to have had little effect on the 
Tonghua pharmaceutical industry, since the pilot policies were carried out mostly in 
South China coastal areas (Guangdong, Fujian provinces). So I extend the first stage of 
the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry development to the middle of 1980s. Furthermore, 
some political events, both local and national, had a great impact on the development of 
this cluster (see Chapter 6.2.2). During the second period the number of pharmaceutical 
firms increased, but in a slow manner. Almost all of the new enterprises were 
established by local government agencies, but for own economic benefits, and were 
soon contracted or privatized. After 1992 Tonghua city began to privatize the large-
scale state-owned/collective firms in the pharmaceutical sector. At the same time a 
great number of new startups was built up. But due to the adjustments of national 
regulation on the medical industry, especially the implementation of GMP policy in 
1997, some loss-making enterprises, including newly established ones, were acquired. 
So there is a rise and fall in the firm number in the last two stages.  
6.2.1 Firm Creation and Organization in the Traditional Planned Economy 
The Tonghua pharmaceutical industry is not knowledge-intensive, at least in terms 
of formal R&D inputs, but one of the high competition pharmaceutical clusters in 
China. It was a peripheral agriculutural economy before 1960. During the first 
development phase of the pharmaceutical sector, roughly from 1958 (the first year of 
SOEs from which the data are available) to 1984, the number of pharmaceutical plants 
went up very steadily without any exit. Here I have to point out that there were several 
TCM stores before the 1950s, which were small-scale and similar to modern family-run 
businesses in the ownership form, employing man-made methods, responsible mostly 
for local people’s health care. I define the history before the 1950s as the prehistorical 
period, which will be investigated briefly as well. 
The demand of basic drugs was hardly met in China during the first development  
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stage over 1958 – 1984, in particular, in its early part (from 1950s and 1970s). There 
were a few small pharmaceutical plants which were not capable of producing local bulk 
drugs before 1950s due to the lack of required technological capabilities. Hence, the 
Beijing Central government decided to directly intervene in the production of basic 
drugs to insure the health security of the people. Some giant pharmaceutical enterprises 
were established, specialized in manufacturing chemical pharmaceuticals, for example, 
the North China Pharmaceutical Factory in Hebei province and Taiyuan Pharmaceutical 
Factory in Shanxi province (see Chapter 3.4.2 ). They consisted of the first generation 
of central SOEs in the pharmaceutical industry that was dominated by the central 
government. At the same time, Beijing Central government encouraged sub-national 
level state to build up new pharmaceutical firms, mostly for local people’s health care, 
which were called “local SOEs” in pharmaceutical industry. In these contexts, Tonghua 
city government as the only financial investor started to construct its local 
pharmaceutical sector. So the first generation of state-owned pharmaceutical enterprises 
were erected from 1950s to 1970s in Tonghua. In addition, the missing intellectual 
protection system was helpful for the first generation of state-owned pharmaceutical 
enterprises to gain ‘kown-how’ on pharmaceutical manufacturing, no need to pay. 
Because of the absence of a patent regime before the 1980s, there was no intellectual 
protection in China, which enabled state-owned pharmaceutical enterprises to learn 
from and imitate their domestic counterparts. From a long-term point of view, the first 
generation of local government-held enterprises served as the platform for the 
development of this pharmaceutical cluster in the succeeding stages, in the sense that 
they provided technological leadership for local pharmaceutical production and 
stimulated entrepreneurial skills related to the pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua. 
Compared to the central pharmaceutical SOEs established in the same period, the 
first generation of state-owned pharmaceutical firms in Tonghua was marked by the 
direct investment of the local state, not by the central one. Somewhat different from the 
traditional Soviet model of socialist enterprises in which the enterprises were highly 
controlled by central government, the creation of the Tonghua pharmaceutical 
enterprises and their early growth were pushed by local states to a great degree 
(referring here to the city, county or township-level states), not directly by the central 
government (for the classification of enterprises in the planned economy in China, see 
Hu, 2005). The local state did not only offer financial support, but also had the ultimate 
decision-making power for significant events, including the entry and exit of 
enterprises, product development and the rise and fall of the positions of the staff. The  
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factory directors as the representatives of local government were in charge of daily 
management and operation, and obeyed the orders of the local government.  
More specifically, entering the 1950s, the first generation of publicly owned 
enterprises (in the forms of state and collective ownership) was erected by 
government’s direct investment. Although collective enterprises were different from 
their state-run counterparts in the ownership form, they followed a similar management 
model of state-run enterprises. Hence, both state-run and collective enterprises provided 
employees with similar welfare of housing, healthcare, child care and education. 
According to government orders, these enterprises produced and then delivered 
products to local medical stations (state-owned commercial pharmaceutical 
organizations, see Chapter 3,2.4). The publicly owned enterprises cared more for 
production quantity than for production value, following the traditional socialist 
enterprises model which could also be observed in the planned economies of the former 
Soviet Union and of Eastern Europe. What the pharmaceutical manufacturers needed to 
do after production was to deliver the drugs to local state-owned pharmaceutical 
wholesale agencies, through which pharmaceuticals were distributed (See Figure 6.2 
and Figure 3.1 in Chapter 3.2.4).  
Objectively speaking, the first generation of enterprises, together with technology 
accumulation during the first stage, had provided a platform for the later development 
of the pharmaceutical industry in the local area, and even other areas in Jilin province as 
well. At least the early state-owned enterprises trained a large number of 
pharmaceutical talented managers and technologists, some of which transformed later 
into private entrepreneurs or advanced managers.  
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Figure 6.2: Firm organization in the traditional planned economy 
Source: own elaboration  
6.2.2 Changes in Firm Creation and Organization during the Early Reform Period 
(1985-1991) 
The second stage (1985–1991) and the third stage (1992–1997) as well were very 
critical in developing the pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua, during which, the whole 
China underwent momentous national institutional changes, such as the ownership 
transformation, the strength of intellectual protection, fiscal and administrative 
decentralization and so on (see Chapter 3.2). With investment liberalization, 
competitive pressures in the domestic market heightened and then  new business 
opportunities for some regions were produced. It was at that period that Tonghua 
opened the window of opportunity for the TCM industry. During the second stage, the 
rapid growth of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry was largely based on micro-
enterprise management innovation and organizational innovation (for example, the 
emergence of the contracted enterprises and private organizations), which reflected the 
powerful influence of changing national institutions on local industry in transitional 
countries. During the third stage, this cluster was partly driven by smooth 
transformation of enterprise ownership with a lower rate of umployment, and partly by 
the advance of local technological capabilities. From Figure 6.1, we can find that the 
increasing number of pharmaceutical enterprises during the mid-1980s and the early 
1990s marked the second period of rapid growth of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry, 
in which a great deal of new pharmaceutical start-ups were built up in Tonghua, and 
these newly established enterprises found a new and highly profitable sector, ginseng-
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based invigorants. The market niche allowed Tonghua firms to successfully enter the 
TCM industry. I will explain this aspect in Chapter 8.  
There were two significant events that happened around 1985 which greatly 
influenced theTonghua pharmaceutical industry: the fiscal decentralization (“eating 
from separate kitchens”, a system of central-local revenue sharing) and the reduced 
scope of the administrative jurisdiction of the Tonghua Prefecture (Hunjiang City has 
not been under the leadership of the Tonghua Prefecture after then). In the new fiscal 
system, more and more expenditure responsibilities was transferred from  higher-level 
governments to lower level governments, on one hand, and devolved functions, on the 
other hand, by gradually transfering authority for decision-making, finance and 
management to quasi-autonomous units of local government with corporate status 
(fiscal decentralization). Local budgetary revenue was in general not enough to cover 
the expenditures, so local governments were allowed to collect off-budget revenues in 
order to tight over the fiscal shortfalls (Zhang, 1999). Thus local government had to 
create and cultivate new revenue sources. As a consequence, “creating revenue” 
became the most popular phrase in China and the subnational governments scrambled 
to establish new enterprises to ease their fiscal pressure, as what can be termed as “local 
state corporate” (Lin, 1995; Oi, 1992) or “industrial firms”(Walder, 1995, 1998) (for a 
more detailed explanation, see Chapter 9.4 ). Against this background, many local 
government agencies in Tonghua established their own small pharmaceutical enterprises 
with the sole objective of creating extra income for employees. At the same time, the 
rapidly growing economy in China and enhancing health awareness brought about 
together the drastic increase in China’s pharmaceutical industry, especially in the 
invigorant sector. The new ventures seized a huge market opportunity (ginseng-based 
invigorants, see Chapter 8.3) which was largely neglected by “old” enterprises. This 
leads to a question of why almost all local government agencies in Tonghua were 
involved with the highly profitable sector when they were confronted with a large 
number of industrial opportunities. The answer could be ascribed to the strong social 
networks of “pharmaceutical enterprises and local state” that originated at least in the 
planned economy. I will go back to this aspect in Chapter 9.4.  
From a short-term point of view, the economic performance of these state-owned 
pharmaceutical firms established before 1980s was significantly enhanced mainly 
because a series of micro-enterprise management reforms were introduced. The micro-
enterprise management reforms which targeted to improve the economic performance  
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of enterprises in the existing regulatory framework of public ownership, were extended 
to all subprovincial-level governments in the mid-1980s (see Chapter 3.2.2). The micro-
enterprise reform effectively and rapidly enhanced the economic performance of 
pharmaceutical companies before long (which will be explained again in Chapter 9.4.2). 
Therefore, the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry was not only characterized by the great 
expansion in number of firms but also by the rapid growth of the pharmaceutical 
economy during that period. 
From the viewpoint of firm organization there were also some changes in 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical sector. The most visible one is that the established 
enterprises began to adopt a new firm organization, what I would like to call “quasi-
profit-seeking enterprises”. Furthermore, a new entry model emerged, namely the 
entrepreneurial spin-off (but affiliated to the state-owned enterprises in appearance). 
The number of this kind of new startups was, however, very limited at that time. Hence, 
I will concentrate on the first form of organizational innovation here.  
Given the fiscal pressure of local government and relaxed regulation on micro-
enterprise management, enterprises in Tonghua, both state-owned and collective, 
introduced a series of reform strategies of enterprise management, including “the 
factory director responsibility system” and “the contracted managerial responsibility 
system” (both dealt with the “government-enterprise” relationship), and carried out the 
contract-based mechanisms inside enterprises (see Table 6.3). Entering the period of 
micro- management reform, enterprises enjoyed a freedom of decision-making (in 
production, marketing, investment and profit distribution) and could retain a small 
portion of their profits. In the new system of enterprise governance, the factory 
directors (managers) as representatives of the factories made economic contracts with 
local states, which clarified the responsibilities and benefits between both sides; similar 
contracts existed between firms and its subunits (see Figure 6.3). Thus this 
organizational form could be seen as a quasi-market enterprise in becoming a more 
market-oriented economic unit.   
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Figure 6.3:  Organizational form during the early reform period 
Source: own elaboration  
Note: The dashed line represents price-based transactions between both sides, and the solid 
line denotes the bargaining based contract relationship. 
The enterprise reform was not fully based on today’s market mechanism, but on 
bargaining between firms and government, firms and their subunits (see Table 6.3), and 
contributed to transform the SOEs into profit-seeking businesses. As a matter of fact, 
these new policies resulted in the growth of the Tonghua pharmaceutical economy, at 
least in a short term. From a long-term growth perspective, this early reform of micro-
enterprise management of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical firms served as a platform for the 
following stages, in this sense that the existing firms obtained market-oriented 
management knowledge through learning-by-doing, and consolidated the coupled 
coalitions between local government and pharmaceutical firms. This sound “enterprise-
local state” relation provided the relational platform for the following privatization of 
local state-owned and collective enterprises.  
Table 6.3 Characteristics of firms during the early reform period 
Internal market mechanism   Operational autonomy 
 the contractual relationship between business and 
government 
  enterprise management autonomy 
 the contractual relationship between the upper and 
lower levels of firms 
  production unit's autonomy 
 contractual relationship between internal business 
units 
  the autonomy of staff 
Incentive mechanism    
 operators: economic performance of firms   
 employees: performance in production   
 technicians: performance in production 
development 
 
Source: own elaboration  
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6.2.3 Firm Creation and Firm Organizational Change during the Late Reform Period 
(1992-1997) 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry during the period 1992 – 1997 became more 
tumultuous, largely because a host of strategic government policies were implemented. 
The most significant government policy was the large-scale privatization of state-owned 
enterprises, i.e., the “grasping the large and letting the small go” policy. It is important 
to note that economic performance of local government-owned enterprises increased in 
the previous period owing to the micro-enterprise management reform, but their share 
in this local sector shrank due to the phenomenal rise of newly privatized enterprises. 
Additionally, all local pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua were not large-scale state-
owned enterprises (that were formed by Beijing government and were forbidden to be 
privatized). This means that almost all local government-owned pharmaceutical 
enterprises in Tonghua could be privatized. As the regulation on the pharmaceutical 
market became more rigid and intellectual protection rights became stronger, 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical enterprises became more active in improving drug safety and 
effectiveness. In addition, some privatized pharmaceutical enterprises began to create 
and accumulate their firm-specific advantages, for example, based on new product 
brands and the (re)development of new TCM drugs. In brief, this dramatic growth of 
the local sector could be attributed to the smooth and low-cost transformation from a 
publicly-owned-enterprise-dominated economy to a fully private sector. 
Deng Xiaoping's southern tour speech in 1992 fledged the private economy in 
China. As a result, the number of pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua increased by 
20 in merely one year. After the huge growth in 1992, the firm number in the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical cluster stabilized around 46 in the period 1993-1997, during which 
some ill-operated enterprises were merged or acquired by private pharmaceutical ones. 
The ownership reform was completed at the end of the 1990s, when the SOEs-
dominated ownership system was transformed into a private ownership structure. 
As far as the entry mode during that time is concerned, investment by local 
government agencies was no longer a viable strategy. However, a new entry model, 
joint venture, emerged as a main strategy that was often adopted by entrepreneurs who 
came from different regions. The reasons for this would be: (1) Joint venture with local 
entrepreneurs is a good way for non-local entrepreneurs to reduce the risks caused by 
local formal and informal institutions since they can make full use of strong social  
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networks of their partners; (2) local entrepreneurs can share firm-specific capability, in 
particular, of marketing, brands, research and development.  
But the most often-seen form of “new” start-ups in Tonghua between 1992 and 
the end of 1990s was the “contracted enterprise”. At that period, the “grasping the large 
and letting the small go” policy was conducted. In fact, these contracted enterprises 
were erected as early as 1985 and began to go private. Different from other 
pharmaceutical regions where poorly-performed enterprises were directly sold or went 
bankrupt, Tonghua city government adopted a flexible and gradual way instead, 
namely, turning small SOEs and collective enterprises into “contracted ownership”. 
These contracted enterprises were seemingly public in the form of ownership (which I 
call “red cap” enterprise, see also Chapter 9.4), but once they succeeded financially they 
became private entities later on. This alternative way was of importance for the 
entrepreneurial level and for the local industry level, too. It reduced the operational cost 
at the very beginning because the entrepreneurs who contracted firms did not need to 
create a new firm from scratch, rather leased production equipments and site of the 
contracted enterprise. More importantly, the contract entrepreneurs accumulated 
experience during the contract period, which helped to reduce firm growth uncertainty. 
For the local industry level, large-scale public investment by local government agencies 
before 1990s was fully utilized in a smooth fashion.  
The firm organization of contracted enterprises is different from the foregoing-
mentioned “quasi-profit-seeking enterprises”. In the “factory director responsibility 
system”, operational control of an enterprise was vested by contracts between the 
government and enterprises (not individuals), namely, the economic performance of 
factories was not directly related to the increase and decline of personal wealth, but to 
ups and downs of personal position. But in the new contracted ownership system, the 
contractors tend to put a given amount of money in pledge, and they could get the 
profits if they achieved success, while they would pay for a loss and lose the pledge in 
case of a failure. Once the contracted workshops or plants succeeded in the market they 
could change into “becoming private” in the form of ownership, otherwise they would 
have to be returned again to the “old” system or further contracted to other 
entrepreneurs. The action of contracting ongoing loss-making enterprises was actually 
venturesome, not only economically. Hence, contracted enterprises were in essence 
private and played a function of ‘safety nets’ in the outerwear of public ownership 
(“wear red cap”) to reduce political risk in the circumstances of political and legal  
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uncertainty.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Contracted ownership 
Source: own elaboration 
Note: the subunit (d) was contracted out, in reality private-owned.  
There were two contract systems: partially contracted ownership and wholly 
contracted ownership. The former tended to happen in relatively large state-owned 
enterprises in which one or more production subunits or workshops were contracted, 
while the latter occurred normally in small state-owned enterprises and collectively 
enterprises. These contracted enterprises were run through market mechanism, since 
they were organized independently on the base of price mechanism, buying and selling 
on the market. Many of today’s private pharmaceutical enterprises were transformed 
from contracted enterprises in the 1990s. Xiuzheng Group is a good example of the 
wholly contracted enterprises (for this story of Xiuzheng Group, see 6.2.4).  
6.2.4 Firm Creation and Firm Organizational Change (1998 onwards) 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical sector underwent notable changes since 1998. Apart 
from the remarkable increase and decrease of the amount of firms, acquisition and 
entrepreneurial spin-off became the popular entry modes.  
Due to the implementation of Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) in 1997, 
coupled with increasing market competition, some SMEs fell in a serious financial 
situation. More than ten small and loss-making pharmaceutical enterprises were 
acquired, mostly by local enterprises during the period from 1998 and 2001. As a result, 
the number of firms dropped from 64 in 1999 to 51 in 2001. It is worth noting that the 
drastic fall of the firm number did not lead to serious social problems such as large-
scale unemployment that was often seen in other region’s industrial re-organization. 
This can be ascribed to the sound collaboration of local government and local 
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entrepreneurs, which I will explain in detail in Chapter 9.4. Here I concentrate on the 
change in firm organization.  
After the tormenting period, the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster continued to 
grow in terms of firm number and output value. The formation of new pharmaceutical 
ventures was characterized by multiple forms, including the transformation from SOEs 
or collective enterprises, entrepreneurial spin-off and acquisition. The new entry mode 
of acquisition could be divided into three types, according to whether acquired 
companies and acquiring companies were local or not. The first type is that local 
companies acquire local companies. This kind of acquisition happened relatively early, 
mainly in the latter period of ownership transformation to the private enterprise-
dominated pharmaceutical economy. The main objective of this kind of acquisition was 
to rapidly expand production capacity. The second type is that non-local firms acquired 
local small loss-making firms. These acquiring companies were also mostly specialized 
in the pharmaceutical industry before they entered Tonghua. The acquisition was a less 
risky and economical way of acquiring incumbent pharmaceutical firms with GMP 
Certification rather than going the risky way of establishing new firms involving huge 
financial resources. The third type is that local giant pharmaceutical companies 
acquired non-local companies. Objectives of such acquisitions are more complex in 
nature. Apart from the conventional motivation of gaining market access and expanding 
production capacity in a short term, two strategic objectives were either to eliminate 
competition of similar products or to get access to specific strategic assets of the 
acquired firm such as new products and research capability. Since I will deal with 
access to firm-specific capabilities of product development as motivation for acquisition 
in Chapter 8.5, I will concentrate on other kinds of acquisitions (whose motivations are 
the expansion of production capacity, market access and the elimination of 
competition).  
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Table 6.4: Typology and motivation of acquisitions 
Typology of Acquisitions  Motivation 
local firms acquire local firms  rapidly expanding production capacity 
non-local firms acquire local small 
loss-making firms 
Access to nationally certified manufacturing facilities 
local giant pharmaceutical companies 
acquire non-local companies 
market access and expanding production capacity 
eliminating competition 
access to acquired firm-specific strategic assets 
Source: own elaboration 
The new mechanism of creating new startups and entrepreneurial spin-offs and 
attracting investment from different regions or industries began to function in the 
late1990s (the temporal ordering of these forms will be made clear in Chapter 7.4). 
With the development of local enterprises, non-local investments (from outside 
Tonghua but in China) were attracted to the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector, mainly 
through acquisition of poorly operating small state-owned enterprises. For instance, 
Beijing Jinkaiwei Group entered into Tonghua by acquiring Kai Wei Pharmaceutical 
Co. Ltd. Secondly, new startups were created by local entrepreneurs from other 
different technological fields like real estates development industry. The forms of 
attracting investments either from other regions in China (mostly in the same province) 
or from other industries could be seen as an agglomeration mechanism, as Boschma and 
Wenting (2007) observed in the automobile industry in Great Britain. The mechanism 
of entrepreneurial spin-off also began to play a role in creating new ventures, since 
some new pharmaceutical startups were created by the entrepreneurs who worked in the 
same industry (for this kind of examples, see Chapter 7.3.3). 
The firms transformed from public owned enterprises, spin-off firms and attracted 
firms from other regions and sectors occupied one third of the total existing 
pharmaceutical enterprises, respectively. The reason behind the emergence of the new 
forms of firm creation could be ascribed, first of all, to the formation of the social and 
legal environment in favour of private enterprises. At the same time, the emergence of 
agglomeration mechanisms and entrepreneurial spin-offs shows that market-oriented 
mechanisms of allocating economic resources began to function. Additionally, in the 
case of Tonghua, this local pharmaceutical sector has grown into the first-class TCM 
industrial cluster in China; having a good reputation across China was helpful to attract 
firms from other regions and sectors to this local sector.   
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Entering the late 1990s, a new firm organization form, the enterprise group, 
emerged in this local sector. The emerging giant TCM enterprise groups in Tonghua are 
mainly Xiuzheng, Daodong and Maoxiang Group. Among them the most splendid one 
is the Xiuzheng Group. With having acquired some local loss-making state-owned 
pharmaceutical enterprises in large scale around 2000, including Tonghua City 
Pharmaceutical Factory, Liuhe Chuangqing Chemical Pharmaceutical Company Ltd, 
Xiuzheng Group’s production capacity expanded within a short time. In order to control 
well high-quality, high-grade upstream raw materials, Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group 
also acquired some upstream enterprises to provide TCM raw materials. For example, a 
large-sized spotted deer breeding company was acquired in 2004 as an affiliated plant to 
produce deer velvet and deer blood. Deer velvet (the generic term of the male Elk) and 
deer blood have huge medicinal value and have been used in TCM for over 2000 years. 
After 2005 Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group launched a new strategy of “going 
outside Jilin”, mostly through acquisition. In September 2005 Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical 
Group acquired Kuangxi Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. in Sichuan province (in Southwest 
China), jointly with China North Chemical Industries Corp. (NOCINCO), a state-
owned holding company with a headquarter in Beijing. This reorganized company 
would leverage advantages of Xiuzheng Group in management and marketing networks 
to improve its economic performance. This acquisition provided Xiuzheng 
Pharmaceutical Group with easy access to the established market of the acquired 
company, over-the-counter (OTC) drugs, for instance, anti-hypertensive drugs. In 
addition, Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group announced that 200 million RMB would be 
invested to expand the reorganized company to China’s southwest industrial base of 
Xiuzheng Group. The main objective of this investment was to utilize Chinese wildlife 
resources in Sichuan mountain areas as medicine materials to meet the growing demand 
in Chinese Southwestern TCM market. According to the vice director of the office of 
product planning at Xiuzheng Group, 
“If this plan could be achieved, the total industry capacity of Xiuzheng 
Pharmaceutical Group Pharmaceutical Group would be doubled, with an expected total 
output value of 3 billion RMB” (Interview, No.1 in Appendix 2).  
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Figure 6.5: Expansion of Xiuzheng Group in Jilin province 
 
6.3 The Origin of the Pharmaceutical Enterprises in Tonghua 
The main task of this section is to construct a genealogical tree of selected 
Tonghua pharmaceutical enterprises (shown in appendix 5) based on collected 
information of all the firms in the cluster and on their history. It is especially 
noteworthy that almost all the studies on the origin of firm creation have depended on 
the carrer experience of firm founders and the history of the firms themselves. The 
organizational change of the Tonghua pharmaceutical firms is summarized in Figure 
6.6. 
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Figure 6.6: Evolution of Firm Organization in Tonghua Pharmaceutical Industry  
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6.3.1 The Early Generation of Tonghua’s Pharmaceutical Enterprises (-1985) 
The origin of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry can be traced back at least to the 
second half of the 19
th century, when several family-run TCM stores already existed. 
For example, Deyuan Yang established the Yongcheng TCM store in 1875 with 30 
employees selling self-made Chinese herbal products. There were three large TCM 
stores in Tonghua then (the other two were Jishenghe and Faxin) with a total of around 
150 employees by 1950, mainly selling hand-made medicines.  
Shortly after the Chinese Communist Party came into power in China, the private 
ownership was abolished (1953-1956) and then these stores’ production workshops and 
equipments were restructured to establish the first “modern” pharmaceutical enterprise 
(in term of machinery production), Tonghua Commercial Parmaceutical Plant, in 1958. 
Later in 1969 this plant was renamed Tonghua City Pharmaceutical Factory and has 
now been merged with Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group. 
In the 1960s the industrial system of pharmaceutical manufacturing in China was 
greatly improved through public sector investments, and most of the newly established 
large state-owned pharmaceutical enterprises were located in metropolises (also see 
Chapter 3.4.2). However, the domestic demand for essential drugs was not met at that 
time, in particular in rural or peripher areas. In addition, since Tonghua lies in a remote 
mountain area through which epidemic diseases used to spread, Tonghua city 
government struggled with the lack of necessary medicines for a long time. In response 
to the central government’s call for self-sufficiency policy, which encouraged basic 
drugs to be produced locally, five pharmaceutical plants were set up by the local 
government.  
The plants specialized in producing chemical medicines, among which are 
Tonghu County Pharmaceutical Plant (which was renamed as Baishan Pharmaceutical 
Plant later) and Tonghua City Qianjin Pharmaceutical Factory and Tonghua County 
Raw medicine Factory (renamed as the Baishan Pharmaceutical Plant in 1984). The 
predecessor of Tonghua County Pharmaceutical Plant was Tonghua City Hospital’s 
preparation room, and it was separated from the hospital in 1967, while the Tonghua 
City Qianjin Pharmaceutical Factory became a joint venture of a small collective 
pharmaceutical plant (Hongwei) and a state-run Chemical plant (Tonghua City 
Comprehensive Chemical Plant) in 1968. Tonghua County Raw Medicine Factory was 
founded by Tonghua County Medical Bureau in 1969. At the very start the plant  
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produced chemical medicines such as streptomycin, but because of the lack of required 
technological capabilities it turned to produce ginseng-based invigorants after 1973. 
Two new chemical pharmaceutical enterprises were established in first two years of the 
1970s: Ji’an County Pharmaceutical Factory by a local government agency (Ji’an 
County Light Industry Bureau) in 1970, and Meihekou Pharmaceutical Factory 
established by a local state-owned medicine wholesales enterprise (Meihekou Medicine 
Station) in 1971.  
There were two other pharmaceutical plants set up during the 1960s and 
specialized in Traditional Chinese Medicine, Baishan No.2 Pharmaceutical Factory and 
Meihekou No.1 Pharmaceutical Factory. The former one was founded on the base of the 
production technology of a local health school (Tonghua City health school) in 1969, 
and the latter was reconstructed in 1969 from a Chinese herbal medicine store 
(Shancheng Town Chinese herbal medicine store).  
It is worth noting that Tonghua city was a military post before 1980 since it is 
located near the Chinese – North Korean border, and the garrison troops set foot in the 
pharmaceutical industry in the 1960s and 1970s. These plants were “57” 
Pharmaceutical Factory in Liuhe County (laterly renamed as Liuhe County Shuangqing 
Pharmaceutical Factory) in 1966, Meihekou Sanhong Pharmaceutical Factory in 
Meihekou County in 1968, Liming Pharmaceutical Factory in 1968, and Xinyu 
Pharmaceutical Factory in 1969. Almost all of this kind of plants had no technologically 
experienced parent enterprises in the pharmaceutical industry, except for Liming 
Pharmaceutical Factory, which was transformed from a workshop of military hospital 
(206 Hospital) in 1968.  
From the above discussed proofs, it is safe to say that the years around the 1970s 
witnessed the first hot wave of the creation of pharmaceutical plants. The characteristics 
of this hot wave could be summarized as follows. (1) The rise of local pharmaceutical 
enterprises could be seen as the local response to the huge need of basic drugs over 
China; (2) the pharmaceutical enterprises were created by local drug administrative and 
regulatory authorities for public benefits, not for own economic well-being (for the 
macro-institutional background see 6.2.2), which is significantly different from the 
investment incentives of local government agencies in the TCM industry in the 1980s; 
(3) a new chemical sector emerged during this period. Athough the chemical sector as a 
whole finally failed (largely because of the lower local technological base and the  
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competition with TCM industry for local financial and labour force resources), the 
emerging TCM industry benefited a lot from it. I will refer to this aspect in Chapter 
8.1.3. 
There are a few newly established pharmaceutical plants in the 1970s. In the first 
half of the 1980s, however, five new pharmaceutical plants were erected, with the result 
of increasing the number of pharmaceutical plant up to 18. Among them were two, 
founded by the local garrison, namely, Changcheng Pharmaceutical Factory
48 in 1984 
and Meihekou Shanbao Pharmaceutical Factory in 1985, and another two were erected 
by local government agencies i.e., Liuhe County Chinese Medicine Factory by 
Agricultural Bureau in 1980, and Baishan No.5 Pharmaceutical Factory by Tonghua 
County Light Industry Bureau in 1985. Furthermore, Huinan County Ginseng & Deer 
Pharmaceutical Factory, was founded by a factory specialized in deer raising. All of 
these new pharmaceutical plants were specialized in TCM, which was the local 
response to a huge demand of TCM in China’ domestic market.  
There were 18 pharmaceutical enterprises by the mid-1980s (see Figure 6.1) and 
the pharmaceutical industry had already become one of the pillar industries in Tonghua 
city. Its output value, sales and profits and taxes reached RMB 256.65 million Yuan, 
RMB 2.176 million Yuan, and RMB 1.216 million Yuan, respectively, with a total of 
1347 employees. The economic growth of Tonghua pharmaceutical enterprises in the 
middle of the 1980s could be partially ascribed to the increasing demand. Firstly, the 
high-speed economic growth after the reform and opening-up policy enable people to 
pay more for health care; Secondly, China’s education, not only higher education, 
which had been interrupted by the Cultural Revolution (from 1966 and 1976) was 
resumed, the increasing level of education was helpful to raise people’s awareness of 
health. Thirdly and the most importantly, the value of TCM has been re-affirmed by 
China’s government entering the Deng Xiaoping time. For a long time, the Chinese 
government had paid more attention to Western medicine, especially during the 
Cultural Revolution period. The remarkable evidences are that the number of doctors in 
TCM was reduced by half, from half a million in 1958 to a quarter of a million in 1978; 
and that the number of national TCM colleges sharply decreased, from 23 to 5 during 
the same period. However, the importance of TCM was emphasized again in China 
after Deng Xiaoping came to power (in 1977).  
                                                        
48 It was transferred to the local government in 1998  
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Decreasing poverty rates, increasing education levels and refinding the medicinal 
value of TCM contributed together to the rapid growth of the whole pharmaceutical 
industry, in particular increased market shares. Tonghua enterprises seized this huge 
and (re)emerging market opportunity to develop the TCM products based on ginseng 
and other national herbs. Tonghua city was the earliest region in developing large scale 
ginseng products, which not merely opened up a window of opportunity for the 
following development of TCM drugs, but also provided it with an initial advantage. 
6.3.2 The Second Wave of New Start-Ups (1985-1992) 
China’s central government began to carry out fiscal decentralization in 1984, and 
the scope of the administrative jurisdiction of the Tonghua prefecture was reduced in 
1985. According to the new public fiscal policy, the expenditures of governments, state-
owned enterprises and other public departments (for example, education) had to be 
assumed by public revenues at the corresponding level (for a detailed explanation of its 
influence on local economic development, see Chapter 9.2). As a result, in Tonghua as 
well as in other regions in China, the local state had to seek new sources of economic 
growth to easy fiscal pressure. Thus, various government agencies in Tonghua built up 
a large number of TCM enterprises and expected higher profits and taxes from the TCM 
industry. For example, Baishan No.5 pharmaceutical plant (later transformed to 
Dongbao Group) was established by Tonghua County Government in 1985. Liuhe TCE 
plant and Liuhe longgangshan pharmaceutical plant became an independent entity from 
Liuhe Changqing pharmaceutical plant around 1986. Baishan No.6, No.7 and No.8 
pharmaceutical plants came into being in 1987. 
Tonghua city made determined decisions to develop the pharmaceutical industry 
as the pillar industry around 1987, when a lot of human and financial resources were 
put into this promising field. It is notable that a large number of local government 
agencies were entangled into this sector at that time, in particular in the production of 
tonics based on natural herbal plants (for example ginseng), which was a highly 
profitable industry in the second half of the 1980s. But the so-called public agencies 
were not administrative authorities of the pharmaceutical industry, and they established 
new pharmaceutical ventures under the name of their own organizations in collective 
ownership just to promote own economic welfare. Against this background, six new 
pharmaceutical plants were born within one year in 1988. They were Yayuan 
pharmaceutical plant (laterly transformed to Goldenhorse Group) founded by one  
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department of Erdaojiang district government; Tonghua City No.2 pharmaceutical plant 
(purchased by Wantong Grounp later), Huinanhuifa pharmaceutical plant and Linhai 
pharmaceutical plant
  by Tonghua County Economic and Trade Bureau, Changliu 
pharmaceutical plant by Changliu primary school and Huinan County Pharmaceutical 
Factory co-founded by Jilin medical staff secondary school (in Changchun) and Huinan 
County government.  
Over the next few years Huinan Biochemistry pharmaceutical plant was set up by 
Huinan County government in 1989, Liuhe Tianli pharmaceutical plant was 
transformed from Liuhe County Deer Raising factory in 1991, Tonghua County Shiyan 
pharmaceutical plant was founded in 1991, Fangda pharmaceutical plant and Hengan 
pharmaceutical plant were built up by the Tonghua Township Enterprises Bureau and 
Tonghua City Grain Bureau respectively in 1992. 
6.3.3 The Privatization Process of Public Firms and the New Generation of New 
Start-Ups (1992-1997) 
As mentioned before, different from the “big bang” path of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union, especially Russia, the process of privatization in China was 
not finished overnight, but was conducted gradually through continual pilot 
experiences. Tonghua city launched the historic course of ownership transformation in 
1992, after then almost all pharmaceutical firms in Tonghua had been transformed to 
private ownership. This raises questions of who took over the transformed enterprises. 
The take-over of the local government-owned enterprises must involve substantial 
resources, not restricted only to financial resources. The most significant resource was 
the relational resource. Only those local elites (namely both local government officials 
and top-level enterprise cadres) who had a strong social network, in particular with 
local government, could take over the transformed enterprises since their strong social 
network provided easier and more access to the scarce resources. The strong social 
network not only endowed them with the priority of taking over these enterprises at a 
cheaper price, but also enabled them to raise required financial resources for the taking–
over. Furthermore, these new established pharmaceutical companies were private in 
ownership from their beginning. Local cadres raised the needed funds, firstly by 
borrowing from extended families and kinship networks, later through public share 
issues (after the mid-1990s). From the above-mentioned aspects the importance of 
social networks in coordinating and negotiating various interested actors during the  
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process of firm creation and growth should be recognized. I will especially deal with 
this aspect from the perspective of an institutional approach in Chapter 9. Here I just 
want to give some empirical evidences.  
Today’s two influential pharmaceutical companies that rise to the top 100 China’s 
pharmaceutical enterprises by sales, Xiuezheng Group and Wantong Group, can be 
taken as example for illuminating the process of privatization. The predecessor of 
Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group was the attached pharmaceutical plant of the Tonghua 
Chinese Medicine Institute. This small plant could not afford the wages for their 
employees in 1995 because it fell into an extremely serious, difficult financial situation, 
with accumulated liabilities as high as 4 million Yuan RMB and estimated fixed assets 
of 250,000 Yuan RMB. Xiu Laigui, a middle-level leader at Tonghua City Traffic 
Police Bureau who had a sound relation with the director of the local authority of 
medicinal industry, took over this plant at a very low cost but under the condition that 
all of the employees would not be fired
49. This plant was transformed into a limited 
liability company in 1996, still remaining a state-owned firm, and was later transferred 
into a private firm at the end of 1998. Owing to innovation in market and improved 
product quality (for this aspect, see Chapter 8.3.2), Xiuzheng rapidly developed at an 
annual growth rate of 1,876% in terms of total revenue between 2000 and 2004. It 
contributed 169 million Yuan RBM to the state taxes, accounting for 8.2% of total taxes 
by all private enterprises in Jilin province in 2001. Nowadays Xiuzheng has grown into 
a big group with nearly 10,000 employees and total assets of 4.8 billion Yuan RMB and 
has entered into the top 10 China's pharmaceutical enterprises by sales.  
Similar to Xiuzheng Group, Wantong Group also went through the process from a 
state-owned plant (Tonghua City No.2 pharmaceutical factory establish in 1988) to a 
contracted enterprise and then to a private entity. In 1997 Pan Shoude who was the top 
manager of a local Optical state-owned enterprise with  rich experience in marketing, 
raised a total of 2 million RMB (this number was large for the individual family at that 
time) from families and friends to contract Tonghua City No.2 pharmaceutical factory, 
which owed the banks more than RMB 7,000 million and countless wages at that 
time.The TCM market shifted from the supply side to the demand side in the early 
1990s and the increased competition in TCM industry compelled pharmaceutical 
                                                        
49 In the course of reform of state-owned enterprises, irregular payment of staff salaries was a frequent phenomenon 
in poorly managed enterprises. Therefore, solving the employment problem was an important matter for 
governments.  
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enterprises to pay more attention to the demand side. The many years working 
experience of marketing enabled him to be more sensitive to the needs of the market. 
Through innovation in marketing and in product (re)development, just in the first year 
after being contracted, Wantong pharmaceutical factory developed into one of the local 
star firms and today jumps into the list of the top 100 pharmaceutical enterprises in 
China. 
These two groups have one thing in common, i.e., both Xiu Laigui and Pan 
Shoude did not have any experience in working in the pharmaceutical industry before 
they gallantly adventureed on contracting ill-run pharmaceutical factories. Xiu Laigui 
was a middle-level leader at the Tonghua City Traffic Police Bureau, while Pan Shoude 
was the manager at a state-run store specializing in selling watches and glasses. They 
attached greater importance to the market demand and drug quality which allowed them 
to establish firm-specific advantages in marketing. In particular, Xiuzheng Group has 
now established a strong marketing network and brand advantage. 
It is necessary to note that the state-owned enterprises that were contracted by Xiu 
Laigui and Pen Shoude were relatively small and loss-making before. But there is 
another kind of contracted state-owned enterprise which was relatively larger, for 
example, Dongbao, Changlong, Huaxia and Ji’an. Most of the local relatively large 
SOEs or SOEs with relatively better economic performance were taken over by the 
managers who had been working in the contracted firms for many years (for a detailed 
discussion, see Chapter 7.3.3). This reflects the timeline in privatization of different 
kinds of state-owned enterprises (which I will deal with in Chapter 7.4). Put simply, the 
loss-making and small pharmaceutical enterprises were on the list of the first groups to 
be privatized. If its ownership was collective, the pace of privatization would be 
accelerated. Those relatively large state-owned enterprises, especially with good 
economic performance, would be privatized later.  
During this period of privatization of SOEs there were also a small number of new 
entrants coming into Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry. The main forms of the 
creation of new pharmaceutical enterprises during this period include joint ventures and 
entrepreneurial spin-offs. Non-local enterprises often adopted the mode of joint venture 
with local enterprises to enter Tonghua. For example, Yujin Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd 
was co-founded by one local company and four non-local companies (one is Shanghai 
Institute of Plant Physiology of Chinese Academy of Sciences) in 1993. Yujin  
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Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd and two non-local pharmaceutical companies (Dalian Tianwei 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Dalian Yawei Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.) jointly established 
Hongtaomao Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd in 1996. At the same time one could observe that 
a few entrepreneurs left their origins to run their own business in the same industry. The 
experience of Zhang Shouli and his colleagues is a good case here. They left Qianjin 
Pharmaceutical Factory and established a new entity – Xinghua Pharmaceutical Limited 
Liability Company – in 1997. There is an additional case, namely, Tonghua Chanyuan 
Institute of Burn Scar which was founded by a doctor from a local military hospital 
(No. 206 Hospital). In addition, local government officials began to set up their own 
pharmaceutical companies through acquisition or greenfield investment. For example, 
Liu E, a former Tonghua County government official, created Shenyuan Pharmaceutical 
Company in 1993. I have a special section on this aspect in the next chapter. 
6.3.4 The Fourth Wave of New Entrants (1998-1999) 
The period from 1998 to 2003 witnessed big ups and downs in terms of the 
population of firms in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical cluster. The firms’ number jumped up 
to 59 in 1998 and continued to increase to 64 in 2001, but dropped to 51 in 2001. The 
reason of firm closure was mostly connected to a new national regulation, according to 
which, the pharmaceutical enterprises should meet GMP standards, or else, they would 
be forced to exit. As a result, some small and ill-performed enterprises were forced to 
merge or become acquired, or went directly bankrupt. Despite the fact that some young 
and small enterprises, especially those TCM enterprises which were established around 
the mid-1990s in Tonghua, could hardly survive in this increasingly competitive market, 
while some new firms were erected. Although most of these newly established 
enterprises were created by local entrepreneurs, a considerable number of new firms 
was created by non-local investors. More importantly, from the viewpoint of time 
sequence, the spin-off mechanism and the ability to attract non-local investments to 
Tongua (agglomeration economy) began to play an unprecedented significant role in the 
term of new firm number.  
Some new non-local entrants tended to invest in this local pharmaceutical cluster 
through acquisition of poorly operating small enterprises. Acquisition is a good strategy 
for non-local entrants to gain an entry platform, mostly for the expansion of production 
capability. The acquired firm in turn leveraged the acquiring firm’s product 
development and marketing infrastructure or social network to achieve further national 
growth and expansion in the long run. For instance, a health food company from  
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another significant pharmaceutical cluster in Jilin province (Aodong) founded Liuhe 
Zixing Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd, through wholly purchasing Luotongshan 
pharmaceutical
 factory (i.e. Changqing NO.2 pharmaceutical
 factory that founded in 
1992, renamed as Luotongshan in 1993). Jingzhuzangyao Group, a company 
specialized in TCM drug in another province, acquired Boshile Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd 
in Liuhe County. These acquisitions were all conductive to get access to nearby raw 
materials and to improve pharmaceutical
 equipments of the acquiring enterprises. In 
addition, the acquired firm can make use of social networks of acquiring enterprises to 
seek valuable resources. A good case here is Beijing-based Jin Kai Wei Group which 
acquired Weide Pharmaceutical Company and then formed Tonghua Kai Wei 
Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. With the help of its Beijing eadquarter, Tonghua Kai Wei 
developed a cooperation relationship in research and development with Beijing 
Jinbencao Herbal Medicine Science and Technology Development Ltd which was 
located in the largest medical research area in North China (Haidian District Hi-tech 
Development Zone in Beijing).  
Among the enterprises founded by local entrepreneurs, some were spin-offs, while 
others were established by entrepreneurs without previous industrial experiences. 
According to my field survey, the new startups during this period were established 
through greenfield investments. Spin-off entrepreneurs here refers to those low or 
middle-level managers and engineers who used to work in this pharmaceutical cluster 
and subsequently opened their own operations in this sector (Dahl, et al., 2005; Klepper, 
2001). Spin-off entrepreneurs usually gain entrepreneurial experience that provides 
them with capabilities needed when self-employed. Examples for entrepreneurial spin-
offs in this TCM cluster would include the following entities: (1)Yang Tianyu, the 
former director of Tonghua City No.2 Pharmaceutical Factory, created Guruite 
Pharmaceutical Ltd. after Wangtong Group purchased the majority shares of Tonghua 
City No.2 Pharmaceutical Factory and took over its equipments imported in the 1980s 
from Germany. (2) Liu Peng, who had been working at the marketing department of 
Xiuzheng Group for a long time, built up Shenghe Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. (3) Wei 
Zhenglin, who worked as a senior manager in Golden Horse Pharmaceutical Company 
for a long time, founded Zhenglin Pharmaceutical Company in 2000. (4) Du Jinxin, an 
experienced pharmaceutist who he worked at the Tonghua City Center Hospital for 
approximately 20 years, set up Fengyang Pharmacutical Co., Ltd. But three years later 
this small plant went bankrupt.  
From a comparative point of view, the economic performance of these enterprises 
as a whole is still not as good as that of the transformed enterprises today. The  
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following reasons could explain this: firstly, competition in the TCM sector after 2000 
became increasingly fierce because some relatively larger pharmaceutical enterprises 
had already created firm-specific advantages that could hardly be imitated by their 
rivals; secondly, the social network of spin-off entrepreneurs is not as strong as that of 
local cadres, which limited the resources they can mobilize. From this aspect, we can 
find that the social network is important, not only in creating new firms, but also in the 
development process of firms (see Chapter 9.3). 
New pharmaceutical enterprises in the Tonghua TCM cluster were founded by 
entrepreneurs without previous industrial experiences, mostly from the local real estate 
industry. For instance, Zhou Xujie set up Tengda Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. in 2002 by 
buying the operating license from a bankrupt pharmaceutical enterprise. Wang 
Xingtong founded Jiuming Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. on the base of a plant which used to 
produce veterinary drugs in 2003. Another small company, Jiafeng Pharmaceutical Co., 
Ltd., which has disappeared now, was erected in 2001 by Wangpin who did not have 
working experience in pharmaceutical sector. These pharmaceutical enterprises are in a 
worse financial situation compared to the above mentioned entrepreneurial spin-offs, 
and now are still on the brink of bankruptcy. Besides the reasons indicated above, 
another main reason for this is that these entrepreneurs did not accumulate enough 
industry-specific knowledge and location-based social network (for a detailed 
explanation, see Chapter 7.1.4). 
Several small-sized private pharmaceutical companies were set up during this 
period, such as Hongjiu Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Baixing Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. 
in 1998, Siwei Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. in 2001. We only know that these companies 
were set up by local entrepreneurs. Other data and information about their backgrounds 
are not available.   
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Chapter 7 The Origins of the Pharmaceutical Entrepreneurs 
in Tonghua 
This Chapter will concentrate on the evolution of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
entrepreneurs, through which we also can understand the coevolutionary process of 
firm, institution and technology, and figure out who links these entities and in what 
ways. There are at least three reasons that can explain why I study the coevolution of 
firm, technology and institution in an industrial cluster in the transitional countries 
through the lens of entrepreneurs. Firstly, the study on entrepreneurship is fundamental 
for the process of economic change (Gunther McGrath, 2003), even in transitional 
countries. Secondly, as Schmupeter (1934) said, entrepreneurs are habitually the 
innovators not only of new technologies, but also of new institutions, and even more 
important, new technologies and institutitons together in turn open the way to new 
markets and higher productivity. In the transitional context, entrepreneurs not only 
introduce new products, production methods, markets supply of new materials or parts, 
but also create new institutions and new organizational forms. Finally, it is widely 
acknowledged that entrepreneurship is a critical element in the formation of clusters, 
playing a role of organizing and coordinating various resources and mobilizing social 
networks. 
This chapter aims to provide empirical evidence for the origins of the 
entrepreneurs in the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry to examine the relationship 
between prior experiences of entrepreneurs, the temporal sequence, the mode choice of 
entry and the economic performance of their private enterprises. Based on what 
discussed this chapter, the co-evolution between enterprise and institution will be 
examined in detail in Chapter 10.3. Here, I do not want to analyze in detail the initial 
factors at the level of the entrepreneur as individual person, which definitely influence 
the motive of the entrepreneurs to start their businesses. Instead, I will focus on the 
historical trajectory of the entrepreneurs in the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster. The 
collected data of the entrepreneurs’ work experiences (CVs) will offer us clear clues to 
understand where they came from and where/what they are doing. Thus, this chapter is 
crucial to explain how entrepreneurship evolves in the transtitional context.   
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7.1 Entrepreneurs in China’s Transitional Contexts 
7.1.1 Placing Entrepreneurship in Real Historical Context  
Different from existing researches identifying characters of entrepreneurs such as 
innovativity, creativity, leadership, being a risk-taker and so on (for example, Pistrui, 
2001), this section will focus on the formation process of entrepreneurship in the 
transitional Chinese context. According to my theoretical framework, the entity and its 
surroundings influence each other over time (which we might call “coevolution”). 
Entrepreneurs are the most dynamic actors in developing clusters into complex adaptive 
systems, where entrepreneurs and the external (institutional and technological) 
environments co-change over time. Entrepreneurs can play a role of “creative 
destructors” when “old” environments do not match new changes (for example, in 
technology and institution); namely, they exercise intentionally strategic actions and 
construct new external conditions that facilitate their business operation through “trial 
and error”. The new environments in turn contribute to the development of industrial 
clusters. Thus, I totally agree with Geoffrey and Wadhwani (2006) that 
entrepreneurship research should place more attention to the historical particularity, 
temporal and geographic context of entrepreneurial processes, their effects on industry 
structure and the competitive dynamics of firms. Accordingly, a dynamic and historical 
perspective will be employed in this chapter to understand the formation of the 
entrepreneurship in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical cluster over time.  
In fact, some scholars have similar arguments. For example, Acs and Audretsch 
(2003)
  view entrepreneurship as what happens at the intersection of history and 
technology. These ideas are actually not original, but they have widen and deepen the 
use of Schumpeter’s historical methods (1947) in the entrepreneurship study. The 
dynamic and historical approach to entrepreneurship is in concert with evolutionary 
economics, in particular with a co-evolutionary study. A co-evolutionary analysis of 
institutions and organizations would be a powerful tool to deliver deep insights into the 
machnisms of the entrepreneurship affecting the long-term changes in social and 
economic institutions as well as in their own organizations (for example, the seminal 
work of Murmann, 2003). Fundamentally, placing entrepreneurship in real historical 
context – the broader industrial, economic and social settings – is critical for drawing 
sensible generalizations about entrepreneurial behavior. In other words, an 
understanding of the historical context helps us to be clearly aware of the spatio-
temporal particularities of entrepreneurship which vary significantly over time and 
places. The implication for studying entrepreneurship in transitional nations is that a  
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theoretical generalization being valid in the context of American or European 
capitalism may not be applicable to entrepreneurial behavior in the context of 
transitional countries. Likewise, because the Eastern and Southeastern Asian countries 
(China, North Korea, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) and the former Central and Eastern 
Europe and Soviet Union adopted different ways of transforming from the centrally 
planned economic system to the market economy, for simplicity, gradualism versus 
shock therapy, each transitional country has its own spatio-temporal particularities of 
entrepreneurship. When one studies the formation of entrepreneurship, he must place 
more attention to country-specific contexts. Of course, I here do not deny the imporance 
of theoretical generalization of country-specific entrepreneurship. Indeed, it will enrich 
the empirically-based theory of entrepreneurship. 
7.1.2 Why the Founders of Enterprises  
Although there is no generic definition of entrepreneur, the attempts to distinguish 
entrepreneurs from small business owners or managers have discovered significant 
differentiating features of entrepreneurs (for a review, see Carland et al., 1988). 
Entrepreneurs are commonly described as individuals who can tend to bear high risk 
and have a high need for economic achievement. From this sense, three kinds of 
individuals should be seen as entrepreneurs in the context of China’s transtition: firstly, 
enterprise contractors in the early reform, who were willing to accept a high level of 
political and financial risk to take over loss-making state-owned enterprises; fecondly, 
those who transformed state-owned or collective enterprises into private entities; and 
lastly, the founders of new business ventures (see Chapter 6.2 and 6.3). Despite that I do 
not want to deny the roles of other social class groups (for example, professional 
managers, scientists, industrial workers and traders) in the rise of an industrial cluster, I 
will concentrate on a specially important group of entrepreneurs who play a major role 
of mobilizing and coordinating a variety of resources to create local wealth. 
The following reasons may explain why I focus on the entrepreneurship in 
studying industrial clusters in China: Firstly, the entry mode and growth rate of SMEs, 
especially at their early stage, are strongly influenced by the resources and the abilities 
of their founders. Compared with their western competitors, the pharmaceutical 
companies in Tonghua, even in China, are very small and young. Thus, it is the 
professional manager that tends to be in charge of daily operations in Western 
pharmaceutical companies, while the role of day-to-day management is almost played 
by the enterprise founders of pharmaceutical companies in Tonghua. This means that an 
entrepreneur in a Tonghua pharmaceutical company is both capital owner and manager  
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of daily operations and the firm’s fate is greatly influenced by its entrepreneur(s). 
Secondly, through the lens of the enterprise founder we can study the evolution of other 
factors (e.g, institution and technology). In the case of China’s transitional period, 
entrepreneurs are not passive products of (institutional) structural constraints, but 
innovative actors who draw on preexisting resources to innovate (for example hybrid 
firm, firm organization, new products) and to create economic value. The foundation 
and operation of enterprises undoubtedly require various resources, for example, 
technological and financial ones. Entrepreneurs have not only various social and 
political identities, but also relatively stronger social networks, compared with other 
people. The strong social network gives the entrepreneur an enormous leverage in 
coordinating different interests and mobilizing resources. Thirdly, Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical cluster is a small community, in which most of entrepreneurs are 
previous enterprise cadres and government officials. These local political and economic 
elites have known each other for a long time and trust each other and thus formed 
strong social networks. These networks mediate the access to non-economic resources 
and affect their economic strategies. Thus the founders of new or transformed 
enterprises in Tonghua play an equally important role as government in coordinating 
economic activities.  
To be honest, my purpose is not to identify the particularities of China’s 
entrepreneurs during the transitional period, even if this issue is equally important and 
also associated with my study, but I will document the historical footsteps of the present 
entrepreneurs in the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector. Before going into the details, it is 
necessary to take a brief look at the enterprise cadre system and make a difference 
between enterprise cadres and entrepreneurs.  
7.1.3 From Cadre to Private Entrepreneurs  
Because of the mutation of the political system from Capitalism to Socialism, 
there has been no existence of a private enterprise or joint venture with foreign capital 
during the period from the end of the socialist transformation in 1958 to the beginning 
of the reform and opening-up policy in 1978. Therefore, there was no (private) 
entrepreneur in China during that period. Those who operated and managed the state-
owned or collective plants were not entrepreneurs but enterprise cadres. Enterprise 
cadres worked in industrial enterprises but shared the social status of the state cadres as 
government officials. Enterprise cadres are essentially different from private 
entrepreneurs, as Table 7.1describes.  
During the planned economic period enterprise cadres (factory directors) were  
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designated by the government at the corresponding level and had the same social status 
as party-state cadres (government officials). They operated the enterprises according to 
the governments’ production plan rather than market demand, and they were more 
concerned about production volume than production cost or the market itself. In the 
context of the planned economy the enterprise cadres could move from industrial 
enterprises to government agencies. Namely, if the enterprise was effectively operated 
and managed, especially in terms of production volume, the enterprise cadres would be 
promoted to a higher level of position in the party-state system or enterprises. The 
motive of enterprise cadres was to gain a higher position, in particular in the party-state 
system (see Figure 7.1).  
Table 7.1: Differences between entrepreneur and enterprise cadre 
 enterprise  cadre  entrepreneur 
social status  hired employee  boss or founder of own enterprise  
rewards  fixed rewards according to work years and 
position   uncertain rewards 
time   a manager with running the business over a 
long period of time  
an entrepreneur start-up process is 
involved with the start-up process 
risk  no risk   Risk taking 
main task 
routine day-to-day management of the business, 
follows rules & procedures, obedient to 
government  
initiators of  change 
founder of new ventures 
relation with 
government   enterprise cadre is assigned by government  entrepreneur can’t move into 
government  
Source: own elaboration  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1: Cadre movability between enterprise and party-state system 
Source: own elaboration  
Under the old system of the “iron rice bowl”, the enterprise cadres enjoyed stable 
and admirable wages and welfare in light of their posts but not the economic 
performance they achieved. The enterprise cadres had rather limited space to change 
work units except for government’s arrangement. Therefore, we can venture to say that 
(private) entrepreneurship did not exist during that time. But it is notable that some of 
the trained enterprise cadres in the planned economy became later entrepreneurs who 
Promotion
Enterprise 
cadres 
Higher position in 
government 
Lower position in 
government
Designation 
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played a role as the engine of an economy as Schumpeter indicated very early in the 
Theory of Economic Development (1934).  
One of the most important outcomes of implementing the reform and opening-up 
policy was that local Schumpeterian entrepreneurship was ignited. But what should be 
emphasized here is that the process of formation of China’s entrepreneurship was not 
finished overnight, but was a gradual process. The formation trajectory of Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical entrepreneurs was very strongly path dependent, in the sense that some 
of today’s entrepreneurs in the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster were an enterprise cadre 
in the planned economy, and then a contractor of hybrid firms (red cap enterprises) at 
the very beginning of economic reform and finally to the founder of today’s private 
enterprise. In doing so, they accumulated rich pharmaceutical industry-specific business 
experience and established strong and sound connections with the local state and 
pharmaceutical researchers. Each step had a strong influence on the next step and each 
new step was involved with new innovations in organization, technology and 
institution. Entrepreneurship played an important role in creating new paths of 
organization, technology and institution and coordinating them. Accordingly, it is safe 
to say that the formation of pharmaceutical entrepreneurs was a combined result of path 
dependence and path creation. Hence, an in-depth tracer study on this gradual process 
from enterprise cadres from the planned economy to private entrepreneurs would be 
important and meaningful to understand the complex process of the formation of the 
Tonghua TCM cluster. I have to say that it is so difficult to strictly classify 
entrepreneurs in my empirical study. The first reason is that information about their 
career experiences is incomplete; the second one, their experiences are extremely 
diversified, for example, some of them used to work for the industry as well as for 
government. Thus we can’t figure out which experience has more influence on their 
current occupation due to the absence of enough personal interviews to judge. 
7.1.4 Heterogeneity of Entrepreneurs in Social Networks and Knowledge 
According to my field survey, I found that the founders of private pharmaceutical 
enterprises mainly come from the following social groups before the privatization of 
SOEs: former enterprise leaders, technicians, middle-enterprise managers, government 
officials and entrepreneurs from different regions and industries. As summarized in 
Table 7.2, as these enerprise founders had different career experience, they were 
heterogenous in the structure of their social networks and knowledge. Here social 
network can be classified into three types, according to the functions of a social 
network: production-related guanxi network (links to suppliers, product users, business  
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partners, universities), environment-related one (links to local political decision-
makers); market-related one (general customer relations built through marketing, 
trademarks, clubs).  
Table 7.2:  Entrepreneurs’ heterogeneity in social networks and knowledge 
Social Network With  Knowledge   
Local 
Government 
Technical 
Personnel 
Market Firm 
Management 
Technology Market 
Enterprise Leaders             
Enterprise Contractor            
Technician              
General Manager             
Government Official             
Entrepreneurs From 
Different Areas 
           
Local   Entrepreneurs 
From Different 
Industries  
          
Source: own elaboration  
Note: = weakest ties or least knowledge; = strongest ties or most knowledge  
For example, the former government officials have the closest ties with local 
government agencies, but have no pharmaceutical industry-specific ties and knowledge. 
However, the top leaders of state-owned enterprises kept a strong relation with the local 
state since these economic elites were assigned by local government and worked in 
industrial enterprises as state cadres, and so they held the pharmaceutical industry-
specific knowledge and networks (for example with the academic community). As I 
have argued in Chapter 6.1.3 the changing national and local institutions determined 
when and how new firms were formed. Here I want to extend this argument and state 
that the previous experiences of entrepreneurs determine to a large extent their entry 
mode as well as their enterprises’ economic performance. Different from the spin-off 
scholars (for example Steven Klepper), who focus more on the capabilities and 
knowledge of entrepreneurs themselves, I place my emphasis on the role of social 
networks entrepreneurs have, especially with local government. The reason for this is 
that in a transition economy, characterized by weak markets, poorly specified property 
rights and institutional uncertainty, the social network became a powerful tool to get 
access to resources and technology. Here I will link the previous experiences of 
entrepreneurs to how and when they created new firms, and then compare the economic 
performance of their enterprises.  
7.2 Who Are the Entrepreneurs of Tonghua’s Pharmaceutical Industry 
Table 7.3 (see p. 185) illuminates different types of entrepreneurs in the Tonghua  
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pharmaceutical industry in the different phases, in which institutions changed. 7.2.1 
Contractor Type Entrepreneur  
The group of contractor type entrepreneurs could be seen as the first generation of 
private entrepreneurs because they took political and financial risks to partially or fully 
contract those state-owned or collective poorly-performing enterprises in the 
transitional period. This kind of contracted enterprises or workshops was semi-
privatized in formation of ownership, which I called “red cap enterprises” (RCEs) 
earlier. “Red cap enterprise”, a typical form of hybrid firm in China’s transitional 
period, refers to the reputation a private enterprise enjoys by becoming attached to a 
government department or a public-owned enterprise and doing business in the name of 
a state-run or collective run enterprise. RCEs were under collective titles but  in reality 
private. It is an intermediate property form that falls between market and hierarchical 
forms of organization (Williamson, 1991). Reasonably speaking, the hybrid 
organizational form was illegal, because RCEs partially operated in the private 
economy; yet, the private economy was forbidden in China at that time. But the 
formation of these hybrid firms were tolerated and even encouraged by local and even 
central governments because the Beijing central government saw them as a promising 
way to introduce the market mechanism with little cost to the state, and local 
governments believed that it was a new financial resource to ease its fiscal pressure. 
That illustrates that during that time the national formal and informal institutions were 
not friendly to private businesses, for example, in denying private enterprises’ business 
licenses. Contract entrepreneurs were forced to search an alternative firm organization 
which retained features of the preexisting governance structure to avoid various 
political risks in the transition economy (Nee and Cao, 1999). In the case of Tonghua, 
local governments have actually had an ownership stake in this kind of Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical enterprises (see Chapter 6.2.2).  
The emergence of the hybrid firms could be an innovative response in the 
transition to an efficiency-oriented economy. That is, on the one hand they  made use of 
market forces that were incrementally replacing the state planning mechanism to 
struggle against pressures for efficiency and flexibility in rapidly changing  
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Table 7.3: Summary of the evolution of the entrepreneurs in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry 
 
Note: the number in the brackets is the number of corresponding entrepreneurs in the entrepreneur datebase 
Time   National Institution   Local Institution  Type of Entrepreneurs  No.  of 
cases 
Performance  
In the mid-
1980s 
Fiscal decentralization 
Micro-enterprise reform,  
The private economy was formally accepted, 
but not by social members ; 
Entrepreneurship in South China was gradually 
formed 
Local government as industrial corporates 
Pharmaceutical industry as the focus of 
industrial development in 1985; 
Market-oriented firms emerged 
 
 
Contractor entrepreneurs  6(16)   
After 1992  The “socialist market economy” was formally 
endorsed as China's reform goal for the first 
time. 
The private economy became wildly accepted 
in China 
The initiative of pharmcity was launched 
in 1995 
local entrepreneurship began to gestated 
Experienced Technicians and 
Managers 
6 (6)   
After the mid-
1990s 
Enterprise leaders  11 (26)   
 
Privatization of small and medium-sized state-
owned enterprises  
The GMP policy began to implemented  in 
1997 
Local capital market was developed  
Encourage  cadres to do business (Xiahai) 
Local infrastructure (for example 
transportation, communication and 
information) was greatly improved 
Local  entrepreneurship was formed 
Government official   7 (7)   
Local competition shifted national 
domestic market 
Entrepreneurs from other 
regions 
6 (6)    Around 2000 
 
 
  Local   entrepreneurs from 
other industries 
4 (4)    
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environments (Nee, 1992), on the other hand, these hybrid organizations still wore the 
“read coat” of state or collective enterprises  and then have certain transaction cost 
advantages over alternative governance structures. More important, the hybrid 
ownership form created unique opportunity for private enterprises to learn how to adapt 
new economic performance-oriented environments and circumstances. Hybrid firms 
were efficient to a great degree during transition, but they would ultimately become 
costly and disappear.  
Actually, once the Beijing central government formally endorsed the legitimacy of 
this intermediate firm organization, private ownership became widely accepted in 
China. RCEs took off the “red caps” and became private in the ownership, which 
enabled them to obtain the legitimate management rights and defined the property rights 
as well. Thus in the later process of taking off the red caps, there was no private 
property rights infringement that was commonly seen elsewhere across China. A 
number of current enterprises in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical cluster, including the two 
largest firms, Daobao Group and Xiuzheng Group, were ever contracted in the 
transitional period. 
The contractor type entrepreneurs not only created a new firm organization (hybrid 
firm), but also initially found a huge market niche (the ginseng-based tonics) a short 
time after the reform and opening-up, which opened up a window of opportunity for the 
subsequential development of TCM industry at the beginnings of the 1990s. More 
important for the whole cluster, they triggered local entrepreneurship and local 
competition in the following ways. (1) Their entrepreneurial activities firstly and clearly 
challenged and eroded the pharmaceutical market monopoly of state-owned enterprises, 
gradually, over time, rather than in one abrupt shift, which made some space for private 
economy; (2) their early commercial success during the period of the contract business 
(1985-1992) attracted a large number of new and established enterprises to the new 
sectors (initially, the ginseng-based tonics), which also brought competition (firstly in 
product and market, afterwards in technology) to this cluster. As a consequence this 
group of contractor type entrepreneurs is very important in nurturing local private 
entrepreneurship and creating local industrial advantages in the TCM sector.  
The story of Li Yikui, who is the founder of today’s Dongbao Group, represents the 
first generation of contract entrepreneurs who took over ill-performing state- 
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owned enterprises in the mid-1980s. After four years’ study in biology in the 
Beijing University (the top university in China), Li Yikui became a technician at 
Tonghua Baishan General Pharmaceutical Plant and worked there for as long as ten 
years. Because his working plant was not willing to commercialize his research results 
of ginseng royal jelly, he left this plant and contracted a small and loss-making plant in 
1985. However, this plant was a market-oriented industrial firm, even still in the form 
of state-owned ownership. As I pointed out in Chapter 6.3.1 the mid-1980s witnessed 
the first wave of economic growth in China, increased education and health awareness. 
In addition, the important medicinal value of TCM was acknowledged at that time. 
These factors led together to a huge market of drugs, especially of TCM. Thanks to 
being familiar with pharmacy, additionally to the growing market of ginseng-based 
tonic industry, Li Yikui transformed this plant into the production of ginseng royal jelly 
(a healthcare product based on ginseng), making use of rich resources of ginseng in 
Changbai Mountain. But it was increasingly difficult for small enterprises, even state-
owned ones, to obtain bank loans, because China’s government began to restructure and 
commercialize state-owned banks into market-orientated, for-profit organizations at that 
time. So Li Yikui had to search an alternative financial source to start his new project. 
Surprisingly, he obtained the main funding capital from ginseng trades, at the very 
beginning RMB one million Yuan. In order to start the ginseng trade business the plant 
raised RMB 60 thousand Yuan from the entire staff and loaned 20 thousand Yuan from 
banks. Tonghua Baishan pharmaceutical tonic plant was upgraded in 1985 to Tonghua 
Baishan No.5 pharmaceutical Factory. Li Yikui, after serving as the director for 8 years, 
became the chairman of the board, since the reform of ownership took place in 1992. 
Today, this small business has grown up as a national well-known enterprise in China. 
There are two other cases for the first generation of contract entrepreneurs. One is 
Yang Ziqing, and the other is Zhang Yucai. With a ten years working experience in 
Tonghua Baishan No. 3 Pharmaceutical Factory, Yang Ziqing, together with two other 
colleagues, was assigned to build up a pharmaceutical packaging plant affiliated to 
Baishan No. 3 Pharmaceutical Factory in 1984, which produced pharmaceutical drugs 
packaging for Baishan No. 3 Pharmaceutical Factory. Because of outstanding 
performance, Yang Ziqing was promoted to be the director of this plant in 1986. But 
attracted by the success of Li Yikui, he also contracted a small collectively owned 
pharmaceutical enterprise (Linhai Pharmaceutical Factory) in 1988. In 1999 Linhai 
Pharmaceutical Factory became a fully private entity. Yang Ziqing became one of the  
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owners and is still the chairman and general manager of the company until today. 
Zhang Yucai, the founder of Yu-Jin Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., has almost 40 years 
of experience in the pharmaceutical business, similar to Yang Ziqing. In 1988 he 
contracted a tablet production workshop of Baishan No.1 pharmaceutical plant in which 
he had already worked for about 20 years. After being operated successfully for two 
years, this workshop was separated from the parent enterprise and expanded to form a 
new independent enterprise, Baixueshan Pharmaceutical Plant, which was subsequently 
acquired by a listed company headquartered in Changchun city. In 1993 Zhang Yucai 
founded a private pharmaceutical business, Yu-Jin Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. It was 
reported that this company has cooperated with Shanghai Institute of Biological 
Sciences (SIBS) of the Chinese Academy of Sciences (CAS), which is one of the 
important public life science research institutions with first class of high-quality 
biotechnology talents in China (for the cooperative form, see Chapter 8.4.2). The 
cooperation brought a rich fruit, a new drug (injection recombinant staphylokinase that 
is used for thrombotic diseases, especially acute myocardial infarction thrombolytic). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure7.2: The model of contractor type entrepreneurs 
Note: the dashed-boxes represent that the entity itself does not exist.  
The story of Xiu Laigui could be seen as a representative of the second generation 
of successful contract entrepreneurs, who contracted local government-owned 
enterprises during the mid-1990s. Unlike the first generation of contract entrepreneurs 
who have a long-term experience in the pharmaceutical industry, the second-generation 
of contract entrepreneurs did not have any industrial experience. But the contracting 
enterprise offered them a chance to enter the pharmaceutical industry at a relatively 
cheaper price, compared to other forms of creating new start-ups. In addition, their 
previous management experience, although of foreign sectors, may have contributed to 
their success.  
Xiu Laigui, the founder of Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group, contracted a small 
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pharmaceutical factory affiliated to Tonghua City Pharmaceutical Industry Research 
Institute in 1995, after he had worked in Tonghua City Bureau of Transportation for 
more than ten years. The plant had a huge debt when it was contracted (RMB 200 
thousands). This loss-making factory became a local small giant, whose output value 
achieved more than 2.1 billion in the same year, equivalent to one third of the entire 
pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua.  
Dong Qiyu, who was the director of a local large chemical fiber plant and had 
accumulated rich management experience, contracted the Baishan No.4 Pharmaceutical 
Factory, which was at a difficult stage by the mid-1990s. After the shareholding reform 
in 2001 Dong Qiyu became a major shareholder and chairman of this company.  
After having done business for approximately ten years in southern China, Han 
Yanhua returned to his hometown, Tonghua, and operated a pharmaceutical business by 
contracting a state-owned pharmaceutical firm, the Fenglin pharmaceutical Factory, 
which pertained to Tonghua County Ginseng and Antler Company in 1998. After three-
year trial operation, he wholly bought out this entity, and transformed it to a new title, 
Huachen Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.  
7.2.2 Enterprise Leaders Type  
Many of the entrepreneurs in the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster were former top 
managers of state-owned or collective enterprises (enterprise leader) in this sector. 
Here, I use the term of “leader”, not “manager” to underscore their highest position 
inside enterpises. This group constitutes a major part of entrepreneurs in the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical industry. There is a big difference between contractor entrepreneurs and 
enterprise leader entrepreneurs in the sense that the earliest private entrepreneurs 
(contractor entrepreneurs) who have own entities, although in the hybrid form of 
ownership, appeared around 1985, while most of all enterprise leaders became private 
entrepreneurs after 1995. The reason why these excellent enterprise elites became 
private entrepreneurs after 1995 includes at least the following points. Firstly, because 
the Beijing central government’s attitude to the private economy became very clear-cut 
and state-owned and collective enterprises were allowed to be privatized after 1992, so 
possesing a private entity was no longer politically risky. Secondly, Toghua city 
government launched a strategic action – “to construct the Pharmcity” – in 1995, and 
then began to privatize state-owned and collective pharmaceutical enterprises on a large 
scale. The close relation to the local state enabled local economic elites (together with  
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the political elites, local government offices) to be the main beneficiary during 
ownership transformation. From a long-term evolution this group plays an important 
role in developing this industrial cluster. Specifically, in order to ensure local fiscal 
revenue under the fiscal decentralization, the local government selected capable 
managers to run enterprises. Once some managers failed, they would probably be 
replaced by others. The inner selection and competition amongst enterprise cadres 
before privatization made it possible that these survivors among the top managers or 
directors were more appropriate and more competitive. In addition, these economic 
elites’ stronger social network with local government, which was formed before 
privatization, allowed them to more conveniently utilize the local government-
sponsored privatization programs to transfer the ownership of state assets to themselves, 
at least at a cheaper price. This phenomenon can also be seen in other transitional 
countries with a socialist regime background (Rona-Tas, 1994; Nee, 1989). 
According to whether these entrepreneurs were the former managers of state-
owned enterprises in the planned economy or not, we can identify two subgroups of 
“enterprise leader entrepreneurs”. As noted above, the first subgroup consists of 
entrepreneurs who formerly were enterprise directors before privatization, but are now 
the owners of the same enterprise (whom I would like to call “ ‘inside’entrepreneurs”). 
In the model of enterprise leader type entrepreneurs, as Figure 7.3 shows, the 
entrepreneur of FirmA belongs to this type. Among the top 10 Tonghua pharmaceutical 
enterprises in terms of output value in 2004, four enterprises’ entrepreneurs can be 
classified into this subgroup. The second subgroup of the enterprise leaders type 
entrepreneurs were also enterprise leaders but did take over enterprises in which they 
never worked before (‘oustside’ entrepreneurs). The entrepreneurs of FirmB and FirmC 
in Figure 7.3 could be included into this subgroup.  
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Figure 7.3: The model of enterprise leader type entrepreneurs 
Note: the dashed-box represents that the entity itself does not exist. The enterprises with 
the same letters represents that the enterprise with a capital letter was transformed from the 
enterprise with   the same lowercase letter.  
They were Zhang Yisheng of Ji’an Yinsheng Pharmacutical Co, Zhang Hong
 at 
Huinan Changlong biochemical Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Liu Peng at Huinan huifa 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd.
 Because I did not have access to any information about Zhang 
Hongbiao’s work experience, I will take the others as examples to illuminate the 
characteristics of enterprise leader entrepreneurs. 
Zhang Yi-sheng accumulated rich experience in business management since he 
had held a position of director of a Casting Plant for a long time. In addition, serving for 
the local state as the vice-director of Ji’an County Employment Bureau (the middle 
level officals in the local party-state system) helped to strengthen his interpersonal 
network with local government officals. In 1994 Zhang Yi-sheng was assigned by local 
government as the director of the Ji’an pharmaceutical factory that was founded in 
1970. The plant was changed to a wholly state-owned limited company in June 1997. 
One year later he bought this company from the local government together with his six 
colleagues and turned it into a private limited liability company. Today Ji’an Yinsheng 
Pharmacutical Company has evolved to a star enterprise in Jilin province, ranked the 
second largest one by profits in 2004 in Tonghua city. 
Similarly, Liu Peng was assigned to Huinan County Ginseng & Deer 
Pharmaceutical Factory after graduating from secondary school. When Huinan County 
No.2 Pharmaceutical Factory was merged into Huinan County Ginseng & Deer 
Pharmaceutical Factory, Liu Peng, then vice director of Huinan County Ginseng & 
Deer Pharmaceutical Factory, was promoted to become director of the newly merged 
plant. The state-owned enterprise was converted into a private one in 2000. This 
company was renamed Huinan huifa Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. later, and was listed as 
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one of the top 10 Pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua city in terms of profits in 2004. 
Hua Yu-qiang, today’s Chairman of the Board of Huaxia Group renamed by 
Tonghua Baishan Pharmaceutical Factory, had been working in this enterprise for his 
life. He was the factory director and led the enterprise’ reform from the SOEs 
governance system to the contracting system, and finally to the governance structure of 
private-owned enterprises. In 1997, Tonghua Baishan Pharmaceutical Factory was 
transformed to joint-stock enterprise, in which state-hold shares were still kept at that 
time. Three years later the company was fully privatized and renamed to Huaxia Group. 
This transformed enterprise has now become a large pharmaceutical company 
consisting of six subsidiaries in the subfields of the pharmaceutical sector, such as 
production, sale and cultivation of Chinese Herbal Medicine. 
There are some other entrepreneurs in the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster who 
used to hold a top position (as factory directors) before the ownership reform. They are 
Wei Xiaoming at Changcheng Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Zhang Yong at Shenlong 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd., Liu Yuming at Yongkuang Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. and Yan 
Zhonghui at Liuhe Tianli Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd..  
So far I gave some examples of the first subgroup of enterprise leader type 
entrepreneurs, here I will turn to the second subgroup. Although somewhat different 
from the first subgroup, the entrepreneurs in the second subgroup used to be factory 
directors as well, but took over or reorganized other factories in which they had never 
worked before. This kind of entrepreneurs tended to take over pharmaceutical factories 
on the verge of bankruptcy. According to my survey in Tonghua, the number of the 
second subgroup of enterprise leader type entrepreneurs is very low (only three). Liu 
Yan is a good example for this subgroup. He was very familiar with new drug 
development since he studied in Beijing Medical College and then worked in the 
pharmaceutical industry. He was the vice factory director of Liuhe County Chinese 
Medicine Factory and was in charge of production and development. After leaving this 
factory he raised funds from friends and colleagues to buy a loss-making state-owned 
pharmaceutical enterprise, the Longgangshan Pharmaceutical Factory, and renamed it 
to Zhongchen Pharmaceutical Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. in 2000. 
In this group of enterprise leader type entrepreneurs, the number of “‘inside’ 
entrepreneurs” who took over their previous working enterprise is larger than that of 
“‘outside’ entrepreneurs” who never worked in the enterprises they took over before.  
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Some reasons may explain these striking phenomena: Firstly, only those pharmaceutical 
enterprises with serious financial problems could be taken over by outsiders, and it was 
almost impossible for the outsiders to take over well-performing pharmaceutical 
enterprises, because their owner (local government) was not willing to take the risk of 
losing taxes. Secondly, the sound economic performance consolidated the relation 
between the existing enterprise cadres and the local government, which undoubtedly 
increased the difficulty of outsiders’ contracting this business.   
7.2.3 Experienced Entrepreneurs of New Ventures 
Different from the two types of entrepreneurs discussed above who did not really 
create new entities and transformed the established SOEs or collective enterprises to 
private ones, the experienced entrepreneurs of new start-ups started their private 
business not by transforming publicly owned enterprises, but by establishing new 
companies from scratch. According to their prior employment position and know-how, 
these entrepreneurs can be divided into two types: technicians, and high-level 
managers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure7.4: The model of experienced entrepreneurs of new ventures 
Note: The dashed arrow denotes that the entrepreneurs of new ventures work as managers 
in the previous pharmaceutical enterprises. The solid arrows mean entrepreneurs of new 
ventures were technicians previously.  
The high-level manager type of entrepreneur here refers to those employees who 
worked as general manager and were responsible for the operation of the whole 
pharmaceutical venture, while the technician type of entrepreneur had a long-term 
experience in producing or developing drugs, and thus has had long-term interactions 
with scientific community in the pharmaceutical sector before creating his/her own 
pharmaceutical business. Almost all entrepreneurs of this group emerged after 1995. In 
addition, the number of this kind of entrepreneur is relatively lower. This seems to 
illuminate some characteristics of the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster, which are 
different from the Western pharmaceutical clusters.  
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Firstly, the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster actually is a concentration of 
pharmaceutical manufacturers in which the access to productive resources was more 
important, at least before 2000, while advanced pharmaceutical clusters in the Western 
nations depend more on R&D-based knowledge, where the access to technological 
resource concerning new drug development and promotion is the most important. 
Secondly, the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster emerged in a weak institutional 
environment, for example, the absence of venture capital, thus entrepreneurs in 
Tonghua had have to turn to personnal connections to acquire such economic resources 
or reduce political risk. This leads to the third difference, the social network (especially 
with the local government during the transitional period, now with the academic 
community) matters much more than the capabilities of firms themself. If we take a 
look at the fact that because experts in technology did not have stronger relational 
network compared to top-level enterprise cardres, the economic performance of their 
pharmaceutical firms was relatively lower, we can better understand how much 
important social network in firm growth China’s transition was.  
Technician Type Entrepreneurs 
Zhenguo Wang’s entity seems to be an exception in the whole group of new 
pharmaceutical firms established by experienced entrepreneurs, and it ranked amongst 
top 20 pharmaceutical companies by 2004 sales. His success is perhaps due to his 
multiple social identities before he established this new venture. Zhenguo Wang has a 
rich experience in the pharmaceutical sector, since he learned how to treat diseases 
when he was an armyman (from 1973 to 1977) and later the deputy director of Tonghua 
Baishan Pharmaceutical Plant (from 1977 to 1983). He was promoted to a higher 
position of the local government (Secretary of Tonghua Municipal Party Committee 
Office) in 1984 and then he developed a strong relational network with local 
government. Thus in some sense he is not a pure technician-type entrepreneur. He made 
a surprising decision of giving up his admirable and stable government job and set up a 
medicine institute in 1986, Tonghua Changbai Mountain Drug Institute. His action of 
resigning the job in government was very early and he is the first generation of 
industrial businessmen in Tonghua. During the middle of the 1980s the TCM industry 
was faced with a huge demand, the social network that benefits from his mixed social 
identities helped him to overcome the entry barriers (for example, the access to business 
license). The first mover advantage, together with the advantages owing to his diverse 
career backgrounds (for example, strong social network with local government and  
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being familiar with pharmacy) was helpful for his early commercial success. In 
addition, he built up anti-cancer hospitals, and all products were sold only through these 
hospitals. This unique business mode enabled him to gain monopoly profits and 
effectively avoid the competition of latecomers from which other Tonghua 
pharmaceutical firms suffered. Today his small institute developed into an industrial 
group with 12 branches and offices in more than 300 cities at home and abroad and 
ranks among the top 500 private enterprises in China.  
There are other two pharmaceutical enterprises established by local 
pharmaceutical experts. One is Tonghua Chanyuan Institute of Burn Scar that was 
founded by Xu Baohua in 1996, a doctor from a local military hospital, No. 206 
Hospital. This institute was renamed to Tonghua Chanyuan Medicine Technologies 
Ltd., but its financial situation is relatively weak today. The other one is Fengyang 
Pharmacutical Co., Ltd., founded around 2000 by Du Jinxin, a pharmacist with 
approximately 20 years working experience in Tonghua City Center Hospital. This 
small plant went into bankruptcy shortly after its establishment. The poor economic 
performance of these two pharmaceutical enterprises established by local medical 
experts seems to illustrate that those entrepreneurs who merely had much knowledge of 
the new drug development did not have more advantages any longer in the context of 
China’s transition. Firstly, their very weak relational network with local government 
and financial institutions made it basically impossible for them to take over the SOEs or 
collective enterprises during privatization because governement and enterprise cadres 
had stronger relational ties with local state; secondly, the lack of experience in 
marketing and business management makes it increasingly difficult to survive in a 
competitive drug market. 
Manager Type of Entrepreneurs 
Different from enterprise leader entrepreneurs—the special group of entrepreneurs 
in post-communist countries who transformed their own social identity from the top 
magagers of state-owned enterprises (as government representatives) into private 
entrepreneurs, manager type of entrepreneurs worked as middle or low-level managers 
in the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector, and left their previous employer and build up 
their pharmaceutical enterprises. The number of firms established by this kind of 
entrepreneurs is relatively lower and their performance as a whole is not good. The 
reason might be that this kind of pharmaceutical enterprises occurred after the mid-
1990s. These lower-level managers have had less advantages in taking over state-owned  
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or collective because the social network of lower-level managers with local government 
was very weak, almost all of the established pulic enterprises were taken over by local 
government officials and enterprise leaders during privatization. Thus lower-level 
managers who wanted to posses their own private bussiness had to establish a new 
enterprise, which was (and still is) costly. The implementation of GMP policy since 
1997 worsened the financial difficulties of small and middle pharmaceutical enterprises. 
Furthermore, lower-level managers merely had  internal enterprise management 
knowledge, and the lack of economic access to other economic resources, for example, 
loans and marketing channels, made them to become less  successful in the increasingly 
competitive TCM market. As a result, the new pharmaceutical entities inevitably went 
into bankruptcy, as the following cases will show.  
There are only three cases of this kind of manager type entrepreneurs. After 
Tonghua Qianjin Pharmaceutical Plant went into bankruptcy, its production site and 
manufacturing equipments were taken over by Dongbao Group in 1996. Zhang Shouyi, 
the former director of this plant co-founded Xinghua Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd. together 
with his colleagues in 1997. Yang Tianyu has a similar experience as Zhang Shouyi. 
When Tonghua City No.2 Pharmaceutical Plant was purchased by Wantong Group in 
1996, Yang Tianyu, the director of this closed factory created his own private business, 
Guruite Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd. which is currently a subsidiary company of Wantong 
Group. Wei Zhenlin, who worked as an advanced manager in Golden Horse 
Pharmaceutical Company for some years, founded Zhenglin Pharmaceutical Company 
in 2000. 
7.2.4 Entrepreneurs from Different Industries 
There is another group of local entrepreneurs, inexperienced entrepreneurs who 
had no industry experiences in the pharmaceutical sector, neither in technology nor in 
firm management. According to their career backgrounds, I will divide this group into 
two subgroups, government official entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs who came from 
different industries, technologically unrelated to the pharmaceutical sector. 
Government Official Entrepreneurs 
The government official entrepreneurs in the pharmaceutical cluster are those who 
previously had higher-level positions in the local party-state system and now run their own 
private enterprise. Compared with other kinds of entrepreneurs, this subgroup has three 
remarkable features. The first point is that they entered the private pharmaceutical sector  
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relatively late, after 1995; the second is the number of government official entrepreneurs is 
relatively large, compared to the expert entrepreneurs of new ventures (see Chapter 7.3.3), 
but not higher than that of the contractor entrepreneurs and enterprise cadres entrepreneurs; 
the third is that the economic performance of their pharmaceutical enterprises in whole is 
not so good.  
There are at least some reasons why so many local political elites in Tonghua 
became private entrepreneurs by taking over SOEs. Firstly, the rule of how to privatize 
SOEs was not standardized and unified by the Beijing government, so local states were 
largely responsible for industrial reorganization and privatization. This made it possible 
for local political elites to make use of their strong social network to preferentially 
privatized SOEs. Secondly, government bureaucrats and party officials had worked for 
a long time in the local government bureaucracy, and they formed strong social 
networks with other members of local community of political elites who are still in 
local government. This allowed former government officials to maintain an 
overwhelming advantage in taking over state-owned SOEs. However, as time went by,  
the fundamental market economy-oriented institutions began to emerge and flexible 
market-based pricing mechanisms replaced the rigid traditional planned allocation 
mechanism and became the dominant mechanisms for economic allocation, local 
political elites inevitably became less favored in getting access to marketing channels 
and the research community because they had not developed the strong social networks 
with the communities concerned before. This is why firms of local political elites did 
not outperform the enterprises transformed by top-level economic elites. Local 
economic elites not only had as strong social networks with local government as 
political elites had, but also developed social networks with industrial communities of 
TCM.  
Now I am going to give some examples on this type of entrepreneur and I will 
return to the social factors behind the success of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry in 
Chapter 7.4. Two of the most impressive government official entrepreneurs are 
undoubtedly Dong Guozhi and Du Weijing, who used to serve for the government as 
vice-mayors (the highest-ranking officer in the local bureaucracy) and started their own 
businesses later. After resigning in 1995 Dong Guozhi established his own enterprise in 
Zhuhai, a southern city which offered a better entrepreneurial environment because the 
economic reform and opening up was earlier. Du Weijing worked as vice-General 
Manager in a local big pharmaceutical company, Tonghua Dongbai Group, and then  
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founded Tianma Group in Tonghua in 1997. Now Tianma Group has grown into a local 
star enterprise with five subsidiaries.  
Liu Licheng had helped Jinma Pharmaceutical Group Co., Ltd. to become a listed 
company in 1997 when was the director of the Tonghua City Planning Commission. 
After that, he joined into Jinma Pharmaceutical Group as vice president in 2000. Later 
he obtained a controlling stake in Jinma Pharmaceutical Group by buying a great deal 
of state-owned shares. 
Wang Ping, the former director of the Property Administrative Office at CPC 
Tonghua Municipal Party Committee, together with a retired deputy secretary of the 
municipal party committee, co-founded Weide Pharmaceutical Co. Ltd., which was 
acquired by Beijing Jinkaiwei Group. 
Baixing Pharmaceutical Factory, a small and collective-owned enterprise and the 
predecessor of Baixing Pharmaceutical Ltd., was affiliated with the Tonghua City 
Bureau of Foreign Trade, and reached the edge of bankruptcy by the late 1990s. The 
leader of this Bureau then raised about RMB 4 million Yuan from families and friends 
and bought out this plant in 1998.  
Ju Hongfu, the former leader of the Township Enterprises Bureau, has a similar 
story. He purchased Fadang Pharmaceutical Factory which was directed under the 
control of his bureau at the end of 1990s.  
It seemed easy for the powerful people in local banking and other financial sectors 
to enter the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector in the late 1990s in which almost all state-
owned or private MSEs had more or less difficulties in financing. Wang Xuefeng was 
the governor of a national bank in Tonghua for a long time and thus he was familiar 
with commercial loan procedures. Meanwhile, he had accumulated a strong personal 
network with local government agencies, which allowed him easier access to the 
business license of a pharmaceutical company. Wang Xuefeng obtained bank loans to 
establish a new pharmaceutical company, Dongsheng Pharmaceutical Ltd. A similar 
story happened to Li Huaijin, who had also been the governor of Huinan County 
Construction Bank before he collected funds from this bank in 2002 to privatize 
Jilingyaozhuan Huinan Pharmaceutical Factory, which was established in 1988. 
Zhang Hong seems to be a particular case. On the one hand he had worked in 
government agencies for many years as well, though not at the top level in the local 
bureaucracy. On the other hand, since he studied pharmaceutics in a university and used  
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to serve in the Tonghua City Health Bureau, he was familiar with pharmacy. These 
factors together contributed to his commercial success in the pharmaceutical sector. He 
bought a small enterprise on the verge of bankruptcy in 1999. This loss-making factory 
has now grown up into one of the small giants in the pharmaceutical sector. 
Entrepreneurs from Technologically Unrelated Industries 
As the TCM sector in Tonghua grew, it attracted some local investment from from 
other industries and the new startups were set up by these businessmen who had worked 
in other industries technologically unrelated to the pharmaceutical sector before they 
entered the TCM industry. The number of this kind of entrepreneurs I can find is only 
six, almost all of which appeared around 2000 and their economic size in total is 
relatively small. This seems to show that industry-specific knowledge and social 
relations (with the pharmaceutical research community) have become increasingly 
important after 2000 and were not easy to be replicated by the external entrants. Thus 
the acquisition of the established enterprises became the main entry model by external 
entrants to overcome these barriers (see Chapter 6.3.4). The stories of the six 
entrepreneurs, who come from technologically unrelated industries, are as follows:  
There are three real estate developers who entered the pharmaceutical factory. 
These are Yu Longyao, Zhou Xujie, and Wang Xingtong. In 2000 Yu Longyao wholly 
purchased a township enterprise, Hengsheng Biochemical Pharmaceutical. This new 
enterprise disappeared from the sector, however. Zhou Xujie bought the business 
license of a bankrupt pharmaceutical plant and founded Tengda Pharmaceutical 
Company around 2002, but it was already declared bankrupt in the same year. Wang 
Xingtong also purchased the licenses of Jiuming Pharmaceutical Factory and 
established Jiuming pharmaceutical company in 2003.  
There are some businessmen from other technologically unrelated industries. For 
example, Li ping, born in Tonghua, did business in the electronics industry in South 
China. He returned to his hometown in 1999 and then acquired a loss-making 
collective-owned plant (Liming Pharmaceutical Factory). Long Deming, a former 
transport businessman, acquired Jinhui Pharmaceutical Company (the offspring of 
Baishan No.3 Pharmaceutical Factor) around 2002. After making much money from the 
paper-making industry, Guan Baoshu acquired Baishan No.8 Pharmaceutical Factor 
(which was established in 1987) and renamed it into Mingtai Pharmaceutical Company 
in 2003.  
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7.2.5 Entrepreneurs from outside Tonghua City 
This group of entrepreneurs to be discussed in this section is different from the 
above-discussed groups of local entrepreneurs in this sense that they came from regions 
outside of Tonghua city (but still from China). Therefore I would like to call them “non-
local entrepreneurs”. The number of the enterprises established by non-local 
entrepreneurs is very limited, only five. This group has the following characters: firstly, 
the entrepreneurs in this group are not local people; secondly, all of them have rich 
experiences in the pharmaceutical or technologically related sectors; finally, they 
entered the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster through acquiring loss-making enterprises 
(for the entry mode choice, see Chapter 6.2.4 and Chapter 6.3.4). 
Boshi Le-Pharmaceutical Company and Sanzhu Zhongyao Company among them 
are branches of non-local companies. Today’s Boshi Le-Pharmaceutical Company was 
acquired in 1997 by Jizhu Group, a pharmaceutical and health food company. Likewise, 
around the year 2000 Sanzhu Zhongyao Company was transformed from a TCM plant 
by a medicinal group that came from outside. 
Chunsheng Guo, an entrepreneur from another pharmaceutical region in Jilin 
province (Dunhua city), owned a health food company before he acquired Luotongshan 
Pharmaceutical Plant in 1998. The acquired company was established in 1992 and was 
in a very bad financial situation before.  
Weida Huang, a professor in Fudan University, had already set up Shanghai Yi-
sheng Biotechnology Company before he acquired a loss-making company in 2003 
(Tonghua Yisheng company that was established in 1998). Similarly, Wanming Zhang 
is also an expert in the field of TCM from Shanghai, and acquired a small 
pharmaceutical factory in Tonghua (Yongyuan Pharmaceutical Company) around 2000. 
7.3 Government Official Entrepreneurs in the Tonghua 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
As I have argued in Chapter 6.2.1 and Chapter 7.1.1, the entrepreneurial behavior 
of new firm creation is, to a large extent, an embedded phenomenon, strongly 
dependent on a country’s contextual conditions. In transition countries the most 
important factor influencing when and in what ways the new private enterprises are 
created is the changing national (formal and informal) institutional environment, 
concerning the ownership reform, regulation of labor markets and financing. But we  
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can find that the time and entry mode choice of the creation of new firms varies a lot 
throughout the same country. This means that the local context has a very important 
influence on the features of the entrepreneurial behavior in new firm creation. In the 
case of the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry, the formation of local entrepreneurship- 
friendly institutions could be in part ascribed to one special group of entrepreneurs, the 
former government officials. Although the economic performance of their private 
pharmaceutical enterprises as a whole is not so good (see Chapter 7.3.4), the 
entrepreneurial behavior has been of great significance to the emergence and 
development of the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry.  
Although I have already discussed the special group of government official 
entrepreneurs in Chapter 7.2.4, it is very necessary to make a detailed description of the 
formation of this special group of entrepreneurs, by which we can better understand the 
social factors behind the success of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry and the role of 
the special group of government official entrepreneurs.  
Historically, there are three waves of local political elites moving from top or 
middle leadership positions in various government agencies to local private firms. The 
first wave took place around the mid-1980s. Some state officials entered into the 
business in the pharmaceutical industry, a sector with tremendous profit potential at that 
time. Wang Zhaoguo’s entrepreneurial experience, discussed above, is very 
representative. The second wave emerged after the Southern Cruise of Deng Xiaoping 
in 1992, which unleashed an unprecedented wave of economic growth and political 
relaxation in the course of Chinese economic reform. It was the ideological 
breakthrough that inspired some elites who had gained a quite high position in local 
governments to start private business.  
It was reported in one local newspaper (Meihekou Daily, Sep.2, 1992) that Gong 
Chuanren resigned from the post of County Magistrate (the top-ranking official at the 
county-level bureaucracy) and then owned and operated three private enterprises in the 
territorial range of his previous authority. When talking about this adventurous choice, 
this ex-governor said without hesitation that his decision was encouraged by Deng 
Xiaoping’s speech during his inspection tour. In the same year, Sun Huanzhong, the 
head of the neighboring county (Huinan county), gave up the government job and then 
establish new firms in Zhuhai and Dalian. Now he is Deputy General Manager of 
Tianma Pharmaceutical Company created by a former Vice Mayor. Although some of 
their new startups were neither related to the pharmaceutical sector nor based in 
Tonghua, they ignited local passion to create an own business.   
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During that period some ex-government officials went into business successively. 
Different from the late government official entrepreneurs who have their private 
pharmaceutical business, the first generation of official entrepreneurs did not enter the 
Tonghua pharmaceutical industry, perhaps because this sector was not as strong in the 
early 1990s as afterwards. From a long term viewpoint, “going to the sea and doing 
business” of local party-state cadres was helpful to nurture the entrepreneurship-
friendly social atmosphere in Tonghua. 
The local government’s positive attitude to the brain drain from the local party-
state system and further to the private economy aggressively encouraged more 
government officials to create or join the private pharmaceutical enterprises. Initiated in 
1995, the revolutionary strategy “to build up the Pharmcity” dramatically promoted the 
development of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry. At the same time, Tonghua city 
government encouraged government officials to go into business, which accelerated the 
breakup of the traditional ideology of viewing work in government as the first choice. 
In 1996 the “Regulation on Encouraging the Municipality Staff to Lead Loss-making 
Enterprises” explicitly offered some preferential policies to those government officials 
who were willing to do business, including remaining in position and (still) receiving 
their wage from local state in three years. The formal policy stimulation aroused the 
wave of government officials to go into business. 
The third wave occurred after 2001. According to incomplete statistics, a total of 
141 officials went into business, either in private or state-owned enterprises, as 
advanced managers or as new entities’ founders. The statistics also show that eighty 
percent of the former government officials joined local private pharmaceutical firms. 
The reason why this sector became the first choice of local political elite to go into 
business could be that this sector was the largest private economy in Tonghua, with 
expected high profits. The pharmaceutical enterprises established by former 
government officials are rather few in number during that time. This reflects that market 
competition became increasingly fierce and the barrier to the pharmaceutical sector in 
China rose since intellectual property rights began to be strict and became well 
protected, and Good Manufacturing Practices Standards were issued and implemented. 
Regarding the role of the local political elite in this sector, we can at least find two 
important aspects. Firstly, their entrepreneurial behavior contributed to the formation of 
a local entrepreneurship’s friendly culture. In the traditional Chinese Confucian culture 
the government officials belong to the highest social classes and are regarded as the 
outstanding social elite who have a great influence on China’s life. In the case of  
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Tonghua, the other social classes were well aware that the national institutions became 
friendlier to the private economy mainly through local high-ranking government 
officials landing jobs in the private sector. This means that the entrepreneurial behavior 
of the local political elites was helpful to kindle considerable enthusiasm of local people 
for private entrepreneurship.  
Secondly, not only do they contribute to nurture local social norms friendly to the 
private economy, but they also play an important role in forming local industrial 
policies which are particularly favorable to the pharmaceutical industry, since 
government official entrepreneurs have strong ties with their previous colleagues and 
can lobby the local government.  In fact, the formation and the successful 
implementation of the two strategic policies in the history of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
industry, pharmaceutical industry as the focus of industrial development in 1985 and the 
Pharmcity in 1995 (which I will explain in Chapter 10.2), partially benefited from the 
closer dialogue of local government and government official entrepreneurs.  
7.4 Conclusion  
I agree with Nee that the “analysis of China’s transition to a mixed economy must also 
view the state as a primary actor in establishing the institutional arrangements required for 
the growth of markets and the rise of entrepreneurship” (Nee, 1989, p: 171). The genesis of 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical entrepreneurs reflects well the influences of the temporal 
sequencing of national institutions, related to restructuring or privatizing publicly owned 
enterprises and encouraging the development of the private economy. It is true that China’s 
national institutions have facilitated resurgence of private entrepreneurship. But what I am 
arguing with particular emphasis is that although the state (actually, the central 
government) can change formal institutions such as rules and laws rapidly, it seems to be 
difficult to change the mindset of some institutional actors such as decision makers in state-
owned banks and other agencies, local cadres, tax officers and government officials (Yang, 
2002) to a private economy-friendly mental attitude, at least in the short run. This means 
that the renewal of private entrepreneurship in China can be ascribed to the effects of the 
national institutional changes, on the one hand, and can be seen as the result of the social 
process of locally accepting private entrepreneurship, on the other hand. The local social 
environment largely determines when and in what way private entrepreneurship was 
formed. Thus, here I want to link the temporal sequence of the different types of private 
entrepreneurs in Tonghua with the institutional changes affecting entrepreneurship, both 
informal and formal, to testify that not only formal institutions (namely, the central  
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government as its representative), but also informal institutions (for example, social capital, 
guanxi) have great influence on the formation of entrepreneurship in China. At the same 
time I will take the geographical dimensions of institutions into account, both national and 
local.  
In the traditional Chinese culture of Confucian doctrine, the merchants have always 
been ranked at the bottom of the hierarchy of social classes (with the exception of China’s 
coastal regions, for this point, see Wei et al., 2007), and the lowest position of the 
merchants in the official Chinese social hierarchy was further cemented in the Maoist 
period. Creating one’s own business still carried negative social connotations (Lao and 
Sohmen, 2001), even entering the 1980s.  
It is Deng Xiaoping’s consolidation of power in 1978 that paved the way for the 
resurgence of the private economy and has introduced serial regulations which allow 
various non-state entities to come into being, including the urban nonagricultural individual 
economy in 1981, rural individual businesses in 1984 and private enterprises with more 
than eight employees in 1988 (Young, 1995). But the private economy should not be 
encouraged. Across the whole country the private economy only took off in the coastal 
regions (particularly in southern Guangdong province and southern Zhejiang province) in 
the early 1980s (Hubbard, 1995), while the private economy in Northeast China (one of 
China’s old industrial regions where the state-owned economy is still holding an overly 
high proportion in the regional economy) did not occur on a large scale until 1992.  
In the case of Tonghua city, because of the pressure of the fiscal decentralization, 
some local government agencies have invested as local industrial companies in the 
TCM industry to make up for the inadequacy of public finance. In the intensified 
competition caused by the increase of new entrants into this sector, some of the small 
state-owned, especially newly established collective enterprises teetered on the brink of 
bankruptcy in the 1980s. The introduction of a fully-fledged “contract responsibility 
system” to the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector in the middle of the 1980s greatly 
increased the profits of state enterprises by transforming them into self-supporting 
economic cells in a short time. At the same time some enterprise directors contracted 
ill-performing state-owned or newly established collective enterprises and became the 
first generation of private entrepreneurs in Tonghua (contractor entrepreneurs). 
Although these contracted companies were registered as a collective enterprise or 
legally affiliated to the state-owned enterprises and appeared in the ownership form of 
publicly owned enterprises, they were essentially private (see Chapter 6.2.2). After the 
middle of the 1990s, when the private economy was widely accepted in Tonghua, the  
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hybrid firms were transformed and legally recognized as private entities.  
Two events, taking place in the year of 1992, were very meaningful to China’s 
economic reform and the formation of a conducive atmosphere for private 
entrepreneurs. One was Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour speech of “both plans and 
markets are economic means”; the other is the Fourteenth Party Congress. In the party 
congress the “socialist market economy” was formally endorsed for the first time as 
China's reform goal, which tends to be viewed as the second emancipation of the mind 
campaign (the first wave is in 1978). In the mid-1990s, impelled by phenomenal coastal 
economic development based mainly on overseas private capital and local 
entrepreneurship, people across China had developed a  considerable passion to create 
their own enterprises. In brief, the private economy became widely accepted in whole 
China after 1992. 
In Tonghua the move of local bureaucratic-political elites to the private economy 
during the mid-1980s, together with other local factors (for example, the strategic 
objective of the Pharmcity that was put forward), contributed to the formation of a 
conducive social culture for private entrepreneurs. Thus creating one’s own private 
enterprise started to be accepted by the local government and social members in the 
early 1990s, which resulted in a hot wave of creating private pharmaceutical enterprises 
in Tonghua. Some experienced technicians and managers began to leave the state-
owned enterprises to create their own enterprises. The increasing number of new 
pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua shows that the period was a golden time for 
creating private entrepreneurs. 
China carried out the “grasping the large and letting go the small” policy around 
1995. The large-scale privatization of small and medium-sized SOEs began to be 
carried out around 1997 in Tonghua. During the small SOEs privatization period local 
enterprise cadres and government officials had considerable power and privileges in 
transforming public enterprises to private assets and their social identity changed from 
state cadres to private entrepreneurs, since both the economic and political elites had 
their advantage from social networks with the local government. When market 
mechanisms replaced the government’s forces in the allocation of resources, 
bureaucratic-political elites lacked social links with industry-specific communities, in 
particular with pharmaceutical researchers, and the enterprises of the former 
government officials began to show a decline in economic performance in the 
increasingly competitive environment. Only enterprise cadres were able to establish 
strong social network with local government and with the TCM industry-specific  
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communities at the same time (for example, pharmaceutical research, and salesmen), so 
their enterprises are the most competitive today.  
Around 2000, Tonghua started to attract investments from other regions and 
different industries, which means that the agglomeration economy started to drive the 
growth of this pharmaceutical cluster. The economic performance of the investment 
from technologically unrelated industries as a whole is the worst in the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical sectors. The reason for this could be that these entrepreneurs did not 
build-up the pharmaceutical industry-specific networks and knowledge before they 
entered this sector. For the investment in this sector from other industries, its economic 
performance is determined to a great degree by acquisition of companies. If the 
acquiring company has a strong market competition competence, the acquired entity 
operates well; otherwise, it could be on the verge of bankruptcy.  
  206
Chapter 8 The Evolution of Technology in Tonghua’s 
Pharmaceutical Enterprises 
This chapter aims to provide empirically observed evidences of the evolution of 
technology in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical enterprises, and proceeds as follows. In 
Chapter 8.1, I will give the working definition of technology and classify it into three 
categories, new product development technology, production/process technology, and 
management technology. The next four sections show the descriptive evidences of the 
evolution of technology in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical enterprises. In Chapter 8.6 I will 
develop a causal explanation of technological change in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
enterprises from a coevolutionary perspective. 
8.1 Defining Technology at the Micro-Level of Enterprises 
Togday, nobody can deny the importance of technology in economic and social 
development, and the production and diffusion of new technology is a hot topic in the 
literature on industrial clusters. Industrial clusters are conceived mainly as a viable way 
to foster innovative performance, the theory of industrial cluster emphasizes the 
importance of non-trade linkages and collaborative relationships among clustered firms 
which are potentially useful for the creation and diffusion of new technology. But I will 
go to the micro-level dimension of technological change – individual firms, on which I 
will explore the dynamics of technology in the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry. 
Before starting the empirical study, it is necessary to define what kinds of technologies 
are to be discussed in this dissertation.  
Technology is a much more complex bundle of knowledge, which can be 
embodied in an extremely varied range of artifacts, people, procedures and 
organizational arrangements. An easy way to classify technologies is to associate 
“technology” with different production activities, for example product design, 
manufacturing processes and organizations. Accordingly, there are at least three 
categories of technology at the micro-level of individual firms. One involves some form 
of new-to-market innovation (e.g. in-house R&D and patenting), which can be called 
“new product technology”; the second includes the use of embedded technologies, for 
example, acquisitions of machinery, equipment and software, which may be termed 
“production technoloy”; the third contains organizational and marketing-related 
strategies such as staff training, which could be named “enterprise management  
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technology” (OECD, 2008).  
New product technology encompasses the skills, knowledge and routines involved 
in generating new products. In the case of the pharmaceutical industry, technology is 
often based on the stages of discovery/basic research and clinical trials. Nowadays, in 
order to ensure the efficacy and safety of new drugs, a great deal of approaches and 
technologies are required, respectively, for investigating complex biological systems, 
measuring drug effects and predicting outcomes, and so on. Although the new drug 
development technology can be represented by physical media, such as documents or 
videos, it is characterized as “tacit knowledge”, highly personal and hard to be 
formalized.  
 
 
Figure 8.1: Technologies in the pharmaceutical development and production 
Note: Stage (1) and Stage (3) are involved in new product technologies; Stage (2), Stage (4) 
and Stage (5) are involved in production technologies, but all are involved in management 
technologies. 
Production technology involves those product-related skills and knowledge 
needed to make established products efficient with existing plant and processes. This 
kind of technology can be identified with machinery. Hence, the development of new 
acquisition and the installation of new machinery can be included in the innovation of 
production technology. For the pharmaceutical industry, the objective of production 
technologies is to transform laboratory-scale production to full-scale factory production 
and to solve challenging formulation and processing problems for drugs. In practice, 
they are involved in the conception, design, construction, and operation of 
manufacturing plants, also in the conception, design, scale-up, manufacturing, and 
labeling and packaging processes in the conversion of chemical and biological raw 
materials into pharmaceuticals.  These technologies are mainly involved with 
pharmaceutical engineering and enable firms to monitor raw materials inputs, schedule 
production, control output quality, maintain and replace machinery. This kind of 
technology is relatively easy to be standardized and coded, for example, Good 
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Manufacturing Practice (GMP), a worldwide recognized standardized guideline for the 
control and management of manufacturing and quality control of pharmaceutical 
products that must be observed during manufacturing in China. 
Management technology is to organize an enormously variable range of elements 
in production systems, and involves those skills and knowledge needed in the aspects of 
the procedures and organizational arrangements inside enterprises. For a pharmaceutical 
enterprise, management technologies are involved in each aspect of operational 
procedures, for example, financing, investment, marketing, technology management, 
personnel, managing materials, and quality control.  
It is noteworthy that in the case of the TCM industry, the development of TCM 
drugs involves the redevelopment of “old” TCM prescriptions, which requires not only 
production technologies for the conversion of the dosage form, but also some 
technologies for measuring the efficacy and safety of new drugs. This means that new 
TCM drug development draws largely from existing stocks of the TCM knowledge 
embodied in existed TCM drugs or prescriptions.  
As Bell and Albu (1999, p: 1717) pointed out, very few components of 
technologies are “ready-made” and the introduction of some elements of technology 
requires the interactions with other elements of technology. Namely, the use of 
technology is the process of creative problem-solving and innovative re-configuration 
of knowledge. Furthermore, technologies are rooted in a specific set of change-
generating resources or capabilities which are located within the structure of 
technology-using firms, and the sources of technology are not limited to technology-
using firms. Customers and competitors, for instance, may be much more important 
sources of technology. Consequently, the learning process plays an important role in 
building and strengthening firm capability.  
8.2 The First Generation of Enterprises  
As documented above (in Chapter 3.1), before the second half of the 19
th century 
in China, Traditional Chinese Medicine (TCM) was the only way to preserve and 
protect people's heath and prevent diseases. The TCM stores as the business 
organizations performed an important function of pharmaceutical production and sale, 
and were usually owned and operated by families. Although there was no legal 
intellectual property protection at that time, the key recipes for drugs and key  
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production technique were strictly controlled by the core family, and were very difficult 
to reveal. In other words, in family-owed TCM stores, for example, the three large TCM 
stores (Yongchengqing, Jishenghe and Faxin) mentioned earlier, the core of the 
pharmaceutical technology (recipes of drugs) as key technological secrets was governed 
only by the core family (commonly, the head of the family and the eldest son), and 
these valuable recipes were passed down through generations, while the ordinary 
knowledge (for example, forging, stewing, roasting stir-frying steaming and heating 
during the processing of herbs) was transferred through a master and apprentice 
relationship. 
China didn’t significantly develop the chemical medicine sector until 1950, thus 
both TCM and chemical medicine have been massively manufactured in Tonghua since 
the 1950s. Even some small cities like Tonghua got highly involved in producing 
chemical medicine. In fact, before 1980, only two of the already established plants were 
specialized in TCM. This is partially because the Western medicine was imagined as a 
more effective, faster and safer approach to disease treatment. Finally due to 
insufficient local knowledge for production of chemical medicines, some initially 
specialized chemical-pharmaceutical plants were forced to convert into TCM ones, 
which I will explain later on. Here I want to discuss the main accesses of the first 
generation of enterprises to how to produce drugs. Here, I need to point out that the 
technology that Tonghua has been seeking for is not technology about developing new 
drugs (what I might call R&D-based knowledge), but on how to manufacture 
pharmaceuticals (production knowledge). 
8.2.1 The Technological Origin of the First Generation of TCM Plants 
For the first generation of TCM plants, the experienced parent entities familiar 
with TCM could be seen as the main external source of technologies, at least at the very 
start. Here I take Tonghua Commercial Pharmaceutical Factory and Meihekou No.1 
Pharmaceutical Factory that specialized in TCM as examples to illustrate this point. The 
former was transformed from the “old” TCM stores mentioned above (Yongchengqing, 
Jishenghe and Faxin), while the latter was an offspring of a Chinese herbal medicine 
store. The common point of them is that their parent entities had got a good command 
of how to develop and manufacture TCM, even in a hand-made way. Tonghua 
Commercial Parmaceutical Factory is a very good example, which I will explain in 
more detail later. From a long-term perspective, these two early established TCM plants  
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in planned economy times provided a seminal base for the following accumulation of a 
common pool of localized knowledge in the Tonghua TCM industry during the planned 
economy, which in turn became the “knowledge base” for the rapid growth in 
transitional and post-privatization period. 
Let me turn to Tonghua Commercial Pharmaceutical Factory to explain how the 
new entities benefited from their experienced parent entities in the perspective of 
technological succession. The first state-owned pharmaceutical plant, Tonghua 
Commercial Pharmaceutical Factory, was the result of the combination of three old 
family-owned TCM stores, namely, Yongchengqing, Jishenghe and Faxin. The factory 
was erected on the original site of Yongchengqing TCM store and took over 150 
employees who previously worked in these three private TCM stores. These employees 
could be seen as the seedbed of the establishment and growth of the first state-run 
plants, at least technologically. Some of senior pharmacists were able to develop new 
drugs and improve old--aged preparations based on their rich experiences that 
originated from their previous family-run TCM stores. Four new drugs developed 
during the 1960s and 1970s were good examples: two were directly developed by 
veteran pharmacists, namely, a medicine for Rheumatoid Bone pain developed in 1969 
and a medicine for asthma developed in 1976. The other two (i.e., the oral liquid 
ginseng royal jelly in 1976 and a new Chinese medicine for cold and cough in 1979) 
were developed by well-trained young pharmacists. They received university education 
in medicine and pharmaceuticals, but an internal training system of enterprise, 
especially the “master- apprentice system”, was undoubtedly helpful for these young 
university graduates to learn more about the production process of Chinese medicine in 
practice.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.2：Knowledge Transmission of the Early TCM Plants and Parents 
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Different from the first state-owned plant, the other plants got production 
technologies mainly from pharmaceutical commercial organizations. For example, 
Meihekou No.1 Pharmaceutical Factory was established by 18 women who were family 
members of the employees of Meihekou Medical Station, a state-owned pharmaceutical 
commercial organization. These women had no direct experience with any subfield of 
the TCM sector. However, this factory was an affiliated plant of Meihekou Medical 
Station, and could receive regular technical guidance from this medical wholesales 
station. In the early years, the main products of this small plant were simple Chinese 
medicine products such as prepared slices of Chinese crude drugs and ginseng extract 
powder. 
8.2.2 The Technological Origin of the First Generation of Chemical Medicine Plants 
The technological sources of the first generation of chemical medicine plants in 
Tonghua are more complicated. We can divide these plants specialized in chemical 
medicine into two basic groups worth discussion. The first one consists of the off-
springs of experienced institutions of chemical medicine, such as Western medicine 
hospitals, health schools, and so on. Similar to the TCM enterprises during the same 
period, these new established chemical medicine plants gained pharmaceutical 
production technology from their parent entities. Tonghua County Raw Medicine 
Factory (namely, the Baishan Pharmaceutical Plant) is a good example of those 
pharmaceutical factories which were the descendants of hospitals. This plant was 
erected in 1967, and most of its technicians previously worked in the preparation 
department of the Tonghua County Hospital. At its initial stage, it produced some 
simple products for this hospital in a very small scale, such as glucose injection. 
Similarly, Liming Pharmaceutical Plant was born from a hospital in 1968, and its main 
founders had served at 206 Hospital for a long time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.3： Knowledge sources of the early chemical medicine plants 
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Not all chemical medicine plants of the first generation in Tonghua, however, 
were derived from institutions in the pharmaceutical sector, and these compose the 
second group of chemical medicine plants. For the enterprises in this second group, 
learning from each other through local government-controlled  labor mobility and 
learning from their domestic counterparties outside Tonghua were of great importance 
for getting know-how in pharmaceuticals. Accordingly, at least three external 
technology sources can be distinguished.  
Firstly, owing to the absence of a patent system in China and the relative easy 
access to knowledge on how to produce, improve and develop drugs before the 1990s, 
learning from each other frequently happened between the local state-owned 
pharmaceutical enterprises. Those enterprises which were established from the scratch 
had to seek technical help from the state owned large-sized pharmaceutical enterprises 
across China, mostly in Changchun and the neighboring provinces. Ji’an County 
Pharmaceutical Factory, a relatively larger state-owned pharmaceutical factory, is a 
good case here.  
Ji’an County Pharmaceutical Factory was converted from a chemical enterprise 
(an insecticide factory) in 1972. Although the new firm made use of some equipment of 
its predecessor (e.g. fermentation facilities), there undoubtedly exist huge technological 
differences between agricultural insecticides and human medicine. In order to learn how 
to manufacture oxytetracycline (a type of antibiotic which is used to treat bacterial 
infections), this new state-run plant sent technicians for many times to large-sized state-
run pharmaceutical factories (for example Dalian pharmaceutical factory in Dalian, 
north China, Shanghai No.3 pharmaceutical plant in Shanghai). After external learning 
and constant trials, they successfully produced qualified oxytetracycline products. Later, 
the product quality was greatly improved under the personal guidance of 7 engineers 
and technicians from Wuhan Antibiotics Factory. 
Secondly, the proliferation of technology among local pharmaceutical firms also 
contributed to the growth of this cluster, which could be reflected in the form of 
mobility of technical personnel with rich experience in developing and manufacturing 
drugs. Different from the free mobility of labor in today’s China, personnel mobility in 
the planned economy was tightly controlled by the government. In other worlds, only 
the government had the right to determine how and on what scale personnel mobility 
took place. However, although employees could not freely choose working places as  
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their children do nowadays, such kind of “compelled” personnel mobility also 
contributed to the diffusion of technology and knowledge, especially tacit knowledge, 
from an already established firm to a new one.  
It is estimated that five plant-level leaders, forty one middle-level management 
cadres and technical cadres were transferred from Changqing Pharmaceutical Plant to 
the newly establised plant between 1984 and 1988. Among them, three plant-level 
leaders, eight middle-level management cadres and technical members and fifty front–
line production workers were transferred directly to Changqing No.2 Pharmaceutical 
Plant when it was established in 1987. These human resources became the new plant’s 
seedbed for its subsequent development. This model of knowledge transmission based 
on the local government-dominated personal mobility constituted the dominant 
mechanism of technology diffusion among Tonghua’s pharmaceutical firms during the 
planned economy period.  
Last but not least, the linkage of local pharmaceutical enterprises with external 
knowledge institutions made up for the insufficient local knowledge. Let me take 
Changqing Pharmaceutical Factory as an example to explain it. In order to improve the 
management quality and technology, Changqing Pharmaceutical Factory frequently 
organized semi-full-time television courses and invited university professors, mostly 
from Changchun (the capital of Jilin province), to give a variety of courses ranging 
from pharmaceutical sciences and engineering to enterprise operations management 
such as quality, production, inventory management, accounting. At the meantime, this 
factory adopted the strategy of “sending out”, namely sending promising young 
employees to colleges, which partially filled up the shortage of well-trained 
pharmaceutical talents in Tonghua, since the higher education was broken by the 
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976). By 1985, Changqing pharmaceutical factory had sent 
more than 20 young employees to pharmaceutical universities and colleges in Jilin 
province or a neighbor province (Liaoning), such as Yanbian Medical College, 
Shenyang Pharmaceutical University, and Changchun College of Chinese Medicine. 
After taking three or four years training courses on how to produce and develop drugs, 
these well-educated members returned and then became the technical backbone of the 
plants.  
It should be noted that the above mentioned three mechanisms, in particular staff 
mobility among publicly-owned firms, were also adopted by TCM enterprises at the 
same time. In addition, both Western medicine and TCM enterprises made use of two  
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common training forms in the early period, namely, irregular in-house short-term 
courses and the regular “master-apprentice” training system. The two learning 
mechanisms were popularly adopted during the period from 1983 to 1988 all over 
China. The in-house short-term courses, including quality testing, quality management, 
and cost management, were taught by advanced staff or university professionals. The 
master-apprentice system is a traditional way by which tacit knowledge can be 
transferred into practice. In the planned economy period, young employees usually 
worked under the guidance of the masters. The apprentice usually worked with his/her 
master for several years, and in a long-term daily contact, he or she attained the level of 
skills by regular practices, which is nowadays termed “learning-by-doing”.  
8.2.3 Summary of Technological Origins of the First-Generation Enterprises 
China's science and technology system followed the Soviet Union model, in 
which public research institutes monopolized the R&D activities and state-owned 
enterprises were delegated to production functions. The divide between R&D and 
civilian industries was prevalent in China during the planned economy (see Chapter 
3.2.3). Against this background, the first generation of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical plants 
had the following character as a whole: (1) TCM plants had produced traditional 
products based on historically accumulated knowledge, especially by senior 
pharmacists, without great advance in production varieties or quality; (2) in the 
subsector of Western Medicine, the plants had to seek technological help from the 
outside owing to the serious lack of related local knowledge; (3) staff mobility between 
firms under the same ownership, and learning-by-doing (through the “master-
apprentice” training system) and external learning as well, were of great importance to 
the whole Tonghua pharmaceutical sector; (4) a few formal R&D inputs in terms of 
number of personnel and expenditure produced very limited outputs of new product 
varieties, as compared with the following transitional and market-oriented periods. 
However, from a historical perspective, accumulated technological experience during 
the first stage provided a platform for the later development of the pharmaceutical 
industry in Tonghua, and even wider areas in Jilin province, including training a large 
number of professional managers and pharma entrepreneurs.   
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8.3 The Early Reform Period  
8.3.1 Chinese Nutritional Medicines Based on Ginseng 
Entering the 1980s, more and more autonomies were granted to factories due to 
the introduction of the factory manager responsibility system and the management 
contract system (see Chapter 3.2.2). The transition to the performance-oriented entity 
from purely production organization endowed the factories with more impetus of 
developing new products than before. In addition, due to the improved living standards 
and the increasing health awareness since the Deng’s time, the demand for drugs and 
invigorants, particularly natural plant-based tonics, climbed sharply and so did the TCM 
sector in Tonghua. This trend can be perceived from the fact that all of the four newly 
established enterprises between 1980 and 1985 were specialized in TCM just from their 
very beginning. In addition, some chemical pharmaceutical plants established in the 
1970s successively transformed to the production of traditional Chinese medicine from 
chemical drugs.  
 
Figure 8.4: Ginseng production Series 
Note: Ginseng saponin is the active ingredients extracted from ginseng, and can lower 
blood sugar, cure diabetes. 
There were three main categories of “drugs” during this period: chemicals, Chinese 
medicine for treating diseases, and invigorants (nutritional Chinese medicine, made 
from natural herbs and natural ingredients like Ginseng, angelica). Strictly speaking, 
invigorants are not real drugs for treating diseases but for preventing diseases in 
advance by enhancing overall energy, maintaining, increasing, or restoring the tone or 
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health of the body or an organ. More interestingly, the economic output of the last two 
categories of products phenomenally increased while the first one significantly 
declined. From the viewpoint of economic value, the most profitable products 
manufactured in Tonghua during the 1980s were the tonic medicines based on precious 
natural herbs in the Changbai Mountain. More importantly, from a historical viewpoint, 
entering the sector of tonic medicine opened a window to its locational opportunity for 
TCM industry since it accumulated a wealth of technological experience and huge 
financial resources. 
Tonghua, as one of the first regions where nutritional Chinese medicines were 
produced, was the outstanding leader in producing oral liquid made from ginseng, 
angelica and other precious Chinese medicinal herbs. According to the TCM theory, the 
proper dosage of ginseng with angelica can improve body circulation, increase blood 
supply, and help to keep body balance. Ginseng is rich in Northeast China, and almost 
more than 90% of ginseng used in China comes from the Changbai Mountain (Tonghua 
city is located in this mountain area). Therefore, it is a long history that Tonghua people 
makes use of ginseng, together with other Chinese medicinal herbs, to serve for local 
health care. However, it was only after the 1970s that the ginseng product was 
expanded to oral liquid and other varieties which are easy to be absorbed (see Figure 
8.4). As early as the beginning of 1970s, some of the pharmaceutical factories in 
Tonghua began to develop new ginseng products.  
Weixing Zhao, a senior pharmacist at Tonghua Baishan Pharmaceutical Factory, 
developed the prescription of Ginseng Royal Jelly Liquid through studying the 
literature on the Chinese medicine. After a short-term learning from a large state-run 
enterprise in Chuangchun (Chuangchun Pharmaceutical Factory) in 1972, Weixing 
Zhao became familiar with production processes. Since then, the new Ginseng Royal 
Jelly Liquid began to be produced in his factory and put on the market. In the next few 
years, several technological projects uninterruptedly improved the quality of the royal 
jelly (for example, the refining process further removed of impurities in 1975). Higher 
quality and more appreciated taste, in addition, people’s more concerns about health 
brought by China's economic development and rising education, made the product a 
good sale. By 1985, the sales of Ginseng Royal Jelly Liquid of Tonghua Baishan 
Pharmaceutical Factory increased by 10 times as against 1975. It even was in short 
supply.   
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Another best-selling product at that time was ginseng extract. For instance, the 
accumulated output value of ginseng extract and ginseng antler extract in Meihekou 
Pharmaceutical Factory had reached RMB 11.84 million Yuan by 1978, accounting for 
59.4% of the total output value of this plant. This plant got technical support from a 
wholesale station, Fushun City Medicine Station. In 1976, the output value of Ginseng 
Royal Jelly and Ginseng Oral Liquid reached RMB 6.453 million Yuan, the profit RMB 
359 thousand Yuan, and tax RMB 286 thousand Yuan, occupying an important position 
in the entire Tonghua medical industry (See Table 8.1).  
Table 8.1: Importance of tonic medicine 
Unit: Million Yuan 
Source: Cao, 1989. 
Thus, after the middle of the 1980s, the increasing entrants intensified competition 
in the TCM market. The deconcentration of economic administration motivated 
Tonghua pharmaceutical factories, in particular market-oriented hybrid enterprises, to 
create new products in order to meet the market demand. It was the fast wave of 
economic growth in China that stimulated the market of the nutrition products to 
rapidly expand. Some of the contracted pharmaceutical factories in Tonghua seized this 
golden market opportunity, making full use of the local ginseng industry-specific 
advantage accumulated in the planned economy times, and then grew into competitive 
private enterprises. As I have shown earlier, in fact, there had existed a lot of similar 
TCM products before these marketable products were developed. For example, the first 
generation of successful products of Baishan No.5 Pharmaceutical Factory after being 
contacted by Yikui Li, fresh ginseng royal jelly oral liquid, actually existed in the 
1970s. Another good example is the first product with good sales of Zhen Nao Ning, an 
efficient drug for vascular and nerve headache which also has a long history in Tonghua 
city. 
This contracted company created tremendous profits from these already existing 
“new” drugs through changing the components, improving the product quality or the 
process, or promoting marketing innovation. It illuminates that the new firm 
organization became market-oriented and cared more about market demand. In the 
Year Output  Value  Profit  Tax 
Nutritional Oral Liquid（1976）  64.53 3.59 2.86 
Entire Medical Industry（1977）  1,056.60 8.79  4.30  
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planned economy, the main mission of the pharmaceutical manufacturing enterprises 
was to implement the production plan made by the corresponding level government and 
then deliver their products to relevant state-owned pharmaceuticals commercial 
enterprises, without considering production cost and markets. But since the 1980s, the 
pharmaceutical companies were granted more and more autonomies, including 
marketing their products and keeping parts of profits. Against this background, the 
leading pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua started to pay more attention to market 
demand and introduce various marketing models, for example, advertising, recruiting 
well-trained salesmen and constructing strong marketing networks. The successful story 
of Baishan No.5 pharmaceutical factory (today’s Dongbao Group) is a good example.  
Being established in 1985 (see Chapter 7.3.1), Baishan No.5 pharmaceutical 
factory was the latest one of a total of over two hundred pharmaceutical plants in Jilin 
province. After 20 years of hard struggle, the factory has grown up into a nation-wide 
well-known pharmaceutical giant, and is ranked on the list of the top 10 TCM 
enterprises in China, with a total staff of over 3000 (the salemen is excluded). The 
commercial success of this enterprise started from its first generation of products. As 
mentioned many times in this dissertation, the 1980s witnessed the drastical growing 
demand for invigorant and tonic medicines product. After taking over the small plant, 
Li Yikui carried out production innovation, namely, improved the production process 
(to break down the bitter compounds through steaming and drying processes) and added 
some sweat components (for example, honey) to alleviate the unpleasant bitter taste. 
Additionally, Li Yikui was the first person in China who advertised for medicines on 
television. Specifically, he made use of a historical event, a joint mountaineering team 
consisting of athletes from China, Japan, and Nigeria climbed the Everest in 1986, and 
the news of the athletes taking “fresh ginseng royal jelly” was broadcasted on CCTV 
(China's most popular and influential TV station). After that, the first product (fresh 
ginseng royal jelly) became well-known across the country, and earned a profit of more 
than 3 million RMB in 1987. The huge profit not only completely changed this factory’s 
financial predicament, but also provided the solid financial foundation for its 
subsequent development to expand the firm’s size. 
Furthermore, from the point of view of the local industry, the commercial success 
of this product of fresh ginseng royal jelly attracted a lot of Tonghua pharmaceutical 
enterprises to invest in the sector of ginseng-based invigorants, which even caused the 
war of ginseng-based invigorants. This is of great significance to the following  
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development of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry. Firstly, the higher profit of ginseng-
based invigorants lured both new and established enterprises to enter this sector. 
Secondly, the increasing entrants led to competition in the market of ginseng-based 
invigorants, which forced them to develop truly new TCM drugs. Thus it is safe to say 
that the development of ginseng-based invigorants opened up a window of local 
opportunity for the TCM industry, at a cheaper cost. Thirdly, the massive investment in 
this sector resulted in the (re)emergence of TCM industry in Tonghua. Tonghua enjoys 
the first-mover advantage as the first region specializing in TCM in China. 
8.3.2 Innovation based on Existing Traditional Chinese Medicines 
After the reform and opening up policy, China’s government began to reorient 
R&D activities from military to civilian products. Starting in 1984, the full funding 
assignment system was changed and state funding to public research institutions was 
severely reduced, which threatened the basic survival and research activities of 
scientists. Public research institutions and universities were encouraged to establish 
commercial firms or do joint research with industrial enterprises to ease the scarcity of 
funding (see Chapter 3.2.3). At the same time, market competition in the sector of 
ginseng-based invigorants in Tonghua became increasingly fierce, and profits 
remarkably declined. As a result, both contracted pharmaceutical firms which were 
more market-oriented and large state-owned firms that were previously protected by 
bureaucrats were forced to search new products. To redevelop the existing TCM drugs 
was a good choice.  
During the early economic reform period the “new” TCM drugs were developed 
mainly based on already existing varieties. Entering the TCM industry through 
improving already existing TCM drugs is a rational and habitual response to rapid 
market change, instability of national institutions, and the absence of effective state-
enforced property rights. Thus, Tonghua’s pharmaceutical firms in transition searched 
projects with low-risk, quick and high-return. In addition, due to TCM’s long history in 
this region, the development of “new” TCM drugs based on the already existing TCM 
drugs was less risky than the development of entirely new drugs.  
However, the traditional non-injectable dosage forms of TCM drugs include 
decoction, powder, bolus, and extract, which are generally inconvenient to be taken and 
are hardly to be absorbed. The introduction of Western medicine to China has changed 
the way of how Chinese people take medicines. People became aware that the dosage  
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forms of Western medicine, namely, pills, tablets and capsules, are more convenient to 
take. Thus, the TCM firms in Tonghua were forced to change the traditional dosage 
forms of TCM drugs in order to fit the changing practices of taking medicine. However, 
the transformation of dosage form is so complicated that Tonghua pharmaceutical 
enterprises at that time hardly did learn this alone, so they started to construct closer and 
frequent relationships with universities and pharmaceutical research institutes to jointly 
develop new products, improve the quality of existing medicines, and transform the 
dosage form. For example, Liuhe Changqing Pharmaceutical Factory began in the 
1980s to positively establish ties with universities and made marvelous achievements 
(See Table 8.2).  
Table 8.2: Technological cooperation projects of Changqing Pharmaceutical Factory (1985-1988) 
Name  Treatment  Research Institute (Location)  Year 
NewTablets Kechuanling  Cough variant asthma  Jilin  Institute  of  Chinese  Medicine(in 
Chuangchun)  1985 
Cold medicine series  Anti-cold medicine 
Infant cold medicines 
The China Society of Traditional 
Chinese Medicine(Beijing)  1985 
Aperitive Pills  Defaecation  Changchun college of TCM   1985 
Injection Ahylysantinfarctase  Cerebral  thrombosis 
embolism 
Jilin Institute of Chinese Medicine(in 
Chuangchun)  1986 
Progesteoni  Suppositories  Gynecopathy  Second Clinical School at Bethune 
Medical University   1986 
Rheumatalgia- 
Reliveing Tablets 
Arthritis  Changchun college of TCM  1986 
Tongbining Capsules  Pain killer \Anodyne  Jilin  Institute  of  Chinese  Medicine(in 
Chuangchun)  1986 
Source: Cao, 1989  
The method of redeveloping the already existing TCM is often used in developing 
“new” TCM drugs. The reason why today’s Xiuzheng Group has grown into a high 
competitive large company in China from a small plant within a short time of ten years 
can also be ascribed to the successful redevelopment of the existing TCM drugs and 
other factors (such as constructing the strong market network and brand advantage). 
The first best-selling product of Xiuzheng Group was a kind of gastrodia pill. As a 
matter of fact, this medicine is a traditional Chinese herb made from gastrodia, 
scrophulariaceae and other Chinese medicine materials, mainly for treating epilepsy, 
headache, hypertension, and neurasthenia (weakness-fatigue) and other convulsions.  
When Xiu Laigui
  took over the small pharmaceutical factory (Tonghua City 
Pharmaceutical Industry Research Institute) around 1995, a year in which China’s  
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pharmaceutical market was in turmoil, fake medicine and inferior medicines were 
prevalent. The inferior gastrodia pill without enough gastonia could virtually not cure 
targeted diseases. In order to compete in the established market, Xiu Laigui used 
enough gastrodia to produce a qualified product of gastonia pill; but even so, he had to 
sell his pure gastrodia pill at a lower price than that of inferior products at the 
beginning. This marketing strategy worked very effectively. With the increase in sales 
volume, the sales price of genuine gastonia pill increased gradually. The product 
produced a profit as high as 5 million RMB in 200 days, a huge number at that time.  
The second, the best product of this company, Sidashu (English name is Vitamin 
U, Belladonna and Aluminium Capsules), actually was also the result of redeveloping 
an old traditional Chinese medicine for excessive gastric acid. One year after the first 
commercial success, Laigui Xiu bought by chance a prescription for the treatment of 
hypertension from a veteran TCM doctor and then produced this “new” Chinese 
medicine in the form of capsule. There were in fact a lot of formulas for stomach 
medicines in TCM pharmacopoeias (books listing drugs and their directions for their 
uses). What contributed to the commercial success of Xiuzheng Group is that (1) 
Xiuzheng Group changed traditional dosage into which was easy to take and absorb; (2) 
it insisted on producing high quality based on genuine materials; (3) it invested much 
money in advertising and in constructing strong sales networks, and then created a 
national well-known brand. By 1997, the sales volume of this new redeveloped 
medicine broke through 200 million RMB, which was a huge number for a single 
variety in China.  
The high profit that Taiheshenggan capsule made stimulated a large group of 
pharmaceutical enterprises to invest in producing stomach drug, which resulted in a war 
of stomach drugs in Tonghua. From this lesson, Xiu Laigui became aware that no 
matter how good the product without its own brand is, it is very easy for other 
companies to follow and imitate. Since then, Xiuzheng Group began to spend huge 
money on advertising and building up its own marketing networks throughout China. 
Xiuzheng Group has taken a long-term advertising-intensive path, and adopts it up to 
now. The drug advertisement of Xiuzheng Group is broadcasted on the television in 
prime time every day. Today Xiuzheng Group has already well constructed sales 
networks covering most parts of the country and the strong and highly efficient 
marketing networks brought about high profits, which enabled this local giant to put 
more and more money and other resoures to oragnzation the formal and in-house R&D.  
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8.4 The Later Period of the Economic Reform 
During the later phase of transition, from 1992 to around 2000, there were several 
notable changes which were different from those in the previous stages and enormously 
influenced the following development of this local cluster. The first one is the influx of 
well-educated university graduates to Tonghua pharmaceutical firms, which provided 
fresh and advanced human resources for Tonghua pharmaceutical enterprises. The 
second is that a few of Tonghua pharmaceutical enterprises were involved in the bio-
pharmaceutical industry.  
8.4.1 New Human Resource of University Graduates  
In the planned economy period, university graduates were generally assigned to 
their hometowns by government. This means that almost all university graduates in 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry were local people before the midd-1980s. In the late 
stage of the planned economy, some university graduates had already come to Tonghua 
and worked in this emerging industry, among them the founders of the largest local 
companies (Laigui Xiu graduated from Jilin university and Yikui Li from Beijing). But 
their number was very limited.  
During the initial period of the economic reform and opening up, local schools 
became a major source of new talented employees. With the rapid development of 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry, local schools, Tonghua City Technical School (a 
vocational school, established in 1980) and Tonghua Normal College (established in 
1958) started to set up relevant courses. There were some differences in the training 
systems between the two schools. The former mainly trained low-level technical 
personnel, including pharmaceutical machinery operators and laboratory assistants, 
while the latter offered courses in pharmaceutical preparations, TCM, biological 
sciences and marketing. Since most of the students were born in Tonghua, they worked 
there after graduation. Different from the non-local graduate students who came from 
other regions afterwards, the local educated employees were deeply embedded in this 
local society and were strongly loyal to this industrial community; namely, they flowed 
merely among different pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua, rarely moved outside, 
even in the most difficult stage of state-owned enterprise reform. Their high loyalty to 
this local sector guaranteed the successful transformation from a poor-perferming state-
owned economy to a vigorous private pharmaceutical economy in a certain sense.  
With the development of higher education in China, an increasing number of  
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university graduates began to join in the economically growing pharmaceutical 
corporations in Tonghua, especially in the departments of marketing and R&D 
laboratories in the middle of the 1990s. This generation of educated staff graduated 
from universities outside Tonghua, initially from Changchun and recently from faraway 
regions. It is notable that most of these trained staff did not work in Tonghua, but often 
did marketing as salesmen of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical enterprises all over the country, 
which I have already discussed in Chapter 5.1.4. They move among different regions 
and work for different pharmaceutical enterprises (not only for Tonghua pharmaceutical 
enterprises), which brings regional market information of cross-china to Tonghua.  
8.4.2 The Development of Bio-pharmaceutical Products 
China’s government had decided to significantly develop the biotech industry 
since 1986. It is estimated that a quarter of the National High-tech Research and 
Development Plan projects (the 863 plan) was placed in this emerging field by 2000 
(for a history of biotechnology policies in China, see Prevezer and Han, 2006). 
Although the main products of the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster today are still TCM, 
four companies in this cluster began to set foot in biotechnology in the 1990s. More 
interestingly, they entered into this new industry in different ways. It is not safe to say 
that Tonghua TCM cluster will tranform into a biopharmaceutical cluster in the nearby 
future. 
Yucai Zhang, owner of Tonghua Yujin Pharmaceutical Company, got to know 
that a research team of Recombinant Staphylokinase for Injection, led by the leading 
scientist of Shanghai Plant Physiology and Ecology Research Institute of Chinese 
Academy of Sciences, fell into financial crisis. This project’s basic research was 
initially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation Committee (a national 
public foundation for basic research) in 1983. After that, the project received financial 
aid for pre-clinical research from an enterprise group (its name is not accessible) in 
1992 and from Chengdu Jinpeng Biotechnology Co., Ltd in 1995. However, Chengdu 
Jinpeng Biotechnology Co., Ltd could not afford its complete preclinical trial because 
its cost was too large for a small company. Just then Yucai Zhang participated by 
investing RBM 3 million Yuan to continue the pre-clinical research. Chinese State Food 
and Drug Administration (SFDA) approved “Recombinant Staphylokinase for 
Injection” as the class I drug. Class I drugs in China refer to the new drugs that have not 
been marketed in the world before. The project created a substantial return for Yujin  
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Pharmaceutical Company. From this story, we can see that Tonghua Yujin 
Pharmaceutical Company entered the production of so-called biopharmaceuticals 
through financial investment, not in-house research. 
Table 8.3: Financial sources of “recombinant staphylokinase” project 
 Unit: thousand RBM 
Year   Financial  Source  Function  Sum 
1983  National Natural Science Foundation 
Committee  
Basic research "staphylokinase" Cloning 
Research 
30 
1992  An Enterprise Group   processes experiments on fermentation and 
separation and purification  
200 
1995  Chengdu Jinpeng Biotechnology Co., 
Ltd 
pharmacology, toxicology tests  600 
1996  Yujin   Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd pre-clinical  drug  research  30000 
1997  Yujin   Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd  Production   70000 
Source: own elaboration 
Maoxiang Group and Dongbao Group adopted different ways to enter the 
biopharmaceutical sector, by mergering or jointly-creating research-oriented 
enterprises. Maoxiaong Group merged with ChangSheng Gene Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd 
(in Changchun) in order to get access to biotechnology. The latter is a gene technology 
research institute that sprang off from the earliest and largest public research institute in 
North China. When the new start-up went into financial crisis around 2000, it was 
merged by Maoxiaong Group and became an affiliated company.  
Dongbao Group entered biotechnology by jointly creating a new research 
institution, Gan & Lee Pharmaceutical Company in Beijing. Gan & Lee Pharmaceutical 
Ltd. is the only pharmacological enterprise that focuses on biosynthetic human insulin 
in China since 1994, under the leadership of a returned scientist from America. The 
commercial marriage of the first-class manufacturer (Li Yikui) and the top-ranking 
scientist (Dr.Gan) shows again that the strong extended family network will be helpful 
to commercialize research achievements. Dr.Gan and the founder of Dongbao Group 
(Li Yikui) were university classmates. Classmateship, some kind of brotherhood, is a 
very significant social relationship in Chinese culture. Gan & Lee Pharmaceutical 
Company is one of the sub-companies, and undertakes the mission of research and 
development of Dongbao Group.   
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8.5 The Period of Formal R&D 
The pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua entered the period of formal R&D after 
the new Millennium, in the sense that the leading pharmaceutical enterprises pre- 
dominantly expanded their R&D activities and more and more scientists worked at in-
house laboratories. More importantly, through these in-house scientist or the social ties 
with their academic colleagues, were strengthened. Apart from formal and frequent 
cooperation, conglomeration and merger of private and small research-intensive 
enterprises became common forms by which the large pharmaceutical manufacturers 
made an attempt to construct and improve their capabilities of developing new drugs. 
It costed Xiu Zheng Pharmaceutical Group less than 10 years to grow into a 
relatively large and nationwide famous enterprise. It has become an industry leader in 
Jilin in terms of output value since 2000. Based on a brand advantage for over-the-
counter drugs and networks of marketing and distribution, Xiuzheng Group set up its 
leading position in the traditional Chinese medicine market. To consolidate its market 
leadership, Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group launched a series of actions to improve the 
research capability largely through merger and acquisition.  
In 1999, Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical Group established an in-house technology 
center in Changchun High-tech Development Zone, Jilin province, near to the new 
campus of Jinan University, where the Departments of biology and pharmaceutics are 
located. This was upgraded to “Jilin Engineering Center of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine”, which is conceived to be a cooperative research centre. It combines several 
research institutions’ expertise in the TCM sector (see Figure 8.5). The center operates 
on a national scale. Now it employs more than 300 scientists and has two branches in 
Shenyang and Shanghai. It was equipped with a small-scale production facility which 
will serve for process innovation, production trials as well as the transformation of the 
TCM, not basic research as the Western pharmaceutical giants do. 
Another function of this technology center is to cooperate with knowledge 
institutions for multifold innovation. Firstly and more importantly was to develop truly 
new drugs, for instance, in cooperation with Jilin University to develop thrombolysis; 
second and most commonly was to create new dosage forms for existing TCM durgs, 
for example, in cooperation with Changchun College of Traditional Chinese Medicine 
to create the particle dosage form for Huanhuicao (a Chinese medicine for cough and 
asthma). The third was to improve the production process, for example, a key 
production technology of TCM was achieved through collaboration with Tianjin 
University.  
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Figure 8.5: The key cooperation network of Xiuzheng Group 
Source: the website of Xiuzheng group. www.china-xiuzheng.com 
Note: the dashed arrows represent the co-founder of CCTCM (Changchun College of 
Traditional Chinese Medicine). The solid arrows denoted the current cooperative projects. 
NNU: Northeast Normal University; CCTCM: Changchun College of Traditional Chinese 
Medicine; SHDI: Shanghai drug institute 
As I pointed out in Chapter 6.1.3, acquisition is common for the large 
pharmaceutical manufacturers to get access to firm-specific strategic and competitive 
assets of the acquired companies such as new product portfolios, brands, research 
laboratories and technologies. The strategy was adopted as well by the leading Tonghua 
pharmaceutical companies after 2000. For example, in 2004, Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical 
Group acquired a biopharmaceutical company, Beijing Xinluowei Pharmaceutical 
Technology Ltd. which was a leading biopharmaceutical company in China, having a 
strong biopharmaceutical product portfolio. This acquisition was motivated to gain an 
entry into the biopharmaceutical market. It was reported that Xiuzheng Pharmaceutical 
Group would invest 450 million RMB to upgrade this acquired company into China's 
largest R&D base for the Modernization of Traditional Chinese Medicine in Beijing, 
jointly with other pharmaceutical manufacturers and research institutes. In addition, 
Xiuzheng Group introduced Korean ginseng processing technology and cooperated 
with ginseng processing enterprises in the Republic of Korea in 2005 in order to 
develop international markets, with a clear aim to make use of the advanced ginseng 
processing technology and marketing advantages of the Korean business partners. 
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Figure 8.6: R&D and large production bases of Xiuzheng Group 
8.6 Conclusions 
8.6.1 Tonghua’s Pharmaceutical Industry is a Low Technology Sector   
Different from the Western pharmaceutical clusters such as Cambridge 
Biopharmaceutical Cluster in which industrial growth is largely dependent on R&D-
based knowledge, the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector is still a low-technology cluster 
(see Chapter 5.3). Although R&D input data of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry is 
not available, the entire R&D input of Tonghua city (see table 8.4) tells us that Tonghua 
as a whole is not a research-intensive region, even in Jilin province. Now, the total 
R&D input in Tonghua is still very small, not to mention in the pharmaceutical 
industry.  
The Beijing xiuluowei company 
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Traditional Chinese Medicine R 
& D base in 2005, 
Nanchang 
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The Kuangxi pharmaceutical 
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expansion 
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Table 8.4: R&D inputs in Tonghua in 2003 
   No. Research institute  R&D personnel  R&Dexpenditure 
(Mil.RMB Yuan) 
Tonghua=A 4  4,08  107.83 
Jilin=B 107 139.54  12,102.72 
A/B*100% 3.74  2.92  0.89 
Source: Jilin Province Science and Technology Statistics Yearbook (2003) 
8.6.2 Technological Evolution and Firm Organizational Change  
It is theoretically argued that new start-ups are a source of path-breaking 
innovations and opening new submarkets (Klepper, 2001; Boschma and Wenting, 
2007). This is also true for the Tonghua case. But we should note that in the case of 
Tonghua a lot of “new” pharmaceutical enterprises was transformed from the SEOs but 
entrepreneurial spinoffs mainly occurred around 2000 and hitherto whose number has 
been very limited. This illustrates that the market mechanism in China is not well 
developed and still under construction. The variety in technology, especially in the 
transitional period (from 1985 to 2000) is highly related to the changing institutions and 
firm organizations. For example, during the early reform, the contracted firms, a 
market-oriented firm organization, emerged and then created businesses in niches 
markets (the ginseng-based invigorant in the midd-1980s) to which state-owned 
enterprises were initially more reluctant to enter. And once a niche market had been 
opened up, both new startups and established enterprises swarmed into the emerging 
sector, and the small niche market subsequently became a big industry.  
The technological transformation (from the chemicals-dominated industry to the 
ginseng products and then to TCM drugs) is not based on the dynamics of industrial 
technology itself, but on organizational innovations (for example, the emergence of 
contracted enterprises and transformed enterprises) and development of 
entrepreneurship. Considering that organizational innovation and the emergence of 
entrepreneurship coevolved with national and local institutions, we can say that the 
technological evolution is a result of coevolution of firm organization, institution and 
entrepreneurship. Thus, we can not well explain the evolution of technology in 
Tonghhua pharmaceutical enterprises without the coevolutionary approach. Now I will 
discuss this in more detail. 
8.6.3 Technological Evolution in Coevolutionary Perspective  
The evolution process of the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector went through three  
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main stages technologically: the coexistence of TCM and Western medicine (but 
chemicals-dominated industry), the ginseng-based invigorants, and TCM drugs. We can 
find that technology evolved with the changing national and local institutions and 
changing firm organization, as Figure 8.7 summaries.  
During the centrally planned economy period (1953-1978), the local government 
made more efforts to produce Western medicine, but local technological resources for 
manufacturing Western medicine were absent since those SOEs had to resort to the 
large enterprises outside Tonghua. At that time, it was easy for SOEs to get access to 
production technologies from domestic and local counterparts. The reasons for this are 
that intellectual property at that time in China was seen as a “free good”, and a patent 
system was absent until 1985. The SOEs which specialized in Western medicine during 
the planned economy have turned to the emerging sector of ginseng-based invigorants, 
partly because the local base of the chemical industry-specific knowledge was very 
week, partly because the rigid bureaucratic management system of state-owned 
enterprises resulted in a slower response to the changing market. The relatively slow 
and inflexible response to market consequentially led to relatively poor economic 
performance of clumsy state-owned enterprises, compared to that of emerging red cap 
enterprises with with hybrid ownership structures. But the hybrid firms outperformed 
SOEs because of flexible management and rapid response to the changing market. 
However, objectively speaking, the commercially unsuccessful chemicals sector has 
played an important role in transforming traditional dosage forms into the typical 
westernized dosage forms. 
The first generation of TCM factories was the seedbed for the sectors of ginseng 
based Chinese nutritional medicines and TCM drugs. Tonghua had historically been one 
of the TCM centres in North China. There were a large number of veteran pharmacists 
there and they carried the TCM sector- specific tacit knowledge to newly established 
enterprises after the foundation of PR China. Although some of the first generation 
TCM factories originated from those organizations that had no techological relation 
with pharmaceutical manufacturing, they were blessed with the social historical 
cohesion that can also be found in the Third Italy, and the extended family networks. 
For example, Meihekou No.1 Pharmaceutical Factory received regular professional 
guidance mostly from a local state-run pharmaceutical commerce organization, because 
almost all staff was family members of the employees of this pharmaceutical wholesale 
station.   
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2000 
Organized R&D 
 In-house labs 
 Contractual research 
 Access to the research capacity 
through acquisitions 
 Marketing experiences 
 Personal connection with 
research institutes formed 
Production technologies 
that transformed traditional 
dosage forms to modern 
ones 
Nutritional Medicines Based Ginseng  
 Organizational innovation 
 Redevelopment of Niche Market  
 Cooperation with research institutes 
 
TCM drugs
 Organizational innovation 
 Cooperative research with research institutes 
 Large scale- entry of university graduate 
High loyalty of local staff to 
this sector ensures the state 
market of labor force even 
during the transitional period 
TCM factories were 
the seedbed of ginseng 
prodution 
 
Chemicals-dominated industry but TCM 
existed as well; 
 Learning production technologies from 
outside, local knowledge transfer through 
“government- dominated staff mobility” 
 Short-term courses and “sending young 
staff to college” in the early 1980 
 Financial support  
 Relational platform  
 The advantage of markteting 
network and brands
1985  1992 
 Micro-management reform
 Commercialization of research 
results 
 New organization of contracted 
firm emerged 
 China’s economy grew  
 Increasing health awareness  
 Privatization of publicly 
owned enterprises 
 Increasing stronger 
intellectual protection 
 GMP in 1997 
 Pharmcity in 1995 
 The rising higher education
 Stricter regulation of TCM 
drugs 
 Increasing domestic market 
competition 
 The rise of biotechnology 
industry in China 
 No intellectual protection 
 The planned economy 
 State-owned or collective enterprises 
 Higher education was interrupted from 
1966 to 1976 
 Local state as industrial corporation  
Figure 8.7: Evolution of technology in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry  
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With regard to the mechanism of technology diffusion, relatively large local 
factories played the role of a bridge as they transferred the knowledge that they learned 
from extra-regional enterprises to intra-regional small or newly established ones. The 
local government-dominated staff mobility was an important knowledge transfer 
channel inside Tonghua. Technical and managerial personnel, even normal staff, flowed 
among state-run enterprises normally under the common jurisdiction. Although such 
personnel transfer among pharmaceutical plants was not based on employee requests, 
these non-voluntary transfers undoubtedly were helpful for technological diffusion 
among SOEs within this cluster.  
Entering the 1980s, two new learning mechanisms emerged, namely, short-term 
courses and “sending young staff to college”, which were of great significance to the 
subsequent industrial development. Firstly, both learning mechanisms trained technical 
and managerial personnel and thus promoted the management technologies of the 
whole pharmaceutical sector. Secondly, those who were sent to colleges and then 
received higher education were promoted to become enterprise cadres. Some of them 
played a bridge role linking pharmaceutical manufactering to research-intensive 
institutions and became private pharma-entrepreneurs later on.  
Although almost all startups established during the early 1980s began to shift to 
produce TCM, the market of TCM was still smaller at that time. In addition, the 
management system of SOEs was rigid. In the mid-1980s a new organizational form 
emerged, i.e. contracted firms, which is a typical form of hybrid firms in China with 
relatively higher autonomy compared to the state-owned enterprises due to the 
introduction of the factory director responsibility system (for the background of this 
institution, see Chapter 3.2.2; for the empirical evidence, see Chapter 6.2.2). Some 
contracted firms seized the opportunity of the emerging tonic market and successfully 
opened up the window of locational opportunity of the ginseng-based tonic market in 
the mid-1980s (see Chapter 7.3.1). The techniques of producing ginseng-based tonics 
are less complicated than chemical medicines and are consequently easier to be 
imitated. In addition, the enterprises that entered early this new sector enjoyed high 
profits and a favorable market environment with increasing demand. Therefore, more 
and more new startups and established enterprises, including the previous chemical 
medicine plants, joined in this emerging sector. 
During the period of the enlarged enterprise autonomy (from the mid-1980s to the 
end of 1980s), the management technologies, even of state-owned enterprises, were 
significantly promoted, because the operational autonomy was decentralized to factories 
and even their subunits (see Chapter 6.2.2). At the same time, the production  
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technologies were also improved since Tongue pharmaceutical enterprises at that time 
increased financial investments into the hardware building, especially introducing 
mechanized and automated production lines. For example, Jin’an Pharmaceutical Plant, 
a local large scale pharmaceutical enterprise, imported production equipments twice (a 
capsule filling machine in 1986 and an automatic double-deck tablet making machine in 
1987) from the Federal Republic of Germany.  
In traditional ginseng processing, ginseng usually was physically distorted and 
some active ingredients were partially lost, and its economic and medicinal value was 
thus reduced. But with the new production processes and techniques, the original shape 
of ginseng is well maintained and its active ingredients are better kept. The advantages 
in productivity and quality increased the economic value at least by 30 percent. It is 
necessary to point out that these advanced equipments could not necessarily ensure 
sustainable competitiveness of the enterprises, and the material form of technologies 
plays a positive role only in sound environments of socially shaped soft technologies. 
This is why the state-owned enterprises with advanced equipments were less 
competitive than contracted firms which did not have sound production equipments but 
adopted a more flexible management system. In other words, the soft technologies such 
as enterprise management are of more importance in the transitional economy than hard 
technologies like production technology.  
As the tonic sector grew radically, revenues and profit margins fell off. Some 
leading pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua began to shift to the TCM drugs that are 
actually able to treat and cure some diseases. The (re)development of the TCM industry 
during the ownership transformation was blessed with Tonghua’s long history of TCM, 
especially the long-term relationship of the local enterprises with the research institutes 
and universities formed in the second half of 1980s. Most of the “new” TCM drugs 
were not totally new in this sense that they were redeveloped from the old-age varieties 
through incremental innovation, not radical innovation, for example, the dosage form 
transformation, the changes in components, and the improvement of the quality. 
Although the redevelopment of age-old TCM formulas is not as complicated as that of 
new chemical synthesis of drugs, it is also involved with a great deal of technologies. 
As a result, Tonghua’s pharmaceutical enterprises began to foster cooperative 
relationships with pharmaceutical research institutes and universities in the early 1980s. 
In fact, both sides of pharmaceutical enterprises and knowledge institutions benefit a lot 
from the commerical cooperation. The reduction of R&D funding from the state forced 
scientists to search an alternative financial resource, and the commercialization of 
research results was encouraged by the state (see Chapter 8.3.2 and Chapter 3.2.3). For  
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the pharmaceutical enterprises, when the competition of ginseng-based TCM market 
became increasingly fierce in the late 1980s, pharmaceutical enterprises had to turn to 
scientific cooperation with universities and other knowledge institutions. Though 
cooperation during the 1980s was not frequent, it offered the important relational 
platform for the closer cooperation that enterperise and research community developed 
afterward. More specifically, the privatized enterprises during the early 1990s made full 
use of early formed personal connections with pharmaceutical scientists in public 
universities and research institutes to develop new drugs and improve the quality of 
existing drugs. That shows that the lasting personal connection contributed to 
transferring knowledge from research instutitions to the pharmaceutical industry.  
Entering the new Millennium, formal and organized R&D emerged in the 
Tonghua pharmaceutical sector, against the background that the Chinese government 
enforced stricter regulation on the TCM industry and the increasing market competition 
compelled enterprises to attach more importance to drug safety and effectiveness and 
even new drug development. Generally speaking, TCM drugs are relatively safe with 
low toxicity, but it doesn’t mean that TCM drugs have no toxicity at all. In order to 
ensure the safety of TCM drugs, the Chinese government stated in the end of the 1990s 
that the safety evaluation of TCM drugs should be performed in accordance with Good 
Laboratory Practice (GLP) standards. 
At the same time, some business groups emerged, such as Xiuzheng, Wantong, 
Dongbao, mostly through mergers and acquisitions. These groups became so financially 
powerful to build up formal in-house R&D departments, some of which are not located 
at Tonghua, but at the capital of Jilin province or Beijing. The R&D alliance strategy 
between enterprises and specialized R&D institutions became common in the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical sector. Through the field survey, I found that more new products were 
developed through contractual research or bought from their allied specialized R&D 
institutions, while in-house laboratories are engaged with process innovation for the 
improvement of product quality, rather than new drug development. 
In addition, we should note that although a few enterprises in Tonghua were 
involved in bio-pharmaceutical products, it is doubtful to say that the whole cluster will 
be transformed into a biotechnological cluster in the next decades. In fact, the rapid 
entry into the biopharmaceutical field is largely blessed with increased financial 
strength and social networks these entrepreneurs constructed before. To be specific, the 
dynamic industrial development since the mid-1980s was based on product extension 
and market expansion and process innovation, not on R&D-based knowledge, but the 
high-speed growth layd the solid ground for getting financial means for the mergers and  
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acquisitions of local and non-local enterprises, which not only expanded production 
capacity but also got access to research capacity. To sum up, the stronger and stronger 
financial base allowed a few Tonghua’s pharmaceutical enterprises to get R&D-based 
knowledge in other regions, which in turn further increased the competitive and 
comparative advantage of the cluster.  
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Chapter 9 The Evolution of Institutions in the Tonghua 
Pharmaceutical Industry 
In the previous three chapters, I have already investigated the evolutionary 
trajectories of firms, entrepreneurs, and technology, more or less in a separate way. In 
this chapter, I will turn to the remaining population — “institution”, and to examine 
evolution of institutions in the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry. Finally, I will go back 
to the main theoretical question, i.e. to develop of a coevolutionary explanation of the 
Tonghua pharmaceutical sector.  
9.1 A Multi-Scalar View on Institution  
From the previous chapters, we can see that Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry 
has developed into a nationally renowned industry and that various actors collaborated 
in this development process. This leads to important questions: who created or 
coordinated the collaboration, in what ways, and what was the role of institutions in 
creating this competitive sector in Tonghua. During this development process, both 
national and local institutions had an influence on Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry, 
but to a different degree and in different phases.  
In theory, institutions interplay at different scales; and as the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical enterprises grow, we could image that they will have more and more 
voices in higher level policy-making. In fact, the pharmaceutical entrepreneurs in 
Tonghua have already had some voice in policy- making, ont only at the local level but 
also at provincial one. However, the impact of Tonghua’s enterprises on higher-level 
institution making was very weak before 2000, in particular at the national level. 
Accordingly, Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry is not a good case for studying the 
bilateral scalar coevolution of bottom-up and top-down relationships, but only for 
looking at a one-sided scalar (top-down) relationship. 
So I will concentrate on the top-down way of the multi-scalar coevolution, by 
which higher-level institutions affect the evolution of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
industry. I will explain briefly which types of institutions were observed in this 
dissertation, and why local social capital and social connections should be seen as local 
informal institutions, before I start to examine their dynamic coevolutionary process.   
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9.2 A Top-down Approach to Institutional Evolution 
As mentioned above in Chapter 1.3.2, following North’s definition of an 
institution, I classify institutions into formal or informal forms. At the same time, I 
made a difference between local institutions and higher-level institutions. In the case of 
Tonghua, the city and counties are defined as the local levels, while the province and 
the state are seen as the higher levels. In the previous chapters, I have largely focused 
on the national level of institutions concerning changes of firm organization and 
entrepreneurship, technological innovation and registrations on drug and healthcare 
system as well and then I have examined the influences of these national institutions on 
the development of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry (see Table 9.1).  
Table 9.1: Mapping the chapters of national institutions 
Chapter 
 National  level 
National institution  influences on Tonghua 
Enterprise reform and ownership 
transformation  
Chapter 3.2.2 ;  
 
Chapter 6.2; Chapter 6.3; 
 Chapter 7.1.2,;Chapter 7.3 
Science and technology 
management system  
Chapter 3.2.3;  Chapter 8.3  Formal 
institutions  
Registrations on drug and 
healthcare system  
Chapter 3.2.4  Chapter 6.2.4 
Chapter 7.3.3;  
Informal 
institutions 
The public's attitude toward private 
ownership 
Chapter 3.2.1  Chapter 6.2.3; Chapter 
6.3.3 
Chapter 7.3; 
In the previous chapters, institutions at the national level were seen as external 
variables to the explanation of the dynamics of the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster. In 
this section, I will turn to the local institutions, including industrial policies, local social 
capital, and social connections. I view local institutions as endogenous variables. It is 
very important to note that the nation-level institutions can be changed by the lower-
lever actors, for example, when the local enterprises have ample strength, or join with 
other social spheres and other regions’ entrepreneurs. It is not surprising that the formal 
institutions for market transactions (e.g. commercial law) were weak and no one 
expects them to mature overnight. Thus the entrepreneurs made use of social networks 
to supplement the weakness of formal institutions. Hence, among several types of local 
institutions, I will concentrate on the role of social capital, and its Chinese form, in 
linking firms to technologies and formal institutions. At the same time, I willl take into 
account the role of national institutions in creating this local sector. The change in 
institutions in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical sector in the reform period is summarized in 
Table 9.2.  
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Table 9.2: The institutional changes in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical sector during the reform  
Table 9.2continued  
Institution  Describing The Main Contents  The Influence On Tonghua  Time 
Institution  Describing the main contents  The influence on Tonghua  Time 
Micro-enterprise 
management 
reform 
“Factory Directors Responsibility System” 
granted more autonomy to factories. Factories 
could produce more than the plan quota and sold 
the surplus to the market, and the extra profit was 
partly kept by factories.  
The reform allowed substantial scope for bargaining between individual 
enterprises and their supervisory agencies, which allowed enterprise leaders to 
establish a close relation with local government officials, which provided the 
relational platform for the following privatization stage. 
in the early 
1980s 
Business-
Government 
relationship 
Contract responsibility system  The “red cap” enterprises emerged, the new firm organization shifted to  ginseng-
based invigorants, which gradually opened up the window of tcm industry again.   in the late 
1980s 
 Fiscal 
decentralization 
The transfer of expenditure responsibilities and 
revenue assignments to lower levels of 
government; “eating from separate kitchens”, 
 
Local government agencies created own businesses as industrial corporations to 
ease  fiscal pressure  in the early 
1980s 
Bank reform  Four specialized banks  allowed to compete for 
deposits and loans 
Local governments assisted state-owned or collective enterprises in obtaining 
loans through local branches of state specialized banks  1984 
 Regulation  on 
TCM 
No patent protection 
No regulation on new drug test 
Easy to obtain business license 
Weak regulation pricing and quality inspection 
 
Shift to ginseng production, and gradually opening up of the window of locational 
opportunity of tcm industry. 
Continuing entrances of new tcm enterprises gradually intensified competition 
which led to decreasing and finally vanished monopoly profits so that firms shifted 
to tcm drugs in the end of 1980s 
in the early 
1980s 
Local industry 
policy 
Tonghua city formally claimed in 1985 for the 
first time that the pharmaceutical industry should 
be developed as the key industry 
A hotwave of new startups 
The first generation of Xiahai cards   
 
in 1985 
Social capital   Originated  in the planned economy, but was 
strengthened,   
As a main way to get necessary resources 
It contributed to the emergence of new hybrid firms  
  1980s  
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The objective of 
economic reform 
 The “Socialist Market Economy” as  a clear objective of the 
economic reform was formally endorsed by Beijing 
government  
 
The private economy was accepted by social members 
A huge increase of approximately 30 new start-ups in one year. 
1992 
Bank loan   Implementation of a  rigid loan policy,  
State specialized banks were transformed into State owned 
commercial banks, and rigid loan policy began to be carried 
out 
Minimized the local government’s influence on loan from banks 
Firm loans had to be reimbursed. 
It was very hard for ill-performing enterprises to get loans from 
banks, which accelerated  bankruptcies of loss-making 
enterprises  
after 
1995 
Financing   Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange  Dongbao Group became listed companies 
 
1990  
1991 
regulation  on  TCM  The preparation method and production process became 
patentable in 1993 
Good manufacturing practice in 1992,  
And good clinical practice in 1999  
 
All new pharmaceutical enterprises must meet the gmp 
standards at their start, which raised entry barriers for new 
entrants, and resulted in the stability of the number of 
pharmaceutical enterprises during this period. 
 
in the 
early 
1990s 
downsize the state 
sector 
The “grasping the large and letting the small go” policy gave 
local governments authority to restructure the firms, 
privatizing them, or shutting them down 
 
Local political elite (government officials) and economic elite 
(the state-owned enterprise leaders) became the largest 
beneficiaries in privatizing state-owned enterprises 
 
In 1997 
national innovation 
strategy 
“to build China as an innovation-oriented country” as a new 
national strategy 
New drug development 
Consolidated cooperation with universities and research 
institutes  
 
1999 
Local industrial policy  “ to build Tonghua as Pharmcity”   Improved infrastructure, new startups  
Xiahao cadres increased  
 
in 1995 
Social capital  Both political elite (government officials) and economic elite 
made use of relational advantage to “take over” state- owned 
enterprises, and Xiahai cadres became the bridge between 
government and private enterprises. 
Partially helpful to solve social problems such as   
underemployment, wage arrears, bankruptcies and lay-offs 
Helpful for the formation of formal institutions (e.g. Pharmcity 
strategy and encouraging cadres do business)  
 
In the 
late 
1990s  
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9.3 Social Capital, Guanxi Network as Local Institutions 
The concept of social capital began to be used in the 1960s, mainly in the work of 
Pierre Bourdieu (his first formulation appeared in Bourdieu, 1980, see Trigilia, 2001), a 
French sociologist,. In the late 1990s, the term became fashionable in various fields 
(Narayan and Woolcock, 1999, for a history of this concept, see Trigilia, 2001), 
including economic geography. However, this concept has been subject to a variety of 
interpretation (see Huang, 2003). Social capital is defined in some literatures as one of 
the capital forms, namely economic capital, cultural capital, and social capital (e.g. 
Robinson and Hanson, 1995; Bourdieu, 1986), being regarded as “the aggregate of the 
actual and potential resources that are linked to the possession of a durable network of 
relationship or mutual acquaintance and recognition” (Bourdieu, 1986, p: 248). In 
some other literatures, though, it is used as “the network of relations which binds 
individual and collective actors, and which can promote co-operation and trust but can 
also create obstacles to local development” (Coleman, 1988, p: 118). Furthermore, 
another reference is made to the capacity for co-operation, to trust (Portes, 1998; 
Montgomery, 2000), and therefore to a particular form of local culture (Cox, 1995). The 
different views of the concept of social capital have a common feature that the social 
relationships can potentially improve the efficiency of economic activities, but also 
possibly produce negative effects. In other words, trust and common cognition (e.g. the 
shared vision) that circulate by means of personal relationships might limit opportunism 
and facilitate economic co-operation (that might be termed a “collective action”) for a 
collective object, either private or public. But social capital or social networks, due to 
its function of preventing competition, might lead to collusion between actors and 
therefore discourage innovation in economic fields. The similar viewpoint was put 
forward by Granovetter (1985), Coleman (1990), and Portes (1998), and was also 
proven by economic geographers (e.g. Schamp, 2005; Hassink, 2007), although this 
concept has not been used in their case or theoretical studies. 
My motive here is not to make a systematic and theoretical discussion about social 
capital, but to examine its Chinese form. Chinese business is famous for its use of social 
networks in business transactions, it is not surprising that in researching China, social 
scientists have paid much attention to social guanxi or guanxi network (e.g. Yang, 1994; 
Tsang, 1998; Luo, 2000). The practice of Confucian ideology, coupled with common 
social norms, regulate the way Chinese individuals utilize guanxi (Standifird and  
  240
Marshall, 2000). Guanxi as a type of social capital network is a fundamental web of 
interpersonal relations permeating Chinese societies, and embedded in every aspect of 
Chinese social life. Chen and Chen (2004) assert that a close guanxi may provide more 
confidence for guanxi partners to utilize it for both expressive (affection and trust) and 
instrumental (business) purposes. Guanxi networks are flexible, efficient, available, and 
low in financial cost (Standifird and Marshall, 2000). 
Powerful social networks matter a great deal in the formation and development of 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry. Just like the Third Italy, the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical industry is historically a very small community with social cohesion. 
Before the mid-1990s, most participants were local residents. Those entrepreneurs and 
government officers who are now active in this sector were local residents, and most of 
them have lived there for their whole life. They tended to attach much importance to 
traditional loyalty based on regional origins. Owing to the long-term living together, 
and close workplace ties, participants are considerably loyal to colleagual networks and 
extended family and kinship networks.  
Networks of blood and kin played a special role in overcoming the absence and 
lack of supporting conditions, such as financial resources and venture capital during the 
transitional period. Because of the state monopoly on the financial sector, private start-
ups had very limited channels of raising capital. The vast majority of entrepreneurs in 
the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry raised funds from extended families and kinship 
networks when they prepared to run their own private entities. At the same time, the 
extended family networks served to relay important information, such as information 
about business opportunities. Furthermore, the venture partners during the start-up 
phase were chosen, firstly, from the extended family and kinship networks, and then 
from the colleagual networks. Even in today’s pharmaceutical business groups in 
Tonghua, some key positions are still occupied by family members.  
Though a colleagual network cannot be equivalent to an extended family network, 
it is active and useful. Because of weak formal institutions, for example, uncertain 
property rights, weaker intellectual property protection, strong colleagual networks, 
colleagual networks became a strategic mechanism to promote access to economic 
resources, reduce risk or disadvantages by cooperating and exchanging favors. Strong 
colleagual networks could deal with bureaucratic rigidities, material scarcities and 
personal political insecurities throughout the Communist period and so entrepreneurs 
were able to rapidly handle changing markets, transmuting institutions, and personal  
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economic insecurities in the post-Communist period (Wellman et al., 2002). Strong 
kinship and colleageship-based relational networks also allowed entrepreneurs in the 
Tonghua pharmaceutical industry to effectively reduce environmental uncertainty 
(especially in politics), lower transaction costs, and provide useable resources during 
the transitional period. This is why so many private pharmentrepreneurs in Tonghua are 
former state enterprise leaders and government officials who had closer colleagual 
networks with local leaders in various fields of this industrial community, and why the 
entrepreneurs invested so much in fostering and maintaining various relational 
networks.  
According to the functions of guanxi, we can classify Chinese guanxi forms into 
three types: The first one is production-related guanxi network (links to suppliers, 
product users, business partners, universities), the second one is environment-related 
(links to local political decision-makers); the third one is market-related (general 
customer relations built through marketing, trademarks, clubs).  
9.4 The Evolution of Local Institutions  
9.4.1 Institutions Prior to 1978 
The local government was the first driving force to the first generation of 
pharmaceutical enterprises. As illuminated in Chapter 6.2.1, the first generation of 
pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua mainly consisted of small state-owned or 
collective firms, which means that the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry in the 
traditional planned regime was monopolized by publicly owned enterprises, and all 
entry and exit decisions were made by local governments. The first and direct pusher of 
the emergence and growth of pharmaceutical plants in the early phase was local 
government, not central government, playing the role of financial investor and the 
ultimate decision maker concerning important events and the mobility of enterprise 
cadres. Additionally, local government provided the necessary social services to its 
employees and their families, including housing, healthcare, child care, and education, 
to name but a few. In some sense, the creation and development of local publicly owned 
enterprises were local major political- economic issues (Perotti, et al., 1999), and the 
management of those enterprises was part of a large governmental system. 
The enterprise cadres as representatives of local government managed enterprises 
in the traditional planned economy. Since economic performance of the enterprises  
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under their leadership was highly associated with their personal promotion, the state-
owned enterprise cadres usually sought financial and human resources in virtue of 
personal relationship (guanxi) with local government. This investment from local 
government fostered the close relation between local government and firms during the 
early stages of industrial development. This close collaboration between enterprises and 
local government, which originated in the planned economic period, has laid a 
relational platform for the formation of local social capital. I will explain this aspect 
later on.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9.1: Local interaction between government and firms 
Note: The solid-line arrow denotes a strong influence, while the dashed arrow represents a 
weak 
Due to being tightly constrained by the rigid planning economic system, the 
pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua developed relatively slowly before the 1980s, in 
terms of economic performance (see Figure.9.2). A huge economic success was 
achieved in the pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua after the micro-management 
institutional reforms. To be specific, since 1978, especially after the introduction of the 
contract responsibility system in Tonghua around 1988, Tonghua’s pharmaceutical 
industry had been growing. Industrial output, sales and profits in 1988 reached RMB 
544.6 million Yuan, RMB 338.34 million Yuan, RMB 76.43 million Yuan respectively. 
The industrial output value of the pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua accounted for 
33.9% of Tonghua’s gross industrial output value. This means that the pharmaceutical 
industry was a major pillar of the economy in Tonghua city since that time. Among its 
sub-regions, Tonghua County’s pharmaceutical industry was placed in the forefront, 
with the output value of RMB 113.307 million Yuan in 1988 representing 43% of the 
county's total industrial output value, RMB 264.144 million Yuan (Cao, 1999, p: 22).  
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Figure 9.2: The economic performance of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry (1960-1985) 
Source: Cao, 1989 
9.4.2 Institutional Change in the Early Reform Period  
Entering the 1980s, local governments in China were faced with financial 
pressure, so local government agencies set up businesses to ease their financial 
situation. At the same time, the regulation on the enterprise ownership became 
somewhat relaxed, and a new type of firm organization (contracted firms) emerged. 
These market-oriented firms had to invest in establishing social capital in order to 
compete with rivals (e.g. SOEs) for the necessary resources and market. Thus, the 
relation between firms and government in the early reform period was reinforced, 
which contributed to the formation of some local policies favorable to this growing 
industry (e.g. to develop the pharmaceutical industry as the key industry in 1985) and 
informal institutions. The coupled interaction was increasingly strong partially because 
the dramatically changing macro-institutional environments (for example, the national 
fiscal reform, the micro-enterprise management reform and the regulation on TCM 
market) produced the external driving force of strengthening their links. The closer 
relation was useful for both parties of local government and firms, which is the internal 
driving force. In other words, the change of the macro-institutional environment forced 
governments and firms to work together in order to cope with the new circumstances. 
Here, I will explain the formation process of local government-business relationship in 
the early reform period.  
Two influential events happened in the early 1980s. The first one was the fiscal 
decentralization and bank reform, which changed the way of enterprises’ financing. The 
introduction of a new fiscal policy (under the nickname of “eating from separate 
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kitchens”, fenzao chifan) altered the traditional central-local fiscal relations and 
motivate regional governments to develop the regional economy with greater 
enthusiasm. Under the old fiscal system, “unified revenue and unified expenditure” 
(tongshou tongzhi), all government revenues and expenditures were under the tight 
control of the central government (for a detail history of the fiscal decentralization, see 
Qian, 1999). However, the new fiscal system allowed the central-local sharing out of 
revenues to be fixed for several years in advance and earmarked the profits of local 
enterprises as local revenues (Shirk, 1993; Hubbard, 1995). Hence, fiscal 
decentralization granted sub-national governments more authorities and incentives to 
promote the local economy because regional government can retain part of the revenues 
they produced. In addition to the financing of enterprises, since 1984, the State Council 
allowed four specialized banks
50 to compete for deposits and loans in previously 
monopolized markets, so enterprises were allowed to open accounts in more than one 
bank. The economic performance of the branches of specialized banks was highly 
associated with the local economy in which they operated. So, the specialized banks 
were energetic to replace the government and provided loans to SOEs. At the same 
time, the local government executed more or less influence over banks’ credit decisions.  
The second influential event was that the scope of the administrative jurisdiction 
of the Tonghua prefecture was reduced in 1985, since Hunjiang City was separated out. 
The rest of the former Tonghua prefecture comprises today’s Tonghua city (see Figure 
5.1). The reduction of jurisdiction scope implies a significant reduction in local 
government revenues. Accordingly, the Tonghua government had to find other methods 
of gaining public economic income. The rapid growth in the TCM industry made it 
become a first choice. After the policy reforms and opening up in 1978, in particular 
after the implementation of the “micro-enterprise management reform” around 1984 in 
Tonghua (see Chapter 3), the pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua had developed rapidly 
in terms of new firm number and economic performance (see Figure.9.2 and Figure 
6.1). By the end of 1985, the number of pharmaceutical factories reached 18, employing 
6,590 persons, with a total output value of 149.93 million Yuan, and profits of 19.02 
million Yuan. In addition, the market of ginseng-based tonics boomed across China 
during the early 1980s. It is also worth of being noted that, in the 1980s, the Chinese 
                                                        
50 In China, the People's Bank of China (PBOC) served both as the central bank. There are four specialized banks: the 
Agricultural Bank of China (ABC) for the rural sector; the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for the 
industrial sector, the People's Construction Bank of China (PCBC) for long-term investment, and the Bank of China 
(BOC) for foreign exchange business.  
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central government began to implement weaker regulations on TCM which made it 
easier to obtain a business license. To a large extent, Tonghua’s success in 
pharmaceutical industry, especially in ginseng-based tonics, also attributed to the 
unique opportunities created by China’s weak regulation on the pharmaceutical market 
(beside the above mentioned license, pricing and quality inspection). A large number of 
TCM enterprises was established and then reaped monopoly profits. It is estimated that 
for these early entrants, the average rate of net profit on capital was 70 percent and the 
total rate of profit and tax per unit of capital was 40 percent. Continuing entry of new 
TCM enterprises gradually intensified competition which decreased profits. However, 
the huge profits in the early 1980s and early 1990s greatly contributed to the takeoff of 
TCM sector. Faced with a huge market and high returns, in addition to the increased 
fiscal pressure owing to the fiscal deconcentration, Tonghua city formally claimed in 
1985 that the pharmaceutical industry should be developed as the key industry. This 
industrial strategy was very early, compared to other TCM regions. The firm’s 
organizational forms and the factory management system changed in the early 1980s, 
which was highly connected with institutional changes on the national level. The 
changes of national institutions created an institutional space for the Tonghua 
government to open up the window of the ginseng-based TCM sector. In fact, the 
national institutional adjustments gave other TCM regions (at least in North-eastern 
China) an equal opportunity to revitalize the TCM sector, but merely a few regions 
including Tonghua city developed into the nation-wide famous TCM industry bases. 
The reason for this lays in local factors, in particular, in the continued local institutional 
innovation. The activation of local entrepreneurship, the construction of local industry-
specific social capital, and sustained innovation of local industry policy together 
contributed to the industrial success of the early phase, which allowed Tonghua city to 
gain a first-mover advantage.  
The “Factory Directors Responsibility System” allowed substantial scope for 
bargaining between individual enterprises and their supervisory agencies, in the setting 
of output and quality targets (Hubbard, 1995). But it is noteworthy to say that the 
enterprise leaders (factory directors) at that time bargained with local governments or 
supervisory agencies, not directly for themselves, but for the sake of the factories they 
were working in. In the following reform phase of privatization, entrepreneurs of 
contracted enterprises also bargained with the governments, but for their own benefits, 
which I will explain later on. I would like to say here that the early bargain and long- 
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term colleagueship with local governments made the enterprise leaders establish a close 
relation with local government officials, which provided the relational platform of their 
smooth taking over of those enterprises in the privatization stage.  
I focus on the early reform stage here. The “Contract Responsibility System” in 
the late 1980s not only increased factory director’s (or manager’s) autonomy over 
production and staffing, but also motivated staff by linking their income to negotiated 
performance targets (Byrd, 1991, p: 10-11). In short, the fiscal decentralization and 
reduced administrative jurisdiction placed much fiscal pressure on local governments 
and the local state thus had to create new rural enterprises or improve the firm’s 
economic performance. These were mainly needed to provide revenues for local public 
goods, such as schools, health care, utilities, price subsidies, urban development, etc. At 
the same time, the newly established enterprises could increase income and offered job 
opportunities for the families, relatives and local people (Byrd, 1990, p: 199). The 
introduction of the “Factory Directors Responsibility System” made factories reinforce 
communication and contacts with local government for enterprise’s interests, such as 
tax reduction. Here I will examine in detail why and how local government and 
pharmaceutical firms began to consolidate the long-lasting alliance between business 
and government, which nourished the growth of this local sector. 
This positive mutual interaction between individual enterprises and the local state 
has been favorable for both sides. On the one hand, the local state assisted to firm 
development not only through being involved with the creation of new firms, the 
management and disposal of firm assets, but also through gathering information, 
making connections with potential customers, pulling in production subcontracts and 
using its connections to acquire loans from national banks, and so on (Walder, 2003), as 
what some scholar termed “local state corporatism” (Lin, 1995; Oi, 1992) or “industrial 
firms”(Walder, 1995, 1998). The firm growth and industrial development should bring 
the above mentioned benefits to local governments (increased fiscal revenues and 
employ opportunities). On the other hand, because of the lack of universally applicable 
rules for allocating economic resources in China’ transition to a market economy, 
enterprises had to place a great deal of time and energy to bargain with local 
governments (Tidrick and Chen 1987, p: 198-9), mostly for gaining more resources and 
reductions of taxes. Nee (1992, p: 3) defined local corporatism as a “loosely coupled 
coalition between local government, financial institutions, and firms (collective and 
state owned) aimed at promoting market-oriented growth.” The business-government  
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alliance was a locally efficient solution to the problems of partial reform and weak 
market institutions, although it might have exacerbated overall inefficient resource 
allocation. In sum, the decentralization of enterprise management and fiscal authority 
forced individual enterprises and local government to go together and started the 
tradition of bargaining between both sides (Hubbard, 1995, p: 342). 
The “red cap” enterprises which emerged during the late 1980s and the early 
1990s consolidated this government-enterprise coalition. The “red cap” enterprises can 
be viewed as “safety nets”. They did business according to the market mechanisms, 
namely, they raised founding capital, and then sought raw materials, and most 
importantly, reacted not to the government’s order, but to the rise and fall of demand 
and prices in the market. They had to response to the changing environments in the 
transitional context, especially the moving national-scale institutions where the support 
of a well-specified structure of property rights and effective autonomy were absent. 
Therefore, they turned to personal ties (for example kinship, colleagueship and 
friendship) with local government officials rather than making legal contracts in order 
to ensure that the parties would fulfill the terms of transactions (Yang and Li, 2008), 
and avoid political or life risks. In addition, because the contract was mainly based on 
negotiations between contractors and supervisory agencies, the “red cap” entrepreneurs 
relied more on personal connection with government officials. At the same time, the 
economic improvement of loss-making enterprises could be helpful for supervisory 
agencies.  
The high profit in the TCM sector lured a number of entrants into the 
pharmaceutical industry. During the period of 1988 to 1992, the government agencies at 
the levels of counties, cities and districts established a great deal of pharmaceutical 
plants through joint and independent investment. This kind of semi-official enterprises 
became the bridge linking various government agencies to local pharmaceutical 
industry, and these agencies supported the development of this growing sector. A clear 
evidence is that due to direct interventions by government, a large quantity of loans 
from banks flowed into pharmaceutical enterprises, being used to start new enterprises 
and to expand the size of the old ones. Although most of these companies went 
bankrupt or were privatized in the following years, they were helpful to form the 
business-government collaboration in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry.  
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9.4.3 Institutional Change in the Late Reform Period  
The reform before the 1990s was “groping for stones to cross the river” (in Chinese, 
mozhe shit guohe), while the overall goal of the economic reform became clear step be 
step after Deng’s southern trip in the spring of 1992 (for this history, see Qian, 1999). 
“The Establishment of a Socialist Market Economic Structure” was finally adopted by 
the Third Plenum of the Fourteenth Party Congress in November 1993. The clear 
objective of the economic reform and formal endorsement of private economy greatly 
pushed the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry, and the number of pharmaceutical 
enterprises in Tonghua leaped from 27 in 1991 to 56 in 1992, with an increase of 
approximately 30 new start-ups in one year. The market–oriented economy and the 
business-friendly supporting institutions had been built up since 1994. Besides the 
unemployment insurance system for laid off workers, the capital-market oriented 
financial system was constructed. To be specific, the public fiscal system was moved to 
revenue transfers based on a fixed formula rather than bargaining, the Shanghai Stock 
Exchange and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange were established successively in 1990 and 
1991, and the public issue of “stock subscription cards” was a symbol of China's joint-
stock reform, after which the stock market grew up at an unprecedented speed.  
As regards regulation on the pharmaceutical market, the Chinese government 
relaxed the administrative regulation on pharmaceuticals production before the 1990s, 
when a large number of pharmaceutical plants were run without production licenses, 
and a mass of fake and shoddy drugs flooded into the market. The number of cases 
about fake and shoddy medicines increased continually, from 17,000 in 1992, 24,500 in 
1993, to 41,700 in 1994. In order to cope with the deteriorating pharmaceutical market, 
many attempts have been made since 1992, including the revised patent law in 1993. 
The revised patent law expanded the scope of protection, and biomedical products and 
the preparation method and production process became patentable.The standards of 
Good Manufacturing Practice (GMP) were introduced in 1992, and of Good Clinical 
Practice (GCP) in 1999 (see Chapter 3.2.4). According to the GMP policy, all new 
pharmaceutical enterprises must meet the GMP standards just at their start, which 
undoubtedly raised entry barriers and resulted in the stability of the number of 
pharmaceutical enterprises during this period. 
The national institutional environment was characterized by weak capital 
structures, ambiguous property rights, and high institutional uncertainty as well as  
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imperfect market information during this period. At the same time, local governments 
and firms further consolidated the long-lasting mutual coalition. Firstly and the most 
importantly, these “red cap” entrepreneurs increased their responsiveness and flexibility 
and seized the market opportunities of strong demand for the tonics during the period 
between 1980 and the 1990s, and the hybrid firms could not only provide economic 
benefits (e.g. taxes), but also nonfinancial needs for the state, maintaining full 
employment, and funding housing and social services for their employees. As a result, 
the creation of hybrid firms was encouraged by local governments. Secondly, the fiscal 
pressures on all levels of sub-national governments caused competition among regions 
across China. The faster the local industries grew, the faster local revenues would grow. 
As the regulation on bank loan relaxed in the early 1990s, especially from 1992 to 
1995, government officials pursued too much their “political achievements” and 
encouraged the firms to borrow a lot from banks. However, centralization of the 
operation of the central bank and the specialized bank reform minimized local 
government’s influence on bank loaning after 1995, meanwhile firm loans had to be 
reimbursed. Due to a substantive debt burden brought about by irrational investment, 
together with uncompetitive products and increasingly fierce market competition, a 
large number of SMEs came into financial crisis. Local officials had to search new 
methods to revitalize those poor-performing SMEs. Just at that time, the Beijing 
government encouraged the ill-managed SMEs to be privatized. Local party-state 
cadres and enterprise cadres took advantage of their closer relationship with local states 
to “take over” the poorly managed SMEs.  
Moreover, although the economic performance of SOEs had been improved more 
or less during the enterprise management reform, state-owned pharmaceutical factories 
in Tonghua as a whole were less competitive, as compared to their non state-owned 
pharmaceutical competitors (e.g. contracted firms or newly established private 
enterprises). A great number of small-sized SOEs suffered from losses and came to the 
verge of collapse entering the 1990s. Furthermore, these small-sized state-owned 
pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua could not get special protection from the central 
government, because they were actually on a list of “letting the small go”. As the 
economic reform processed, underemployment, wage arrears, bankruptcies and lay-offs 
in this local sector were becoming more common. Most workers in the SOEs were 
employed on contract terms and hence no longer entitled to the “iron rice bowl” 
protection during the experimental initiation of shareholding enterprises. As a result,  
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employment and social stability became the primary task for local governments. Under 
such circumstances, Tonghua’s government responsed to the Beijing government’s 
policy of privatizing SMEs and then encouraged private entrepreneurs, most of whom 
were the owners of contracted firms, to “take over” these enterprises, in order to 
provide more job opportunities for local residents.  
In addition, this region has suffered a considerable decline in most traditional 
industries, such as textiles, chemicals, machinery, and metallurgical industry, in terms 
of employment and economic output entering the early 1990s. It was high time for 
Tonghua to make a new strategic plan for the future economic and societal 
development. In the year of 1995, the local government proposed the grand and historic 
strategy of “To Construct the Pharmaceutical Industry City” (Pharmcity), which 
undoubtedly promoted the development of the pharmaceutical industry in Tonghua. 
This influential strategy could be regarded as a result of the long-lasting “government 
and pharmaceutical enterprises cooperation” during the new period. Benefiting from the 
ideological liberation and lured by expected high returns from this golden industry, 
some of the new small and medium-sized pharmaceutical companies were set up, 
meanwhile some Tongua pharmaceutical enterprises (especially ‘rep cap’ ones) started 
to restore economic vitality and gradually grew up. By 1994, the number of enterprises 
reached 47. The Tonghua pharmaceutical industry as a whole showed a stable growth 
trend. A group of economic and political elites (enterprise cadres and government 
cadres) also joined into the sunrise industry as private owners or senior professional 
managers in Tonghua city. They played an important role in forming local formal 
institutions such as the Pharmcity strategy and informal industry-specific institutions 
such as social networks (see Chapter 9.5). 
As a matter of fact, besides the pharmaceutical industry, some other newly 
developed industries grew significantly at that time as well, for example, the food and 
wine industries. But no industry had more party-state cadres than the pharmaceutical 
sector. Due to the day-to-day interaction between entrepreneurs, in addition to the rapid 
development of the pharmaceutical industry in terms of firm number and economic 
output, Tonghua city government attached more importance to the pharmaceutical 
industry, and formally made a great decision to build Tonghua into “the city of 
pharmaceutical industry” (Pharmcity) in 1995. This was the first slogan of building a 
Pharmcity in China. Similar strategic initiatives to establish (bio)pharmaceutical bases 
were launched by other regions in China after 2000. Given increased competition  
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among regional governments on economic revenues, the Tongua government increased 
investment in physical and skill infrastructures like transport, general educational 
institutions, technical and managerial training centers. These all together have greatly 
helped the industry to grow. To sum up, the strategy of building Pharmcity was the 
result of the longstanding interaction between local government and pharmaceutical 
enterprises, and this in turn consolidated the mutual coalition between both parties. A 
similar collaboration can be seen in other cases, for example, the BioCity of Turku, 
Turku, Finland (Höyssä et al., 2004). This shows that sound longstanding business-
government relations will be helpful for the gowth of industries, at least in the early 
phase of the industry life cycle.  
After the privatization stage, the Beijing government launched a new national 
strategy, “to build China as an innovation-driven nation”. A major element of its 
strategy is the building of an enterprise-based innovation system. China improved the 
enforcement of intellectual property rights protection to increase the propensity of firms 
to innovate. At the same time, Tonghua’s government changed significantly the role in 
promoting this emerging industrial cluster, from previous industrial investors in the 
planning economy and the coordinator of the privatization of state-owned enterprises in 
the transitional period, to the planner of industrial development and facilitator of 
innovation. Apart from the conventional measures that are often-seen in promoting an 
industrial cluster (for example, encouraging cooperation and dialogue between local 
actors including enterprises and local universities, between enterprises), the Tonghua 
government often invited a number of non-local university professors to Tonghua to 
offer professional training to SMEs both in technology and management. The attemps 
made by local government maintained to some extent the competitive advantage of 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry. 
9.5 The Role of Xiahai Cadres After 1995 
The Xiahai cadres were a very special group of political elites who previously 
worked in local government agencies, and afterward in the pharmaceutical industry as 
employees not private owners. Here we should note that Xiahai Cadres are different 
from government officals entrepreneurs I described in Chapter 7.2.3 and Chapter 7.3. 
These ex-government officals replaced the role of previous enterprise cadres who could 
move amongst spheres of government, state owned enterprise in the command economy 
(see Chapter 7.1.3) and then became a new “bridge” in the market-oriented economy  
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linking the local state to private pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua. This bridge 
contributed a lot to the formation of local institutions favorable to this sector. Thus, I 
will try to discuss how far and in what way this special group of former government 
officals promoted Tonghua’s pharmaceutical sector.  
9.5.1 Xiahai Cadres in the Tonghua Pharmaceutical Cluster 
The relatively successful transformation from a poor SOEs-dominated 
pharmaceutical economy to a highly competitive private one benefited a lot from and at 
the same time also strengthened the local mutual government-enterprise coalition. It is a 
commonly accepted viewpoint that the local government was the dominant actor who 
controlled to a great degree the process and ways of ownership reforms because of the 
absence of the universally applicable practices for privatizing SOEs in China. Without 
the local longstanding and sound collaboration between enterprises and government, 
Tonghua city would not have today’s social stability, not to mention the outstanding 
economic performance of its pharmaceutical sector. It was the business-government 
collusion that contributed to the local government’s taking timely and appropriate 
actions in the restructuring of state-owned enterprise and transforming into the private 
pharmaceutical economy. It was the Xiahai cadres that became a new “bridge” linking 
local governments and private firms and maintained and enforced the business-
government partnership in the Tonghua pharmaceutical community.  
Xiahai is a metaphor of jumping into the (commercial) sea
51 and means the 
phenomenon of people giving up their "iron rice bowl" jobs to start their own 
businesses or going to do business. Thus, Xiahai cadres refer to a special group of 
government cadres who quitted admirable jobs and “jumped into the commercial sea” 
(Xiahai). In the strict sense, Xiahai cadres consist of two spheres, one is the group of 
cadre entrepreneurs who have worked in government but now have their own 
pharmaceutical entities, and the other is the group of professional managers who were 
alsogovernment officials in the past but are now working in this growing cluster as 
senior managers, not as founders or owner. According to incomplete statistics from a 
relevant government agency in Tonghua city (the Organization Department of the CCP 
of Tonghua City Committee that is in charge of party-state cadres), a total of 141 
officials signed their government jobs off and went into business (Table 9.3). The 
statistics also show that 80 percent of these former officials joined in local private 
                                                        
51 In Chinese language, the commercial market was compared to the vast sea in which one had to swim or sink.  
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pharmaceutical firms. Although accurate data are not available, we have reason to 
believe that this number of Xiahai cadres is constantly expanding as this cluster 
develops. Now, a great deal of former local government officials, from the former 
mayor to general government employees, is presently engaged in pharmaceutical 
enterprises in Tonghua city. 
9.5.2 The Reasons of Government Officials Going into Business 
The early 1990s witnessed the mushrooming of administrative talent moving in 
Tonghua, which resulted partly from the Southern Cruise of Deng Xiaoping in 1992, 
which brought forth the famous declaration that “Development is the cardinal principle” 
(fazhan jiushi yingdaoli). Since then, China’s economic reform speeded up the 
ownership transformation. Sagacious government officials became aware of the coming 
of the golden era of China's unprecedented rapid economic development, and some far-
sighted officials in Tonghua left the government and swarmed into the private economy 
by setting up their own business or working in private enterprises as senior managers 
(see Chapter 7.3).  
Tonghua has encountered a rapid growth in the pharmaceutical industry after the 
historic strategy of building Pharmcity in 1995, bringing economic and social 
prosperity. From 1996 to 2000, the number of newly founded pharmaceutical 
companies jumped from 45 to 64. These new businesses required more human 
resources, in particular senior managerial personnel, and therefore provided large space 
for government officials to seek the second career success different from that in their 
previous political life. Consequently, most of the cadres going into business flooded 
into the high-return pharmaceutical industry. With the increase of the number of new 
start-ups and the expansion of existing enterprises, competition grew brutally and in 
turn required more administrative talents to join in the sector.  
Probably the human resources market was underdeveloped, Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical companies usually sought for senior employees with strong capability 
of coordination and management through personal relationships. Government officials 
are a group of social elites who have a higher level of education than local residents. 
Since the entrepreneurs and government officials have lived in the same place for a long 
time, a “small industrial community” full of trust was formed, and local entrepreneurs 
and party-state cadres have an in-depth understanding of each other. Therefore, 
pharmaceutical companies were more willing to hire those trustworthy government 
officials. The pharmaceutical industry in this mountainous area acquired a nationwide  
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reputation as one of the top pharmaceutical industry bases, which attracted a great deal 
of local government cadres to this sunrise industry. 
There are basically three subgroups of party-state cadres who are working in the 
pharmaceutical industry. Firstly, some party-state cadres realized that it is difficult to 
get further promotion in their political career (due to the age limit for a corresponding 
level position in China), and then went into “the commercial sea”. The proportion for 
this subgroup is only about 10% of the total. Secondly, the former officials who had not 
yet reached full retirement age (60 for men and 55 for women) retired in advance in the 
case of already having served for the government for 30 years. For example, Shudong 
Liu retired at his age of 54 in 1997, and then worked in Wantong Group as a senior 
manager, in charge of production site construction and logistics. This group accounts 
for 24 percent of the total of the Xiahai cadres. Finally, some officials were assigned by 
the local state to assist private enterprises as advanced managers. This subgroup 
accounts for 64% of the total. However, my field survey shows that most Xiahai 
officials and cadres are employed by private enterprises, while a small number of them 
are self-employed, namely, they established usually small-scale but independent private 
businesses, especially after the compulsive enforcement of GMP policy. This perhaps 
reflects that after the GMP policy, the pharmaceutical market was strictly regulated, 
market competition therefore became intensified and the entry barrier was increased 
within this local sector.  
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Table 9.3: Former government officials in business by July, 2003 
Pharmaceutical industry  Others    Industrial field 
About 80%  20%   
<35 35-55  ≥56  Age 
9（6.4%） 119（84.4%） 13（9.2%） 
High Middle  Low  Level of social duties in 
local government 
3（16.3%） 44（31.2%） 74（52.5%） 
Voluntary resign  Retirement in advance  After off-the-job  Form of moving 
16（11.3） 34  （24.1） 91（64.6） 
Source: the Organization Department of the CCP of Tonghua City Committee 
Note: One year later, by 2004, the number of Government Officials in business areas in Tonghua city 
increased to 195, with an increase of 8 at the divisional level and 66 at the sectional level. 
9.5.3 The Effect of Government Officials Going into Business 
Although this phenomenon of government cadres’ going to business was not 
unique to Tonghua and can also be observed in other places in China, the phenomenal 
quantity and density of Xiahai cadres were rarely seen in other pharmaceutical regions 
across China. In the transitional China, this phenomenon of a large number of 
government cadres’ Xiahai only happened in China’s coastal regions, the most active 
entrepreneurial areas in China. This seems to mean that the place hosting a great deal of 
former government cadres can be considered as an entrepreneurial area.  
Xiahai was epoch-making and had a far-reaching effect on the development of this 
pharmaceutical cluster. First of all, cadres’ going into business broke the traditional 
official-oriented values (guanbenwei) to some extent, which is helpful to nurture and 
cultivate an entrepreneurial culture that promotes social atmosphere friendly to private 
economy. Xiahai played an essential role in breaking the traditional Confucian thinking 
of official-cored values and in encourageing people to pursue material wealth. A 
remarkable evidence is that there were 13,596 party-state cadres in Tonghua at the start 
of the nineth five-year plan (1996-2000), while this number was reduced to 11,075 by 
2003, with a decrease of 18.54%. Some of these former officials engaged in the local 
pharmaceutical sector.  
Secondly, the former party-state cadres joining the pharmaceutical industry 
upgraded the management capability of the overall industry. For example, under the 
lead of Liu Licheng since 2001 (the former leader of the Tonghua City Planning 
Commission), Tonghua Golden-horse Company grew up from a heavily loss-making  
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enterprise to a local highly competitive one.  
Thirdly, these former government officials brought personal relationships 
accumulated over the years in the bureaucratic system of government to their present 
work units, which solved difficult problems the enterprises were faced with. It is very 
normal that those who were previously government officials are more likely to get 
access to bank loans and to secure an adequate production site, taxes, and fees than 
those without state employment backgrounds.  
Lastly, because this group of former government officials in Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical industry has had a strong and lasting colleagueship with the current 
local policy-makers, they had an unignorable impact on the formulation of local 
development policies. In fact, when the current government officials make some 
policies, they tend to consult these former government officials in the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical industry about how to further promote this sector.  
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Chapter 10 Conclusions 
In the previous four chapters (Chapter 6, 7, 8 and 9) I have examined the 
evolution of firm organization, entrepreneurship, technology and institution during the 
emergence of the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry in the context of Chinese transition. 
These observations demonstrate that we have difficulties in identifying the nature of the 
emergence of industrial clusters in transitional countries. Institutional fuzziness and 
diverse trajectories in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry during China’s transition limit 
the applicability of the existing theoretical and conceptual arguments in literatures on 
industrial clustering that are largely based on the reality of Western countries. What 
seems to be clear, however, is that those existing theoretical arguments do not fit 
China’s reality. Subsequently, I try to go back to the theoretical issues listed in Chapter 
1.2 and to draw a conclusion on the co-evolution of firm, technology and institution on 
the level of an industrial cluster.   
10.1 The Evolution of Tonghua’s Pharmaceutical Industry in 
Comparative Perspective 
From the observations I described in the previous four chapters, we can find that 
there are some differences in the formation mechanisms of industrial clustering between 
transitional countries of the former communist economy and mature capitalist countries 
such as North America and Western Europe. For the formation or emergence of 
industrial clusters in North America and Western Europe, a new technological 
breakthrough is mostly held responsible for the rise of ‘new growth’ regions, just as 
Detroit (the standardized car in the early 1900s), Santa Clara County/Silicon Valley (the 
semiconductors in the mid-1950s), Boston/Route 128 (the minicomputer in the early 
1980s) etc. In studying these Western industrial clusters, some factors associated with 
knowledge production and distribution and proliferation would be at the centre, for 
example, closer proximity to knowledge institutions, the presence of cutting-edge 
technology, and the mechanism of spin-off and so on. At the same time, geographical 
proximity enables potential favorable innovation, but not in the deterministic sense (for 
this point, see Boschma, 2006). Social factors and local institutions that nurture local 
friendly entrepreneurship and interaction between related actors were also emphasized, 
such as the local synergy or collective action between firms and the resulting collective 
efficiency, ‘club’ culture, etc.   
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It is also notable that the arguments based on the experience of industrial clusters 
in Western Europe and North America in which the technological life cycle has more 
importance cannot offer sound explanations for the formation of industrial clusters in 
transitional nations from a centrally planned system to a market system. In these 
transitional nations such as Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and China, 
huge fundamental institutional changes have a more powerful impact on the nation-
scale and local industrial evolution. This transition to a fundamentally different 
economic system gave rise to various changes, including the ownership, the 
redistribution of economic power between the different levels of governments, the 
entrepreneurship cultivation and the construction of market-supporting institutions. Of 
course, there is also a big difference inside transitional countries which I will explain in 
Chapter 10.2. Although China is also facing huge challenges, China has made great 
economic achievements in the short time span of 30 years after the implementation of 
the economic reform in 1978 (see Chapter 1.1). In the last three decades China has 
undergone a comprehensive political and economic transition from a socialist centrally 
planned to a market economy. Fundamental changes in the institutions and the 
economic structure have gradually created the pre-conditions for sustainable economic 
growth.  
The successful transformation of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry is reflected in 
China’s gradual integration into a market economy. The evolution of Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical industry has some remarkable features, as compared to its Western 
counterparts. The main feature is that Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry cluster is 
currently at an early, still immature stage, with a low level of R&D-based technology. 
The low capability of developing new drugs is connected to the past “production-
oriented” not “R&D oriented” S&T policy. On the contrary, the worldwide top (bio) 
pharmaceutical industries clusters are based on cutting-edge technology and knowledge 
which has been accumulated over a long time, and they always dominate the market in 
the global patented drugs. In the case of the TCM industry, China faces big challenges 
particularly from Japan and Korea. Accordingly, as far as the formation mechanism is 
concerned, the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster is different to a large extent from its 
foreign counterparts. In Western countries in which the environments of national 
fundamental institutions (e.g property rights and intellectual property) are well 
developed, technology is a first and major driving force of the development of an 
industrial cluster, but institutional innovation is of much more importance for China.  
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However, for the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector, the impetus is complicated and 
at least the following factors should be included. Firstly, institutional changes, including 
the ownership reform of SOEs, and fiscal decentralization, the financial institution 
reform (for example, bank loan policy adjustment and the formation of stock exchange), 
and local formal and informal institutions (for example, the Pharmcity strategy in 1995, 
the formation and consolidation of a local collaboration between government and 
firms); Secondly, technological advances (for a summary of the technological evolution 
in this local sector, see Chapter 8.6 and Figure 6.5), from imitation-based learning (in 
production technology) to new drug development, which was accompanied with the 
change in the science and technology management system and involvement of higher 
education institutions that provided well educated employees and did cooperative 
research with the industrial enterpries; Thirdly, the formation of local entrepreneurship 
(for a summary of the technological evolution in Tonghua case, see Chapter 7.4 and 
Table 7.3), which can not only be attributed to changes in nation-scale institutions (e.g, 
the private economy was accepted by China’s society, and the ownership reform), but 
also to changes in local social culture and social capital.  
From the above analysis, the most important factor that influences the evolution of 
an endogenous industrial cluster in transitional countries such as the Tonghua 
pharmaceutical industry is not technological change, at least not the most imporantly, 
but changes in fundamental national institutions such as the property rights system, and 
the resulting changes in informal institutions on the national level, for example, s social 
acceptance of of private private enterprises. Tonghua’s success in the pharmaceutical 
industry can be ascribed to the formation of local private entrepreneur-friendly 
institutions and cooperation between local government and pharmaceutical firms, both 
of which originated in the planned economy. The construction of these favorable factors 
is a time-consuming social process that required intensive participation of various social 
actors. From this aspect, we cannot easily understand the formation and evolution of a 
(endogenous) industrial cluster in transitional countries without a systematic social 
perspective. This means that when we study an industrial cluster in countries in 
transition from a former socialist towards a freer market economy (Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia), we should take seriously the changes in basic national institutions and the 
resulting changes in social ideology and attitude to private economy, rather than only 
technology. Of course, we have good reason to believe that when the national 
institutions will be well-established and transparent and property rights and intellectual  
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property rights can be well protected, technology will become an increasingly important 
factor in economic and social development. In fact, the economy of transitional 
countries, including China, has begun to rely more on technology rather than on the 
breakthrough of fundamental institutions. In the case of Tonghua or China’s TCM 
industry, I can imagine that how far Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry, like all TCM 
industrial clusters in China, will progress in future, will largely depend on its 
technological capability (and international market access; perhaps Africa and Asian 
countries could be the targeted regions of outward investment and marketing for 
China’s TCM enterprises). Considering that Tonghua city itselfy is not a knowledge-
intensive area, the further advance of its technological capability will perhaps be mainly 
based on “buy-in”, contract research, and mergers and acquisition as well, just as 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical giants have recently acquired new drug development 
technologies (see Chapter 8.5). 
10.2 Path Creation Based on Initial Conditions  
After having compared the driving forces of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry 
and its counterparts in Western countries in Chapter 10.1, I will tackle one of my 
theoretical questions, how far path dependence matters in creating new paths, based on 
the empirical evidence of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry. This question is related to 
a long-lasting and still ongoing debate: is it necessary or contingent for an industry to 
emerge in some region? The focuses of this debate are on constancy and change in 
creating new paths, and the force of social structure and initiatives of human agency 
therein.  
The difference inside transitional countries could be ascribed to the variance in 
their initial condition that originated at least in the planned economy. As the Tonghua 
case shows, the early conditions of this local sector have greatly influenced it’s 
subsequent trajectory. Here I will briefly summarize by what ways the early macro and 
local conditions previous to 1985 affected the evolution of this local sector (see Table 
10.1).  
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Table 10.1: The initial conditions and variety of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry 
  Initial Conditions Prior To 1985  Implication  Variety 
Firm    SOES enterprises  dominated 
industry; 
 all local enterprises were  governed 
by  local government 
  half of firms was collective in the 
form of ownership 
 the lower the government to which the enterprises were 
affiliated, the easier and earlier they were privatized 
 loss-making collective SOEs became the first generation of 
privatized enterprises (contracted firms) 
 the early relaxed regulation on ownership resulted in the 
organizational innovation and technological transformation 
which allowed Tonghua to have the first-mover advantage. 
  the hybrid firms  in the mid-
1980s 
  private firms in 1990s 
  business groups after 2000 
 
“Enterprise-
Government” 
Relation 
 factory directors as the 
representative of owners 
 local state as industrial corporate 
and welfare providers 
 personnel arrangements and 
production were  governed by   
local government 
 
  local government was directly involved in privatization 
  enterprise cadre and government officials  had considerable 
power and privileges in transforming public enterprises to 
private assets 
  mutual coalition between local government and firms  
  government role changed 
from direct investor or owners 
to facilitator  
  enterprise Cadre and govern 
officials became private   
entrepreneurs  
 
Technology    a long history of tcm  
 existence of Western medicine  
   a great number of local skilled 
workers 
  the  accumulated production technologies contributed to the 
shift into traditional dosage forms of Chinese medicine to the 
modern dosage forms of Western drugs in the post-socialist 
planned economy 
  some redeveloped ginseng products and TCM drugs were 
virtually based on the existing products 
  high loyalty of local workers allowed technologies to remain in 
Tonghua 
 chemical factories established 
in the planned economy fell off 
 ginseng-based invigorants in 
the  mid-1980s 
 TCM drug after 1990 
 formal organized R&D after 
2000  
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As regards the firm structure, the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector was dominated 
by small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) before 1985, about half of which was 
collective in their form of ownership. Not all of the pharmaceutical enterprises in 
Tonghua before 1985 were governed by China’s central government but some by local 
governments (see Chapter 6.1.3). As I pointed out in Chapter 6.1.3, the lower the 
government to which the enterprises were affiliated, the easier and earlier they were 
privatized. The relaxed regulation on ownership resulted in organizational innovation 
(for example, the hybrid were tolerated by local government) and finding a niche 
market (ginseng-based invigorants) which opened up the window of opportunity of the 
TCM sector in Tonghua. 
During the planned economy, local governments were responsible for local 
pharmaceutical factories as representatives of owners and regulators of the local 
economy, allocating inputs and outputs, providing welfare such as housing, healthcare 
for employees (see Chapter 6.3.1), issuing business licenses, coordinating development, 
resolving business disputes, and engaging in profit-tax policies (Qian, 2000). 
Particularly after the fiscal decentralization, local firms became a main source of local 
public fiscal revenues (see Chapter 6.3.2). There were 18 pharmaceutical enterprises in 
Tonghua by 1985, all of which were under the supervision of the county or city-level 
governments. This leads to a close relationship between enterprises and local 
government during the initial stage. Hence, I would like to argue that local “enterprise-
government” collaboration contributed a lot to the formation of the pharmaceutical 
industry in Tonghua, and has its origins in the planned economic period, and was 
consolidated in the process of building the Pharmcity which was launched in 1995 (see 
Chapter 7.3.2). This implies that the early “enterprise-government” relations played the 
role of a platform for the formation of social capital in the post-planned economy (see 
Chapter 9.4) 
In addition, the successful development of the Tonghua pharmaceutical industry, 
in particular, the entry into the ginseng tonic-based sector and the renewal of the old 
sector of TCM, is blessed with technologies which were accumulated before 1985. On 
the one hand, though the chemical factories established in the planned economy fell off 
and shifted to product TCM products, the production technologies they had 
accumulated contributed to the shift of traditional dosage forms in Chinese medicine to 
the modern dosage forms of Western drugs in the post-socialist planned economy (See 
Chapter 8.2 and Chapter 8.6); on the other hand, some redeveloped ginseng products 
and TCM drugs were virtually based on previously existing products.  
Accordingly, it is safe to say that the rise of this local industry did not start from  
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scratch, but is deeply rooted in local history. In other words, the emergence of so- called 
new industries is not an entirely accidental outcome because it is often triggered by 
existing practices and structures that provide challenges or opportunities, which is 
consistent with Boschma’s findings of a center of the British automobile industry, i.e. 
Coventry, Birmingham (Boschma, 2007). Different from the creation form of new 
industries (that could be termed “old industries give birth to new industries”; for 
example, the rise of the automobile industy in Coventry could be attributed to a long 
history of related industries like coach and cycle-making before, Boschma and Wenting, 
2007), the Tonghua case is about the re-creation of industries, namely, about how to 
reutilize pre-existing resources of industries or so-called historical legacy of industries 
in re-creating or redeveloping existing industries. This aspect is equally important for 
understanding the regional or local dynamics of new industries. 
However, a new industry does not automatically present itself in a region, as the 
rise of the Tonghua TCM cluster shows. A more interesting question arises here. In 
reality, many regions share some common initial conditions in the early development 
stage, but some of them finally outperform so far others. Even many regions in 
Changbai Mountain area, besides Tonghua, had similar starting conditions before the 
mid-1980s, in terms of a number of state-owned or collective TCM enterprises and a 
closer “business-government” relation. But why only Tonghua’s TCM sector grew up 
into the highest competitive industry, not others? Hence path creation is more important 
than initial conditions.  
It is these changes in multiple paths that drove transition forward and that 
ultimately determined the nature of the new system during the transitional period. The 
changes in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical sector can be summarized as follows (see Table 
10.2): (1) altered organizational dynamics, including the emergence of new 
organizational forms, for example, the emergence of contracted firms, private 
enterprises, and the resulting formation of private entrepreneurship; (2) dramatic 
changes in technologies, for example, ginseng-based products and redevelopment of 
TCM drugs; and (3) the formation of formal and informal institutions, for example, the 
initiative of Pharmcity launched in 1995, the going to business of government cadres 
which was encouraged by local government, and local social capital which coordinated 
interactions among firms, government, and knowledge-intensive organizations such as 
universities and research institutes. If these innovative actions would not have been 
carried out Tonghua would not have grown up as the first-class TCM industrial region 
in China. Accordingly, today’s success in the pharmaceutical economy is the result of 
the purposeful, deliberate and strategic human action (e.g. Schumpeterian innovation) 
on the base of existing resources or old paths. Clearly, institutional innovation and the  
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activation of local entrepreneurship are fundamental to the transition process, and as a 
result, they have been central to research on market transition. 
Hence, it is safe to state that the emergence of the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster 
cannot be completely attributed to initial conditions, which theoretically follows the 
traditional theory of David-Arthur’s path dependence, but can be considered as an 
artificial result of creating new paths based on old paths. As pointed out above, this 
debate on change and nonchange of the dynamics of an industrial cluster is associated 
to necessity and contingency in the formation of a particular industrial cluster, in 
particular, to constancy and change in creating new paths, and the force of social 
structure and initiatives of human agency. For this question, the concept of the Window 
of Locational Opportunity (WLO) could be especially noteworthy. This approach was 
firstly introduced by the Californian School of Economic Geography in the late 1980s 
(Scott and Storper, 1987; Storper and Walker, 1989, p: 75), and refined later by Ron 
Boschma and his colleagues (e.g.Boschma, 1997; Boschma and van der Knaap, 1999; 
Boschma and Lambooy, 1999, for a review on WLO, see Boschma, 2007). The WLO-
concept questions the widely accepted assumption that new industries start from scratch 
and then claims that the rise of new industries in space, though highly unpredictable, is 
not an entirely accidental outcome because it is often triggered by existing practices and 
structures that provide challenges or opportunities (Boschma, 1996, p: 12). More 
specifically, new industries have the capability to produce space for their own growth 
and development in places through creating new institutional structures. Once the new 
industry emerges somewhere, new supportive institutions come into being and, in turn, 
contribute to the increasing returns at that particular locality. The formation of new 
industries, on the one hand, is embedded in old socio-economic systems, and makes use 
of the existing generic resources, and, on the other hand, creates and develops specific 
and new resources to match the needs of the new industry (Boschma, 2007, p:45).  
Boschma and his colleagues find that some regions have a higher probability to 
develop new industries, when they diversify into new but related directions and build on 
generic resources present in the region (Boschma, 2007). This denotes that old 
industries can give birth to new industries because new industries could be created by 
entrepreneurs of related or supporting industries, so“regions with generic resources like 
related industries may be favourable places on which the growth dynamics of a new 
industry can take off.” (Boschma and Wenting 2007, p: 49). Different from Boschma’s 
study (2007), my case study on Tonghua is how to reinvigorate old industries in the 
transitional contexts, but the mechanism of reinvigorating old industries is similar to 
creating the new industries based old related industries. The Tonghua TCM sector, on 
the one hand, made full use of the existing systems of institution and technology, on the  
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other hand, created new institutional and technological systems. For example, the 
redcap enterprises appeared in the old ownership form of SOEs, but operated according 
to the laws of market economy. At the same time, the Tonghua pharmaceutical 
enterprises utilized well the material resouces including production sites and 
equipments and immaterial assets like technology accumulated before, and also 
continuously found new niche markets and developed new economic structures and 
local institutions. From this aspect, we must move away from a theory in which the 
emergence of an industrial cluster is seen as an automatic outcome of the existing 
path(s) at work, and move to one in which the formation of regional competiveness is a 
product of conscious collective actions.  
Arguably, it is somewhat doubtful whether it will make sense to derive general 
theoretical and policy implications for regional development from the case study of the 
Tonghua pharmaceutical industry, because Tonghua is a very special case in some 
aspects. Because of the context of China’s transition in which the institutions at the 
national level have much more influence on the evolution and development of local 
industries than in mature market economies, some finding are necessarily not universal, 
and can not be applicable to other contexts. Moreover, in a strict sense, no historical 
stories of economic success in one place could exactly recur in other places. As a result, 
the Western world cannot dirctly learn from the Tonghua case. However, this does not 
mean that it is impossible to get general theoretical and policy implications which will 
provide constructive lessons for other regions to cultivate local industries or maintain 
regional competitiveness. In fact, the “historical” perspective on path dependency will 
be useful in the Western world and everywhere else, because the historical heritage 
should or could be successfully used in the Western world as well when it comes to 
policy advice. Accordingly, policy-makers not only in the existing socialist countries 
such as Vietnam and North Korea, but also in Western developed countries and the 
former socialist countries can indirectly learn from the successful transformation of 
Tonghua’s pharmaceutical sector.  
In fact, even Western developed countries in which the basic social institutions 
were well formed are faced with many challenges as well, for example, the 
revitalization of old industrial regions and industrial restructuring. The regional 
industrial economy cannot only be pushed by creating new industries, but also by 
upgrading existing industries. Creating new industries from old industries would be the 
first choice to promote the regional economy, as the case of Coventry’s automobile 
industry shows in which the automobile industry originated from coach and cycle- 
making industry in the same place (Boschma and Wenting, 2007), while the Tonghua 
case illuminates how to develop regional economy by upgrading existing industries. In  
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recreating or redeveloping existing industries, regional policymakers need to develop a 
historical awareness in designing regional innovation policy. Specifically, because the 
creation of new ‘pathways’ for economic development depends considerably from a 
region’s previous economic structures and historical heritages, local development 
agencies should be actively aware of local existing strengths embedded in the local 
tangible assets (e.g, specialized infrastructure, machinery and equipments) and 
intangible assets (specialized labor pool, and technology), rather than creating things 
entirely new from scratch.  
10.3 Summary of the Coevolutionary Process in Tonghua’s 
Pharmaceutical Sector 
In Chapter 10.2, I discussed the constancy and change of the paths in the 
emergence of the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector, which can partially give an answer to 
the question “why an industry does necessarily emerge in some region, not others”. But 
there is still another unanswered question, namely, how did multiple paths work 
together and create a highly competitive industrial cluster. The main task of this section 
is to tackle this question, the main theoretical issue of my dissertation.    
As I have already stated, a co-evolutionary approach is useful for the understanding 
of the complex reality of the economy (see Chapter 2.2.4). But almost all the existing 
literature on industrial evolution from a coevolutionary lens is at the national level, not 
at the regional or local level, except for a paper of Lee and Saxenian (2008). 
Coevolution takes place at multiple levels, however (Lewin and Volberda, 1999; 
Volberda and Lewin, 2003; McKelvey, 1997, p: 360).  “Multiple-level” for economic 
geographers or regional economists could mean multiple geographical scales. Lee and 
Saxenian (2008), as almost geographers, consider the firm as the micro-level, the region 
(especially agglomerations, or industrial cluster) as the meso-level, and nation and 
globe as the macro-level. I see a competitive industrial cluster as a coevolutionary 
hotspot (see Chapter 2.4.4) in which the interaction of multiple populations produce 
positive effects. Since an industry consists of firms and an industry is subject to 
institutions, and technology, I placed institutions and technology into the spotlight in 
this coevolutionary framework for an understanding of the rise and leadership of 
industrial clusters. Here I try to summarize the coevolutionary process in Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical sector (see Table 10.2), based on the collected observations. 
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Contract research, through 
acquisitions 
Encouraged commercialization of research 
results 
Higher education: firstly, local courses 
provided; then non-local university graduate.  
Fiscal and administrative decentralization 
to lower government and firms 
No links to R&D 
Forced to labor mobility 
Interrupted higher education 
Business Group; 
Alliance  
New established 
enterprises: collective 
Chemicals-oriented industry  
But TCM existed as well 
Imitation, slight improvement of 
production technologies 
Institutions, local/national 
Before 1978 
   Micro-management reform
“Self-sufficiency” policy 
Technology Firm organization
SOEs  
Collective  
Informal institutions (guanxi) began to be 
gradually formed  
Pharmcity in 1995
1978-1985 
1885-1991 
1992-2000 
 
After 2000 
Imitation
Ginseing-based invigorants
New drug development 
Biological medicines  
Contracted firms 
Private firms 
More on TCM
The redevelopment of 
TCM existing New drugs 
through cooperation with 
research institutes  
 Stricter regulation of TCM drugs
  Large-scale privatization of SOEs 
Formal R&D departments 
Organizational R&D 
 
Local action and non-local 
collaboration 
Table 10.2: The coevolutionary process in Tonghua pharmaceutical industry 
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In the Maoist period, Tonghua’s pharmaceutical industry was characterized by the 
local government’s direct and intensive intervention, and relative small production 
units, as compared to the large-sized state-owned enterprises in metropolises. Although 
there were some TCM enterprises, the local state committed himself largely to the 
development of the chemical industry, as a response to the self-sufficiency policy of the 
Beijing central government. An evidence is that the local relatively large state-owned 
enterprises were primarily engaged in chemical pharmaceuticals. Meanwhile, there 
were no linkages between Tonghua’s pharmaceutical firms and the technological 
community at that time. The reason for this is that the R&D administrative system in 
China was like what Lieberthal (1992) described as ‘fragmented authoritarianism”, in 
which the manufacturing industry was seriously separated from knowledge production 
institutions. In the fragmented authoritarianism, public research institutes and 
universities were entirely dependent on the state in terms of financial sources and other 
inputs (for a detailed background of China’s science and technology system, see 
Chapter 3.2.3), while the main task of pharmaceutical firms in Tonghua was just to 
produce according to the government’s orders. Thus what the pharmaceutical factories 
in Tonghua searched for a technological improvement during the Maoist period was 
production technology, not the technology of developing new drugs. Further, the 
production technology was diffused through local government-dominated labor 
mobility among Tonghua’s pharmaceutical factories (see Chapter 8.2). Imitation of new 
products was dominant because the intellectual property protection system did not exist 
before the mid-1980s. 
Due to the introduction of the micro-enterprise management reform, Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical enterprises were transformed from a production orientation rather than 
customer-centric approach. More importantly, a new firm organization, contracted 
firms, emerged. They were more market-oriented and had more flexibility in product 
development. In order to survive, the established firms and contracted firms shifted to 
develop ginseng-based invigorants. High profits and enormous market opportunity 
attracted already established and new firms to this huge niche market, which gradually 
opened up the window of opportunity of the TCM industry. As more and more firms 
flooded into the sector of ginseng-based invigorants, the products became more and 
more homogeneous and quality had failed to keep pace with customer expectations, 
which lead to an intensified market competition. So some enterprises shifted to 
producing TCM drugs.   
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At the same time, the science and technology system changed as well, the old 
system of guaranteed annual appropriations from the state (which we might term 
“vertical channels”) was changed into a mutli-channel funding system, in which 
technical knowledge was considered more as a commodity and the flow of funds 
through “horizontal” channels was encouraged, especially between research institutes 
and manufacturing enterprises and between research institutes and local governments. 
The public research institutes began to compete for financial resources from 
manufacturing enterprsies by doing contract research and selling their research results. 
Hence, the first wave of cooperation between the enterprises and universities or/and 
pharmaceutical research institutes appeared in the second half of the 1980s, with the 
main purpose of improving the quality of existing medicines and (re)developing the 
ginseng-based TCM.  
From the above summary, we can find the changes of nation-scale institutions 
including the micro-management reform, the reform of the science and technology 
system, and fiscal and administrative decentralization to lower government and firms, 
and created a new potential opportunity for some areas to (re)develop new industries in 
the early 1980s. However, only a few areas could capure the potential development 
opportunity and then turn this possibility into reality, namely, a few of the TCM regions 
grew into higly competitive industrial clusters. The reason might lie in the local factors, 
i.e. local historic assets and deliberate joint efforts of various local actors. It was the 
new firm organization (contracted firms) that successfully opened up the window of 
ginseng-based TCM sector by making good use of the historically accumulated 
knowledge. Tonghua is the first place of producing ginseng-based tonics in large-scale, 
which let Tonghua have the first-mover advantage. The continuous innovation in 
technology and institution in the subsequent stages created and maintained the 
competitive advantages. 
During the privatisation period from 1992 to the end of the 1990s, most of the 
local pharmaceutical enterprises simply imitated some leading firms’ products, and 
sought low-risk and fast-return, without focusing on technological improvements. This 
is well consistent with some scholars’ statistical findings (for example Guthrie, 1997). 
There are some reasons that can account for this “interrupted” mutual coalition between 
pharmaceutical enterprises and knowledge institutions, especially at the early 
privatisation period. Firstly, although intellectual property rights were issued, the firms 
viewed product innovation as a high-risk and a low-profit strategy as well, because the  
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judicial enforcement of intellectual property rights protection was weak and social 
members did not accept intellectual property as private property, and thus product 
innovations were discouraged. Secondly, also related to the external environments, the 
newly emerging “red cap” enterprises and entrepreneurs preferred short-term and high-
profit projects rather than long-term new product development, due to the chaotic 
system of intellectual property rights. Last but not least, newly established or 
restructured enterprises and even SOEs did not have sufficient funds to engage in the 
(re)development of new drugs during the early transitional period. These newly 
established or restructured enterprises were relatively small and young and therefore 
had to seek fast-return. Meanwhile, the SOEs were suffering from poor economic 
performance brought about by the rigid management system, inflexible managing 
operation mechanism and laggardly response to the changing market, as well as 
competition from restructured or red-cap enterprises.  
But more interesting, the local public trainning system began to respond to the 
dynamic growth in the Tonghua pharmaceutical sector. As I described in Chapter 8.2.2, 
local advanced schools (a university and a vocational training school) started to offer 
full-time training courses in pharmaceutical technology, and marketing and enterprise 
management, and provided a large number of talented people for this rising cluster 
since the midd-1990s. Moreover, some local university professors in related fields did 
part-time jobs in or contract research with Tonghua’s pharmaceutical enterprises. 
After Deng Xiaoping's southern tour speech in 1992, the whole Chinese society 
accepted the private economy and created the private business-friendly environment, 
and after a short time, the Beijing central government began to encourage small-scale 
state-owned enterprises to be privatized. In Tonghua, the local government launched the 
initiative of Pharmcity in 1995, and then stimulated the government cadres to do 
business. We can see that the number of new startups sharply increased, on the one 
hand, and the existing state-owned pharmaceutical enterprises went into financial crisis, 
on the other hand. Some ill-operated enterprises were merged or acquired by private 
pharmaceutical giants, almostly in Tonghua.  
Since the TCM market became increasingly competitive and the awareness of 
intellectual property rights protection enhanced, in addition to the wide acceptance of 
the private economy by the whole society and the growing financial strength of 
enterprises, the pharmaceutical enterprises in Tonghua began to build formal in-house  
  271
laboratories, and rebuild relationships with knowledge institutions inside and beyond 
Jilin province after 2000. At the same time, acquisition is an often-seen way to get 
access to firm-specific strategic and competitive assets of the acquired companies such 
as new product portfolios, brands, research laboratories, and technologies (see Chapter 
8.5). Some mechanisms for linking firms, the technological community and government 
that Murmann (2003) observed in the case of the German synthetic dye industry (1857-
1914), including the exchange of personnel, and the formation of a sustaining 
commercial relation, joint lobbying, could be observed in the present Tonghua 
pharmaceutical sector as well. 
Although similar channels emerged in different places, the degree and the way by 
which these channels operated were different. Similar to knowledge industrial clusters 
both in the Western countries and in China, the leading scientists in the field of 
medicine and pharmaceuticals in Jilin province undertook or participated in some joint 
research projects with Tonghua’s pharmaceutical enterprises, the leading professionals 
trained excellent students, many of whom work today as scientists in in-house R&D 
departments of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical enterprises. But according to my field survey, 
there is no top scientist who resigned university and did a full time job in an enterprise. 
Thus, the access to top scientists of Tonghua’s pharmaceutical entrepreneurs is mainly 
established through their former students who work in their own companies or by other 
personal relations (in Chinese, guanxi). 
A more important cooperation between these two social spheres, together with 
governments, is to jointly lobby higher-level governments for favorable environments, 
including indirect benefits (encouraging the development of TCM industry) or direct 
advantages (e.g. tax treatment and financial support for R&D). The collective lobbying 
does not only bring about economic or financial benefits but, more far-reaching, 
improves the reputation of Tonghua as the promising Pharmcity in China, and, in turn, 
helps to coordinate the various actors, not only local, to jointly push forward Tonghua’s 
pharmaceutical industry.  
After 2000, the local government changed its function from the previous role of 
industrial investors to the planner of industrial development and the facilitator of 
innovation. Besides lobbying higher levels of government for preferential policies, the 
local government played a role as coordinator in creating interaction between 
knowledge institutions and the pharmaceutical sector, in particular with small and  
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middle sized enterprises (SMEs), to make up for a lack of local knowledge. For 
example, local government regularly invited university professors to Tonghua to offer 
various courses on technology and management.  
There are two meaningful points to be emphasized. The first one is that 
coevolution is not a fixed process, i.e. the intensity and effect of co-evolution is an 
important parameter for coevolution. The strong coevolution could lead to a strong 
dependence on each other, and could cause negative effects, as Grabher shows in the 
case of the Ruhr area (1993). But very weak coevolution implies that coevolutionary 
entities have very few interactions or have a one-way causal influence, in which it is 
very hard to produce positive innovation effects. As illuminated earlier, the Tonghua 
TCM industrial cluster went through an increasingly reinforcing interaction of firms 
and technology, firms and local institutions. I argue that the process of the emergence 
and growth of an industrial cluster is in essence a dynamic process of interactions 
between firms, technology and institution, from weak to strong co-evolution, just as the 
Tonghua case shows. The second is that coevolution is not a self-actualizing process, 
but one that is derived from collaborative adaptation among numerous interconnected 
and interdependent populations (of firms, institution, and technology), which is 
harmonized by human actors with innovative awareness (e.g. entrepreneurs and 
innovative governments).  
This leads to another question about coordination mechanisms, i.e., by whom and 
by what ways the changing firms, technology and institution are coordinated. In 
general, radical changes in national (or global) industrial environments (for example, 
the technology revolution in early industrialized countries such as Western European, 
and radical institutional changes in the Eastern European countries, the former Soviet 
Union, China. and today’s Vietnam) could create new development opportunities. 
However, whether one region can grasp these opportunities partially lies not only in its 
own existing capabilities, but also in learning capabilities and coordination capabilities. 
Coordination capability refers to the capability to coordinate various local and non-local 
development agencies. It works largely on the basis of communication, consensus 
building and collaboration among various actors (or interest groups). The coordination 
is both horizontal and vertical. When new industrial opportunities are available, the 
earlier the interest groups can take collective actions, the higher the possibility to gain a 
first mover advantage. Taking collective action can be often seen as a response to 
increasing market competition, namely, more and more regions enter into the niche  
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market. The way of coordination mechanisms which direct all collaborative efforts 
toward the realization of these opportunities is definitely industry-specific, space and 
time-specific. However, just as the Tonghua case shows, the role of the deliberate 
strategic innovation of entrepreneurs and government is indispensable in creating new 
paths. In addition, the dense and well developed social networks, e.g., a close 
government-enterprise relationship, mutual trust of the industrial community members 
and loyalty to the target industry play a primary role in leveraging resources within the 
industrial system.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: Formal Provincial Government Agency and University Interviews  
No:  Names of institutions  Interviewee’s description  Codes 
1.  Development Research Centre of 
Jinlin Provincial Government 
Senior Analyst, Industrial and regional 
Development 
G1 
2.  The Jilin Province Development 
and Reform Commission of 
Jinlin Provincial Government 
Vice Director, Department of Planning  G2 
3.  Jilin Provincial Science & 
Technology Department  
Vice Director, TCM  office   G3 
4.  Jilin Food and Drug 
Administration 
Vice Director, Department of Drug 
Registration  
G4 
5.  Jilin Academy of Social 
Sciences 
Advanced researcher, Institute of Soft Science  
Advanced research, Institute of Rural 
Development 
Advanced research, Institute of TCM Industry 
Development 
G5 
6.  Jilin university   Professor, School of Life Sciences  
Professor, Business School 
Professor, Center for Northeast Asian Studies 
U1 
7.  Northeast Normal University    Professor, School of Life Sciences 
Professor, Urban and Environmental  
Professor, Business School 
U2 
8.  Administrative Office of 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 
Tonghua City 
General Director 
 
G6 
9.  Department of Science 
Technology Tonghua City 
Vice General Director 
 
G7 
10.  Department of Science 
Technology 
Erdaojiang District 
Director G8 
11.   the Organization Department, 
 the CCP Tonghua City 
Committee 
Director, Executive Officer 
 
G9 
12.  Tonghua Normal University 
 
Professor, Pharmaceutical School  
Associate Professor, department of geography 
U3 
Note: G= Government agency; U= university   
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Appendix 2: Formal Local Companies Interviews in Tonghua 
No:  Names of 
institutions 
Chinese Names of 
interviewed 
institutions 
Interviewee’s description 
Interviewed 
firms’  
description 
1.  Xiuzheng   修正  Vice Director, The Office of Product 
Planning 
L 
2.  Xinghua   兴华 General  Manager   
3.  Weijing   卫京 Manager,  Human  Resources   
4.  Changcheng   长城 Manager,
 Marketing   
5.  Fangda   方大 Staff,
 The Office of General Manager  L 
6.  Wangtong   万通 Staff,
  The R&D
 Team  L 
7.  Maoxiang   茂祥  Head of The R&D
 Team  L 
8.  Tengda   腾达 General  Manager   
9.  Shenghe   盛和 Manager,  Marketing   
10.  Limin   利民 Vice  General  Manager   
11.  Feiyang   飞扬 Manager,  Human  Resources   
12.  Jiuming   久铭 Vice  General  Manager   
13.  Jinma   金马 Manager,  Marketing   
14.  Shenyuan   神源 Manager,
 Marketing   
15.  Zhenlin   振霖 Founder   
16.  Dongbao   东宝 Staff,
 The Office of the Chairman  L 
17.  Hongbao   鸿宝 General  Manager   
18.  Huaxia   华夏 Vice  General  Manager   
19.  Zhenguo   振国  Staff, The Office Of the Chairman  L 
20.  Hongtaomao   鸿淘茂 Vice  General  Manager   
21.  Yisheng   颐生 Vice  Manager   
22.  Huachen   华辰 Manager,  Marketing   
23.  Linhai   林海 Founder   
24.  Jurentang   巨人堂 Manager,  Marketing   
25.  Mintai   民泰 Vice  Manager   
26.  Yujin   玉金 Manager,  Marketing   
27.  Huinan Changlong   辉南长龙  Vice Manager, Product Developement    
28.  Tianyu   天宇 Vice  General  Manager   
29.  Huifa   辉发  Vice Manager, Product Developement   
30.  Shenhui   沈辉 Vice  General  Manager   
31.  Hongjiu   宏久 Vice  Manager   
32.  Meihekou Nuoshi  梅河口诺氏 Vice  General  Manager   
33.  Yongyuan   涌源 General  Manager   
34.  Hongxing   宏兴  Staff,  The Office Of the Chairman   
35.  Boxiang   博祥 Vice  General  Manager   
Note: “L” (large) represent that the corresponding enterprise is on the list of the top 10 
pharmaceutical enterprise in Tonghua by 2004 sale.  
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Appendix 3: Formal Non-local Companies Interviews in Changchun 
No:  Names of institutions  Interviewee’s description  Interviewed firms’  description 
1 
Changchun ChangSheng 
Gene Pharmaceutical Co., 
Ltd 
Vice General Manager, R&D 
Merged into a Tonghua 
pharmaceutical company 
(Maoxiang) 
2  Jilin Wangtong 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd 
Staff,
 The Office of the General 
Manager 
Merged into a Tonghua 
pharmaceutical company 
(Wangtong) 
3  Chuangchun Dongbao 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd  Manager, Human Resources 
Merged into a Tonghua 
pharmaceutical company 
(Dongbao) 
4  Natural pharmatech (JiLin 
China) Co., Ltd  Vice General Manager, R&D  its Founder and the chairman 
comes from Tonghua 
5  Jilin Bencaotang 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd  Manager, R&D  its Founder and the chairman 
comes from Tonghua 
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Appendix 4: Interview Designs 
Note: Questions were planned and interviews were conducted in Chinese, and translated 
in English in this dissertation. 
Fieldwork in Tonghua’s pharmaceutical cluster 
The semi-structured interviews were conducted for gathering information of the 
formation of the Tonghua pharmaceutical cluster. The questions were planned to cover 
the issues of the influence of the central and local policies on the growth of the firms in 
this local sector in different periods, the relationship between the cluster growth and the 
technological accumulation, and the key events which happened in the process of the 
firms development including technical innovation, firm organization, market and 
management innovations. 
The sample questions below are presented for the government agencies and firm 
managers respectively. These questions are given in generalized form, but were changed 
slightly according to different interviewees. 
Sample questions for the government agencies 
1. Changes in regulations on pharmaceutical industry 
  Have there been any adjustments of national regulation on the medical industry 
since 1980s? What kind of adjustments? 
  Did the implementation of GMP policy in 1997 influence the pharmaceutical sector 
a lot? How? 
2. Plans and strategies of pharmaceutical industry and their influences 
  In Jilin province or the Changbaishan Mountain Area, what policies related to 
pharmaceutical industry have been conducted since the 1950s? 
  Have Jilin got any favourable industrial policies from the ‘Northeast revitalization 
strategy’ conducted by the state in 2002? Did these policies facilitate the 
development of the pharmaceutical sector? Can you describe the role of these 
policies in promoting the status of pharmaceutical sector in detail? What are 
obstacles to further development?  
  How to lobby the central government for favourable industrial policies?  
  Which pharmaceutical enterprises in Jilin did get the important central investment, 
for example the Bond Project?  What projects?  
  Are there any firms in Tonghua that participate in the national research projects? 
How did the provincial government agency promote pharmaceutical enterprises in 
Jilin? 
  Have these firms improved their technological abilities and economic performance, 
such as developing patents and new products, promoting output values. 
3. Pharmaceutical innovation 
  What are the characteristics of the pharmaceutical innovation? What type of 
innovation is most important for the pharmaceutical industry? Technological 
innovation, institutional innovation, or the managing and organizational 
innovation? Examples?  
  What are the driving factors of innovations? How did the demand and market 
factors influence the innovations in pharmaceutical sector? Examples?  
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4. Local industry-support measures and other China’s TCM regions. 
  What industry-support measurements have been conducted by local authority? And 
what influences have they brought to the performances of local firms and the 
development of the pharmaceutical sector? 
  What are the situations of other TCM regions in China? What advantages and 
disadvantages does Tonghua have compared with them? What corresponding 
measures have the local government conducted?  
Sample questions for the firm managers 
1. The organization of firms 
  How did the ownership of the firm evolve? What was the ownership of this firm at 
the beginning? When did it transfer into a private one?  
  Is this firm a spin-off? If yes, from which parent company? Do you know other 
spinoffs?  
  Does the founder have any experiences in the medicinal field? What did he/she do 
before starting this business? What were the main financial sources of the startup?  
2. Production and technology 
  Have there been, during the last years, any more or less important changes of the 
product that the firm sells on the market?  
  How many patents or brands/labels have the firm applied for and got? What have 
the consequences been of the innovations that have been made?  
  How many technicians in the company? What are their experiences of receiving 
education and undertaking research programs in national and local levels?  From 
whom did these firms learn new production technologies? how to learn the 
technologies concerning the development of new drugs   
  How much money is given to R&D in average year? What is the proportion of it to 
the sales revenue? 
  Where is the core technology of your firm from? Internal research and 
development? Or getting from outside? If both, what is the proportion between 
them?  
  Will you transfer technologies to other organizations? In which forms? License? 
Technology shares? Or others?  
3. Financial situation 
  Where did you get external financial support when you started this firm? By what 
channels and how large of the proportion of the total startup capital? 
  Has this company invested to some projects? Are these projects local or outside 
Tonghua? Can you give me some reasons for investing in other areas? 
  Did the turnover, capital investments and other internal and external factors have 
influence on the development of the firm and the competitive environment? 
  Did you receive any direct financial support from the government? For example, 
capital, land, and so on?  
4. Information about other local firms 
  What kind of relationships between firms producing similar products? Are there  
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inter-firm competition for talents and market shares? 
  Do you participate in any industry associations or similar organizations? Do you 
often exchange information with other firms? 
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1960 
Liming 
(1968) 
2005  1992  2000  1985 
Liming 
Changyu 
Tonghua country  
factory (1967) 
Baishan
(1999) 
Mingtai
(2003)
Baishan 8 
(1987) 
Baishan 7 
(1987)  Yisheng 
(2000)
Baishan 4 
 (1987) 
Jurentang 
(2003)
Dongri (2000)
Shiyan 
(1991)
Xinyu 
 (1969) 
Qianjin (1968) 
Xinhua
(1997)
Tonghua city 
factory (1967) 
Xiuzhengg
 (2000) 
City pharmaceutical industry research institute 
(1992) 
Baishan 5
(1985) 
Dongbao
(1992)
Tianma  
(2000) Tonghua county raw 
medicine factory (1968) 
Baishan 3 
(1984) 
Linhai 
(1988) 
Linhai 
(1999) 
Tonghua 
Country 
 Hospital 
Baishan
(1967) 
Tablet 
workshop 
(88)
Yujin 
(1990)
Xinhua 
 (2000) 
Jinma 
(1993) 
Yayuan 
(1988) 
City 
biochemicals(1990)
Fengyang (2000)
Tonghua city  
factory 2 (1988)
Guruite 
(1996) 
Wangtong (1996) 
Jiuming 
(2003) 
Kai Wei 
(2003) 
Closed firm 
Exsting firm 
Contracted firm 
spinoff 
Ownership 
transformation 
Firm created by non-local residents 
Period (Ⅲ)  Period (￿)  Period (Ⅱ)  Period (Ⅳ) 
Appendix 5: Genealogy of Selected Pharmaceutical Enterprises in Tonghua 
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Appendix 6：University and Public Pharmaceutical Research Institutions in Jilin  
Institution  Founding Year  Location   Relative sub-departments and their information 
Jilin University  1946 Changchun  School  of  Pharmaceutical sciences was founded in 1998, currently with 113 professionals. 7 key 
laboratories at the above-provincial level;  
School of Life Sciences founded in 1960, have 70 staffs  
Northeast Normal University   1946  Changchun  The Department of Biology was founded in 1948, Currently; the School of Life Sciences has a faculty 
of 102 members. 
Jilin Institute of Chemical 
Technology  
1958 Changchun  Pharmaceutical  Engineering began to enrol in 2000, preparation in 2005  
Changchun Normal College  1958  Changchun  Life Science Institute was formally established in 2005, integrating the different teaching units, with a 
total staff of 39 people in 4 sections like molecular biology teaching and research  
Changchun College of 
Medicine 
1936 Changchun  Pharmacy  department has 24 teachers  
Jilin Agricultural 
University(1948) 
1948  Jilin  Chinese herbal medicine plant  
Jilin Medicine Colleg  1952  Jilin  In this college about a total of 150 staffs relative directly or indirectly to pharmaceutical science 
Tonghua Normal College   1958  Tonghua  Department of Pharmaceutical and Food Science has about 30 staffs  
Yanbian University  1949  Yanji  Department of Pharmaceutical sciences was traced to 1976 and established Yanbian medicine research 
centre, with current staffs of 41  
Department of Chinese Medicine was founded in 2005, with a total staff of 23 
Jilin Normal University  1958  Siping  School of Life Sciences founded in 1983，40 full-time professionals 
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Appendix 7: List of the pharmaceutical factories established before 1985 in Tonghua 
Name  Foundation 
year 
Original 
ownership  Parent institutions  Current   Industrial field 
City Pharmaceutical Factory  1958  State-owned  traditional Chinese medicine stores  Acquired by Xiuzheng Group  TCM 
Liuhe County Chuangqing 
Pharmaceutical Factory  1966  Collective  a garrison (2682 army) 
Privatized, Changqing 
Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd 
 
TCM 
Tonghua County 
Pharmaceutical Factory 
 
1967  State-owned  Tonghua county hospital 
Privatized,  
Tonghua Baishan Pharmaceutical 
Co., Ltd 
WM 
City Qianjin Pharmaceutical 
Factory  1968 Collective  pharmaceutical workshop and Tonghua City 
Comprehensive Chemical Plant 
Privatized,  
Xinghua  Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd 
WM 
Meihekou No.1  
Pharmaceutical Factory  1969  State-owned  a TCM store in Shancheng Town  Acquired by Fangda  Group  TCM 
Meihekou Sanhong 
Pharmaceutical  Factory  1968 Collective  Third branch of Logistics deparment of 
Shenyang Military Command 
Acquired by Jilin Pharmaceutical 
Group  
 
WM 
Liming Pharmaceutical  
Factory  1968 Collective  PLA  206  Hospital 
Privatized,  
Liming Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd 
WM 
Xinyu Pharmaceutical  
Factory  1969  Collective  a garrison (2682 army)  Acquired by Dongbao Group  WM 
Tonghua County Raw 
Medicine Factory 
Continued to Appendix 7 
 
1969  State-owned  Tonghua county medical bureau 
Privatized,  
Jinhui  Pharmaceutical Co., Ltd 
WM before 1973 
TM,after1973 
Name  Foundation 
year 
Original 
ownership  Parent institutions  Current   Industrial field  
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Longgangshan Pharmaceutical  
Factory  1968  State-owned  a garrison (93038army)  
Privatized,  
Zhongchen Pharmaceutical Co., 
Ltd. 
WM 
Baishan No.2 Pharmaceutical 
Factory  1970  State-owned  Tonghua City health school  Acquired by  Dongbao Group  WM 
Jian County Pharmaceutical 
Factory  1972 State-owned 
Jian County Light Industry Bureau 
 
Privatized,  
Ji’an Group 
WM 
Meihekou Pharmaceutical 
Factory  1971  Collective  Meihekou Medicine Station 
Acquired by  Maoxiang  
Group 
TCM 
Huinan County Ginseng &  
Deer Pharmaceutical Factory  1982 State-owned  deer  raising  factory 
Privatized,  Tiantai 
 
TCM 
Liuhe County Chinese 
Medicine Factory  1980 State-owned 
Liuhe  County 
Agricultural Bureau 
Privatized 
 
TCM 
Changcheng  Pharmaceutical 
Factory  1984 State-owned  local  garrison 
Privatized,   
Changcheng   Pharmaceutical  
Co., Ltd. 
TCM 
Baishan No.5 Pharmaceutical 
Factory  1985  Collective  Tonghua County Light Industry Bureau 
Developed into Dongbao  Group 
 
TCM 
Meihekou Shanbao 
Pharmaceutical Factory  1985 Collective  Third branch of Logistics deparment of 
Shenyang Military Command  Closed   TCM 
Note: the firm name changed in the planned economy  County Baishan Pharmaceutical Factory,  Baishan No.4 Pharmaceutical Factory, Baishan No.3 
Pharmaceutical Factory; 
TCM= traditional Chinese medicine 
WM=Western medicine  
 
 